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ABSTRACT 
This work investigates the nature of transcendental subjectivity, and whether and how 
the subject can endeavour to know and attest to its absolute foundation with its essential 
structures.  Towards this end, I take up the respective transcendental projects of Edmund 
Husserl and Michel Henry.  I argue that while Henry’s identification of transcendental 
subjectivity with the bodily life of the subject helps further our understanding of these 
matters as initially laid out in Husserl, his position requires revision, as it points toward, 
but fails to sufficiently develop, the finite (intentional) and destructive character of the 
phenomenological life of the living individual.  Accordingly, I contend that transcenden-
tal subjectivity can be understood neither as an absolute consciousness (Husserl), nor as 
a divine, a-cosmic flesh (Henry), but must be acknowledged as nothing other than the 
finite, embodied person in her ineluctable bond with the world, one which harbours both 
life and death drives.  In light of this finding, I suggest that the living subject can most 
fully come to know and attest to the foundation of her being not only through the prac-
tice of phenomenology, but through other forms of culture such as art, ethics and sci-
ence as well. 
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This study investigates the nature of transcendental subjectivity, and whether and how 
the subject can come to know and attest to its absolute foundation with its essential 
structures.  It will do this by taking up the respective transcendental projects of Edmund 
Husserl (1859-1938) and Michel Henry (1922-2002).  Both of these figures stand out in 
the history of phenomenology for their radical claim that the ultimate foundation of 
transcendental subjectivity can, in some way, be given absolutely, and that it is therefore 
possible to establish an absolute knowledge of all experience. 
 Husserl contends that it is principally the phenomenological method that unlocks 
the transcendental dimension, and which allows the subject to attest to the innermost 
nature of the transcendental ego (i.e. who or what it is and how it functions).  In his 
view, the history of philosophy has thus far failed to attain true and lasting knowledge 
of the absolute origin and beginning of all givenness and knowledge owing to its hidden 
assumptions and prejudices, in particular the unquestioned assumption contained in 
what Husserl called ‘the general thesis of the natural attitude’.   In this attitude, in per1 -
ception I take the world of things to be ‘simply there’ (vorhanden), whether my atten-
tion is directed towards them or not.  Thus, in this natural attitude, the transcendental 
source of the intelligibility of our experiences in human consciousness is overlooked.  If 
phenomenology is to obtain systematic absoluteness — i.e. clarity concerning the essen-
tial features or essence of the world as presented to our actual experiences — then it 
needs to free itself from such naïve realism and its supporting suppositions and biases, 
which have remained unquestioned since the evolution of philosophy itself down 
 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. 1
First Book: General introduction to pure phenomenology, trans. by Fred Kersten (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1983), p. 51.  Henceforth, abbreviated as Ideas I.
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through the millennia.  In order to attain true knowledge of this source, therefore, 
Husserl believes that phenomenology must first attain a certain historical absoluteness;  2
that is to say, it must free itself from these wayward philosophical traditions, their im-
plicit assumptions and prejudices, and establish itself as a radically new philosophy of 
human consciousness itself with a new method.  
 According to Husserl, it is the transcendental reduction that clears the way for 
this radically new form of philosophy, and the eidetic reduction that renders philosophy 
as a rigorous science.  In brief, by performing both reductions, it is said that the phe-
nomenologist attains an unbiased, presuppositionless position from which she can re-
flectively elucidate the essential, universal structures of the world.  In doing so, Husserl 
is led back to transcendental subjectivity, which he equates with absolute consciousness, 
as the a priori foundation of the meaningfulness of all life and being (i.e. 
intelligibility).   In claiming that the way in which we know all objects has to do with a 3
priori relations between our human subjectivity and the world (i.e. knowable objectivi-
ty), Husserl’s philosophy assumes a transcendental register in the vein of Immanuel 
 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. by Dorion Cairns 2
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 6.
 Some contemporary scholars, such as James Mensch, query whether Husserl did not begin to question 3
this position in his later work.  See James Mensch, Husserl’s Account of our Consciousness of Time (Wis-
consin: Marquette University Press, 2010), pp. 220, 245.  Such scholars tend to focus on Husserl’s late, 
unpublished manuscripts as evidence for this view.  However, it should be noted that, although these late 
works display a greater attentiveness to the role of the body in the constitution of the world, Husserl him-
self never explicitly asserts that the transcendental ego is embodied through and through.  Additionally, as 
is well-known, Husserl would often undertake these research manuscripts as a way of exploring a particu-
lar theme from a variety of positions and assessing their merits and shortcomings.  These manuscripts did 
not, therefore, always reflect his own philosophical position at the time.  As a result, one must proceed 
with caution in the interpretation of these manuscripts.  More generally, let us join Brian Elliott in ac-
knowledging that, indeed, a ‘new “radical orthodoxy”’ appears to have settled in amongst certain contem-
porary Husserl scholars (e.g. Dan Zahavi and Natalie Depraz), whereby the insights gleaned from more 
recent thinkers such as Heidegger, Levinas and Henry, are taken and retroactively assigned to none other 
than Husserl himself.  Brian Elliott, Phenomenology and Imagination in Husserl and Heidegger (London: 
Routledge, 2005), p. 136, note 3; Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity: Central Topics in Phenome-
nology, ed. by Dan Zahavi (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998).  Though one may appreciate the positions that 
emerge from these figures as novel and important insights in their own right, as readings of Husserl, they 
can leave much to be desired.  Our work here, while drawing on some of Husserl’s late manuscripts when 
they supplement his views, will focus on elucidating and critically examining Husserl’s own philosophi-
cal positions.
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Kant.  Kant similarly maintained that transcendental philosophy has to do with cogni-
tion ‘which is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our a priori concepts 
of objects in general’.   That is to say, for Kant, transcendental philosophy has to do 4
with the concepts that function as the conditions that make possible the cognition of ob-
jects.   
 What distinguishes Husserl’s transcendental philosophy from Kant’s, however, 
is his contention that the foundation of transcendental subjectivity can be given abso-
lutely.  As Lilian Alweiss notes, both Kant and Husserl locate the ultimate source that 
makes possible the appearing of appearances in a primal impression — i.e. the tran-
scendental object = X in Kant, and sensuous data in Husserl — which functions as a 
correlate of transcendental consciousness.   For both, this impression serves to ‘animate 5
and structure [i.e. constitute] the appearing’.   While for Kant this ultimate source is a 6
logical beginning, in the sense of something that ‘needs to be thought yet cannot be 
manifested’, Husserl’s phenomenology takes a bold step and maintains that it can and 
must be revealed.   Thus, as Alweiss correctly concludes, ‘Husserl’s crucial departure 7
from Kant is his attempt to make manifest transcendental consciousness’.   Husserl’s 8
phenomenology claims to manifest ‘that which [Kant’s] critical philosophy posits’.  9
The absolute beginning that Husserl seeks is, therefore, not a merely intelligible one, 
but one that he believes can be given absolutely.   
 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: 4
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 133.
 Lilian Alweiss, The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl (Athens: Ohio 5
University Press, 2003), pp. 46, 51; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 347-348.
 Alweiss, The World Unclaimed, p. 48.6
 Ibid., p. 50.7
 Ibid., p. 58.8
 Ibid., p. 56.9
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 Furthermore, since phenomenology endeavours to attain genuine insight into the 
foundation of all forms of knowledge, Husserl acknowledges that a truly rigorous phe-
nomenology must provide an account of its own methodology.  As he stipulates as early 
as Ideas I,  
phenomenology, by virtue of its essence, must claim to be ‘first’ philosophy and 
to offer the means for carrying out every possible critique of reason; therefore, it 
demands the most perfect freedom from presuppositions and, concerning itself, an 
absolute reflective insight.  It is of its own essence to realize the most perfect clar-
ity concerning its own essence and therefore also concerning the principles of its 
method.  10
In order to function as first philosophy, then, phenomenology, as Husserl understands it, 
must attain an ‘absolute reflective insight’ regarding the basic principles of its own 
method.   To serve as first philosophy, a truly rigorous phenomenology must not only 11
thematise the inner nature of transcendental subjectivity and its essential features, but 
the methodological procedures that have been used to arrive at such findings as well. 
Husserl must, therefore, provide a coherent and compelling account of the details of his 
procedure.  He must, for example, provide an account of the motivation that is responsi-
ble for bringing the subject to undertake this transcendental reduction and, of no less 
importance, explain who or what this transcendental ego really is, how it relates to the 
empirical ego, and how we should understand its constitutive ‘accomplishments’ (Leis-
tungen) at its most basic levels.  Only once this has been done may phenomenology be 
said to attain an absolute knowledge of the final and true absolute of all life and being.   
 The fundamental question that remains is whether Husserl’s phenomenology is 
in fact able to reflectively elucidate the innermost nature of transcendental subjectivity, 
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 148.10
 In this, Husserl informs us that he is following his mentor, Franz Brentano, and his appeal to ‘intuition’ 11
as the basis of the latter’s ‘new descriptive science’ of consciousness, which Husserl first encountered 
whilst attending his lectures on ‘descriptive psychology’ at Vienna University from 1884-1886.  See Ed-
mund Husserl, ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’, trans. and ed. by Linda L. McAlister, in The Philoso-
phy of Brentano (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 47–55.
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as well as the procedures it has followed along the way.  Is Husserl’s reflective method-
ology able to seize upon the innermost depths of the transcendental ego? Does it suffi-
ciently elucidate exactly who or what this transcendental ego is and how we should un-
derstand its most basic constitutive accomplishments?  
 According to French phenomenologist Michel Henry, Husserl’s intentional phe-
nomenology, as well as much of the history of Western thought, has failed to provide an 
adequate account of the inner nature of transcendental subjectivity and how it functions. 
On account of this, Henry believes they have failed to appreciate the way in which the 
ultimate foundation of transcendental subjectivity is in fact given absolutely.  The histo-
ry of Western thought, Henry says, has failed to understand this absolute foundation of 
all that is, this Parousia or perfect and indubitable self-presence, owing to the ontologi-
cal monism that has oriented it from its onset with the ancient Greeks.  For Henry, this 
ontological monism consists in the unquestioned assumption that there is only one mode 
of appearing, that of transcendence, understood as the opening of a distance or outside, 
which enables objects to appear before our gaze.   By construing appearing in this way, 12
Henry claims that the history of Western thought has unduly limited the field of appear-
ing to object-manifestation, to the appearance of things to the gaze of a subject, such 
that something is, if, and only if it can be seen by a subject. 
 Henry sees his basic task as overturning this tradition of ontological monism and 
clarifying the nature of transcendental subjectivity, with a view to demonstrating how its 
ultimate foundation is given to us in an absolute manner.   As he states in the opening 13
sentence of his first magnum opus The Essence of Manifestation, ‘this book was born of 
 Michel Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, trans. by Girard Etzkorn (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 12
1973), p. 89.
 Michel Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, trans. by Douglas Brick (Stanford: Stanford Univer13 -
sity Press, 1993), p. 41.
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a refusal, the refusal of the very philosophy from which it has sprung’.   From begin14 -
ning to end, Henry’s work remains remarkably steadfast in its focus on this basic task. 
While Henry takes up what might at first blush strike one as a strangely eclectic array of 
topics, from aesthetics, to psychoanalysis, Marxism, Christianity, and so on, his funda-
mental concern always remains centred on refining and drawing out further the inner 
nature of transcendental subjectivity and how it functions.   
 In this sense, as critical as Henry is of Husserl, perhaps no thinker has done as 
much to try and realise his ambition of sufficiently clarifying the nature of transcenden-
tal subjectivity, and of demonstrating how its absolute foundation can be given absolute-
ly.  Our attempt to provide a more adequate account of transcendental subjectivity, and 
to address whether and how the subject can attest to its ultimate foundation, will thus be 
both guided and furthered by a critical evaluation of the success and coherency of Hen-
ry’s phenomenological project. 
 As we will show, Henry maintains that the mode of appearing (i.e. the inner na-
ture of transcendental subjectivity) that Husserl and the history of philosophy have 
overlooked is that of life, understood as the way in which the self appears to itself in the 
radically immanent, non-intentional and non-objectifying self-affection that is its sub-
jective body or flesh.   In Henry’s view, it is this radically immanent and affective ap15 -
pearing of life that serves as the true transcendental dimension.  In this case, transcen-
dental subjectivity, which constitutes the foundation of the ecstatic appearing of the 
world and of the reality of everything that is, must be understood as this pure bodily life 
of the subject.  16
 Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, p. xi.14
 Henry employs a variety of terms to describe this body.  Apart from referring to it as a subjective body, 15
he also describes it as the transcendental body, the living body, and the flesh.
 Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, p. 511.16
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 Where Husserl advances a conception of transcendental subjectivity as a pure, 
disembodied ego, Henry’s material phenomenology forces us to reconsider the central 
role of bodily life in our understanding of subjectivity.   As Karl Hefty observes in his 17
introduction to Henry’s Incarnation, unlike Husserl, Henry’s transcendental project is 
not ideal in that ‘it describes life as such, and to that extent also flesh’.   As a result, 18
while Husserl’s intentional phenomenology tends to privilege the role of objectifying 
acts of consciousness (i.e. apperceptive objectification) in his account of the constitution 
of the world, Henry’s material phenomenology gives an unprecedented level of atten-
tion to the role of affectivity in the constitution of self and world.  Indeed, in our view, 
the true and enduring spirit of Henry’s thought consists in its attempt to further our 
awareness of the decisive importance of affectivity in the constitution of this world of 
life. 
 The boldness of Henry’s account of this transcendental life can hardly be over-
stated.  In his later work, Henry draws a distinction between the flesh of the finite indi-
vidual, and that of an infinite and absolute life or God, where the former is immanently 
engendered by and depends upon the latter, such that, as he provocatively writes in I am 
the Truth, ‘[i]n the depths of its night, our flesh is God.’   If we accept this, then, at 19
heart, transcendental subjectivity would consist in the eternal life of God, in the eternal 
self-production of this absolute life, and in the movement of self-generation by which 
God continuously affects and thereby engenders himself and all of the living. 
 Henry also refers to his work as ‘radical phenomenology’, or as a ‘phenomenology of life’.17
 Michel Henry, Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh, trans. by Karl Hefty (Evanston: Northwestern Uni18 -
versity Press, 2015), p. xiii.
 Michel Henry, I Am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity, trans. by Susan Emanuel (Stan19 -
ford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 373.
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 Despite the fact that Henry regards the life of the finite individual as immanently 
enjoined with that of absolute life, he admits nonetheless that the former can somehow 
forget its basis in the latter.  When this occurs, and the subject falls under the illusion 
that she is the author of her own acts, and that her identity consists in her finite inten-
tional existence in the world, Henry claims that the living subject begins to grow tired 
and sick of her life and becomes bent on its destruction and death (what he terms ‘bar-
barism’).  In a significant divergence from Husserl, Henry argues that it is not only, or 
even primarily, through phenomenology that the living individual can rediscover and 
attest to her basis in absolute life, but first and foremost through an engagement in what 
Henry regards as high culture, through an ethical, aesthetic and religious form of action, 
which does not depend upon intentionality.  Might this be what Jean-Luc Marion had an 
intimation of when he wrote that Henry’s thought contains within itself ‘a possibility 
still scarcely glimpsed’?;  that is to say, that the living subject may come to know and 20
attest to the first principles of knowledge which have always eluded philosophy through 
a particular way of feeling and acting. 
 We need, nevertheless, to ask whether Henry’s conception of the transcendental 
life of the subject is in fact sustainable.  Can the purely generative movement of this 
immanent and non-intentional life of the subject adequately account for the richness and 
diversity of its experience, and for all of the transformations that the finite subject un-
dergoes, including the loss and rediscovery of her basis in absolute life? We will argue 
that Henry’s own analyses, in contrast to his assertions, indicate that the phenomenolog-
ical life of the subject has, in fact, a finite intentional formal structure, and that this life 
not only involves a constant productivity (what Henry refers to as ‘life’s drive for 
 Michel Henry, Phénoménologie de la vie, Tome I: De la phénoménologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires 20
de France, 2003), p. 8.  All translations in this thesis are my own unless otherwise stated.
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growth’), but also a drive for destruction (a death drive).  In this thesis, therefore, we 
argue that while Henry’s identification of transcendental subjectivity with the bodily life 
of the subject helps further our understanding of this matter as initially laid out by 
Husserl, his position requires revision, as it points toward, but fails to sufficiently de-
velop, the finite (intentional) and destructive character of the phenomenological life of 
the living individual.     
 This, in turn, requires us to diverge from Henry’s conception of life in a signifi-
cant way, re-opening the question of how we should understand the nature of transcen-
dental subjectivity, as well as how the subject can properly come to know and attest to 
its innermost depths.  Indeed, if, in light of our study of Henry, we acknowledge the ab-
solutely basic character of bodily life, and the fact that this life is not radically imma-
nent and thereby closed off from the world, but always already open to it, then can we 
still speak of a transcendental life? What is more, if life cannot be understood as a radi-
cally immanent movement of self-generation, as Henry argues, then how should it be 
understood? And if we insist on the ecstatic and intentional structure of life, do we not 
thereby lose or diminish Henry’s insights into the essential role of life’s pre-reflective 
and non-objectifying affectivity in the constitution of the world, as Henry himself sug-
gests? Finally, under this new understanding of the life of the subject, how, if at all, can 
she attest to the basis of her being?    
In order to begin to assess these critical issues regarding the nature of transcen-
dental subjectivity, we will first take up the work of Husserl.  Since Husserl contends 
that it is the performance of the reductions that enables the subject to access the tran-
scendental field of experience, and to reflectively thematise the innermost nature of 
transcendental subjectivity and its essential structures, the first chapter of this work 
presents a critical exposition of this methodology.  In our analysis of the intricacies of 
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this methodological procedure, we will argue that, although Husserl makes it clear that 
there must be a union between the transcendental and empirical egos, he does not ad-
dress the nature of this union at sufficient length.  It thus, ultimately, remains unclear 
just who or what this transcendental ego really is. 
Chapter two then puts this methodology into practice.  Doing so will allow us to 
unpack and draw attention to some of those structures that Husserl finds to be essential 
to transcendental subjectivity, and to begin to get a sense for his understanding of the 
latter’s inner nature.  At the same time, we will assess whether this procedure enables 
Husserl to make good on his claim that the absolute foundation of transcendental sub-
jectivity can be absolutely given to us in phenomenological reflection.  We will argue 
that Husserl’s own study of time inadvertently reveals that transcendental subjectivity 
has an ultimate foundation that can never be given absolutely.  His analyses indicate that 
the living present, or what may be called the pre-temporal event of life, as the ultimate 
level of absolute time-constituting consciousness, functions as an anonymous level of 
sense that can never be presented to our gaze.  In other words, Husserl’s analyses reveal 
that the immanence of consciousness is always already broken, that there is a primordial 
transcendence, or unconscious consciousness, that makes consciousness possible, while 
always remaining beyond its grasp.  However, if this is the case, and the pre-temporal 
event of life functions as an anonymous level of sense that can never be captured or un-
derstood in terms of apperceptive objectification, then it remains less than clear as to 
how this most basic level of constitution should be understood. 
 In an effort to further our understanding of who or what transcendental subjec-
tivity really is and how it functions, chapter three examines Henry’s material phenome-
nology as a critique of Husserl’s version of transcendental phenomenology.  In this 
chapter, we will argue that Henry’s work sheds light on the fact that transcendental sub-
 10
jectivity is not an absolute consciousness, but the actual, living, embodied individual, 
understood in its immanent and affective self-appearing, whereas the empirical ego is 
the one and the same ego as displayed in the world’s ecstatic mode of appearing.  In this 
case, Henry’s work suggests that the most basic functioning of transcendental subjectiv-
ity must be understood as a matter of generation, as an unconscious movement of affec-
tivity that produces itself and all of its needs and drives.  In exploring this position, we 
argue that, on the one hand, it remains a point of some contention regarding whether 
this transcendental life of the individual should at heart be understood as finite and hu-
man, or as eternal and divine.  What is more, in his account of these two modes of ap-
pearing, we maintain that Henry fails to adequately account for how the two are united, 
and instead leaves us with a problematic bifurcation of the modes of appearing.  For all 
these unresolved issues, nevertheless, Henry’s phenomenology of life sheds light on the 
importance of the affectivity of the subjective body in the constitution of the world. 
According to Henry, it is the affective drives of life that unilaterally found and guide the 
subject in all of her actions.  Additionally, Henry contends that it is in this pre-reflective 
and non-objectifying self-sensing of the flesh that things are absolutely given to the sub-
ject, and that it is only this transcendental feeling which can provide the individual with 
absolute knowledge of  its ultimate foundation and of everything that is. 
 In order to determine the validity of these monumental findings on the part of 
Henry, chapter four evaluates his position by taking up a dimension of Henry’s thought 
that has received relatively little attention thus far, namely, his study of culture  (i.e. acts 
of self-growth) and barbarism (i.e. acts of self-destruction).  It is here that Henry’s theo-
retical understanding of life is fleshed out in terms of the way in which it actually oper-
 11
ates in our everyday life.   In so doing, it will be found that, contrary to his assertions, 21
Henry’s own analyses, as well as ‘the things themselves’, indicate that life is not only a 
productive but also a destructive movement, and that this movement is finite and inten-
tional in nature. 
 On account of these development, the onus will fall on us to determine what 
these findings mean for our understanding of transcendental subjectivity and the way in 
which the subject can come to know and attest to the basis of her being.  Chapter five 
gets underway with this by arguing that while our findings force us to modify or weaken 
the sense of transcendental subjectivity advanced in Husserl and Henry, it does not abol-
ish it altogether.  Instead, we are forced to acknowledge that transcendental subjectivity 
consists neither in an absolute consciousness, nor in an a pure, a-cosmic life, but in a 
finite bodily life that is always already exposed to the world.  By drawing on the work 
of Henry, Husserl, and other contemporary thinkers, while also critically extending and 
diverging from their findings, we will draw out the nature of this transcendental subjec-
tivity and its essential structures.  In so doing, we will advance a conception of life that 
is able to maintain Henry’s insight into the essential role of non-objectifying affectivity 
in the constitution of the world, but which simultaneously acknowledges and develops 
its finite (intentional) and destructive character.  This means, in part, that the uncon-
scious movement of affectivity should not be understood as a matter of immanent gen-
eration, but as an ecstatic creation that, as such, can never be seen but only felt in a 
vague or indeterminate manner.  One of the consequences of this is that, contrary to the 
assertions of Husserl and Henry, transcendental subjectivity has a ground which can 
never be given absolutely.  At the same time, as we will show, it also opens the door to-
 Henry also explores this in his two volumes study of Marx.  See Marx 1: une philosophie de la réalité 21
(Paris: Gallirnard, 1976); and Marx 2: une philosophie de l’économie (Paris: Gallimard, 1976).  However, 
as a proper study of these volumes would require a work all its own, we will not focus extensively on 
them here. 
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ward a richer and more coherent understanding of how the subject constitutes the world, 
one which recognises that both affectivity and apperceptive objectification are essential 
to this process. 
 With this emergent sense of transcendental subjectivity having been established, 
in chapter six we will be in a position to assess how the subject can attest to the funda-
ments of her being.  We will begin by arguing that it is none other than the needs and 
drives of life that serve as the unity of motivation which determines the course of con-
sciousness, and which thereby enables the individual to problematise her natural attitude 
and to assume some distance towards it.  We will demonstrate how the natural attitude 
arises from the living subject’s felt sense of trust in others and the world, and will argue 
that the subject assumes some distance towards this attitude by undergoing a type of 
shock, one which is commonly experienced in a positive or negative valence of wonder 
or awe, as well as in negative feelings such as boredom.  However this shock occurs, we 
maintain that the ensuing problematisation of the natural attitude can indeed be carried 
out in high forms of cultural activity apart from that of phenomenology, among them, 
art, ethics and science.  In this sense, Henry was not wrong in emphasising that the liv-
ing subject can come to know and attest to the nature of life and its essential structures 
in ways of life that stand outside that of phenomenology.  Yet, as our study will bear out, 
he is mistaken in his insistence that this can be accomplished through an affective life 
that requires no assistance from objectifying acts of reflection.  As we will demonstrate, 
in all of the ways in which the subject assumes some distance towards the world, objec-
tifying acts of reflection can play an important role in problematising the natural atti-
tude, and in thereby furthering the growth of life.  In whichever way the living individ-
ual participates in this pursuit, in doing so, we suggest that the subject participates in a 
 13
veritable community of love and generosity, one which is collectively bent on furthering 
the growth of life in oneself and others in myriad ways. 
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CHAPTER 1 
LEARNING HOW TO SEE: HUSSERL’S METHODOLOGY 
For Husserl, phenomenology is a study of our human consciousness.  In his view, if we 
are to examine our consciousness and its objectivities, and to seize upon its ultimate 
foundation, then we need a special kind of method of enquiry.  In order to understand 
and assess Husserl’s radical claim that phenomenology can unlock and reach the abso-
lute foundation of existence as a whole in consciousness, we thus need to follow and 
understand first the methodological procedures that guide it.  This chapter, therefore, 
begins with a critical exposition of Husserl’s methodology.  As Husserl applies his 
methodology to a study of things, however, initially as the study of the ‘essences’ of our 
normatively valid logical consciousness as such in his Logical Investigations and then 
as the study of ‘pure intentional consciousness’ itself in Ideas I, that method changes. 
This chapter, therefore, distinguishes and addresses some of the key elements that figure 
in this development, focusing on intuition as the principle of all principles, the eidetic 
reduction, and the transcendental-phenomenological reduction.  Commentators and crit-
ics of Husserl’s philosophy, nevertheless, differ in their interpretations as to ‘what the 
reductions are and how they relate to one another’.   In particular, Husserl’s transcen1 -
dental-phenomenological reduction is a major source of controversy, with some com-
mentators seeing it as being either a betrayal of his earlier endeavour to return to the 
things themselves, or an impossibility for phenomenology and phenomenological re-
search that should be rejected altogether.  Husserl himself, nonetheless, insists that the 
reductions — both the eidetic and the transcendental-phenomenological reductions — 
 Dagfinn Føllesdal, ‘Husserl on Evidence and Justification’, Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological 1
Tradition, ed. by Robert Sokolowski (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988), pp. 
107-129 (p. 105).
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are of central importance to his elaboration of a phenomenological philosophy in its at-
tempt to fully manifest the absolute foundation and beginning of existence as a whole. 
This chapter, therefore, concentrates on establishing what these reductions are, how they 
relate to one another, whilst drawing attention to some important aspects of these proce-
dures that still remain unclear.    2
  
1.1 HUSSERL’S BREAKTHROUGH: THE A PRIORI CORRELATION OF ACTS AND THEIR IN-
TENTIONAL OBJECTS 
In order to understand Husserl’s transcendental methods, we first need to know some of 
the basic structures of Husserl’s phenomenology, especially his account of the inten-
tionality of consciousness and its fundamental demand for evidence.  By demonstrating 
how and why Husserl comes to formulate these structures, we will be in a better posi-
tion to understand the meaning of his methodological procedures, as well as the distinc-
tive roles of the respective reductions and how they relate to one another. 
 The development of Husserl’s methodological procedures is motivated by his 
attempt to address the long-standing philosophical problem as to what knowledge really 
is and how the human being can access it.   Going back to the ancient Greeks, philoso3 -
phy has always wanted to overcome prejudice and attain true knowledge, as opposed to 
mere opinion or belief.  As Klaus Held notes, 
 Despite the pivotal importance of the transcendental reduction in Husserl’s work, as Dan Zahavi notes, 2
his account of it is ‘not always crystal clear’.  Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), p. 76.
 Husserl’s doctrine of the intuition of essences, however, is a solution to the problem of the empirical 3
origins of a priori judgements (knowledge-claims such as, e.g., colour implies extension) that neither 
Kant nor Hume could justify — it is thus a post-Humean-Kantian epistemological concern that is not 
found in ancient Greek philosophy: it is rather a ‘modern problem’ and one that Brentano in his descrip-
tive empirical psychology attempted to address, but insufficiently according to Husserl.  For more on this, 
see Theodorus de Boer, ‘The Descriptive Method of Franz Brentano: Its Two Functions and Their Signif-
icance for Phenomenology’, in The Philosophy of Franz Brentano, ed. by Linda L. McAlister (London: 
Duckworth, 1976), pp. 101-107.
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[a]s Plato originally formulated it: episteme, true knowledge, should take the place 
of doxa, opinion.  Opinion falls short of true knowledge in two ways.  First, cer-
tain vacillations which are ‘due to the situation’ always underlie opinions.  True 
knowledge should be free from subjective biases in changing lived situations, and 
in this sense, it should be ‘objective’ and lasting.  Second, whenever we just have 
an opinion, we are making an unfulfilled knowledge claim.  For example, when 
someone says, ‘I think it is too hot in Italy in August’, or ‘I think that the Py-
thagorean theorem is provable’, that person is saying, my point of view could be 
verified by my driving to Italy in the summer, or by my actually carrying out the 
proof of the theorem.  In this way, simple opinion refers through its meaning to 
situations in which what is meant would be proved, fulfilled, confirmed.  Such 
situations bring us close to the issue or the matter at hand, which is only given to 
us ‘from a distance’, so to speak, through opinions.     4
On Held’s reading, there is a certain tension to this account of true knowledge.  On the 
one hand, to attain true knowledge, we must get as close to things as possible; we must 
experience them in a direct and immediate way in the course of our experience.  On the 
other hand, true knowledge also requires that we free ourselves of the subjective biases 
that colour our ever-changing circumstances.  True knowledge must be lasting and ob-
jective; it must be independent of the particular circumstances in question. 
 Rather than resolve this tension by simply choosing one side over the other — 
the subjective or the objective — Husserl’s thought is distinguished by the rigorous way 
in which it attempts to stay true to it.   He does this by trying to demonstrate how the 5
attainment of objective knowledge is essentially connected to subjective sources, with-
out being reducible to them.  To be able to have knowledge of something at all, Husserl 
acknowledges that the subject must be able to achieve a basic closeness to it and to 
thereby experience it in its originarity.  That is to say, he recognises that a necessary 
condition for true knowledge is that the object or state of affairs in question must appear 
or be able to appear within the scope of my experience.  In this sense, all appearance 
 Klaus Held, ‘Husserl’s Phenomenological Method’, in The New Husserl: A Critical Reader, ed. by 4
Donn Welton (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 3-31 (p. 7).
 Ibid., p. 8.5
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and knowledge is necessarily subject-relative.  Something can appear and be known 
only when it presents itself to a subject in a particular situation (i.e.  in its subject-rela-
tive manners of givenness).   
 At the same time, Husserl does not reduce knowledge to a matter of mere sub-
jectivity.  His work bears the acknowledgement that, in the course of everyday experi-
ence, objects do in fact strike us as existing in themselves; that things do appear to us as 
something more than what is given at the moment, as something that has an identity that 
subsists over and through time.  In this case, that which is objectively known cannot be 
wholly reducible to the way it appears to me at the moment in this particular situation. 
It must exist in-itself, independently of its relation to the subject and its situated experi-
ences.  Since all appearance rests upon subject-relative manners of givenness, Husserl 
comes to realise that the latter must somehow serve as that which enables us to grasp 
the objective, transcendent existence of things.   6
 In his study of this matter, what Husserl ultimately finds is that a correspondence 
or correlation, whose character depends on the kind of object in question, exists be-
tween objective things and their originary subjective manners of givenness.  As corre-
lates, the two sides of this relation are ‘inseparable’ from one another, such that we can-
not have one without the other.   Thus, for Husserl, the ‘object in the How of its modes 7
of givenness [i.e. appearance]’ always necessarily corresponds to the actualized experi-
ences and knowledge through which an object appears to the subject in its originarity.’  8
Accordingly, Husserl regards this correlation between objective thing and its subjective 
manners of givenness as an a priori (universal and necessary) law of consciousness, 
 Klaus Held ‘‘Husserl’s Phenomenology of the Life-World’, in The New Husserl: A Critical Reader, ed. 6
by Donn Welton (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), p. 34.
 Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 307, 314.7
 Ibid., pp. 221, 316.8
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which, as such, can be grasped independently of experience.  For Husserl, then, as Held 
notes, the objects in their modes of appearance, together with their accompanying man-
ners of givenness, simply are ‘the “phenomena”, the “appearances”, that “phenomenol-
ogy” deals with, and from which it obtained its name.  In the Husserlian sense, phenom-
ena are nothing other than the existing things which are “in themselves” in the world, 
but only in such a way that they show themselves in their situatedness and as subjec-
tively  “for-me”’.  9
 The discovery of this universal a priori represents Husserl’s major break-
through.  As Husserl later reflects and points out in a footnote found in the Crisis, ‘the 
first breakthrough of this universal a priori correlation between experienced object and 
its manners of givenness (which occurred during work on my Logical Investigations 
around 1898) affected me so deeply that my whole subsequent life-work has been dom-
inated by the task of systematically elaborating on this a priori of correlation’.   The a 10
priori correlation between types of objects and their subject-relative manners of given-
 Held, ‘Husserl’s Phenomenological Method’, in The New Husserl, ed. by Welton, p. 9.9
 Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to 10
Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 
166, footnote.  Husserl further reflects on the central importance of this discovery for his phenomenology 
in the following passage: ‘[t]he fact naively taken for granted, that we see each thing and the world in 
general as they appear to us, concealed, as we recognize, a great horizon of remarkable truths which never 
entered, in their uniqueness and in their systematic connectedness, into the purview of philosophy.  The 
correlation of the world (the world of which we always speak) and subjective manners of givenness never 
aroused in philosophy a philosophical awe (that is, before the first breakthrough of “transcendental phe-
nomenology” in the Logical Investigations), even though it was resoundingly present in pre-Socratic phi-
losophy and sophistry—although here only as a motive for skeptical argumentation.  This correlation 
never aroused its own philosophical interest that might have made it the topic of an appropriate scientific 
attitude.  We remained trapped in what was taken for granted, that is, that each thing appears differently 
for each person.’  Ibid., p. 165.  Here, however, Husserl is being anachronistic in his interpretation of his 
earlier breakthrough to ‘transcendental phenomenology’ in the Logical Investigations (1900-01), as this is 
not the case – Husserl dates his ‘conversion’ to transcendental idealism around 1907-1908.  The break-
through of the Logical Investigations was to ‘essences’.  The distinction he made there was between ‘ei-
dos’ and fact (or factual existences), e.g., colour is not a particular colour (ed thing existing) but a univer-
sal object given to a corresponding act of eidetic ideation or eidetic abstraction or via eidetic reduction. 
This ‘essence’ (colour as a general object) ‘founds’ the empirical basis of the any a priori judgement 
about it, such as, ‘colour implies extension’, i.e. in this judgment what is ‘grasped’ is the ‘essence’ of 
colour, and not a factual judgement about existing colours, but this judgment is valid for all possibly and 
actually existing factual colours.  It is much later when Husserl distinguishes mundane consciousness and 
transcendental consciousness, and this is why he was unhappy with his re-issues of his Logical Investiga-
tions as they had contained the presupposition of the natural attitude, without challenging it, as his later 
position in the transcendental reduction radically does. 
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ness is ultimately understood by Husserl as nothing other than the intentionality of con-
sciousness.   It is the intentional nature of consciousness that enables us to access the 11
objective, transcendent existence of things and to attain true knowledge of them.   
 From relatively early on, then, Husserl understood intentional consciousness as 
that which provides the subject with a genuine access to things as they are in them-
selves.  His ensuing work over the years can be seen as an ever-renewed attempt to clar-
ify and refine our understanding of how intentional accomplishments make objective 
knowledge possible.  In order to begin to understand Husserl’s account of this matter, 
and how it shapes his view of how the phenomenologist needs to proceed in the attempt 
to attain a true knowledge of things, it is of importance to give an account of some of 
the fundamental features in his treatment of intentionality. 
 As a universal a priori structure of our consciousness, intentionality is not seen 
by Husserl as one attribute of consciousness amongst others, but as its defining struc-
ture, which makes it what it is.  As such, intentionality determines all of our different 
act-experiences (i.e. perception, feeling, judgement, wishing, fearing, etc).  By virtue of 
its intentional structure, the acts of consciousness are always directed toward something. 
As directional, consciousness is never enclosed within itself, but is always ‘conscious-
ness of something’.   Thus, consciousness, in all of its acts, is always concerned with 12
something.  Whenever one loves, one loves something; when one dreams, one dreams 
of something; when one perceives, one perceives something.    13
 Husserl develops his account of intentionality from that of Franz Brentano.  See Edmund Husserl, Log11 -
ical Investigations, Volume 1I, trans. by J. N. Findlay (London, Routledge, 1970), pp. 552-523.  Before 
Husserl has encountered this theme of the intentionality of consciousness in Brentano’s thinking, this 
concept, originally deployed in Scholastic philosophy, had undergone extensive revision by Brentano in 
his novel idea of a descriptive psychology. 
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 73.12
 These are ‘objects’ of the activities of consciousness itself, nonetheless, and thus this is not a return to 13
some form of pre-Kantian naive realism. 
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 Husserl maintains that the basic structure of intentionality consists in three ele-
ments: intentional act, content and object.  In brief, the intentional act is the specific 
kind of mental event — i.e. perceiving, imagining, remembering, etc — while the object 
is the transcendent thing or state of affairs to which the act refers.   The content of an 14
intentional act, meanwhile, is the way in which the subject thinks about or posits the 
intended object.    15
 On account of this structure, consciousness can relate to something in two basic 
ways: by intending something (as content) in a signitive act, or by intending something 
(as object) in an originally presentive intuition.   Thus Husserl distinguishes unfulfilled 16
or empty intending acts and fulfilled intentions, or between ‘adequate’ and ‘inadequate 
perception’ or ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic thinking’.   For example, reading a descrip17 -
tion of an object in a book would be an empty intending act of intentional conscious-
ness, whereas when one recognizes what is intended in the description through the sig-
nifying act (either through an actual act of sensory perception or imaginary act of per-
ception), this would be a fulfilled act of intention.   Here, the sign (linguistic descrip18 -
tion) drops out as we experience intuitive fulfillment of ‘the object as intended itself’.  19
Such a transition occurs in intentional consciousness itself.  It is a modification of our 
actual intentional consciousness.  Thus this transition can be seen and is verifiable from 
within a descriptive-phenomenological analysis of these experiences themselves.  Here, 
adequate perception within our intentional consciousness is possible, within limits.  The 
 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume II, pp. 79-81.14
 Ibid., pp. 81-85.15
 Ibid., p. 206.16
 Ibid., pp. 231-232.17
 Ibid.18
 Ibid., pp. 226-227.19
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former inadequate, signifying way of relating to something, nonetheless, is regarded by 
Husserl as essential to consciousness in that it always occurs, whereas the latter relation 
of intuitively fulfilled intentions is only achieved in certain cases.  As intentional, con-
sciousness always intends or means something — i.e. it always relates to something as 
content.  Consciousness is always directed toward something through one of its mean-
ings.   When we relate to things in this manner, ‘what is given to us is not the object in 20
its actual presence but the object as something that is only meant’.   In relating to an 21
object in a signitive act, then, we relate to an object in an empty, vague or otherwise un-
founded manner.  That is to say, we think about an object or construe it as existing in 
this or that way, without it actually having been presented to us.    22
 Our account of how consciousness intends something (as content) in signitive 
acts could well give the impression that, in so doing, the subject merely relates to an 
inner mental image of the object in question.  However, Brian Elliot remarks that it is of 
importance to remember that  
to have content is not for Husserl to find an image of something literally present 
within the mind, it is rather for the act to refer to something quite other than itself 
and to the possibility that the referent be given in direct intuition.  Accordingly, 
the opposition of content and object is not a distinction implying two distinct on-
tological regions, the psychologically immanent and the objectively transcendent. 
Instead, the having of content in intentional consciousness is at once having the 
object in its (intuitive) absence.      23
This difference between content and object, then, is not a difference between two dis-
tinct ontological regions, that is, between two different types of objects or two existing 
objects — but, as Husserl observes in the Logical Investigations, between different 
 Ibid., p. 196.20
 Ibid., p. 232.21
 Similar to Kant, Husserl maintains that concepts without intuitions are empty.  See Kant, The Critique 22
of Pure Reason, pp. 193-194.
 Elliott, pp. 21-22.23
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modes of givenness.   Thus, the very same object can be given signitively (as content) 24
or intuitively (as fulfilled intended object).  What we have, then, is one world and one 
object as experienced in our intentional consciousness, only given in different ways. 
 Because of this, our signitive acts must be seen as ‘the initial phase of the basic 
movement of consciousness outward, towards the immediate presence of the object in-
tended’.   It is because our signitive acts always already refer to and depend upon ob25 -
jective things that consciousness harbours the possibility of actually attaining a genuine 
closeness to things, that is to say, of relating to the presence of things themselves.  It is 
thus through the emptiness of signitive acts that possibility or potentiality comes into 
the life of consciousness. 
 In relating to something in a signitive act, then, consciousness always relates to 
the possibility that its intended object might present itself in its originarity.  Husserl 
maintains that this imbues conscious life with a knowledge of its ability to access the 
originary givenness of things, and with a certain desire to bring this about.  Consequent-
ly, our conscious life is not a static relation to things, but a dynamic movement, one that 
is charged with a tendency towards the presence of things themselves.  For Husserl, 
‘[i]ntentionality is movement in the sense of a striving (Streben) towards increased de-
termination with its intentional object.’    26
 This is what consciousness finds in relating to things in the mode of fulfilled and 
unfulfilled intuition.  By relating to things in this way, the object that was previously 
intended in a vague or unfounded manner is presented to us in a clear and immediate 
way.  When an object is given intuitively, ‘the object is presented in its ‘full “bodily” 
 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume II, pp. 242-246.24
 Elliott, pp. 21-22.25
 Nicolas de Warren, Husserl and the Promise of Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 26
p. 285.  It is, nevertheless, an increased determination with its intentional (intended) object. 
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presence”’.   Therefore, while signitive acts are ‘empty’ acts, intuitive acts are ‘presen27 -
tive’ in character’, where ‘presenting’ is distinct from mere representation (Stellvertre-
tung) by parts, images or signs, as in memory or imagination.   For example, as Philipp 28
Berghofer explains, ‘“[w]hen I think […] there is a book on my desk and its color is 
red”, this act of thinking is a signitive act.  When I look at my desk and see that there is 
a red book on it, this act of seeing is an intuitive act, that is, an intuition’.   By relating 29
to an object in an originally presentive intuition, then, the subject achieves a genuine 
closeness to things; the object is placed before us as it really is in itself, in its objective, 
transcendent existence.    30
1.2 THE CONCEPT OF EVIDENCE 
When a previously empty or unfounded intentional aim is presented with its intended 
object in a corresponding act of intuition, our previously unfounded aim is fulfilled and 
is said to have evidence.   In this sense, evidence is an intentional achievement.  It is a 31
type of experience in which we are brought close to the presence of things in a corre-
 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume II, p. 93.  Husserl does stress that this is analogy — sozusagen 27
— with the givenness of perception.  Colour, for example, is given, as if to say, in its bodily reality, in the 
flesh, just as colours are given to immediate sense perception.  What Husserl is not saying is that colour, 
as a general object, is bodily or made of flesh.
 Ibid., pp. 232-233.  On account of the intentional nature of consciousness, intuition cannot be under28 -
stood in its more traditional guise, as a kind of inner spiritual voice. 
 Philipp Berghofer, ‘On the Nature and Systematic Role of Evidence: Husserl as a Proponent of Mental29 -
ist Evidentialism’, European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2019), 98-117, p. 101.
 Truth arises here as the adequation between an intentional act and its object, as the fulfilment of an 30
intentional act in a corresponding act of intuition.  This is a descriptive-psychological epistemological 
criterion, nonetheless, and not a return to any pre-Kantian realism of ‘adequation’ between mind and 
thing (adaequatio intellectus et rei, or ad rem) that resides ‘outside’ of our actual intentional conscious-
ness.  Because our intentional acts refer to and depend upon the objects toward which they are directed in 
their corresponding manners of givenness, truth is not merely determined by us in a one-sided manner, 
but also by the objects that serve as the guiding thread of our analysis of our intentional consciousness. 
 Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 329-331.31
 24
sponding act of intuition.  Inasmuch as consciousness consists in a movement that 
strives towards an increased determination of its intentional object, evidence can be 
seen as the telos of conscious life.  
 On the basis of this, Husserl comes to view evidence not only as the paradigm 
for philosophical knowledge, but as the foundation of his epistemology, and of all ratio-
nality.  As he writes, ‘all genuine, and, in particular, all scientific knowledge, rests on 
evidence: as far as such evidence extends, the concept of knowledge extends also’.  32
Evidence is seen by Husserl as a necessary condition for knowledge.  We say necessary 
rather than necessary and sufficient (NAS) condition because, as we will see presently, 
Husserl ultimately finds that evidence is not necessarily infallible, as he distinguishes 
apodictic and factual assertoric evidence.  
 While evidence is not a NAS condition for knowledge, as Berghofer argues, 
there is ample evidence in Husserl’s work to suppose that he does view it as a NAS 
condition for justification.   As Husserl writes, ‘[i]mmediate "seeing," not merely sen33 -
suous, experiential seeing, but seeing in the universal sense as an originally presentive 
consciousness of any kind whatever, is the ultimate legitimizing source of all rational 
assertions.’   As he further notes in his principle of all principles: ‘[n]o conceivable 34
theory can make us err with respect to the principle of all principles: that every original-
ly presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originarily 
(so to speak [sozusagen], in its “personal” actuality) offered to us in "intuition” is to be 
accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which 
 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume I, trans. by J. N. Findlay (London, Routledge, 1970), p. 18.32
 Berghofer, ‘On the nature and systematic role of evidence’, pp. 100-104.33
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 36.34
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it is presented there.’   These passages provide us with some clear indication that intu35 -
itive fulfilment (i.e. evidence), within the limits in which it presents its objects (as apod-
ictic or assertoric), serves as a NAS condition for justification.  In that case, if p is given 
to us, then we are justified in believing that p’.        36
 This account of evidence, and the ensuing principle of all principles, are pivotal 
in shaping Husserl’s understanding of how phenomenology must proceed in its study of 
phenomena.  Elsewhere, Husserl describes this principle as ‘the most universal principle 
of all methods, the principle of the original right of all data’.   In brief, this principle 37
dictates that phenomenologists are not permitted to interpret phenomena in advance but 
to find the legitimating evidences within the experiences of consciousness itself.  To at-
tain unprejudiced knowledge of the things themselves, phenomenology must proceed by 
refraining from making any assumptions in advance about experience.   The phenome38 -
nologist must strive to refrain from making presumptions as to what ought to count as 
an experience.  Instead, as Erazim Kohak notes, phenomenology must accept ‘as its 
primordial starting point whatever gives itself in experience, as it gives itself, and only 
as such’.    39
 Ibid., p. 44.  Along these lines, Husserl will state in a later work that ‘if thought, insofar as it is an ac35 -
tivity of judgment, really leads to its goal — to knowledge (i.e., if the judgments are to be self-evident 
judgments) — then […] [o]n their part, these objects must also be so pre-given that their givenness of 
itself makes knowledge , i.e., self-evident judgment, possible.  They must themselves be self-evident, 
must be given as themselves.  To speak of self-evidence, of self-evident givenness, then, here signifies 
nothing other than self-givenness, the way in which an object in its givenness can be characterized rela-
tive to consciousness as “itself-there”, “there in the flesh”, in contrast to its mere presentification [Verge-
genwärtigung], the empty, merely indicative idea of it’.  Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, 
trans. by James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (London: Routledge, 1973), p. 19.
 Berghofer, ‘On the nature and systematic role of evidence’, p. 100.36
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 48.37
 Ibid., p. 44.38
 Erazim Kohak, Idea and Experience (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978), p. 41.39
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 In keeping with this conception of evidence as a matter of experience, Husserl’s 
account of what counts as evidence (i.e. originary givenness) is fairly wide-ranging. 
Evidence comes in various degrees of adequacy and it does not have a single nature.  40
Just as there are different experiences, with varying degrees of clarity, so too there are 
different evidences — i.e. different ways of intuiting things — with varying levels of 
clarity.      41
 Sensible intuition, for one, presents us with the concrete particulars of experi-
ence.  For instance, when we make the judgement ‘“[t]he book is lying on the table” or 
“[t]he table is green”, these expressions contain ‘elements which can be easily fulfilled 
in sense perception, for example, the book, the table, and the green colour’.   That be42 -
ing said, while sensible intuition presents us with the book, the table, and the green 
colour, it does not seem sufficient to present us with ‘the “lying on the table”, or the 
 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume II, pp. 263-264.  Husserl identifies two forms of perfect evi40 -
dence, that of adequate and apodicitc evidence.  Adequate evidence is the kind of evidence the subject has 
when there are no ‘unfulfilled components’, no ‘expectant’ or ‘attendant meanings’, and when all of these 
expectant and attendant meanings have been fulfilled in actual experience’.  Apodicitc evidence consists 
in the absolute indomitability of the given state of affairs, in the ‘absolute unimaginableness (inconceiv-
ability) of their non-being, and thus excluding in advance every doubt as “objectless”, empty’.  Husserl, 
Cartesian Meditations, pp. 15-16.  Up until the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl maintains that adequate 
and apodicitic evidence as necessarily conjoined.  In this later work, though, he states that apodicitc evi-
dences can occur in inadequate evidences.  As he writes, ‘[p]erhaps this remark was made precisely with 
the case of transcendental self-experience in mind.  In such experience the ego is accessible to himself 
originaliter.  But at any particular time this experience offers only a core that is experienced "with strict 
adequacy”, namely the ego's living present (which the grammatical sense of the sentence, ego cogito, 
expresses); while, beyond that, only an indeterminately general presumptive horizon extends, comprising 
what is strictly non-experienced but necessarily also-meant.  To it belongs not only the ego's past, most of 
which is completely obscure, but also his transcendental abilities and his habitual peculiarities at the 
time.’  Ibid., pp. 22-23.  In this case, while Husserl views adequate evidence as an unobtainable ideal, it 
may be possible to obtain apodictic evidence in the case of our own existence in the reflective, immanent 
perception of a current (conscious) experience (Sein als Erlebnis).
 Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus 41
Nijhoff, 1969) pp. 56–67.  Husserl maintains that there is both pre-predicative (i.e. implicit, unthema-
tised) and predicative evidence, with the latter based on the former.  As Dagfinn Føllesdal notes, pre-pred-
icative evidence consists in intuitive fulfilment ‘concerning matters that we have never thought about, far 
less explicitly judged about’.  An example would be ‘the evidence we have that there is a floor in this 
room, evidence which we received as soon as we opened the door and stepped in’.  From 1917 onwards, 
Husserl begins to engage in a study of pre-predicative evidence in the realms of practical activity and 
feeling, though these domains do not receive nearly as much attention as cognitive activities such as per-
ception, and they remain somewhat underdeveloped in his work.  Føllesdal, ‘Husserl on Evidence and 
Justification’, in Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition, ed. by Sokolowski, p. 111.
 Dieter Lohmar, ‘Husserl’s Concept of Categorial Intuition’, in One Hundred Years of Phenomenology, 42
ed. by Dan Zahavi and Frederik Stjernfelt (Dordrecht: Kluwer), p. 125.
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“being green" of the book.   Sensory perception does not seem capable of presenting us 43
with predicative being, that is to say, with complex states of affairs and relations.   As 44
Dieter Lohmar writes, 
[f]or those intentions directed at ‘states of affairs’ (Sachverhalte), it seems impos-
sible that they could be fulfilled by sense perception alone.  In sense perception I 
can see the ‘green,’ but I cannot see the ‘being green’ in the same way.  We might 
generalise this and claim that predicative being is not something perceivable.  But 
not being fulfillable in sensibility alone does not include only predicative being 
but all categorial Forms, i.e., the forms ‘one’, ‘and’, ‘all’, ‘if’, ‘then’, ‘or’, ‘all’, 
‘no’, ‘not’, and so on.  45
Such categorial objects and forms of cognition, nonetheless, are no more mysteriously 
given to our intuitive experiences than the evident sense judgment of particulars.   
 In order to address the issue as to how it is that we relate to and experience more 
complex states of affairs, relations, and universal categories, Husserl thus extends intu-
ition to include a categorial or super-sensible form.   In his view, the subject does not 46
only intuit particular empirical objects, but also abstract conceptual objects.  That is to 
say, consciousness does not only intuit sensory givens or particular things, but more 
complex ‘states of affairs’, universals and other categorial objects.   For Husserl, such 47
categorial or synthetic intuition involves acts of cognitive identification and differentia-




 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume II, pp. 278-280.  While Husserl states that categories are given 46
as ‘an analogue of common sensuous intuition’, intuition here should not be understood as a type of pure, 
immediate seeing, but as a cognitive achievement, as the manifestation of a state of affairs through the 
use of our understanding.  Ibid., 280.
 Ibid., p. 279.47
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as ‘“A is to the right of B”, “A is larger, brighter, louder than B, etc”’.   Categorial intu48 -
ition thus enables us to grasp something as having to do with something else.   For ex49 -
ample, it enables us to see the book as blue, or as lying on the bench, and so on.   
 On Husserl’s account, the sensible intuition of a singular object already contains 
such universal categories, albeit on an implicit level.  Bearing this in mind, Elliott notes 
that ‘there can be no suggestion of two separate worlds, one composed of concrete sin-
gularities the other of abstract generalities.  Instead, the distinction turns on different 
modes of givenness of one and the same basic reality’.   Because of this, such categori50 -
al acts do not in any way alter or falsify the object, but actually reveal it as it is in 
itself.   These categorial intuitions underpin all our categorical acts of logical reasoning 51
(e.g. all s is p, some s is p, some s is not p).  Therefore, the ‘phenomenological elucida-
tion of experience’, or perhaps more accurately speaking, of the experiences of a valid 
logical consciousness as such that Husserl undertakes in the second volume of his Logi-
cal Investigations, simply proceeds as ‘a movement from the implicit to the explicit 
manifestation of structure’, as a movement ‘from the singular to the universal’.   52
 In addition to categorial intuition, Husserl maintains that we also have an intu-
ition of essence or eidos (i.e. eidetic intuition) that is trans-categorial.   That is to say, 53
given the a priori of correlation, the subject is able to achieve an insight into the a pri-
 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume II, pp. 288.  For more on Husserl’s account of categorial intu48 -
ition, see Robert Sokolowski, ‘Moral Thinking’, in Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradi-
tion: Essays in Phenomenology, ed. by Robert Sokolowski (Washington: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1988), p. 235.
 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume II, pp. 155-156, 280-281.49
 Elliott, p. 26.50
 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume II, p. 282.51
 Elliott, p. 26.52
 Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 11-13; Husserl, Experience and Judgment, pp. 26-28.53
 29
ori structures or laws that determine various types of objectivities or regions of being, 
and the intentional acts that are related to them.   As the condition for the appearance of 54
a particular object as this or that, Husserl maintains that this ‘seeing of essences’ pro-
vides the most basic knowledge of what is.    55
 At its heart, then, Husserl contends that phenomenology, in its search for true 
and lasting knowledge, is not concerned with facts.   It is not concerned with particular 56
individuals and the particular things toward which they are directed.  Rather, it is con-
cerned with the essential universal structures or laws (i.e. essences) of intentional acts 
and their objectivities, of which concrete things are but particular instantiations (i.e. es-
sential knowledge).   Thus in an earlier reference and defence of his theory of eidetic 57
ideation, or eidetic abstraction as he calls it in his Logical Investigations, in Ideas I, 
Section §75 (‘Phenomenology as a Descriptive Eidetic Doctrine of Pure Experiences’), 
Husserl stresses this methodological commitment in his definition of phenomenology as 
the way of gaining insight into such higher objects of knowledge corresponding to their 
legitimating sources in eidetic intuition.  In his words,   
[t]he study of the stream of mental processes is, for its part, carried on in a vari-
ety of peculiarly structured reflective acts which themselves also belong in the 
stream of mental processes and which, in corresponding reflections at a higher 
level, can be made the Objects of phenomenological analyses.  This is because 
their analysis is fundamental to a universal phenomenology and to the method-
ological insight quite indispensable to it (unentberliche methodologische Ein-
sicht).  58
 Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 9-11.  By regions of being, Husserl means areas of objectivities that are deter54 -
mined by their eidos, by the outward look they offer in a corresponding originary intuition.
 Ibid., p. 16.  Cf. also Frederick J. Wertz, ‘The Method of Eidetic Analysis for Psychology’, in The re55 -
direction of psychology: Essays in honour of Amedeo P. Giorgi, ed. by T.F. Cloonan and C. Thiboutot 
(Montreal: Le Cercle Interdisciplinaire de Recherches Phénoménologiques, 2010), pp. 261-278 (p. 283).
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 11.56
 Ibid., pp. 8-9, 11, 14.57
 Ibid., p. 177.58
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To attain such an insight into essence, Husserl believes that the phenomenologist must 
engage in a process of eidetic reduction and eidetic variation.   With the eidetic reduc59 -
tion, the subject shifts from its natural reflective focus on contingent, factual conscious 
processes and particular, material objects of sense judgement to a reflection on the es-
sential (i.e. necessary and universal) laws that determine their construction.   We can 60
know, for instance, certain colours of leaves on a tree, but when we make the universal 
a priori judgement that ‘colour’, no matter what particular colour or shade of colour it 
is, ‘is extended’, Husserl argues that we are inspecting what is necessarily true of colour 
itself and making a judgement about colour as a universal object of experience, and not 
just about particular sense judgements of colours.  We cannot know colours without 
colours being extended.  For Husserl, then, all eidetic laws are eidetic-ontological laws. 
They express the ‘inability-to-be-otherwise’ for the experienced or judged object, and 
not the factual, empirical, psychological ‘incapacity-to-represent-things-otherwise.’  61
In such eidetic judgements, therefore, we have gained more knowledge about our expe-
rience of colour itself than of colours as colours (in categorical intuitions), when we 
gain intuitive insight into the essence of colour as extension.  This direct and immediate 
trans-categorial knowledge of colour itself, of what Husserl calls the ‘eidos’ or ‘essence’ 
of the judgement, nonetheless, is given to our experiences.  Thus ‘intuiting essences’, 
Husserl writes in his famous 1910–11 Logos essay ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’, 
‘conceals no more difficulties or “mystical” secrets than does perception.  When we 
bring “colour” to full intuitive clarity, to givenness for ourselves, then the datum is an 
 Ibid., pp. xx, 7-8; Edmund Husserl, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: From the Lectures, Winter 59
Semester, 1910-1911, trans. by Ingo Farin and James G. Hart (Dordrecht, Springer, 2006), p. 17.
 Necessity here means that no instance of intentional life can elude these laws, while universality means 60
that  they encompass all possible cases.  It should be noted that the eidetic reduction itself involves a kind 
of epoche, a suspension of the assumption of factual existence: the essential structures of situations exist 
regardless of whether or not there are certain factual situations.
 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 1, pp. 445–446.61
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“essence” […].  As far as intuition —  i.e., having an intuitive consciousness — ex-
tends, so far extends the possibility of a corresponding “ideation” (as I called it in Lo-
gische Untersuchungen), or “seeing essence” (Wesensschau)’.   62
  According to Husserl, eidetic insight is achieved through a process of eidetic 
variation.  When engaging in this process, the subject begins with the actual experience 
of a fact and then proceeds to modify it in her free phantasy; she projects it into as many 
imaginative contexts as possible, varying its circumstances and even pushing it into the 
impossible.   In so doing, the individual is able to see which of its qualities can with63 -
stand these variations, and thereby attains knowledge of what is truly essential to the 
thing in question.   It is of the essence of colour, for example, to be extended.  In other 64
words, we cannot think away extension from the being of colour itself in and for any 
colour (coloured thing).  It thus follows that for Husserl his account of the ‘intuition of 
an essence’ is bound up with his sustained reflections on ‘dependent and non-dependent 
contents’ of judgement that concerned him in the Logical Investigations.  As Theodore 
de Boer succinctly remarks, ‘when a certain content is subjected to variation in fantasy, 
we discover that there are limits to the variation.  To go beyond such a limit is to rob the 
object of one of its essential characteristics.  This invariable limit is therefore part of the 
essence.  The aspects that can be altered in fantasy are non-essential or contingent’.  65
When we attempt to ‘think away’ or ‘annihilate’ those contents ‘in thought’ that either 
can or cannot be ‘eliminated’, what we are doing, then, is ‘trying to discover the inde-
 Husserl, ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’, in Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Phi62 -
losophy, trans. by Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 71–147 (pp. 110–111).
 Since the subject ‘has incomparably more freedom’ to reshape things in phantasy, Husserl states that 63
‘the freedom of eidetic research […] necessarily demands operating in phantasy’.  Husserl, Ideas I, p. 
159.
 Husserl, Experience and Judgment, pp. 340-342, 347-348; Husserl, Ideas I, p. 11.64
 Theodore de Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, trans. by Theodore Plantinga (The Hague: 65
Nijhoff, 1978), p. 343.
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pendence or non-independence of something’.   For Husserl, therefore, ‘eidetic 66
ideation’, ‘eidetic variation’, ‘eidetic abstraction’, and ‘eidetic reduction’ all mean the 
same; they are all part of the same process of ‘seeing the things themselves’, that is, 
‘essences’.  And this form of ‘seeing’, as de Boer concludes, is ‘not an odd form of 
imagination, but a procedure that is rigorously scientific, according to Husserl’.   It 67
takes, nonetheless, intellectual effort (er-schauen).  
1.3 THE FIRST MOMENT OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION: THE EPOCHE 
What interests Husserl as a phenomenologist is obtaining a radically unbiased and intu-
itively justifiable knowledge of whatever is.  Because of this, he ultimately comes to 
find that phenomenology cannot merely seek knowledge of this or that region of being, 
but must endeavour to achieve unbiased knowledge of the whole of everything that is, 
what Husserl refers to as the world.   This is not a new goal for philosophy.  Since its 68
very beginning, philosophy has sought an insight into the whole of existence, into the 
conditions that are common to all beings.   To attain a radically unbiased knowledge, 69
 Ibid.66
 Ibid., p. 344.67
 The world is understood by Husserl as a universal horizon, i.e. a horizon that encompasses the horizons 68
of all of my possible experiences.  In Ideas I the world is simply ‘the sum-total of objects of possible ex-
perience and experiential cognition, of objects that, on the basis of actual experiences, are cognizable in 
correct theoretical thinking’.  Husserl, Ideas I, p. 6.  This was not an object of enquiry in the Logical In-
vestigations, rather in that study Husserl, for the purposes of enquiry, sectioned off the experiences of a 
normatively valid logical consciousness as such, setting aside the natural world and the world of things 
about us.  This latter ‘fact world’, as he calls it in Ideas I, is simply not a concern of the logician qua logi-
cian. Husserl, in other words, evades this issue in the Logical Investigations, that is to say, presupposes its 
validity.  This presupposition, what Husserl later calls ‘the [hypo]thesis of the natural attitude’, becomes 
radically called into question through the transcendental reduction in Ideas I.
 As Aristotle notes in his Metaphysics, philosophy seeks to determine both what is common to beings as 69
such — i.e. the conditions that apply to beings in general — and the nature of the absolute foundation or 
underlying unity — i.e. the supreme being — of beings as a whole.  See Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, in The 
Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. by Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001), pp. 691-692, 
981b25-982a3. 
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Husserl’s phenomenology must plumb these depths; it must determine whether and how 
the subject is able to obtain an unprejudiced insight into its existence as a whole (i.e. 
world-knowledge).  While the eidetic reduction can be used ‘to light the way from par-
tial regions of the world (i.e., specific regions of being and their related types of acts) to 
their eidetic determinations, this insight into essence as such is still not a general 
knowledge of the world in the sense of a whole’.   Until the philosopher obtains unbi70 -
ased knowledge of the world as a whole, and instead finds her knowledge restricted to 
individual sections, there will always remain the risk that there are unquestioned biases 
and assumptions about consciousness itself lingering somewhere in these still unknown 
regions of being.   To achieve this, Husserl insists that we need to perform a transcen71 -
dental-phenomenological reduction.   It is this famous and celebrated reduction of the 72
natural attitude to the transcendental-phenomenological attitude that Husserl believes 
will finally allow phenomenology to become an unbiased method that both unlocks and 
attains an unbiased knowledge of the world (even if few, if any of Husserl’s so-called 
followers accepted this movement in his thought or in phenomenology). 
 According to Husserl, such a reduction is necessary because, in the subject’s 
natural attitude towards the world, both the world and consciousness remain unthemat-
ic.  In what Husserl calls ‘the general thesis’ of ‘the natural attitude’ (natürliche Einstel-
lung), things are perceived as ‘simply there’ (vorhanden), whether attention is directed 
towards them or not.   In this way, the subject covers over and largely forgets the origin 73
of the meaningfulness of the world in the correlational a priori of that being’s own in-
 Held, ‘Husserl’s Phenomenological Method’, in The New Husserl, ed. Welton, p. 17.70
 Ibid.71
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 113.72
 Ibid., pp. 51, 56.73
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tentional consciousness.   In its normal, everyday acts (i.e. judgments, perceptions, 74
etc.), the subject largely forgets that the world is always an experienced world, and so, 
is always ‘relative to the experiencing subject’.   In ‘the general thesis of the natural 75
attitude’, then, the subject is guided by the unquestioned assumption that the world of 
things enjoys an absolute, mind-independent existence and meaning (Sinn). 
 As a result, the natural attitude is characterised by a certain naiveté, that is, by a 
tendency to take the existence of the world for granted.  As James Dodd comments, our 
natural experience is guided by a ‘naive acceptance that the world “is”, that even the 
ever-present distance between the world and myself simply “is”’.   By the same token, 76
the natural attitude is ‘naive with respect to the significance of its own being’, as a way 
of realising the meaningfulness of the world as a whole.   The natural attitude does not 77
understand itself as such, as a particular ‘realisation of the whole that it “is”’.  78
 None of this is to say that the natural attitude is altogether oblivious of the fact 
that objects appear to us in subject-relative manners of givenness, or that it is dealing 
with a world that challenges and resists its effort with a certain obscurity or otherness.  79
The natural attitude involves an implicit awareness of these basic features of our lived 
experience, yet they remain in the background as unthematic.  The natural attitude does 
not preclude the subject from posing questions about its opinions or those of others, or 
 For Husserl’s account of the personal attitude, which occurs within the natural attitude, see his Ideas I, 74
pp. 240, 252.
 Sebastian Luft, ‘Husserl’s Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction: Between Life-World and Carte75 -
sianism’, Research in Phenomenology 34, no. 1 (2004), 198-234 (p. 204).  Husserl views this unques-
tioned belief in the world as the most basic presupposition of knowledge.
 James Dodd, ‘Attitude - Facticity - Philosophy’, in Alterity and Facticity: New Perspectives on 76
Husserl, ed. by Natalie Depraz and Dan Zahavi (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), p. 68.
 Ibid., p. 67.77
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from engaging in debate and attempting to justify its naively-held beliefs precisely be-
cause the pre-predicative positing of the existence of the world is assumed in the ‘thesis 
of the natural attitude’.  From this position, though, the subject does not feel any need to 
question the ultimate foundation of the meaningfulness of its having ideas, beliefs and 
justifications.  From within the thesis of the natural attitude the world is irrefragable. 
Naive life does not feel any pressing need to ‘satisfy a rigorous, painstaking demand for 
“truth”'.  80
 Briefly stated, then, everyday experience does not tend to be guided by strictly 
theoretical interests.  As John Scanlon notes, the natural attitude ‘presents the world, not 
as it would exist for a purely disinterested spectator, but as it does exist for an interest-
ed, involved participant.  Hence, it presents objects, events and situations as meaningful, 
as value-laden, and as having practical significance’.   The way of life proper to the 81
natural attitude is thus one in which the individual pursues her practical interests with-
out subjecting them to any fundamental questions.  In the natural attitude, the subject 
instead finds herself enamoured with the immediacy and obviousness of the world, by 
the familiarity of this world that is always already there, and which so often arouses her 
interests and satisfies her desires.  82
 If we are to obtain true (i.e. unprejudiced, objective) knowledge of the world as 
a whole, the subject will need to somehow suspend the natural attitude’s dogmatic belief 
 Ibid., p. 69.80
 John Scanlon, ‘Husserl’s Ideas and the Natural Concept of the World’, in Edmund Husserl and the 81
Phenomenological Tradition, ed. by Robert Sokolowski (Washington: The Catholic University of Ameri-
ca Press), p. 230.
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 53.82
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in its absolute existence.   Given that this attitude is as basic as it is to our everyday 83
lives — ‘something that lasts continuously throughout the whole duration of […] natur-
al waking life’, as Husserl states  — one might wonder whether we can free ourselves 84
of it enough in order to reflect on it in the unbiased way that Husserl’s rigorous science 
requires.  How could such a radical transformation possibly come about? Husserl makes 
it clear that the shift to the phenomenological (or theoretical) attitude requires a ‘specif-
ic motivation’.   That being said, if the natural attitude is not explicitly aware of itself 85
as such, and the individual who exists in such a way is so thoroughly satisfied with the 
comforting rhythms and routines of everyday life, then what motivation would there be 
to make a shift toward the philosophical attitude?  From within the parameters of the 86
natural attitude, so construed, escape seems impossible.  As Eugen Fink puts this, the 
phenomenological reduction seems to ‘presuppose itself’.   That is to say, it would not 87
be possible for the subject to suspend all of her prejudices and assumptions unless the 
natural attitude did not already have an understanding that its belief in the absolute exis-
tence of the world is something of a prejudice.  The motivation to undertake the shift to 
the philosophical attitude must therefore be situated somewhere within the natural atti-
tude. 
 As Husserl explains in Ideas I, the phenomenologist needs to ‘set aside all previous habits of thought, 83
see through and break down the mental barriers which these habits have set along the horizons of our 
thinking, and in full intellectual freedom proceed to lay hold on those genuine philosophical problems 
still awaiting completely fresh formulation which the liberated horizons on all sides disclose to us — 
these are hard demands.  Yet nothing less is required’.  Ibid., p. 43.
 Ibid., p. 57.84
 Edmund Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923/24): Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion, ed. by 85
Rudolf Boehm (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), p. 98.
 Ibid., pp. 97-99.86
 Eugen Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation, trans. by Ronald Bruzina (Bloomington: Indiana University 87
Press, 1995), p. 36.
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 Indeed, Husserl ultimately finds the motivation for this shift within the history 
of ideas, more specifically, in the idea of philosophy as a rigorous science and first phi-
losophy.   By engaging in an eidetic and phenomenological analysis of the idea-con88 -
tents and the underlying interrelations between the paradigmatic moments in the history 
of philosophy, Husserl eventually comes to find that this history is based upon the idea 
of achieving perfect self-justification (truth, total self-disclosure) for all of its positions 
(i.e. by grasping the essence of things in evidence).   In his eyes, it is this idea, which is 89
said to be determined in advance by God as the ultimate logos or rational principle,  90
which renders consciousness a rational infinite process of self-constitution, and which 
motivates the subject’s consciousness, in its freedom,  to suspend its naive world-belief 91
by enacting the epoche, by holding itself back from naively positing the world as exist-
ing in various ways.    92
 As Husserl states, in suspending our dogmatic belief in the absolute (indepen-
dent) existence of the world, 
 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 1-2.88
 Edmund Husserl, Erste Philosophie II (1923/24): Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion, ed. by 89
Rudolf Boehm (Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p. 29.  In adopting this eidetic and phenomenological 
stance toward the study of history, Husserl’s approach differs from that of empiricism — for which histo-
ry is a collection of objective facts -- and idealism — for which history is the progression of world-spirit. 
In analysing these historical presuppositions, not as prior philosophical systems, but as layers of sense 
that are sedimented within his own phenomenology, Husserl views his analysis of the history of philoso-
phy as an ‘archeology’ of phenomenological matters.  Ibid.
 Husserl argues for this in Ideas I, pp. 133-134.  As Husserl states later in this same work, ‘[t]he idea of 90
God is a necessary limiting concept in epistemological considerations, and an indispensable index to the 
construction of certain limiting concepts which not even the philosophizing atheist can do without.’  Ibid., 
p. 187, note 17.  For more on this matter, see Cyril McDonnell, ‘The Task and Significance of Philosoph-
ical Reflection on the Relation of the Finite to the Infinite after Kant, in Husserl, Heidegger, and 
Schleiermacher’, in Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society (2011), 93-116 (p. 94, note 4).
 Here Husserl is bringing his version of philosophy as transcendental phenomenology in line with post-91
Kantian German idealism of Fichte where what characterizes human consciousness is its freedom and 
your freedom is your consciousness.  For Husserl’s discussion of this, see his Ideas I, p. 61.  Cf. also 
Marcus Brainard, Belief and its Neutralization. Husserl’s System of Phenomenology in Ideas I (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2002).
 Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 61-62.  While the epoche can be applied to particular objects or regions of being, 92
Husserl ultimately finds it necessary to universalise the epoche, such that it applies to the world as a 
whole.
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the annulment in question is not a transmutation of positing into counter positing, 
of position into negation; it is also not a transmutation into uncertain presumption, 
deeming possible, undecidedness, into a doubt (in any sense whatever of the 
word): nor indeed is anything like that whiten the sphere of our free choice. 
Rather it is something wholly peculiar.  We do not give up the positing we effected, 
we do not in any respect alter our conviction which remains in itself as it is as 
long as we do not introduce new judgment-motives […].  Nevertheless, the posit-
ing undergoes a modification: while it in itself remains what it is, we, so to speak, 
‘put it out of action’ we ‘exclude it’, we ‘parenthesize it’.  It is still there, like the 
parenthesized in the parentheses, like the excluded outside the context of inclusion 
[wie das Ausgeschaltete außerhalb des Zusammmhanges der Schaltung].  We can 
also say: The positing is a mental process, but we make ‘no use’ of it, and this is 
not understood, naturally, as implying that we are deprived of it (as it would if we 
said of someone who was not conscious, that he made no use of a positing); 
rather, in the case of this expression and all parallel expressions it is a matter of 
indicative designations of a definite, specifically peculiar mode of consciousness 
which is added to the original positing simpliciter.  93
In carrying out the epoche, the subject does not negate or completely do away with the 
phenomenon of the world, but merely puts her judgment as to whether or not there is a 
world out of play in order to see the world purely in terms of how it appears to con-
sciousness — i.e. in terms of how it is known.   94
 In doing so, as Scanlon observes, 
I can deliberately adopt the stance of a ‘disinterested spectator’ [what Husserl 
calls the phenomenological or theoretical attitude].  I can assume a stance in 
which I am, temporarily or habitually, disinterested in those aspects of experi-
enced objects that refer, explicitly or implicitly, to my personal value-preferences 
and my personal practical projects.  I do so in order to focus attention exclusively 
upon the purely theoretical aspects of experience, those that disclose what objects 
are and how they are, regardless of how I feel about them or how I might be 
prompted to respond to them practically.    95
As the above passage from Husserl suggests, in suspending the feeling and practical 
layers of experience, these ‘disregarded strata of experience continue to function, but 
 Ibid., pp. 58-59.  It is like an electric circuit (Schaltung) that is ‘switched off’ (Ausgeshalten), but still 93
there, while switched off, a circuit-breaker.
 Ibid., pp. 61-62, 113, 115.94
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they are not taken into consideration as presenting data for theoretically interested ob-
servation’.   96
 For Husserl, then, the point of the epoche is primarily epistemological; it serves 
to liberate and edify the subject.   We suspend our naive belief in the absolute existence 97
of the world in hopes of gaining access to a region that is free of personal interest and 
involvement in the world, and which can therefore serve as the neutral position from 
which we might obtain unbiased, objective knowledge as to what founds this naive be-
lief in the world.  Assuming it can be carried out, the epoche effectively enables the sub-
ject to obtain historical absoluteness, which is a necessary prerequisite for systematic 
absoluteness. 
 Ibid., p. 231.96
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 84.  As Scanlon notes, by ‘disclosing a sphere of reflective observation not accessi97 -
ble within the natural attitude, the reduction points up the limits and relativity of the sense and validity of 
natural experience, limits not noticed by an observer who remains immersed in that attitude.  By thus lib-
erating phenomenological philosophers from those limits, the reduction also brings to light the general 
lesson of the fundamental significance of changes of attitudes.  Thus instructed, we can discern essential-
ly different attitudes within the overall natural attitude, each with its appropriate apperceptive categories’. 
Scanlon, ‘Husserl’s Ideas and the Natural Concept of the World’, in Edmund Husserl and the Phenome-
nological Tradition, ed. by Sokolowski, pp. 229-230.
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1.4 THE SECOND MOMENT OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION: THE REDUCTION 
PROPER 
This brings us to the second, interrelated moment of the transcendental-phenomenologi-
cal reduction, namely, the reduction proper.   In this second moment, the subject is led 98
back (i.e. reduced) to the absolute foundation of the world.  In Husserl’s view, this is 
none other than the pure ego.   When the subject suspends its naive belief in the abso99 -
lute existence of the world, and begins to reflect in an unconditional manner on its acts 
and their structure, Husserl claims that what it discovers is ‘a “pure” Ego stripped of 
any worldly meaning’.   What remains after the epoche ‘is the transcendental Ego, 100
which is not part of the world, but is that which “has” the world “opposed” to it as its 
universal correlate.  This consciousness is the totality of the field of intentionality, as the 
correlate to the worldly totality given in intentional acts’.    101
 Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 20-22.  It is important to stress that, though we are laying out the two moments of 98
the reduction under separate headings, the moments are not separate but are interrelated and occur togeth-
er. The section in Ideas I that houses the reduction is called ‘The Fundamental Phenomenological Consid-
eration’.  Here, Husserl selects and compares the mode of being as thing (Sein als Ding) given to outer 
perceptual-sense experience and being as (conscious) experience (Sein as Erlebnis) given in inner percep-
tion for phenomenological (eidetic) analysis and subjects both of these experiences to an apodictic criti-
cism of experience.  The conclusion of this analysis is well known (even if not well understood or accept-
ed by many): whereas the mode of being as thing (and by extension the world of things) is dependent for 
its very existence on the facticity of the actual harmony (Zusammenhang) of one’s intentional perceptual 
experiences, the mode of being as (conscious) experience is not, and so, has an absolute mode of being (= 
independent of things and the world).  Thus one’s own actual intentional consciousness could exist even 
if the entire world of things were annihilated (in the repeatable world-annihilation thought-experiment). 
My actual consciousness, then, cannot depend upon the thing (the world of things) to exist, for it (and the 
world of things) depend upon the hidden but now unlocked depth dimension of my actual transcendental 
consciousness.  Thus the thesis of the natural attitude — that is, the hypothesis that in perception things 
are simply there (vorhanden), whether attention is directed towards them or not — is unveiled as precise-
ly that, that is, as an unjustifiable phenomenological hypothesis and fictional account of the true meaning 
of the being of the world. 
 Ibid., p. 64.99
 Luft, ‘Husserl’s Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction’, p. 207.  By this Husserl means that our 100
consciousness cannot be compared or understood in terms of any being of a thing given to outer percep-
tual sense experience e.g. as an epiphenomenon of the body or brain etc, as the world, for Husserl, simply 
means the totality of things that are or can be given to outer sense perception.
 Ibid.101
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 The reduction proper thereby reveals that the pure ego is the universal a priori 
origin of the meaningfulness of the world; that it is the pure transcendental field where 
the world’s meaningfulness is constituted in the first place.   As Husserl writes in the 102
Cartesian Meditations, ‘this world, with all its Objects […] derives its whole sense and 
its existential status, which it has for me, from me as the transcendental Ego, the Ego 
who comes to the fore only with the transcendental-phenomenological epoche’.  103
Therefore, this subjective pole of consciousness is transcendental in that it bestows 
meaning on conscious experience, which is to say, it allows it to hold together or make 
sense. 
 This brings about a seismic shift in the subject’s understanding of its relation to 
both the meaning (Sinn) and existence of the world.  In the reduction proper, the exis-
tence of the world whose validity was previously held in suspense is now revealed as 
dependent upon the intentional accomplishments of the pure ego.  In Husserl’s words,  
the whole spatiotemporal world, which includes human being and the human Ego 
as subordinate single realities is, according to its sense, a merely intentional be-
ing, thus one has the merely secondary sense of a being for a consciousness.  It is 
a being posited by consciousness in its experiences which, of essential necessity, 
can be determined and intuited only as something identical belonging to motivat-
ed multiplicities of appearances: beyond that it is nothing.  104
The transcendental reduction essentially gets rid of the interpretation of the material 
world as fostered by the natural attitude as an independent entity and reveals that nature 
only exists as constituting itself within intentional consciousness itself.  In other words, 
the reduction reveals that ‘the world is a part of the correlational a priori’, that it ‘is the 
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 199.102
 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 26.103
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 112.104
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whole of all intentionally appearing objects’.   As such, it enables the subject to see 105
that the relation between consciousness and the world is one of dependence, where con-
sciousness has an ontological priority over the world, such that the latter is relative to 
the former.    106
 As the absolute foundation of the world, Husserl claims that the pure ego enjoys 
an absolute, self-contained existence.   The pure ego is ‘a sui generis entity with no 107
necessary ontological ties to or dependence upon any other existing entity’.   Conse108 -
quently, as James Mensch notes, the pure ego is not determined by worldly, ‘constituted 
formation[s]’ such as the body.   The pure ego is not in the world as a part within a 109
whole; it is not objectively a part of the world, say, as a human being, a mother, daugh-
ter, etc.  Indeed, according to Husserl, the pure ego contains ‘nothing human’ (as seen 
and determined from within the thesis of the natural attitude, and so, a fortiori from any 
natural-scientific theoretical standpoint adopted within that attitude).   Husserl insists 110
 Sebastian Luft, ‘Husserl’s method of reduction’, in The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology, ed. 105
by Sebastian Luft and Søren Overgaard (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 250; Held, ‘Husserl’s Phenomeno-
logical Method’, in The New Husserl, ed. Welton, p. 23.
 Therefore, while the existence of the world depends on consciousness, the opposite is not true.  The 106
subject’s relation to the world is based upon its fundamental difference from the latter.  And it is this dif-
ference that provides the subject with its freedom, with the ability to step back and reflect on the world in 
a disinterested way.  As Husserl writes, ‘[b]etween consciousness and reality there yawns a veritable 
abyss of meaning.’  Husserl, Ideas I, p. 93.
 As Husserl writes, ‘consciousness, regarded in its “purity”, amounts to a self-contained context of 107
being, a context of absolute being, into which nothing can penetrate and from which nothing can escape’. 
Ibid.
 Matt Bower, ‘Husserl on Perception: A Nonrepresentationalism That Nearly Was’, European Journal 108
of Philosophy 25, no. 4 (2017), 1768-1790 (p. 1770).  Indeed, since his aim is to secure unbiased, objec-
tive knowledge, Husserl believes that the pure ego, ‘as a presupposition for knowledge of the world, can-
not be and cannot remain presupposed as a worldly being’, as this would hinder the ability of the phe-
nomenologist to pursue such knowledge and become ‘“genuine epistemology”’.  James Mensch, Deci-
sions and Transformations: The Phenomenology of Embodiment (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2020), p. 8.
 Ibid.  Mensch goes on to note that the point of Husserl’s thought ‘is not just to assert that "this ego 109
must, through the phenomenological reduction and the epoché […] be brought to transcendental purity” 
— i.e., freed from its relation to the body.  It is to eliminate the body’s role as determinative of conscious-
ness’.  Ibid., p. 8.
 Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, pp. 183-184.110
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that transcendental subjectivity contains ‘neither soul nor psychic life nor real psy-
chophysical human beings; all this belongs to the “phenomenon”, to the world as a con-
stituted pole’.   Transcendental subjectivity is ‘a structure that does not draw its final 111
meaning from any given instance of being-in-relation, any given issue or problem of 
life, but is, rather, both prior and independent.  That is: “prior and independent” to the 
sum total of discrete, factical relations, to the order of things, yet nevertheless contained 
“in” them, functioning anonymously, yet universally’.  112
 As such, in unlocking this absolute context of being that has been purified of 
any and all empirical particularities, Husserl believes that he has unlocked a realm that 
is not limited to the a priori modes of human knowledge, but which extends to include 
the a priori modes of knowledge in general, and which thereby applies to all possible 
experience, whether that of humans, extra-terrestrials, or God.  113
 Yet Husserl states that the subject is also an objective part of the world.  As he 
himself would eventually acknowledge, this account of subjectivity — as described in 
the natural and theoretical attitudes — leads to a paradoxical situation in which the sub-
ject is at once that which constitutes the world and something that is itself incorporated 
within it.  As Husserl asks, ‘[h]ow can a component part of the world, its human subjec-
tivity, constitute the whole world, namely, constitute it as its intentional 
formation…?’  However, although Husserl would eventually acknowledge this para114 -
dox, as commentators such as Dermot Moran have observed, his statements regarding 
the status of the transcendental ego are often fairly ambiguous and perplexing, and he 
 Ibid.  Cf. also Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 63, 102, 113, 138.111
 Dodd, ‘Attitude - Facticity - Philosophy’, in Alterity and Facticity, ed. by Depraz and Zahavi, p. 64. 112
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 362.113
 Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, pp. 180, 178.114
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ultimately does not provide a clear, detailed account of the identity of the transcendental 
ego and its relation to the empirical ego.   The problem is no mere side-issue for phe115 -
nomenology.  Insofar as the transcendental ego stands at the very heart of the phenome-
nological method, unless there is a sufficiently clear account of who or what this tran-
scendental ego is, it is not possible to determine just what kind of validity the insights of 
phenomenology truly harbour.  And until this has been established in sufficient detail, 
phenomenology must necessarily fall short as a first philosophy that would account for 
its own procedures and findings. 
 On account of this, it should come as no surprise that the phenomenological re-
duction has historically received no shortage of criticism.   Since its first formulation 116
in Ideas I, Husserl’s peers in Munich and Göttingen — such as Adolf Reinach, Johannes 
Daubert, Alexander Pfänder, Edith Stein and other so-called ‘realist phenomenologists’ 
—  rejected the transcendental turn altogether, viewing it as a turn away from the 117
 Dermot Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), pp. 115
230-231.
 Apart from the basic issue of who or what the transcendental ego is, another prevalent issue in the 116
relevant literature is whether this paradox amounts to a contradiction and fundamental problem for 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.  On this point, there is no general agreement amongst Husserl 
scholars.  While figures such as David Carr argue that it does, others, such as John Drummond, maintain 
that it does not.  See David Carr, The Paradox of Subjectivity: The self in the transcendental tradition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 9; John Drummond, ‘Paradox or contradiction?’ Human 
Studies 25, no. 1, 89-102.  
 The so-called ‘realist’ followers of the early Husserl, based their positions on their interpretations of 117
either Husserl’s views on the intentionality of sense perception or the ‘realism’ of essences.  There is a 
realism in the Logical Investigations, but it is not based upon Husserl’s understanding of the intentionality 
of sense perception, but on the ‘natural attitude’ which is assumed and set aside in that study (and later 
rejected by Husserl).  Regarding ‘the realism of essences’, this was also considered at the time as a kind 
of ‘Platonism’.  Whether we wish to call this ‘realism’ or ‘Platonism’, see Husserl’s response to this inter-
pretation in Ideas, §22: ‘The Reproach of Platonic Realism. Essence and Concepts’, pp. 40–42 (p. 41): ‘I 
did not invent the universal concept of object; I only restored the concept required by all propositions of 
pure logic and pointed out that it is an essentially indispensable one and therefore that it also determines 
universal scientific language.’  Cf. also Emmanuel Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenom-
enology, trans. by André Orianne (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 97; and de 
Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, pp. 263–269.
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richness of ‘the things themselves’ and towards a kind of subjectivism.   More recent118 -
ly, Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith have similarly argued that ‘Husserl, in his so-
called transcendental reduction, wants to sever all ties with reality by substituting acts 
of reflection [i.e. on the universal structure of the pure ego] for straightforward ones, as 
if it were possible to bid farewell to the direct awareness of reality’ and that, as a result, 
Husserl’s phenomenology ultimately ‘not only retreats from reality, it bars to itself the 
very possibility of an access to it’.   On this reading, transcendental subjectivity 119
emerges as an abstract, ethereal entity, which would supplant the empirical ego and its 
real everyday life as the proper object of phenomenological study.  
 In this case, it would be only natural to wonder whether the transcendental and 
empirical egos are simply two different, independent entities.  If so, this would poten-
tially resolve the paradox in question, though it may also fall prey to the accusations of 
Schuhmann, Smith and the realist phenomenologists.  Yet this suggestion stands in con-
trast to Husserl’s own statements on the matter.  Husserl makes it clear that it is the phe-
nomenologist herself who comes to the transcendental ego.  It is by engaging in the act 
of phenomenological reflection that the phenomenologizing individual brings about a 
split between the empirical and the transcendental ego, and so the two must be essential-
ly connected in some way.  If this is the case, then transcendental phenomenology 
would not necessarily close the subject off from the things themselves.  At the same 
time, Husserl is no less clear that the split induced by the phenomenological reduction is 
a radical one, such that it brings about a qualitatively different kind of ego, and a wholly 
 Since there appeared many different versions of phenomenology that not only deviated significantly 118
from Husserl’s original idea but also came into conflict with each other (e,g. Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, 
Sartre, Levinas) the question ‘what is phenomenology?’ emerged by the mid-half of the twentieth century. 
See Pierre Thévenaz, ‘Qu’est-ce que la phénoménologie?’, Revue de théologie et de philosophie, 9, no. 1 
(1952), pp. 9–30.
 Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, ‘Against Idealism: Johannes Daubert vs. Husserl’s Ideas I’, Review 119
of Metaphysics 38, no. 4 (1985), 763–793 (p. 459).
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different kind of reflection.  As he writes, the phenomenological reduction leaves us 
with ‘a very “unnatural” attitude and a very unnatural observation of self and world 
[…]. The unnatural life is the life of pure and radical self-reflection, self-reflection upon 
the pure “I am”, upon the pure egoic life’.   Though there obviously needs to be a 120
union of some kind between the respective transcendental and empirical egos, Husserl 
does not address the nature of this union in detail or at any real length.  While he spends 
considerable time outlining the basic structures of transcendental subjectivity and how it 
functions in constituting the world, he is ultimately rather unclear as to who or what this 
pure ego really is.  Not surprisingly, then, there remains no consensus on this matter to 
this day.       
 In spite of these unresolved issues, in reducing the world to the way in which it 
constitutes itself according to the order of consciousness, Husserl contends that the sub-
ject is able to bring things to their absolute self-givenness.  Husserl notes that transcen-
dent objects in the world are spatial in essence and so they are given to consciousness in 
adumbration (i.e. partial spatial profiles).  In principle, then, the perception of such 
things is always incomplete, inadequate and infinite.  In contrast, he finds that the im-
manent contents (i.e. thoughts and experiences) of consciousness are given absolutely 
(i.e. in an immediate, transparent manner).  For example, when we reflect upon the per-
ceptual acts in which transcendent objects are given to us in partial profiles, these re-
flective acts themselves are not given in partial perspectives.  They do not have a hidden 
backside, but are nothing more than what they appear, and so they are given as abso-
lute. 
 Edmund Husserl, First Philosophy: Lectures 1923/24 and Related Texts from the Manuscripts 120
(1920-1925), trans. by Sebastian Luft and Thane Naberhaus (Dordrecht, Springer, 2018), p. 324.
 47
 In light of this, Husserl regards the immanence of consciousness as ‘absolute 
and clear givenness, self-givenness in the absolute sense’.   For him, absolute self-121
givenness is always a matter of objective awareness.   As he explains in The Idea of 122
Phenomenology, the transcendental reduction thus necessarily involves a reduction of 
the vague, subject-relative givenness of transcendent things to the clear, absolute given-
ness of consciousness.    123
 More specifically, when this reduction follows after the eidetic reduction — i.e. 
after a shift from our natural focus on particular material objects toward a reflection on 
the essence of things — as it normally does in Husserl, the transcendental reduction in-
volves a phenomenological reflection on the essential features of acts directed toward 
essences.   As Dagfinn Føllesdal notes, this is not the same as a reflection on the es124 -
sential traits ‘of acts directed toward individual concrete objects’.   Therefore, it 125
would seem that the order of the reductions does indeed matter.   By following this 126
path, phenomenology comes into its own as an eidetic science of a purified transcenden-
 Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. by Lee Hardy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), p. 27.121
 Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 75-78, 153–155.  Indeed, throughout his work, it is clear that Husserl views the 122
analysis of objectifying acts of intentional consciousness as the most pressing endeavour for his phenom-
enology.  See Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume I, pp. 648, 570-571.
 Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, p. 27; Husserl, Ideas I, p. xx.  Bearing this in mind, Alweiss 123
notes that the philosopher essentially seeks ‘to return to the origins of thought itself.  The original, abso-
lute givenness toward which perception strives is transcendental subjectivity.  The transcendental stream 
of consciousness as absolute describes nothing but this ideal of all knowledge, and is thus a structure that 
is defined by reason.  Husserl refers to it as an originary reason.  “Since the rational positing should be a 
positing originaliter, it must have its rational ground in the originary givenness in the full sense of what is 
determined: The X is not only meant in full determinedness, but is given originarily precisely in this de-
terminedness.”  Perception does not aspire to an outside world, it does not strive toward an idea that is 
posited outside subjectivity; it intends an originary given that is immanent to transcendental subjectivity. 
Transcendental consciousness is an “absolute telos” of all knowing’.  Alweiss, The World Unclaimed, p. 
135; Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 340-341. 
 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: 124
Second Book, trans. by R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), p. 157.  Henceforth 
abbreviated as Ideas II.
 Føllesdal, ‘Husserl’s Reductions and the Role They Play in His Phenomenology’, p. 112.125
 Ibid., p. 113.  That being said, Føllesdal also points out that ‘there are some few texts where he 126
[Husserl] seems to permit the reductions to come in either order [i.e. the transcendental reduction before 
the eidetic].  In that case, phenomenology would presumably comprise the study of both realms’.  Ibid.
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tal subjectivity, where the latter is understood as the ‘ever-present basis of all relation, 
[of] all presence that occurs within the purview of the “world”'.  127
 Bearing this in mind, it is important to remember that while the transcendental 
reduction requires consciousness to turn toward an analysis of its acts, contrary to what 
some commentators have maintained, this does not necessarily entail a neglect of the 
things themselves in favour of wild, solipsistic fantasy.   The transcendental reduction 128
simply enables the subject to reflect in an unconditional manner on the essential features 
of the acts to which the essence of things are given and on which they depend, and to 
thereby recognise its naive world-belief for what it is: an unquestioned and phenomeno-
logically unjustifiable assumption.  In this sense, the transcendental phenomenologist is 
only interested in consciousness as the site of the world’s appearance.  As Husserl him-
self observes, ‘though we have “excluded” the whole world with all physical things, liv-
ing beings, and humans, ourselves included […] [s]trictly speaking, we have not lost 
anything but rather have gained the whole of absolute being which, rightly understood, 
contains within itself, “constitutes” within itself, all worldly transcendencies’.   At its 129
heart, then, the reduction opens one up to the possibility of obtaining true knowledge of 
the world as a whole, to seeing the world in its proper light, in terms of its Idea or truth 
as a world.    130
 Dodd, ‘Attitude - Facticity - Philosophy’, p. 64.127
 Schuhmann and Smith ‘Against Idealism: Johannes Daubert vs. Husserl’s Ideas I', pp. 790-792.128
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 113.129
 In this sense, Husserl’s aim is always to return to an absolute subject that constitutes an ideal objective 130
world.  In his eyes, ‘the only world that ever can exist for me’, the only world that concerns the phenom-
enologist, is the ‘Objective world’ that is constituted by an absolute consciousness.  See Husserl, Carte-
sian Meditations, p. 26.
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CHAPTER 2  
HUSSERL’S ANALYTIC OF CONSTITUTION 
While our critical exposition of Husserl’s methodological procedure has shed some light 
on both its shortcomings and the way in which it is said to unlock transcendental sub-
jectivity as the ultimate foundation of the world, to make good on this claim, none-
theless, Husserl must show how the transcendental ego constitutes the world.  That is to 
say, he must reflectively elucidate those essential structures of transcendental subjectivi-
ty which enable things to appear to the subject as existing in themselves (i.e. in their 
objectivity).  1
 As we will see, Husserl views the process of constitution as unfolding through a 
series of layers — among them, perception, the body, and temporality.   Between 1907 
and 1909, Husserl comes to view temporality as the absolute foundation of all constitu-
tion of a meaningful world.  In the process of demonstrating how the temporal structure 
of human consciousness makes it possible for that being to constitute the meaning of the 
world, he ultimately finds it necessary to set his sights on a still more fundamental ques-
tion, namely, how is it that subjectivity, as this stream of inner temporality, is itself 
made possible? How is it that we are able to experience this stream of experiences as 
such? As we will see, Husserl argues that in order to truly account for subjectivity as the 
 To be sure, in the development of his thought, Husserl also tries to account for what Held describes as a 1
‘narrower, more common sense’ of objectivity.  Held, ‘Husserl’s Phenomenology of the Life-World’, in 
The New Husserl, ed. by Welton, p. 48.  With this type of objectivity, Husserl endeavours to explain how 
it is that objects can appear in the same way to different people, despite the fact that they stand in differ-
ent lived situations.  An account of this kind of objectivity hinges upon an account of the constitution of 
intersubjectivity.  We will address this form of objectivity at a later point.  This chapter limits its focus to 
some of the key elements of subjectivity that makes this type of absolute objectivity possible.
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ground of the world, there must be a more basic ground, that of the living present, or 
what he also refers to as the primordial ego or self.  2
 In this chapter, therefore, our study of Husserl’s constitutive analyses will seek 
to clarify and critically assess his account of some of the essential structures — in par-
ticular, perception, the living body, temporality and the living present — that enable 
transcendental subjectivity to constitute the very existence and objectivity of the world 
as we know it.  This will enable us to familiarise ourselves with Husserl’s account of the 
inner nature of transcendental subjectivity and how it functions.  In so doing, we will 
address the issue as to whether he is successful in making good on his claim that his 
phenomenology, through its focus on the living present as the defining nature of the 
very being of our human intentional consciousness, is able to deliver and present this 
absolute ground to and for phenomenological reflection.  
2.1 THE PRIVILEGE OF PERCEPTION 
Let us now turn to our study of Husserl’s attempt to provide evidence for his assertion 
that the pure ego makes possible the constitution of the world.  In order to demonstrate 
how intentional consciousness constitutes the world, Husserl must explain how con-
sciousness transcends itself.  In other words, how is it that consciousness relates to 
something other than itself? And how is it that, in the natural attitude, consciousness 
comes to apprehend things as existing in themselves? It is a defining feature of 
Husserl’s phenomenology that the meaning of all concepts must be located in perceptu-
 Husserl speaks to the ‘reduction to the living present’ as ‘the most radical reduction’ in Zur Phänome2 -
nologishen Reduktion: Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926–1935), ed. by Sebastian Luft (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
2002), p. 187.
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ally-founded acts.  As such, he views perception as the example and ground of all inten-
tional, lived experience. 
 The question, therefore, now arises as to how it is that perceptual consciousness 
transcends itself, such that it is able to constitute knowledge of objects as existing in 
themselves? Husserl’s account of this matter begins with the observation that, although 
what is intuitively presented to us is not given to us in its entirety, we nevertheless per-
ceive objects as a whole.  This leads to his insistence that each intuition contains a vari-
ety of manners of givenness, or what he refers to as adumbrations.   While those adum3 -
brations that are realised present the object to me as intuited, those that are not are expe-
rienced as potentialities, as that which, while not currently given, could be given at a 
later point for further legitimating outer perceptual-sense experiences.  On this account, 
those adumbrations that are realised point toward certain potentialities and, in so doing, 
form referential interconnections with them (i.e. horizons of sense).  Because a thing is 
spatial in essence, nonetheless, it can never form part of consciousness — in this sense 
it is ‘transcendent’ in a ‘genuine’ sense — and its mode of givenness, in principle, is 
given of eidetic-ontological necessity one-sidedly and in adumbration.  This is an eidet-
ic-ontological law governing the outer perceptual-sense experience of things, or ‘thing-
perception’ as Husserl calls it in the reduction.  
 For Husserl, ‘external perception harbours its inner and outer horizons’.   Be4 -
cause our perceptions involve internal horizons, for example, any content that fulfils a 
preceding intentional aim is given with a background, with a horizon of indeterminate, 
 Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 88, 91.3
 Edmund Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Log4 -
ic, trans. by Anthony J. Steinbock (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), pp. 108, 253.
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perceptually co-given information.   The horizonal (i.e. referential) character of con5 -
sciousness provides us with a rough idea of an intuitable whole, which stands beyond 
and pre-delineates whatever is intuitively given at any one moment in time.   Conse6 -
quently, as Elliott indicates, ‘any “givens” of intuition are subject to an a priori pre-de-
lineation, just as the artist makes sketches of the subject in advance, or the architect pre-
pares a plan of the building to be constructed’.    7
 In this case, whatever is given is always preceded by an intentional anticipation, 
such that what is given to us either fulfils or disappoints our anticipation.  This means 
that our perception of something always involves an anticipation of what is perceivable 
from other perspectives.  According to Husserl, it is this anticipation that gives the sub-
ject in the natural attitude to take presumptively that things transcend what happens to 
be given to it at the moment, and that they therefore have an identity which subsists 
over time, and which exists in itself. 
 In fact, the horizonal nature of consciousness also results in the extension of this 
belief to the world.   In Husserl’s view, there is a certain endless or infinite nature to 8
thing-perception in horizonal consciousness.  In the course of everyday experience, to 
be sure, this or that anticipation may be disappointed.  But such disappointments only 
ever lead to a change in the way we construe things, and not to an utter nothingness.  In 
this way, horizonal consciousness always leads us onto something else, and this end-
lessness of horizonal consciousness gives us a sense of the world as a seemingly in-
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 94.  Meanwhile, external horizons refer to what perception grasps of an object’s rela5 -
tion to one’s own physical body, other objects and the surrounding environment in general.
 Elliott, p. 12.6
 Ibid., p. 15.  In other words, ‘the ‘sense’ of the given for Husserl is always informed by an intentional 7
‘pre-sense’’.  Ibid., p. 12.
 Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 9, 98-99.8
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dubitable horizon of all horizons, as a universal horizon that cannot be negated, on the 
basis of which consciousness can grasp particular objects.  The horizonal nature of con-
sciousness therefore gives us to believe in the world as this ever-enduring ground of ex-
perience, as this ground whose identity transcends our changing lived experiences of 
things, and which thus seems to exist in itself.   
 In order to fully explain how horizonal consciousness is able to anticipate and 
apprehend things as existing in themselves, though, we still need to draw out the specif-
ic components that are involved in this process.  What initiates our anticipation of 
things, Husserl tells us, are the absent yet co-given properties or adumbrations.  As 
these adumbrations are not the focus of our attention, they remain unthematic and 
vague.  As such, they are not presented to me as full-fledged objects, but as non-objec-
tive, non-intentional sensory (or hyletic) content.   Because we do not encounter these 9
adumbrations as objects, Husserl maintains that hyle are reel, immanent moments of 
consciousness.   That is to say, sensory contents seem to be a mind-bound affair, 10
though Husserl’s position on this undergoes some changes in his later years.   The main 11
reason for this is that raw sensation is viewed by Husserl as too indeterminate to make 
contact with the world as such.  That being said, as Matt Bower points out, this is not to 
say that sensation is ‘utterly unstructured’, only that it is ambiguous or obscure.   As 12
 Ibid., pp. 204-205.9
 Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), trans. by 10
John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991), p. 106.
 While the Husserl of Ideas I regards sensation as raw stuff that is immanent to consciousness, as Jere11 -
my Smith notes, the later Husserl seems to regard it as an immanent alterity or transcendence, and so, as 
‘the primordial manifestation of the world, prior to the emergence of explicit objects, belonging intrinsi-
cally to subjectivity’.  See Jeremy Smith, ‘Michel Henry’s Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience and 
Husserlian Intentionality’, pp. 201-203.  For more on this point, see Dan Zahavi, Self-Awareness and Al-
terity: A Phenomenological Investigation (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999) pp. 120-121, 
200-202; Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Zweiter Teil: 1921-1928, ed. by 
Kern Iso (Nijhoff, Den Haag, 1973) p. 379; Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: 
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such, though, raw sensation is said to merely provide the material for the potential ap-
pearance of the world.  It is through sensation that consciousness can access the objec-
tive world’s vast array of colours, shapes, sounds, smells and so on. 
 In order to actually make contact with objectively existing things, however, 
hyletic sensations need to be formed or interpreted by more complex mental acts, by 
noetic acts of apprehension.   For Husserl, then, the ‘[t]he stream of phenomenological 13
being has a [hyletic] stuff-stratum and a noetic stratum.’   By virtue of the privileged 14
role it seems to play in the constitution of the world, Husserl insists that the hyletic stra-
tum ‘obviously stands far below the noetic’, and that ‘[t]he incomparably more impor-
tant and fruitful analyses belong to the noetical side.’   By forming or interpreting inde15 -
terminate sensory content, it is these noetic acts that allow consciousness to apprehend 
or apperceive an objectivity as revealing itself through the sensory content.  While sen-
suous hyle, which Husserl regards as the basic substratum of experience, is needed to 
get this constitutive process underway, it is the apperception of the sensuous data that 
enables consciousness to transcend itself and to construct (i.e. constitute the meaning 
of) objects as such.   In so doing, Husserl finds that consciousness is directed toward 16
more than what is currently given.  In apperceiving the object as such, then, conscious-
ness simultaneously anticipates the possibility of experiencing the object in its 
entirety.   In this way, apperception not only presents objects to us, but it also appre17 -
 Ibid., pp. 205-207.  In this sense, Husserl does not believe that sensation has its own ‘world-involving 13
intentionality’; this only arises from its being caught up in animating acts of apprehension or interpreta-
tion.  See Bower, ‘Husserl on Perception’, p. 1787.  Because of this, Didier Franck notes that Husserl 
views sensation as ‘negative and relative to intentionality’.  Didier Franck, ‘The Object of Phenomenolo-
gy’, in Nietzsche and Phenomenology, ed. by Élodie Boublil and Christine Daigle (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2013), pp. 258-273 (p. 265).
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sents properties of the object that are not currently given, but which could be from an-
other perspective.   In giving rise to these appresentations, apperception constitutes 18
horizons of sense, which enables the individual in the natural attitude to apprehend ob-
jects as transcending what is given to it at the moment, and, in this sense, as existing in 
themselves.   
 However, as we know, in a philosophical-phenomenological attitude, one re-
frains from any belief in the existence or non-existence of the world and, in a disinter-
ested fashion, reflects on the how of an object in its appearance to consciousness.  In so 
doing, the philosopher qua phenomenologist comes to understand that the object that 
appears to the naive individual in the natural attitude as existing in itself is in fact the 
noema, which is to say, something that is constituted by a corresponding noetic appre-
hension.   As such, the noema is deemed to be essential to consciousness, but it is not a 19
real part of it.   In other words, the noema is the object as perceptual meaning; it is the 20
object as experienced, which is distinct from the transcendent object itself, understood 
as ‘the bearer of the object’s properties’.   21
 The relation between the noema and the object in Husserl is a complicated and 
contentious one.  John Drummond has shown, in compelling fashion, that the distinc-
tion is not in fact one between two distinct entities, but between two different perspec-
 Ibid., pp. 125-126.  This means that our perceptions do not merely present us with whatever sensory 18
information is given to us at a particular moment — they also appresent ‘non-sensory a-modal informa-
tion.  A-modal information concerns co-present properties that are not part of the sensory makeup of per-
ceptual experience at a given moment’.  Matt Bower, ‘Affectively Driven Perception: Toward a Non-rep-
resentational Phenomenology’, Husserl Studies, 30, no. 3 (2014), 225-245 (p. 4).  It is the appresentation-
al character of consciousness that enables us to have access to the full (objective) presence of things. 
Ibid., pp. 3, 5.
 Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 213-214.19
 Ibid., p. 214.20
 Smith, ‘Michel Henry’s Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience and Husserlian Intentionality’, p. 21
207.
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tives on one and the same entity.   According to Drummond’s interpretation, Husserl 22
locates the relation between consciousness and the object within the noema itself.   On 23
this view, the noematic core is the meaning or sense of the object in its fullness, while 
the object itself is the innermost moment of the noema.   On this reading, there is thus 24
a strong intimacy between noema and object.  Owing to this intimacy, when conscious-
ness transcends its own ‘reel’ moments — raw sense stuff and its noetic apprehension 
— it encounters the real, concrete object as noematic sense.   It is this object that ap25 -
pears to consciousness owing to its constituting activity.        
 The process of constitution is therefore seen by Husserl as essentially a matter of 
sense-bestowal (i.e. apperceptive objectification).   It is noetic sense-giving that is es26 -
sential to perceptual consciousness — i.e. without noetic sense-giving, there is no per-
 John Drummond, Husserlian intentionality and non-foundational realism: Noema and object (Dor22 -
drecht: Kluwer, 1990); John Drummond, ‘The structure of intentionality’, in The New Husserl: A Critical 
Reader, ed. by Donn Welton (Bloomington: Indianan University Press, 2003).  The other dominant view 
of the view, which is known as the West Coast interpretation — Drummond’s interpretation being that of 
the East Coast — is that the noema and the object are two ontologically distinct entities.  Apart from the 
fact that this position stands in contrast to some of Husserl’s other findings, the drawback of this position 
is that it makes Husserl adopt more of a strictly representationalist stance towards things than he perhaps 
really did.  See David Woodruff Smith, Husserl (New York: Routledge, 2007); David Woodruff Smith 
and Ronald McIntyre, ‘Husserl’s identification of meaning and noema’, The Monist 59, no. 1 (1975), 
115–132.
 Drummond, Husserlian intentionality and non-foundational realism, p. 138; Drummond, ‘The struc23 -
ture of intentionality’, pp. 190-192.  
 Smith, ‘Michel Henry’s Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience and Husserlian Intentionality’, p. 24
207.  Speaking to the difference between noema and object, Smith notes that while ‘the tree itself per-
forms photosynthesis and can burn up in a fire’, the suggestion ‘that our experience of the tree, either as 
noesis or noema, should burn up or perform photosynthesis is in an absolute sense unthinkable.’  Ibid., p. 
200.  Given the intimacy between noema and object that is highlighted in Drummond’s interpretation, one 
may wonder whether Drummond himself goes far enough in stressing the degree of intimacy between 
noema and object.  As Smith notes, ‘[i]n describing the transcendent object as the innermost moment of 
the noema, we are clearly asserting the inseparability of object and noema.  But in the case of a perceptual 
noema, this inseparability has such an intimate character that there is simply no question of two distinct 
objects being objectifiable in any sense, even within their inseparability.  And if the real object were a 
moment of the noema, the question would arise, how do we know that moment? Through another noema? 
The unique, incomparable, connection between [noematic] meaning and object is demonstrated by the 
infinite regress this question leads to’.  Ibid., p. 208.  
 Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 213-214.25
 The noetic-noematic structure therefore ‘designates the correlational a priori [of intentionality] in its 26
universal form.  It signifies the essential relatedness of world and conscious life’.  Sebastian Luft, 
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ception or world of things as known — and which drives its constituting activity.  By 
transcending its own reel moments and synthesising hyletic data into objectivities, the 
subject relates to real objects through their corresponding noematic sense.  As a result, 
as Mohanty aptly sums up, for Husserl, ‘our experiencing-of-the-world in its inmost na-
ture’ is essentially a matter of sense-bestowal (Sinngebung).      27
2.2 FLESH AND BODY 
While Husserl undoubtedly views the perceptual constitution of the world as driven by 
noetic sense-bestowal, around the time of Ideas II, he begins to realise that an account 
of perceptual constitution remains incomplete until we come to some understanding of 
the complex role of the perceiving body.   To understand the role of one’s own body in 28
the perceptual constitution of the world, we first need to understand what the body is for 
Husserl, and how it relates to the transcendental ego.   
As is well known, Husserl draws a distinction between two interconnected con-
cepts of the body: the lived body (Leib) or flesh and the objective or physical body 
(Körper).  The body (as Körper) is a spatial-temporal object replete with physical-chem-
ical properties given to acts of outer perceptual-sense experiences.  Meanwhile, and by 
comparison, the body as lived (Leib) is my body as revealed to me in my first-person 
lived experience — i.e. via kinaesthetic sensations, interoception, proprioception and so 
forth.  For Husserl, the body is first  (and primarily) known as an object of outer sense 
perception, which the subject takes over as its own — that is, as a lived body — by 
 J.N. Mohanty, Phenomenology: Between Essentialism and Transcendental Philosophy (Evanston: 27
Northwestern University Press, 1997), p. 57.
 Husserl, Ideas II, p. 161.28
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virtue of the distinct double aspect specific to the sense of touch.   In his words, ‘the 29
body as such can be constituted originally only in tactuality and in everything localised 
within the sensations of touch, such as warmth, cold, pain, and the like’.   When one 30
hand touches the other, the hand that is touched by the other appears to me as touched, 
but also as itself a site of tactile sensation.  Once awoken as this site of sensation, the 
touched hand responds by itself becoming a lived body.  As Husserl writes, ‘when I 
touch the left hand I also find in it, too, series of touch-sensations, which are “localized” 
in it, though these are not constitutive of properties (such as roughness or smoothness of 
the hand, of this physical thing) […].  If I do include them, then it is not that the physi-
cal thing is now richer, but instead it becomes Body, it senses’.  31
 What is interesting to note about this account of the awakening of the lived 
body, as Claude Romano points out, is that ‘the whole description proceeds as if my 
lived-body, at the beginning, were merely a body among others [accessible via act of 
outer perceptual-sense experiences], that is to say, were not at all my body; for my body, 
too, “is perceived from the outside,” writes Husserl, “although within certain limits”.’  32
Husserl can claim that the body is, in a way, perceived from the outside,  
because it is in a certain way outside myself.  Indeed, from the transcendental 
point of view, I have a body, but I am not my body: the Leib is not a ‘component 
piece of the Ego’, it remains ‘foreign to the pure Ego (Ichfremde)’.  In short, my 
body is something I ‘possess’, something which depends on my pure Ego, but 
‘does not belong to the realm of what properly pertains to the Ego (Ichliche)’; it is 
only ‘the Ego’s first “subjective possession”’, and only the Ego can be called a 
subjectivity in the authentic and originary sense.  Refractory to any inclusion in 
 Ibid., pp. 150-151, 158.29
 Ibid., p. 150.30
 Ibid., p. 152.  As per this account, the objective body is constituted as mine (i.e. as a lived body) when, 31
by virtue of my sense of touch, I become aware of it as the carrier of my sensations. 
 Claude Romano, ‘After the lived-body’, Continental Philosophy Review 49, no. 4 (2016), 445-468 (pp. 32
455-456); Husserl, Ideas II, 152.  Taylor Carman makes a similar point in ‘The Body in Husserl and Mer-
leau-Ponty’, Philosophical Topics 27, no. 2 (1999), 205-226 (p. 211). 
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the world, the pure Ego is only secondarily incarnated in a lived-body and always 
remains in principle irreducible to it.   33
For Husserl, then, the transcendental ego consists in a pure mental awareness of itself, 
which logically precedes and is independent of anything outside itself, including its 
body.   In sum, as Taylor Carman remarks, the lived body is something that ‘an essen34 -
tially disembodied transcendental ego has or owns as the locus of its subjective sensa-
tions.  The lived body is not itself constitutive of intentionality, for Husserl, but is a 
noetic achievement of transcendental subjectivity’.  35
 Given this distinction between the pure ego and the body, Husserl views the lat-
ter as essentially an object, though, to be sure, a uniquely intimate, privileged one.  As 
he writes,   
[a]mong the bodies [Körper] belonging to this ‘Nature’[…] I then find my ani-
mate organism [Leib] as uniquely singled out — namely as […] the only Object 
‘in’ which I ‘rule and govern’ immediately, governing particularly in each of its 
‘organs'.  Touching kinaesthetically I perceive ‘with’ my hands; seeing kinestheti-
cally, I perceive also ‘with’ my eyes; and so forth; moreover I can perceive thus at 
any time.  Meanwhile the kinesthesias pertaining to the organs flow in the mode ‘I 
am doing’, and are subject to my ‘I can’; furthermore, by calling these kinesthe-
sias into play, I can push, thrust, and so forth, and can thereby ‘act’ somatically — 
immediately, and then mediately.  36
The body is that unique object in which the subject holds sway in an immediate way — 
it is the immediate organ of my will (i.e. the ‘I can’).   The ego and its lived body form 37
a unity, which renders the body the unique site through which I engage with the world.  38
 Romano, ‘After the lived-body’, p. 456; Husserl, Ideas II, pp. 223, 226, 259.33
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As such, the lived-body is seen by Husserl as the most basic substratum of experience, 
as that in terms of which all other objects are perceived. 
 As the immediate expression of my will, Husserl comes to view the body as 
playing an important role in the perceptual constitution of the world.  As he writes, the 
body functions as ‘the medium of all perception; it is the organ of perception and is nec-
essarily involved in all perception’.   As a result, knowledge is not simply a matter of 39
consciousness but of the body as well.  Husserl’s study of how objective things are con-
stituted leads him to the basic realisation that objects are only perceived when they 
stand over and against us.  Spatial objects thus not only presuppose an onlooker, but an 
embodied one, one that occupies a certain spatial extension.  The constitution of spatial 
objects thus presupposes an embodied consciousness.  As Husserl writes, 
things appear and do so from this or that side, and in this mode of appearing is 
included irrevocably a relation to a here and its basic directions.  All spatial being 
necessarily appears in such a way that it appears either nearer or farther, above or 
below, right or left.  This holds with regard to all points of the appearing corpore-
ality, which then have their differences in relation to one another as regards this 
nearness, this above and below, etc., among which there are hereby peculiar quali-
ties of appearance, stratified-like dimensions.  The Body then has, for its particu-
lar Ego, the unique distinction of bearing in itself the zero point of all these orien-
tations.  One of its spatial points, even if not an actually seen one, is always char-
acterized in the mode of the ultimate central here: that is, a here which has no oth-
er here outside of itself, in relation to which it would be a ‘there’.  It is thus that 
all things of the surrounding world possess an orientation to the Body, just as, ac-
cordingly, all expressions of orientation imply this relation.  40
As this indicates, objects can be perceived as over there because my body ‘is always 
‘here,’ as this absolute centre of orientation.   It is this absolute here-ness of the body 41
that enables all other things to be experienced as there.   Therefore, I understand spatial 42
 Husserl, Ideas II, p. 61.39
 Ibid., p. 166.40
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 Unlike its relation to other objects, the ego cannot distance itself from its body; it is united with it as 42
this absolute here.  Ibid., p. 167.
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relationships such as left-right, near-far, etc., in terms of their relation to my body.  As a 
result, it must be said that our perceptual landscape is necessarily determined through 
bodily movement. 
 Because of this, we necessarily experience the unity and continuity of the world 
through our body.   Since the body serves, 43
as the bearer of the zero point of orientation, the bearer of the here and the now, 
out of which the pure Ego intuits space and the whole world of the senses […] 
each thing that appears has eo ipso an orienting relation to the body, and this 
refers not only to what actually appears but to each thing that is supposed to be 
able to appear.  If I am imagining a centaur I cannot help but imagine it as in a 
certain orientation and in a particular relation to my sense organs: it is ‘to the 
right’ of me; it is ‘approaching’ me or ‘moving away’; it is ‘revolving’, turning 
toward or away from ‘me’ — from me, i.e., from my Body, from my eye, which is 
directed at it.  44
The world as a whole is always experienced in relation to my body.  Even those objects 
that we imagine bear a necessary relation to one’s own body.  And ‘in virtue of its facul-
ty of free mobility’, the embodied subject can ‘induce the flow of the system of its ap-
pearances and, along with that, the orientations’ — i.e. it induces all appearances to ad-
just themselves to the positions of our moving body.  45
 It is this movement of the body that enables perception to function in the mobile 
way that it does.  As Irene McMullin notes,  
[w]e experience spatiotemporal objects as having a horizon of possible future pro-
files because of the possibility of getting closer and grasping: a possibility that is 
dependent on the ego successfully holding sway over the body such that it is the 
effective vehicle of its striving.  The active agency of the body accomplishing the 
ego’s intentional orientation is a necessary condition of the elements constitutive 
of any particular perception.  Moving one’s eyes this way or that is necessary to 
gather visual data, applying pressure on something allows one to assess its resis-
tance, etc.  46
 Ibid., pp. 165-166. 43
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In all of these ways, then, the perceptual constitution of the world depends on the body, 
as that unique object through which the will of the (conscious) ego is expressed in an 
immediate way.  
2.3 PASSIVE SYNTHESIS 
As Husserl’s work develops, he comes to realise that intentionality has a greater depth 
than he originally envisioned.  Intentionality involves not only the activity of the ego, 
but also functions on a passive level, prior to any active position-taking or attentiveness 
on the part of the ego — i.e. in kinaesthetic consciousness, and passive affectivity and 
association.   To be clear, Husserl does not view this passive affectivity as utterly pas47 -
sive, but as the lowest level of activity.   On this level, the subject who finds herself 48
affectively moved by certain alluring contents, and who develops a particular style of 
bodily comportment by responding to them in turn, gradually develops certain ‘implicit 
preferential structures’ — what Anthony Steinbock calls a ‘dispositional orientation.’  49
This dispositional orientation ‘“allow[s]’ the phenomena to organize themselves accord-
ing to primordial laws of association.  In these cases, what we have are precisely the 
affective formation of sense-unities’.   By virtue of our bodily style of comportment, 50
our perceptual landscape takes on ‘a particular [affective] configuration’, where certain 
 Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, p. 210.47
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contents stand out for me as being in some way more significant than others.   We can 51
see this affective awakening of the environment in the following example given by 
Steinbock: 
[w]hile climbing on a rock face I have before me a rough, tan-coloured surface 
organized willy-nilly all along the face of the cliff.  Half way up the rock face a 
protrusion suddenly distinguishes itself from the others because it is white […]. 
Now it becomes especially affective for itself, but it also ‘pairs’ in a transference 
of sense with another white protrusion, and then simultaneously calls for a series 
of protrusions (some white, some not) into its ‘nexus’; it illuminates an entire path 
of protrusions, precisely both as ‘grips’ and as etching a ‘pathway’.  The entire 
path gets affectively articulated whereas prior to this it was affectively unarticu-
lated […].  In this case, as the protrusion becomes prominent it emerges simulta-
neously as affectively significant, enough so that it ‘stands out’ for me; its white-
ness pairs with another white protrusion a small distance from it; they form a kind 
of co-present whole.  Here they, together, prefigure a pathway to the top of the 
cliff, at least a potential passage, illuminating an entire string of both white-
coloured and non-white coloured protrusions; they gain an affective priority.   52
Whether these white marks motivate me to actually respond to them will depend on my 
particular style of comportment (i.e. on my dispositional orientation).  For the individ-
ual who is not an experienced climber, or who has a different background and style, 
these white marks may not stand out, and the individual may instead find herself drawn 
to another affective pairing altogether.  53
 Notably, this affective propagation of sense occurs not only in the present mo-
ment, but also in the past and future phases of time.  For example, as Steinbock ob-
serves, suppose I hear a melody while I am ‘busy doing something else; it does not even 
register as a disturbance.  Now there is a phase that arouses either a particular pleasure 
or displeasure.  The entire melody in the immediate present is accentuated, and in one 
stroke […] the affection and the pleasure or displeasure “radiates back” into the preced-
 Steinbock, ‘Affection and Attention’, p. 28; Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthe51 -
sis, pp. 47, 199-201.
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ing phase of time, “affectively highlighting it as a unity”.’   In this case, ‘it is not only 54
the present that gives the past an affective force that it never had before, but the whole 
melody gives even the instigating present a new affective prominence as a part of the 
whole melody.’   Finally, this affective propagation of sense can occur in relation to the 55
future.  In his analysis of passive association, Husserl maintains that when something is 
received on a passive level — say, the sound of a distant, constantly chiming bell — and 
it gradually slinks back into the past, as ‘this particular givenness “lingers,” and the new 
affective force of the present [the new impression of the chiming bell] “reanimates” the 
preceding phase of time ‘by virtue of a retroactive transference of sense, the call for this 
particular futural course [the reappearance of the chiming bell] is intensified’.   In this 56
way, ‘a constitutive teleology is in play such that the affective force of a future occur-
rence confers its force upon present “possibilities” allowing some to be given and al-
lowing others not to be seen.  The force radiates out from it in such a way that it accen-
tuates objects that will fulfil the conditions for forming a uniform configuration’.   57
 On Husserl’s account, these passive associations do not yet give us objects or the 
world as such, but rather what he refers to as pre-constituted ‘object-like formation[s]’, 
or pre-given sense-unities.   That being said, these pre-given sense-unities do serve as a 58
condition for the perceptual constitution of worldly objects and events.   According to 59
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Husserl, then, it is when the passive associations of this lower-level are taken up by acts 
of attention and reflection that the world is constituted as such.    60
2.4 THE DEPTHS OF TIME 
As these last examples suggest, our lived experience seems to be invariably and neces-
sarily structured in temporal terms, in terms of present, past and future.  While Husserl’s 
investigation of temporality in 1905 simply focusses on constituted experiences (i.e. 
acts and sensory contents), between 1907 and 1909, he realises that ‘immanent’ time-
consciousness — i.e. the synthesis of temporality — serves as the absolute foundation 
of all constitution, and is thereby responsible for the unity and continuity of our experi-
ence.   Temporality thus serves as the universal form of all conscious life, such that we 61
exist temporally.   As such, the study of time is seen by Husserl as ‘the most difficult of 62
all phenomenological problems’, and yet as also ‘perhaps the most important in the 
whole of phenomenology’.  63
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Sheehan (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), p. 394, and Husserl’s letter to Rickert on De-
cember 26, 1928 (Ibid., p. 395).  See Cyril McDonnell, Heidegger’s Way Through Phenomenology To the 
Question of the Meaning of Being: A Study of Heidegger’s Philosophical Path of Thinking from 1909 to 
1927 (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2015), p. 259, note 8.
 Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, p. 73; Husserl, The Crisis of 62
the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, p. 169.  Nicolas de Warren addresses 
Husserl’s account of time as the fundamental problem of transcendental phenomenology at length in 
Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
 Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, pp. 286, 346.63
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 As with all of his constitutive analyses, Husserl’s study of time is oriented 
around the attempt to show how objectivity arises for consciousness — i.e. how things 
appear as existing in themselves.   Beginning with the study of perceived things — as 64
the paradigm of constitution — he notices that ‘all manners of givenness are subject to 
temporal succession because they are situated in my flow of consciousness’.   As such, 65
Husserl contends that consciousness can order transcendent objects according to what 
he calls objective time (i.e. clock time), which consists in a linear sequence of discrete 
units or now-points (i.e. not-yet-now, now, no-longer-now).  Because perceived things 
are given according to the temporal succession of consciousness, they always occupy a 
‘definite temporal position’ in this succession — i.e. as before or after one another, even 
as they move ever-further away from the present now.   As a result, the period of these 66
objects’ existence is quantifiable and datable.   The fact that objects are seen as existing 67
in themselves thus ‘follows fundamentally from the fact that these objects are present at 
a determinable point in time, or over a succession of such points in “objective time”’.  68
 What remains for Husserl to determine is how this objective time is constituted 
and known by consciousness in an original way.  He begins by observing that the 
present now-point is experienced by us as occupying a privileged position in this se-
quence.   As John Brough notes in the introduction to the time-lectures, one of the 69
ways in which the present-now is privileged is  
 Held, ‘Husserl’s Phenomenology of the Life-World’, p. 43.64
 Ibid., p. 44; Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, p. xxx.65
 Ibid., pp. 7, xxx, 67-68.66
 Ibid., p. 767
 Held, ‘Husserl’s Phenomenology of the Life-World’, p. 44.68
 Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, pp. 37-38.69
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as a point of orientation.  Like the ‘here’ from which I look out into the world and 
around which I orient my perceptual space, the now supplies the point of refer-
ence for temporal experience.  It is in relation to the that things and events appear 
as past or future.  Another side of the now’s role shows itself in the fact that I am 
conscious of a past object or event as something that was once now; similarly, I 
am conscious of whatever is in the future as something that will be now.    70
As a part of this, past and future moments are further arranged in terms of their distance 
from the present-now — i.e. as having just occurred a day ago, a month ago, as some-
thing that might occur shortly, or somewhere down the line.  
 The temporal dimensions of past and future are given by way of remembrance 
and expectation.  These acts belong to the level of temporality that is immanent to con-
sciousness (i.e. subjective time).  Through recollection and expectation, we re-present 
the past and the future.  As we can only remember what has already been given to us in 
the present via perception, memory is always related back to its originary manner of 
givenness as ‘“presenting”’.   As Husserl writes, ‘[m]emory is the re-presentation of 71
something itself in the sense of the past.  The present memory is a phenomenon wholly 
analogous to perception.  It has the appearance of the object in common with the corre-
sponding perception, except that the appearance has a modified character, in conse-
quence of which the object does not stand before me as present but as having been 
present.’   Similarly, since that which we expect ‘finds its fulfilment in a perception’, 72
 Ibid., p. xxvi.70
 Held, ‘Husserl’s Phenomenology of the Life-World’, p. 44.  As we will see, Husserl distinguishes be71 -
tween primary and secondary memory.  Primary memory (retention) is our consciousness of the object 
just as it is elapsing — it presents the past in an original manner.  Meanwhile, secondary memory (i.e. 
recollection) gives the object once again, as having once been.  Secondary memory therefore re-presents 
the past.  As Husserl writes, recollection can occur as ‘a simple grasping, as when a memory “rises to the 
surface” and we look at what is remembered in a flash.  In this case what is remembered is vague; per-
haps the memory brings forward, intuitively, a privileged momentary phase, but it does not repeat its ob-
ject’.  Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, p. 39.  Or else we ‘execute 
a memory that actually does reproduce and repeat, a memory in which the temporal object is completely 
build up afresh in a continuum of re-presentations and in which we perceive it again, as it were — but 
only “as it were.”  The whole process is a re-presentational modification of the perceptual process with all 
of the latter’s phases and stages’.  Ibid.  Husserl similarly distinguishes between primary and secondary 
expectation.  Ibid., pp. 43, 101, 240, 328.
 Ibid., p. 61.72
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expectation is itself always related to its originary manner of givenness as 
‘presenting.’    73
 Subjective time thus consists in this stream of mental states, with perception 
serving as the central reference point.   Subjective time, whose structure consists in this 74
succession of mental states, is the essential condition that makes possible objective 
time.  Our ability to order and measure objects in objective time, and thus view them as 
existing in themselves, is made possible by the fact that such objects are given to us as 
occupying a fixed place in the temporal succession of our mental states.   
 Once Husserl comes to this finding, though, he finds himself faced with the fol-
lowing question: while subjective time makes it possible for us to apprehend objects 
and the world as existing in themselves in objective time, what makes subjective time 
possible? How is it that we are able to constitute and know subjective time as this suc-
cession of mental states and thereby order things in objective time? If consciousness 
was merely swept along in this succession, then it would not be possible for us to be 
aware of the succession of temporal acts and to grasp transcendent objects in objective 
time.   
 Husserl maintains that it is only if our conscious life occupies a kind of fixed 
place amidst this succession that the latter can stand out as such by way of contrast.  75
He contends that it is only because consciousness has a continuous, unvarying inner 
awareness of itself that it is able to unify and apprehend its succession of mental experi-
 Ibid., p. 58.73
 As Husserl writes, ‘[i]t is certainly evident that the perception of a temporal object itself has temporali74 -
ty, that the perception of duration itself presupposes the duration of perception, that the perception of any 
temporal form itself has its temporal form.’  Ibid., p. 24.
 John B. Brough, 'Notes on the Absolute Time-Constituting Flow of Consciousness’, in On Time: New 75
Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time, ed. by Dieter Lohmar and Ichiro Yamaguchi 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), pp. 21-49 (pp. 45-46).
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ences and thereby perceive objects in objective time.   This newfound level of inner 76
time-consciousness stands as the underlying universal form of conscious life.  It is the 
foundation and most basic form of synthesis, which works anonymously and implicitly 
in all other forms of synthesis.   
 In this respect, Sokolowski remarks that Husserl’s study of time reveals ‘that the 
apodictic field of inner experience, which we have gained by [transcendental] reduction, 
is not really the ultimate absolute’.   As Husserl himself put this in Ideas I, ‘[t]he tran77 -
scendentally 'absolute' which we have brought about by the reductions is, in truth, not 
what is ultimate; it is something which constitutes itself in a certain profound and com-
pletely peculiar sense of its own and which has its primal source in what is ultimately 
and truly absolute [i.e. the living present].’   Therefore, as Sokolowski rightly notes, 78
‘[t]he absolute which we attain through [the transcendental] reduction is not the ultimate 
goal of phenomenology.  It points back to something still more fundamental […] the 
truly final absolute.  Thus the stream of consciousness is now seen to be itself “relative” 
to another “absolute”, one which is absolute in a new sense’.   In this case, ‘[j]ust as 79
subjectivity is required as the condition of possibility for the real world, the present in-
 To be able to grasp a succession of events as such, the flow of absolute consciousness must have an 76
invariant form and speed.
 Robert Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution (The Hague: Martinus Ni77 -
jhoff, 1970), pp. 160, 199.
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 198.  Husserl’s setting aside of the issue of time as the determining feature of our 78
actual consciousness in the argument of the reduction of the natural attitude to the transcendental-phe-
nomenological attitude that unlocks the absolute mode of being of our actual consciousness in the ‘Fun-
damental Considerations of Phenomenology’ of Ideas I, however, was to establish apodictic knowledge of 
the existence of consciousness first.  Consequently, the phenomenological investigations into its structure 
and features could be more readily secured in such a science of absolute intentional consciousness and its 
objectivities.  This is why Husserl remarks in ‘The Fundamental Consideration of Phenomenology’ that 
he can forgo his earlier investigations into the experience of time ‘without endangering their rigour’, that 
is, the apodictic arguments for the relative existence of the world of things and the absolute existence of 
consciousness in the reduction, and so, ‘fortunately we [Husserl] can leave out of account the enigma of 
consciousness of time’.  Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 193–194.  See McDonnell, Heidegger’s Way Through Phe-
nomenology, p. 259.
 Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution, pp. 199-200.79
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stant [i.e. the living present] is required as the condition for subjectivity.’   In other 80
words, subjective time, as the absolute foundation of the world, itself depends upon a 
more basic absolute, a final and true absolute, which, as such, constitutes itself, and so 
does not require a still more basic ground to account for itself.  81
 There are therefore three connected levels of constitution involved in internal-
time-consciousness.  Husserl first spoke to this matter in a text written between 1907 
and 1909, in which he differentiates between: 
 1. the things of empirical experience in objective time [. . . ;]  
2. the constituting multiplicities […] the immanent unities in pre-empirical time;  
3. the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness.    82
As Brough points out, around 1911 or 1912, Husserl describes these levels as follows:  
1. the internal consciousness, the experiencing [formerly level 3],  
2. the experience [formerly level 2], 
3. the intentional object of the experience [formerly level 1].  83
 Ibid., p. 200.  For a study of these levels of time with respect to the issue of novelty, see my article 80
‘The Issue of Novelty in Husserl’s Analysis of Absolute Time-Constituting Consciousness,’ Philosophy 
Today 62, no. 3 (2017) 969-987.
 Thomas M. Seebohm, Hermeneutics. Method and Methodology (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004), p. 99.  The 81
very ability of consciousness to reflect upon itself presupposes this living present of absolute conscious-
ness, as ‘a standing abiding structure’.  This is why this structure is not an act of reflection itself since 
reflection presupposes it.  Thus, as Seebohm correctly points out and distinguishes ‘protention and reten-
tion have nothing in common with expectation and memory or remembering.  The latter are indeed activi-
ties of the subject, but such activities themselves occur within the pre-given formal temporal framework. 
This formal structure of the three mutually founded abstract moments is a standing, abiding structure’. 
Ibid.
 Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, p. 77.82
 Brough, 'Notes on the Absolute Time-Constituting Flow of Consciousness’, p. 23; Edmund Hussserl, 83
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 Whatever terminology is employed, the discovery of this most basic level of 
time-consciousness means that in order to make good on his aim of seizing upon and 
verifying the absolute foundation and origin of all givenness and knowledge, Husserl 
must perform the reduction once more.   Husserl must lead us back to this final abso84 -
lute, to this living present, to this origin of time, which Kant regarded as the ‘hidden art 
[…] of the human soul’,  and proceed to bring it before our reflective regard in its ab85 -
solute givenness.  Because of this, in his later work, Husserl calls for a reduction to the 
living present, to ‘the sphere of primal temporalization, in which the first and primally 
welling sense of time comes forward’, as ‘the most radical reduction to that subjectivity 
in which everything that is valid for me originally accomplishes itself’.   As Sokolows86 -
ki notes, only once this has been done can he ‘say that he has truly founded the possibil-
ity of his rigorous science, and established a base of final apodicity for philosophy as he 
conceives it’.  87
2.5 ABSOLUTE TIME-CONSTITUTING CONSCIOUSNESS 
To fully understand how the form of absolute consciousness makes it possible for con-
scious life to constitute and know its immanent temporal acts (i.e. the experiences of 
subjectivity) and their corresponding transcendent objects, we need to clarify this basic 
 De Warren also makes this point in Husserl and the Promise of Time, p. 29.84
 Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, p. 273.85
 Husserl, Zur Phänomenologishen Reduktion, p. 187.86
 Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution, p. 200.  It is of importance, none87 -
theless, that Husserl had already (and only) discovered and so established the apodictic basis to his inves-
tigations in his analysis of ‘[reflective] immanent perception’ in the reduction.  He never relinquished this 
starting-point in his definition of phenomenology. 
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form, this hidden art of the soul, and to understand how it functions.  Husserl refers to 
the primal synthesis (i.e. flow) of absolute time-constituting consciousness as the living 
present.  Importantly, this living present is characterised by Husserl as an extended 
present.   That is to say, there is a certain transcendence at the heart of the immanence 88
of the living present — i.e. a transcendence-in-immanence.  Rather than being a discrete 
unit, then, the living present has a width; it consists in ‘pointing beyond itself’ — i.e. as 
intentional.    89
 While Husserl does at times describe hyletic data, considered abstractly in itself, 
as non-intentional, and as only becoming intentional by virtue of its connection with a 
chain of retentions, it is important to remember that, in his view, hyletic data ultimately 
does not occur in isolation but always together with a chain of retentions.   In his eyes, 90
the primal impression does not occur as a pure now that stands outside its relation to 
retention and protention — as the just-elapsed and just-coming phases of time — which 
then proceed to contaminate and negate the pure now.  Instead, both retention and pro-
tention are present as moments of the primal flow.  Far from contaminating the pure 
now, retention and protention make it possible.  As Alweiss correctly notes, the primal 
impression can only ever appear ‘within the tension of retentions and protentions’.  91
The pure now only ever appears as exceeding the moment, as pointing beyond itself, 
and so as extended, modified and adumbrated.  For Husserl, then, there is no unextend-
ed or isolated now.  The now is but an abstraction, something ideal.    92
 Husserl, Die Bernauer Manuskripte, p. 62; Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of 88
Internal Time, p. 27.
 Alweiss, The World Unclaimed, p. 41.89
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 As such, the living present is a pre-temporal event, which has a tripartite form 
consisting of primordial impression-retention-protention.   The primordial impression 93
serves as the momentary phase of actualisation, which is distinct and yet inseparable 
from the just-elapsed-phase (retention) and the just-coming-phase (protention).   It is 94
this primal impression (i.e. sensuous hyle) that initiates the primal temporalising process 
of absolute consciousness, and so, it is viewed by Husserl as ‘the primal source of all 
further consciousness and being’.   As Mensch notes, Husserl maintains that while con95 -
sciousness can generate retentions and protentions, it does not produce the primal im-
pression, which must always be received from outside itself.   Meanwhile, as Husserl 96
views it, retention perceives the just-elapsed phase of the flow of absolute conscious-
ness (level one), as well as the past of the experience (level two), and that of the object 
(level three).  In this sense, retention presents the past in a direct, original way.   As its 97
‘counterpart’, protention similarly presents the phase of time that is just entering the 
now-phase in a direct and original manner.   Together, these moments constitute the 98
living present as a continuous deferral from one phase of time to another.   In doing so, 99
they mark out its structural form as a continuous (primal) change, as a continuous run-
ning-off or differential repetition (i.e. self-differentiation).   With the arrival of each 100
 Husserl, Die Bernauer Manuskripte, p. 37. 93
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nomenology of Time, ed. by Dieter Lohmar and Ichiro Yamaguchi (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), pp. 
153-168 (p. 159).
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new impression, protentions are actualised and become retentions, while prior retentions 
sink further and further into the past.  That is to say, those just-elapsed phases that con-
tinue to motivate and have some bearing on conscious life (i.e. near retention) sink fur-
ther into the background and become far retentions, which, in Husserl's view, continue 
to have an effect on passive associations, but which do so in a way that tends to go un-
noticed.   The living present may thus be seen as a ‘comet’s tail’, with all of its inter101 -
twined dimensions continuously modifying and motivating one another.  102
 That being said, this description of the form of the living present as a ‘primal 
change’ should not confuse us into viewing it as a temporal process.   While this pri103 -
mal change gives rise to temporality, it is not itself a temporal flow, understood as ‘a 
continuous succession of objects’.   As Husserl writes elsewhere, the primal impres104 -
sions, retentions and protentions of the absolute flow are ‘objectivities fundamentally 
different from those constituted in time.  They are neither individual objects, nor indi-
vidual processes, and the predicates of such objects or processes cannot be meaningfully 
ascribed to them’.   This indicates that ‘the constituting phenomena have an ontologi105 -
cal sense that is different than that of the object they constitute’.    106
 As such, Husserl describes the absolute flow as pre-temporal, pre-individual and 
anonymous (i.e. inexperiencable, unsayable) level of sense.   Since the absolute flow 107
 Ibid., p. 371; Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, pp. 514-515.101
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 Ibid.  Husserl regards not only transcendent things but also immanent acts or unities of subjective time 104
as objects.
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is not temporally constituted (i.e. pre-temporal), and so, cannot bear the attributes of our 
individual acts or experiences in subjective time (i.e. pre-individual), Husserl maintains 
that we ultimately cannot speak about or experience the anonymous sense that is pre-
constituted by the primal flow, since to speak of it in a statement would be to ontify it; it 
would make it into an object in time and thus falsify it.   Hence his claim that, for this 108
primal flow, and for everything that goes on therein, ‘we have no names’.  109
 For all that, although Husserl’s account of the absolute flow as pre-temporal re-
quires that he employ language that does not evoke ‘common temporal predicates’, he is 
often obliged to do so.  As Brough states, ‘[i]t is interesting that when Husserl applies 
temporal language to the flow, he often engages in something resembling negative the-
ology or even the analogical predication of Aquinas.  For example, he refers to the abso-
lute flow as “primal change”.  Now change is ordinarily a mark of the temporal, but 
Husserl immediately cautions that this primal change “is not in any time”, although 
"time first of all originates in it”’.   Moreover, ‘[h]is frequent use of prefixes — “qua110 -
si-”, “pre-”, “primal”, and so on — also alerts the reader not to take the terms to which 
they are attached in their usual sense.’    111
 However, as Michel Henry himself will notice, this seems to pose a serious 
problem for Husserl’s phenomenology.  There may be structural or logical reasons for 
positing the necessity of an absolute flow.  Yet, as we know, the aim of phenomenology 
is not to posit a logical beginning out of necessity but to return to the things themselves 
as they reveal themselves.  If the primal flow cannot be in some way experienced, then 
 Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, p. 382.108
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it would seem that transcendental phenomenology should not even be speaking of it. 
So, does the subject not experience the absolute flow in some way or other? Assuming it 
does, can this primal flow be revealed in apperceptive objectification (i.e. absolute 
givenness)? And if not, what ramifications would this hold for our understanding of 
constitution at this fundamental level? We will return to these issues shortly.    
 In order to understand how, on Husserl’s view, this flow makes it possible for 
objectivity to arise for consciousness, let us continue to try and clarify the flow for our-
selves.   
As pre-temporal, the absolute flow is ‘not something in time that could properly 
be said to appear in the modes of now, past, and future.’   The absolute flow does not 112
consist in a series of sporadic acts that begin and end, and that ‘can move from change 
to rest and from rest to change, and can change more quickly or more slowly.’   As 113
Brough points out,  
[e]vents, immanent or transcendent, can begin, accelerate, slow down, and end, 
which the primal process as continuous, unvarying flowing cannot do.  The ‘pri-
mal process is process, but no longer constituted in the same way as the objects 
belonging to immanent time’.  The flow abides, and its ‘standing signifies being 
constant as “process” — the process of primal temporalization’.  The absolute 
consciousness flows but never finally flows away, never begins and ends as an 
individual act does.  It is always there.  114
Since the primal flow is always there, without individual acts that begin or end, it is 
viewed by Husserl as an infinite flux, as an endless chain of retentions, whose streaming 
always maintains the same form and speed.  The primal change of the living present is 
thus an invariant form, which continuously abides throughout all of the changing, indi-
vidual experiences in subjective time and their corresponding transcendent objects. 
 Ibid., p. 31.112
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Husserl describes the invariant form of the flow in paradoxical terms as a standing-
streaming, as a ‘fixed but flowing now’ — i.e. as a continuous change.   Viewed ‘in 115
abstraction from what fills it [i.e. experiences in subjective time and their corresponding 
contents], the form of the flow is not flowing.  It is “standing”.  On the other hand, it 
never actually exists without being filled, and “the filled form, that is, the primal phe-
nomenon, is flowing”’.   Drawing a helpful image from William James, Dan Zahavi 116
notes that the absolute flow can be described as standing ‘permanent like a rainbow on a 
waterfall, its own quality unchanged by the events that stream through it’.   In other 117
words, the primal flow stands as the experiencing of life, which remains constant 
throughout all of the individual experiences that stream through it.         
 This fixed but flowing form is seen by Husserl as distinct and yet inseparable 
from the immanent temporal acts that stream through it — the flow (i.e. experiencing) 
and its acts (subjective experiences) being distinct yet inseparable moments in one and 
the same flow of consciousness.   The primal flow is distinct in that, as the final and 118
true absolute foundation of all life and being [i.e. intelligibility], it constitutes itself and 
all objects, whether immanent (i.e. subjective time) or transcendent (i.e. objective time), 
and so, it does not require some deeper level to give rise to it.   As Husserl writes,  119
[a]s shocking (when not initially even absurd) as it may seem to say that the flow 
of consciousness constitutes its own unity, it is nonetheless the case that it does. 
And this can be made intelligible on the basis of the flow’s essential constitution. 
Our regard can be directed, in the one case, through the phases that ‘coincide’ in 
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the continuous progression of the flow and that function as intentionalities of the 
tone.  But our regard can also be aimed at the flow, at a section of the flow, at the 
passage of the flowing consciousness from the beginning of the tone to the end.    120
Throughout all of the objectifying acts in which consciousness is directed toward 
things, the primal flow thus constitutes its own unity and appearing as a pre-memorial, 
pre-reflective and non-objectifying awareness of itself. 
 At the same time, the absolute flow is inseparable from the succession of our 
mental states in that the pre-reflective self-awareness of the former never occurs apart 
from the temporal occurrences of the latter.  Consciousness is, therefore, its acts, but, as 
our conscious lives are founded upon this pre-reflective self-awareness that remains 
constant throughout all of the temporal changes of our lives, it is also ‘more than its 
acts’.   Brough captures the distinction between the absolute flow and subjective time 121
in an especially compelling way when he writes: 
[t]he flow is that dimension of my conscious being that is irreducible to my acts. 
To be aware of myself as something more than my particular acts, more even than 
the total flow of acts, is […] to be aware of the flow.  Again, that awareness is not 
of the flow as an object that is or could be isolated from its acts.  The awareness 
of the flow is a kind of constant presence attending my acts, or, better, haunting 
them.  It shows itself in my awareness of the continuity of my ongoing conscious 
life.  I do not experience my flowing consciousness as exhausted by the acts that 
now fill it or have filled it or will fill it.  The flow is no more the sum of its acts 
than the sea is the sum of its waves; and just as there are no waves without the 
sea, there are no acts without the flow.   122
Another way of putting this would be to say that the flow is the continuous experiencing 
(i.e. a pre-memorial, pre-reflective self-awareness) of conscious life, which makes pos-
sible, and so, cannot be exhausted by the individual experiences that come and go over 
the course of our lives, including acts of remembering and expectation themselves. 
 Ibid., pp. 214-215, my emphasis.  In his analysis of our experience of time, Brentano could only find 120
unity in the present time, the hearing of a tone, not unity over and through time as Husserl does in the 
hearing and having heard a tone.
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 As distinct yet inseparable from the immanent temporal objects that pass 
through it, Husserl finds that the primal flow — especially through its retentional phase 
— functions as ‘a double intentionality’.   He refers to the retentional consciousness 123
of the elapsed segments of the flow as the flow’s ‘horizontal intentionality’, and the re-
tentional consciousness that is directed toward the elapsed segments of the immanent 
object as the flow’s ‘transverse intentionality’.   Because of this, when absolute con124 -
sciousness retains the elapsed segment of the flow, which is originally directed toward a 
segment of an object as now by way of its primal impression, it also retains the elapsed 
segment of the object that is correlated with it.   And since each retained segment of 125
the flow itself harbours a retentional consciousness, that retentional consciousness, and 
the segment of the object that is correlated with it, are conserved as well, and so on.  126
 In this way, it is the primal flow that makes it possible for us to have an aware-
ness of the succession of our mental states, and to thereby order and measure objects in 
objective time.  It is this pre-memorial self-awareness that, in providing us with a fixed 
place amidst the succession of subjective time, centres our life and provides it with con-
stancy, and thereby makes it possible for us to unify and apprehend our changing tem-
poral experiences as such.  The primal change of the living present ‘lets us journey in 
time, backward in memory to what we have lived through and forward in expectation to 
what we anticipate as coming.  If consciousness did not flow, there would be nothing to 
remember or expect; but if it were not constant, if it did not “stand”, there could be no 
remembering or expecting’, and so, no ordering of objects in objective time as existing 
 Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, p. 390.123
 Ibid., pp. 391-392.124
 Ibid.125
 Ibid., p. 86.126
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in themselves.   At heart, then, it is this peculiar form of the living present that makes 127
it possible for reflection and objectivity to arise for consciousness.  The living present 
makes possible the constitution of subjective time (i.e. the experiences of subjectivity) 
and our perception of objects as existing in themselves.   
2.6 THE MYSTERY OF INNER TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS 
  
The fundamental question that remains is whether transcendental time-constituting con-
sciousness, as the hidden art (or inner nature) of the soul, can be experienced and ulti-
mately perceived by our reflective gaze? Can Husserl’s phenomenology, which under-
stands absolute self-givenness in terms of objective awareness allow the primordial ego 
to appear in a clear and immediate way? Does it sufficiently clarify what this primordial 
ego is and how it functions? As Henry reminds us, unless the appearing of transcenden-
tal subjectivity has been adequately clarified, the entire project of phenomenology is 
effectively threatened.   As Zahavi writes, ‘not only would its own preferred reflective 128
methodology remain unaccounted for and obscure, but without an adequate understand-
ing of self-manifestation, its detailed analysis of act-intentionality and object-manifesta-
tion would also lack a proper foundation, and phenomenology would consequently be 
incapable of realising its own proper task, namely to provide a clarification of the condi-
tion of possibility for manifestation’.  129
 Brough, ‘“The Most Difficult of all Phenomenological Problems”’, p. 39.127
 Michel Henry, Material Phenomenology, trans. by Scott Davidson (New York: Fordham University 128
Press, 2008), pp. 26, 31.
 Dan Zahavi, ‘Michel Henry and the Phenomenology of the Invisible’, Continental Philosophy Review 129
32, no. 3 (1999), 223-240 (p. 225).
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 We have seen how inner time-consciousness functions as a pre-reflective, non-
objectifying self-awareness.  And yet Husserl also describes this pre-reflective experi-
encing of our experiences as inexperiencable and unsayable.  How, if at all, do we 
square these accounts? While Husserl is often rather less than clear on this matter, to the 
extent that we undergo this primal flow, it is reasonable to suppose that it must be expe-
rienced in some way — i.e. in a pre-reflective and non-objectifying manner.  In that 
case, it may well be that the primal flow is ‘inexperiencable’ simply in the sense that it 
can be experienced neither on a reflective level nor adequately captured in speech. 
Hence, it remains a ‘pure — and, so to speak — still dumb […] experience’, as Husserl 
elsewhere describes it.  130
 Yet we know that Husserl cannot be satisfied with this.  Rather than simply posit 
a logical beginning, one that needs to be thought but which cannot be manifested, 
Husserl’s phenomenology is distinguished, in part, by its claim to be able to manifest 
this hidden art of the soul.  In his early time-lectures, we find Husserl stating that the 
subject does ‘know of the flow of consciousness as flow’, that she ‘can look at it’.   As 131
Jeremy Smith points out, ‘Husserl says of the “pure I” that “as an absolute given, that is, 
as that which can be brought to givenness in a regard that fixes [an object] in reflection, 
a regard that is possible a priori, there is nothing at all mysterious or mystical about it”, 
explicitly equating the givenness of “I” to its presence to reflection, or at least to its 
ability to be made present to reflection’.   Indeed, Husserl believes that ‘[e]very intel132 -
lectual experience, indeed every experience whatsoever, can be made into an object of 
 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 38.130
 Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, p. 389.  131
 Smith, ‘Michel Henry’s Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience and Husserlian Intentionality’, p. 132
193; Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, 
Volume II, ed. by Marly Biemel (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), p. 97.
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pure seeing and apprehension while it is occurring’.   Elsewhere, he states that it is 133
because the I lives-through its experiences — i.e. because it has a pre-reflective aware-
ness of them — that I can become conscious of such experiences via reflection.  As he 
writes, ‘[a]ny mental process which is not an object of regard can, with respect to ideal 
possibility, become “regarded;” a reflection on the part of the Ego is directed to it, it 
now becomes an object for the Ego.’   Thus Husserl subscribes to the Lockean-134
Humean transparency thesis of the mind; that is, that the mind has access directly to it-
self and all its operations that can be ‘seen’.  This, however, assumes a dualistic meta-
physics of human subjectivity, of a lucid mind and opaque body.  Commenting on this 
passage from Husserl, Alweiss notes that ‘[t]here is thus an Erlebnisreflexion that is dif-
 Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, p. 24.  Along these lines, Husserl also states that I can ‘see this 133
act of seeing itself’.  Ibid.
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 174.  This dualistic theoretical metaphysics of human subjectivity will be chal134 -
lenged, on phenomenological grounds, by existential phenomenologists who start from the experiential 
unity of mind and body, the conscious body, that cannot be separated without distortion of the reality of 
individual human existence as experienced. 
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ferent from the reflection on the immanent object, since it purely makes manifest an 
awareness that already is.’   In Husserl’s words,  135
[t]his occurs in the form of ‘reflection’, which has the remarkable property that 
what is seized upon perceptually in reflection is characterized fundamentally not 
only as something which exists and endures while it is being regarded perceptual-
ly but also as something which already existed before this regard was turned to it. 
‘All mental processes are intended to’: This signifies, then, that in the specific 
case of intentive mental processes not only are they consciousness of something 
and present as consciousness of something when they themselves are the Objects 
of a reflecting consciousness, but also that they are there already as a ‘back-
ground’ when they are not reflected on and thus of essential necessity are ‘ready 
to be perceived’.  136
Though the primal flow is prior to any perceptual act, since we live-through the primal 
flow, Husserl believes that it can be seized upon by our perceptual regard. 
 In these very same time-lectures, though, Husserl does come to realise that this 
absolute foundation can never be entirely seized upon.  He comes to see that ‘[t]he con-
stituting and the constituted coincide, and yet naturally they cannot coincide in every 
respect.  The phases of the flow of consciousness in which phases of the same flow of 
 Alweiss, The World Unclaimed, p. 67.  Husserl, however, does distinguish the unity that is present in 135
one concrete ‘cogitatio’ of an act of (reflective) immanent perception of a currently lived experience from 
the ability of consciousness to reflect upon other things (whether such be things given to acts of outer 
perceptual sense-experience or a memory).  These unities within consciousness must also be distin-
guished from the kind of infinite unity of reflection on finite acts of experiences — the idea in the Kant-
ian sense — that Husserl also identifies as a peculiar unity within human consciousness.  See Husserl, 
Ideas I, §83, ‘Seizing Upon the Unitary Stream of Experiences as “Idea”,’ (pp. 197–199).  Husserl, there-
fore, does not confuse (or compare) the incompleteness characteristic of thing-perception with the incom-
pleteness characteristic of the idea of the infinity of reflection on acts as Alweiss suggests, when she 
comments, ‘[i]n immanent experience we are faced with an incompleteness that does not occlude the co-
appearance of that which appears in its failure to appear, which in turn is fully present [i.e. the idea of 
infinity of such acts for reflection transcendentally deduced].  In [reflective] immanent experience the 
infinite fulfilled stream of intentions is fully present despite the incompleteness of the adumbrating nature 
of lived experiences [i.e. that are characteristic of outer perceptual-sense experiences of things]’.  Ibid., p. 
32.  Given the lack of distinctions by this author that are eminently present in Husserl’s thought, this 
commentator, as McDonnell remarks, ‘has no alternative but to conclude: “Reading Ideen I [...] we fail to 
understand how these claims have come about.  How can we simultaneously see incompleteness and 
completeness?”.’  Cyril McDonnell, ‘Husserl’s Critique of Brentano’s Doctrine of Inner Perception and 
its Significance for Understanding Husserl’s Method in Phenomenology’, in Maynooth Philosophical 
Papers 6 (2011), 74–111 (p. 101-102, n. 110).  Contrary to Alweiss, nonetheless, ‘we can see how these 
claims do come about, and understand them, if we distinguish, as Husserl does, between: (1) the incom-
pleteness that is characteristic of thing-perception; (2) the complete unity between perception and its ob-
ject (which is here an Erlebnis) in an act of reflective immanent perception; and (3) the deduction, on the 
basis of the recognition of the finiteness of the knowledge-claim of immanent perception as finite, of the 
idea of infinity for reflection on experiences by the transcendental (intellectual, and not sense) imagina-
tion.’  Ibid., p. 102.
 Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 98-99.136
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consciousness become constituted phenomenally cannot be identical with these consti-
tuted phases, nor are they.’   If this is the case, then while we may be able to describe 137
aspects of the primal flow to some extent, it can never be grasped as a whole.  Indeed, 
insofar as the primal flow functions as a continuous change, Husserl’s phenomenologi-
cal description of the flow suggests that reflection can never grasp the event of the pri-
mordial ego in its actual occurrence as the source of conscious life, but only after it has 
slid into the past as an object.  The moment our reflective regard is brought to bear on 
the primal flow it has already changed and become another, that is to say, it has become 
the performance of the act of reflection.  Therefore, the act of constituting — i.e. the 
primal flow — can never be given absolutely.  138
 In the eyes of Husserl, the pre-temporal event of consciousness is only given as 
a Kantian idea.  As he writes in Ideas I, ‘[i]n the continuous progression from seizing-
upon to seizing-upon, in a certain way, I said, we now seize upon the stream of mental 
processes as a unity. We do not seize upon it as we do a single mental process but rather 
in the manner of an idea in the Kantian sense.’   Husserl contends that this ideal ap139 -
pears as such in the interplay of the chain of retentions and protentions.   On his ac140 -
count, then, the absolute foundation of the transcendental ego only ever appears as an 
ideal that can never be realized, and which exists only in being infinitely deferred. 
Husserl believes that it is this idea of perfect givenness that directs perceptual con-
sciousness and which is anticipated in each appearance, thereby motivating the phe-
 Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, p. 88.137
 Michel Henry makes this point in Material Phenomenology, pp. 25, 27-29, 31, 37, 48.  Cf. also Al138 -
weiss, The World Unclaimed, p. 70; and Klaus Held, Lebendige Gegenwart: Die Frage nach der Sein-
sweise des Transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, Entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik (Dor-
drecht: Springer, 1966).
 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 197.139
 Ibid., pp. 342-343.140
 85
nomenologist onto infinite progress.  As such, the possibility of reflectively seizing 
upon the absolute totality of the stream of consciousness functions as a regulative ideal 
in Husserl’s thought.  141
 Despite the unwavering commitment of his phenomenology to an idealization of 
intuition and presence, Husserl’s phenomenological descriptions of this absolute con-
sciousness lead him to ask whether this does not force us to admit that the ultimate 
foundation of transcendental subjectivity must consist in an unconscious domain: 
[b]ut now we ask whether we must not say that there is, in addition, an ultimate 
consciousness that controls all consciousness in the flow.  In that case, the phase 
of internal consciousness that is actual at any particular moment would be some-
thing intended through the ultimate consciousness; and it would be this ultimate 
consciousness that passes over into the reproductive (retentional) modification, 
which itself would then be something again intended in the ultimate conscious-
ness.  This ultimate intentionality can take up into itself the style of paying atten-
tion, and in this way we can become conscious of its content in the manner of the 
object of attention.  We find, moreover, that when we do pay attention to some-
thing, something is always already ‘appearing’ — the style of attention always 
runs through and across an intentionality.  But if I direct my regard towards an 
actual momentary phase of the flow? But we should seriously consider whether 
we must assume such an ultimate consciousness, which would necessarily be an 
‘unconscious’ consciousness; that is to say, as ultimate intentionality it cannot be 
an object of attention (if paying attention always presupposes intentionality al-
ready given in advance), and therefore it can never become conscious in this par-
ticular sense.   142
If the absolute foundation is unconscious, then it would be fundamentally impossible for 
it to ever be brought to the clear light of day (i.e. to consciousness).  It would be neces-
sary to acknowledge that the immanence of consciousness is not an absolute, self-con-
tained field, but is always already ruptured by an unconscious life that precedes it and 
 Ibid.141
 Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, p. 394.  In his Psychology 142
from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), Brentano has ruled out any ‘hypothesis of the unconscious’ in his 
idea of a descriptive psychology because this science relies on direct (= non-hypothetical), a priori, intu-
itive knowledge of consciousness itself and its operations.  See PES, Book II, Section II Inner Conscious-
ness (pp. 101–137).  Husserl is well aware of this position and embraces it himself in his appeal to intu-
ition as the source for all knowledge about consciousness itself.  For Husserl, following Brentano, what-
ever is in consciousness must be, if not consciously perceived, ‘ready to be perceived’.
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which makes it possible, and which forever exceeds intuition and presence.    
 However, within these early time-lectures, Husserl ultimately rejects this posi-
tion.  As he writes,  
[i]t is just nonsense to talk about an ‘unconscious’ content that would only subse-
quently become conscious.  Consciousness is necessarily consciousness in each of 
its phases.  Just as the retentional phase is conscious of the preceding phase with-
out making it into an object, so too the primal datum is already intended — 
specifically, in the original form of the ‘now’ — without its being something ob-
jective.  It is precisely this primal consciousness that passes over into retentional 
modification — which is then retention of the primal consciousness itself and of 
the datum originally intended in it, since the two are inseparably united.  If the 
primal consciousness were not at hand, no retention would even be conceivable: 
retention of an unconscious content is impossible.  143
   
Husserl remains reluctant to accept the unconscious ground of life that his own analyses 
point toward.   Insofar as the event of consciousness functions ‘as a differential repeti144 -
tion, a repetition in which, for the first time and after the fact [i.e. post-factually], the 
consciousness of the now becomes conscious of itself’, the ultimate foundation of the 
primal self appears to function as a past that has never been given as present, as an un-
conscious life that exceeds intuition and presence.   As we have already seen, though, 145
because the subject lives-through the elapsed phases of the flow, Husserl believes that it 
is possible for the subject to reflectively perceive the flow, and that, as he writes, 
‘[t]hese acts stand to retention by way of fulfilment.’   As Rudolf Bernet correctly 146
notes, ‘[t]his is a metaphysical assertion, for it defines the retentional self-appearance of 
the flow privatively as a merely provisional datum, teleologically aligned toward the 
 Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, p. 123.143
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reflective perception of the retained flow.’   As Bernet goes on, these very ‘same 147
metaphysical prejudices’ prevent Husserl from fully appreciating the consequences of 
‘the post-factuality of the retentional self-appearance of the flow’.   They lead him to 148
contend that ‘only that can be post-factual which was initially given in present 
actuality’.   Despite this, and however inadvertently, Husserl’s own analyses suggest 149
that this is not the case, and that there is an unconscious life that founds and exceeds the 
immanence of consciousness.  Husserl’s conception of phenomenology as a rigorous 
science that affords primacy to intuition and presence thus ultimately falls at the hands 
of a life that forever exceeds its grasp.   
 Yet, if we accept this, then how should transcendental phenomenology proceed 
in light of these developments? Should it simply concede that this ultimate foundation, 
this hidden art of the soul, cannot in any way be given absolutely? Should the philoso-
pher endeavour to give up the seemingly deep-rooted desire to achieve an absolute 
knowledge of things in their perfect givenness? Is it even possible to overcome this de-
sire? What is more, there is the lingering issue or question as to who or what this pri-
mordial self actually is.  Should we understand its innermost nature to be conscious or 
unconscious? And, of no less importance, how, if at all, is it bound to the human being 
and the human ego? Finally, given that, at its most fundamental level, the synthesis of 
the primal flow yields an anonymous sense that cannot be captured or understood in 
terms of apperceptive objectification (i.e. sense-bestowal), it would seem that the con-
stitution of meaning cannot merely be a matter of sense-bestowal.  If the most funda-
mental level of constitution cannot be construed in this way, then how should it be un-
 Bernet, ‘Is the Present Ever Present?’, p. 109.147
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derstood? In light of the above considerations, Bernet himself suggests that the task that 
falls to phenomenology, ‘in place of an objectifying mirroring of the visible, [is] to 
search for the “wanting names” of those phenomena which cannot be named in the lan-
guage of reflective phenomenology’.  In his eyes, ‘[t]hough he prefigured it’, owing to 
his ‘demand for a reflective objectification of the phenomena constituting time-con-
sciousness’, Husserl ‘himself never walked this path consistently’.  By what name 150
should this basic level of constitution be called? While Husserl’s work forces all of 
these questions upon us, it does not offer a clear or compelling response.  It will thus be 
necessary to look elsewhere to develop further clarity on these issues. 
 Ibid., p. 109.150
 89
CHAPTER 3 
THE PRODUCTIVE FORCE OF LIFE: 
 HENRY’S IMMANENT CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL 
Henry’s work can be understood as a search for the ‘wanting names’ of transcendental 
subjectivity.  Indeed, he contends that not only Husserl’s intentional phenomenology, 
but much of the history of Western thought, has failed to provide an adequate account of 
the nature — or way of appearing or ‘living’ (vivant), to use Henry’s terminology — of 
the subject and how it functions.  Despite his critical stance toward the history of phi-
losophy, Henry nevertheless identifies a rare few thinkers who serve as precursors to his 
own work, and whose writings at least begin to gesture toward the radically immanent, 
non-intentional and affective appearing of life that, in his eyes, stands as the hidden art 
of the soul, which the history of Western thought has generally overlooked.   The work 1
of René Descartes figures prominently amongst those rare few.  In Descartes’ initial in-
sights into the being of the subject (cogito) — what Henry calls ‘beginning Cartesian-
ism’ — Henry believes he finds one of the more concrete and compelling arguments for 
upholding that the subject exists in a radically immanent and affective manner.   
 This chapter, therefore, will first approach Henry’s thought through his reading 
of Descartes.  Doing so will allow us to familiarise ourselves with one of the principle 
arguments that Henry sees as pointing toward the radically immanent and affective 
manner in which the subject appears or experiences itself.  Despite this, however, Henry 
maintains that Descartes does not fully recognise or develop the phenomenological life 
 As Kevin Hart notes, ‘[f]or Husserl, [hyle] and [noesis] are moments of a phenomenon, although the 1
noetic is prized over the hyletic because it is an intentional rapport with something imagined or real, inner 
or outer.  Accordingly, he emphasizes the noetic side of phenomenology.  Can one develop the other [i.e. 
hyletic, affective] side? That is Henry’s question.’  Kevin A. Hart, ‘Spiritual Acoustics: On Being in 
Common (Kierkegaard, Husserl, Henry)’, Analecta-Hermeneutica 8 (2016), 310-330 (pp. 325-326).
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of the subject that his own descriptions of the cogito point toward.  In proceeding to lay 
out Henry’s development of the transcendental life of the subject, our aim will be to 
draw attention to the way in which his work helps us provide a more adequate account 
of the nature of the subject, and of the way in which the individual is able to obtain ab-
solute knowledge of the ultimate foundation of her being. 
3.1 HENRY, HUSSERL AND DESCARTES 
Henry’s critical reading of Husserl centres around the latter’s treatment of the imma-
nence of the subject.  While Henry regards Husserl’s Lectures on the Consciousness of 
Internal Time as the most important and ‘beautiful work of twentieth century philoso-
phy’,  he maintains that Husserl fails to examine the immanence of the primordial ego 2
in a sufficiently pure manner.   In his eyes, though Husserl’s work contains ‘[t]he bril3 -
liant insight that every act and every lived experience is an impression’,  he ultimately 4
does not do justice to his initial insight into the sensual hyle of experience as the ‘primal 
source of all further consciousness and being’.   According to Henry, Husserl fails to do 5
justice to hyletic data inasmuch as he fails to grasp it in its radical immanence, as a non-
intentional and non-objectifying mode of appearing — i.e. the self-manifestation of the 
pure ego —  and instead makes it conform to the transcendence (i.e. intentional struc-
 Henry, Material Phenomenology, 21.2
 Michel Henry, ‘Philosophie et subjectivité’, in Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle, Volume 1: L’u3 -
nivers philosophique, ed. by André Jacob (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989), pp. 46-56 (p. 
50).
 Henry, Material Phenomenology, p. 35.  As Husserl himself puts this, ‘[i]n a certain sense […] all expe4 -
riences are intended through impressions or are impressed’.  Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Con-
sciousness of Internal Time, p. 93.
 Ibid., p. 70. 5
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ture) of the primal flow.  In so doing, Henry believes that Husserl reduces all appearing 
to that of object-manifestation. 
 This is what Henry refers to as ‘ontological monism’: the assumption that there 
is only one mode of appearing, namely, the ecstatic, transcendent appearing of the 
world, or object-manifestation, understood as the appearance of an object to our percep-
tual gaze.  Indeed, in a sweeping interpretation of the history of Western thought, Henry 
claims that the course of Western philosophy has been largely guided by this ontological 
monism.  As a result, for all the attention it has paid the matter, Western thought has still 
yet to provide an adequate account of who or what the subject is and how it functions.  
 That being said, it should be acknowledged that Henry is clearly mistaken in as-
serting that Husserl completely overlooks the pre-reflective and non-objectifying ap-
pearing of the subject.  As we observed in the previous chapter, Husserl acknowledges 
that the primal self enjoys a continuous, pre-reflective and non-objectifying awareness 
of itself in all of its acts.  Be that as it may, on Henry’s account, Husserl neither grasps 
its true nature — i.e. he does not treat it in a sufficiently pure manner — nor does he 
fully appreciate its importance in the subject’s constitution of itself and the world.  Even 
though Husserl acknowledges the non-objectifying mode of appearing proper to the 
subject more than Henry admits, it is nevertheless true that there is a tendency in his 
thought to treat appearing largely in terms of object-manifestation, and thus to regard 
the role of sensuous hyle — i.e. affective, non-objectifying self-appearing — in the 
process of constitution as secondary to that of apperceptive objectification.   6
 In order to remedy this, Henry believes that it is not enough for the phenome-
nologist to simply bracket the intramundane contents of the world — i.e. ‘the empirical 
 Husserl, in other words, in his definition of phenomenology, begins with the view there are intended 6
objects of experience, thus there are acts intending those objects; so, phenomenology, as far as Husserl is 
concerned, is both a regressive and correlative investigation into this 'constitution’ of intended objects. 
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world and the psychological ego inscribed in it’ — and relinquish our naive belief in 
them as fostered by the natural attitude.   To truly treat the immanence of the subject in 7
a sufficiently pure manner, it is necessary to suspend or question the ecstatic appearing 
that opens and makes possible the light of the world to consciousness.  We have to go 
one step back into and back behind, as it were, consciousness as understood from within 
the natural attitude.  Henry believes that Descartes provides us with such a way, and, to 
the extent that this is the case, in doing so he provides us with a more adequate account 
of the independent and unique appearing of the subject.    8
 In this sense, the work of Descartes serves as something of a critical pivot-point 
between Husserl and Henry.  Husserl famously critiques Descartes’s account of the cog-
ito as failing to establish that consciousness exists absolutely or how it is given in a fun-
damentally different way than transcendent objects in the world.  In his eyes, 
Descartes’s cogito remains a ‘little tag-end of the world’, and insofar as this is the case, 
‘his work falls short of establishing the independent and unique way in which the sub-
ject exists (i.e. its absolute existence).’   As far as Henry is concerned, however, it is 9
Husserl who falls short of this goal more so than Descartes.  By conceiving the imma-
nence of the subject as a transcendence-in-immanence (i.e. as a primal flow) which 
opens up the world as an ecstatic horizon of visibility in light of which things can ap-
pear to us, Henry sees Husserl’s understanding of transcendental subjectivity as still 
bound to the appearing of the world.  Because of this, Henry maintains that Husserl fails 
to uncover the truly transcendental field of experience, to uncover the purely immanent 
 Henry, Material Phenomenology, p. 58.7
 Michel Henry, ‘The Critique of the Subject’, in Who Comes After The Subject? ed. by Eduardo Cadava, 8
Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 157-166 (p. 157).
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realm that, as such, has no relation to the world or to anything outside itself, and which 
is therefore truly absolute, namely, the transcendental life of the living subject. 
 This is not to say, however, that Henry fully endorses Descartes’s method as the 
sole, or even the primary path toward an insight into the absolute existence of the sub-
ject.  Henry views Descartes as simply providing the phenomenologist with the means 
to begin to gain a theoretical understanding of the subject’s radically immanent way of 
living.  
3.2 THE IMMANENT APPEARING OF THE COGITO 
Descartes’s proof of the absolute existence of the ego cogito arises at the end of the ter-
mination of his process of methodological doubt, or what Henry calls his radical 
epoche.  Let us briefly recall the nature of this procedure.  In an effort to counter skepti-
cism over certainty in any of our knowledge-claims and secure an unshakable (i.e. in-
dubitable, certain) foundation for all appearance (i.e. being) and knowledge, Descartes 
tries to doubt everything: he doubts himself as a man who exists in the world; he doubts 
his eyes, legs, the ground on which he walks, as well as everything he sees and even the 
external world itself, which may be nothing more than an illusion.   But even if every10 -
thing I see and think about can be doubted, there is one thing that cannot be: the exis-
tence of the doubter, my thinking itself — ‘I think, therefore I am.’  Everything can be 
doubted, with the exception of my self, as this thinking thing.  As Descartes writes, ‘[a]t 
last I have discovered it — thought; this alone is inseparable from me.  I am, I exist — 
 Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, p. 17.10
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that is certain.  But for how long? For as long as I am thinking.’   In this way, 11
Descartes’s radical epoche is said to demonstrate that the existence of the self as a think-
ing thing is the ultimate foundation of appearance and knowledge for which philosophy 
has always been searching.  
 Henry’s interpretation of Descartes’s account of the cogito (i.e. of the intercon-
nectedness of thought, appearance, being) stands in marked contrast to the dominant 
view of the primary functioning of Descartes’s cogito as a matter of representational 
thinking, that is to say, as the posing of something before consciousness.   As far as 12
Henry is concerned, Descartes himself is at least partially to blame for the prevalence of 
this short-sighted view in the secondary literature.  Because Descartes did not fully un-
derstand or appreciate just what it is that his method of doubt stumbles upon, he eventu-
ally aligns the cogito with representation, and ultimately mistakes it as a cogito me cog-
itare, as a self-representation that accompanies all of my representations.   According 13
to Henry, in ‘beginning Cartesianism’, it is not representational thinking that determines 
the way in which the subject exists and knows itself.  If we actually inspect Descartes’s 
initial phenomenological descriptions of the cogito, what we find is that, at heart, 
thought is not reflexive or intentional, and so, it does not depend on or refer to anything 
 René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 2, trans. by John Cottingham, Robert 11
Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 18.
 In the commonplace view, as evidenced in the work of Heidegger, the cogito is the locus of objectivity. 12
The cogito is the model of representational thinking, which consists in placing something before our re-
gard.  To the extent that the cogito functions as the absolute ground of being, it effectively reduces every-
thing that is to an object for a subject.  What is more, contrary to Heidegger’s interpretation of Descartes' 
account of the cogito as itself presupposing the being of the cogito, Henry points out that ‘Descartes does 
not say “I am”; he says “therefore I am.”  Far from arising without presupposition, his affirmation results 
from the systematic elaboration [and discovery] of the indispensable prerequisite from which alone the 
proposition of being is possible.  This prerequisite is nothing other than the appearance which Descartes 
calls “thought.”  The determination of this prerequisite is the content of the cogito.  “We are only by virtue 
of the fact that we think [Nous sommes par cela seul que nous pensons].”’  Michel Henry, ‘The Soul Ac-
cording to Descartes’, in Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes, ed. by Stephen Voss 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 40-51 (p. 41).  
 Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, pp. 44, 47.  For more on this, see Martin Heidegger, Niet13 -
zsche: Volumes Three and Four, trans. by Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 
104-106, 108.  Cf. also Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, A355, A363.
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other than itself.  Therefore, what Descartes’s methodological doubt really proves is that 
the existence of the self can be established with unshakeable certainty (i.e. in an abso-
lutely clear and distinct way) without having to appeal to object-manifestation, which is 
to say, without having to appeal to anything outside ourselves (i.e. to a cogitatum or ob-
ject of thought).  Henry believes he finds evidence for this view in the following two 
passages: 
The fact that it is I who am doubting and understanding and willing is so evident 
that I see no way of making it any clearer.  But it is also the case that the ‘I’ who 
imagines is the same ‘I.’  For even if, as I have supposed, none of the objects of 
imagination are real, the power of imagination is something which really exists 
and is part of my thinking.  Lastly, it is also the same ‘I’ who has sensory percep-
tions (sentiens), or is aware of bodily things as it were through the senses.  For 
example, I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat.  But I am asleep, so 
all this is false.  Yet I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed.  This can-
not be false; what is called ‘having a sensory perception’ is strictly just this, and in 
this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking.  14
Thus often when we sleep, and sometimes even when we are awake, we imagine 
certain things so forcibly, that we think we see them before us, or feel them in our 
body, although they do not exist at all; but although we may be asleep or dream-
ing, we cannot feel sad or moved by any other passion without its being very true 
that the soul actually has this passion within it […] we may be mistaken therein 
regarding perceptions which relate to objects which are outside us, or at least 
those which relate to certain parts of our body, but that we cannot be so deceived 
regarding the passions, inasmuch as they are so close to, and so entirely within 
our soul, that it is impossible for it to feel them without their being actually such 
as it feels them to be.  15
According to Henry, what these passages demonstrate is that, for one, even though what 
appears to me — that is, the content which appears in the light of the world — may be 
false, what cannot be doubted is my immediate (i.e. non-ecstatic) awareness — i.e. 
 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 2, p. 19.14
 Ibid., p. 338.15
 96
videor, thought, ‘it seems to me’.   When it seems to me that I am hearing or being 16
warmed, I may be mistaken about the worldly content of my awareness, but I cannot be 
mistaken about the existence of my awareness itself.   Even when doubt forces us to 17
cancel the validity of everything we see and all of our representations, the validity of 
our immediate self-awareness (i.e. self-appearing) remains.  In this case, even without a 
cogitatum, even without an intentional object, this awareness occurs in a perfectly clear 
and distinct way.     
 One might be understandably confused by this account of awareness.  If this 
awareness excludes any and all transcendence, and does not involve a relation to some-
thing other than the subject or thought, how should it be understood? Henry steps in 
here to try and lend some precision to the matter.  As the subject’s primal self-awareness 
excludes ecstasis, it cannot be mediated by the ecstatic temporality of the world, and so, 
it occurs without delay.   And since this immediate self-awareness does not involve a 18
relation to anything other than itself, it is also given non-horizontally.  In the immediacy 
of its awareness, the subject is, as it were, ‘crushed up against itself’ at each point of its 
 In Henry’s view, Descartes’s account of the ‘[t]he cogito finds its ultimate formulation in the proposi16 -
tion ‘videre videor’ — it seems to me that I see [i.e. sensory awareness].’  Henry, ‘The Soul According to 
Descartes’, in Science of René Descartes, ed. by Voss, pp. 41-42.  For Henry, the formulation that is 
equivalent to ‘‘videre videor’ in the Cartesianism of the beginning is ‘sentimus nos videre’ — ‘we are 
aware that we see’ — an assertion all the more interesting because Descartes makes it in the course of 
opposing the vision of animals, who properly speaking see nothing at all, to ‘human’ vision, that is, to 
actual vision, which thus does not consist only in videre but counts as such only if sentimus nos videre’. 
Ibid., p. 43; René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 3, trans. by John Cotting-
ham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), pp. 61-62. 
 Descartes expresses this point in another way in the following passage: ‘even though the objects of my 17
sensory experience and imagination may have no existence outside me, nonetheless the modes of thinking 
which I refer to as cases of sensory perception and imagination, in so far as they are simply modes of 
thinking, do exist within me — of that I am certain’.  Or again, ‘[b]ut when I see, or think I see (I am not 
here distinguishing the two), it is simply not possible that I who am now thinking am not something.’ 
Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 2, pp. 24, 22. 
 As Henry writes, ‘[t]hought’s primal sensing is radically opposed to the sensing that rules seeing, hear18 -
ing, touching, and even understanding (insofar as it is a seeing, intueri) […].  Thought’s essential self-
sensing is not merely different from ek-stasis; it excludes it, and precisely this exclusion determines the 
concept of immediacy.’  Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, p. 22.
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being.   What we are left with, then, is a primal awareness in which we cannot ‘draw a 19
distinction between the object of awareness and our awareness [itself]’.   To borrow 20
Henry’s language, the subject is at once both appearing and what appears, without any 
distance or difference between the two.  Therefore, prior to any reflective or objectify-
ing relation to something beyond oneself, the subject already knows itself in this imma-
nent, pre-reflective and non-objectifying self-awareness. 
3.3 THE PRIMAL SENSING OF THOUGHT 
We can perhaps make this account seem more tangible by highlighting the other impli-
cation of the above passages from Descartes, namely, that thinking is not merely a cog-
nitive or mental accomplishment, but an affective one.  In Descartes’s words, ‘[b]y the 
term ‘thought,’ I understand everything which we are aware of as happening within us, 
in so far as we have awareness of it.  Hence, thinking is to be identified here not merely 
with understanding, willing, and imagining, but also with sensory awareness (imaginans 
quoque et sentiens)’.   According to Henry, then, it is this immanent ‘self-sensing that 21
originally presents thought to itself and makes it what it is, [namely] appearance’s origi-
nal self-appearing’.   Rather than unfolding in a rarified, sterile realm, thought always 22
 Henry, I am the Truth, p. 56.  As Henry states in an earlier text, the subject’s immediate self-awareness 19
is characterised by ‘its Being-riveted-to-itself in the perfect adherence of identity’.  Henry, The Essence of 
Manifestation, p. 660.
 Lilian Alweiss, ‘The Bifurcated Subject’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17, no. 3 20
(2009), 415-434 (p. 424).
 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 2, p. 195.21
 Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, p. 22.22
 98
involves this immediate self-sensing.   As Henry writes, ‘Descartes continuously af23 -
firms that we sense our thought, sense that we see, that we hear, that we warm our-
selves’.   Thus, as one commentator correctly concludes, ‘(T)o say that “I see that I am 24
certain” is a type of thought-sensing and not merely “thinking that I see” in the sceptical 
sense: “thinking that I see is sensing that I see”.  Sensing is a type of thinking, a ‘primal 
sensing.’’  25
 In this case, what Henry sees Descartes’s account of thought as alighting upon, 
however unwittingly, is that all facets of our original self-experience rest upon a basic 
self-sensing.  In experiencing this or that affective state, in experiencing joy or pain, ex-
citement or boredom, we not only experience the affective tonality itself — i.e. the joy 
or suffering — but also our own self and life.  In each of its affective experiences, the 
self experiences itself as being alive, that is, as a living being who immediately senses 
its own living, who senses or lives-through its joy and pain, its moving and breathing, 
and so on.  Therefore,  
it is altogether possible to say ‘I’m walking, therefore I am,’ [or, for that matter, 
‘I’m crying, therefore I am] on the condition that one understands by this the im-
mediate experience of the walk, the walk reduced to what it really is for the one 
who is walking, the pure subjective experience of the act of walking.  Reduced to 
this pure experience, walking is nothing other than a cogitatio and, thus, is fun-
damental to what I am, to the sum as well as to the ‘I think.’  It is only a modality 
of this ‘I think’ itself in the Cartesian sense, understood as that which is experi-
enced immediately in and of itself.   26
 Therefore, while Descartes is occasionally charged with reducing human life to cognitive or rational 23
thought, this is far from being the case.  Descartes develops an account of thinking that goes well beyond 
what has become the standard, everyday understanding of the term.  Henry is certainly not the only one to 
pick up on this point.  The point has also been made by Heidegger, amongst others.  See Heidegger, Niet-
zsche: Volumes Three and Four, pp. 19, 22. 
 Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, p. 21.24
 John Mullarkey, Post-Continental Philosophy: An Outline (New York: Continuum, 2006), p. 53.25
 Michel Henry, ‘Incarnation and the Problem of Touch’, in Carnal Hermeneutics, ed. by Richard Kear26 -
ney and Brian Treanor (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), p. 140.
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 With this account of the subject’s primal self-awareness, then, what Henry is ef-
fectively trying to say about all of our experiences, as Zahavi remarks, is that, 
experiences are essentially characterized by having a subjective ‘feel’ to them, 
that is, a certain quality of ‘what it is like’, or what it ‘feels’ like to have them. 
When I am conscious, I ‘feel’ my experience, i.e. I am aware of what it is like to 
have it.  This way of ‘feeling’ the experience does not presuppose the intervention 
of mediation of any sense organ or higher-order intentional act, but is simply a 
question of a direct and immediate self-affection […].  To be in pain, embarrassed, 
happy, or stubborn is to be (self-)aware of it.  It is, so to speak, both a way of be-
ing and a way of being aware.  27
This account of the subject’s primal self-awareness thus tries to speak to something fair-
ly simple, even naive, about the nature of our experience.  As Sébastien Laoureux notes, 
‘[t]he experience “of feeling that one is oneself” has a kind of obviousness that material 
phenomenology wants to seize upon in all its depth and specificity.’   What it is like to 28
feel myself living, to feel myself walking or breathing, gazing at the setting sun or 
smelling fresh coffee in the morning, involves an immediacy and a singularity that Hen-
ry’s account of the subject’s primal awareness is trying to articulate.  
3.4 THE EMBODIED COGITO 
Bearing all of this in mind, Henry contends that Descartes’s cogito is necessarily em-
bodied.  Indeed, Descartes’s own work offers support for this view, as when he notes 
that 
we also experience within ourselves certain other things which must not be re-
ferred either to the mind alone or to the body alone.  These arise […] from the 
close and intimate union of our mind with the body.  This list includes first, ap-
petites like hunger and thirst, secondly, the emotions or passions of the mind 
 Dan Zahavi, Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation (Evanston, Northwestern 27
University Press, 1999), p. 111.
 Sébastien Laoureux, ‘Hyper-transcendentalism and Intentionality: On the Specificity of the ‘Transcen28 -
dental’ in Material Phenomenology’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17, no. 3 (2009), 
389-400 (p. 396).
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which do not consist of thought alone, such as emotions of anger, joy, sadness and 
love, and finally, all the sensations, such as those of pain, pleasure, light, colours, 
sounds, smells, tastes, heat, hardness and the other tactile qualities.   29
The existence of such sensory states suggests that there is a primal bond between mind 
and body.   As Descartes explains, if the bond between mind and body were not essen30 -
tial to the being of the subject, then 
I, who am nothing but a thinking thing, would not feel pain when the body was 
hurt, but would perceive the damage purely by the intellect, just as a sailor per-
ceives by sight if anything in his ship is broken.  Similarly, when the body needed 
food or drink, I should have an explicit understanding of the fact, instead of hav-
ing confused sensations of hunger and thirst.  For these sensations of hunger, 
thirst, pain and so on, are nothing but confused modes of thinking which arise 
from the union and, as it were, intermingling of the mind with the body.  31
Yet since states such as hunger and pain are not experienced or properly known by a 
pure consciousness, but by one which is immersed in and determined by the sensibility 
of its bodily being, Descartes feels justified in asserting that there are states which re-
quire an essential bond between mind and body.  32
 In Henry’s view, these unique sensations, and the fundamental bond they imply 
between mind and body, do not call into question Descartes’s basic dualism between the 
mind (i.e. the soul, thought) and the extended body that appears in the spatio-temporal 
world.  As we know, Descartes’s radical epoche eliminates all beings — i.e. extended 
bodies — and their way of appearing — i.e. the ecstatic appearing of the world.  Ac-
cording to Henry, the bond in question merely indicates that what remains after the radi-
cal epoche, namely, the cogito, should itself be understood as a transcendental bodily 
life — what Henry also refers to as the subjective body or the flesh — as a transcenden-
 René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1, trans. by John Cottingham, 29
Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 209.
 Alweiss, ‘The Bifurcated Self’, p. 423.30
 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 2, p. 238.31
 Alweiss, ‘The Bifurcated Self’, p. 423.32
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tal affectivity or pathos (videor), which consists in an immediate and non-objectifying 
self-affection.  The cogito, as the first principle of everything, as the original upsurge of 
appearing (i.e. being) that first enables everything to come to be and to be known, 
should be understood as a radically immanent bodily awareness.   
 Consequently, what Henry, through his reading of Descartes, does a better job of 
recognising than did Husserl, is the fact that the body is not first or primarily known as 
an object of outer sense perception.  As seen here, the radically immanent and non-ob-
jectifying self-embrace of the flesh allows the subject to know its body as its own from 
the very beginning, without having to be objectified.   If this is the case, then, contrary 33
to Husserl, whose own approach and understanding of the lived body is determined by 
this presumed priority of objectifying perception, the experience of one’s own bodily 
life cannot, in principle, be properly or sufficiently approached by way of a derivative 
of thing-perception, or from the analogy of thing-perception.  Therefore, contrary to 
what Husserl suggests, there can be no pure ego that would in principle be irreducible to 
its lived body.  The living subject does not, as in Husserl, first have a pure mental 
awareness of itself, which would be existentially or logically prior to and independent 
of anything outside this consciousness, including its body, such that it would only come 
to apprehend and ‘possess’ its body as its own ‘from the outside’ in the objectifying ex-
perience of touch (or visual outer sense perception).   Rather, transcendental subjectivi34 -
ty is embodied through and through, and essentially comes to know itself by way of its 
bodily awareness.   
 As Zahavi notes, according to Henry, ‘[w]hen I am conscious of my bodily movements and sensibility, 33
then I am conscious of it by virtue of the body itself; more precisely, by virtue of the very self-affection of 
bodily life, and not because the body has become my intentional object.’  Dan Zahavi, ‘Subjectivity and 
Immanence in Michel Henry’, in Subjectivity and transcendence, ed. by Arne Grøn, Iben Damgaard, and 
Søren Overgaardp (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), pp. 133-147 (p. 148).
 Husserl, Ideas II, pp. 152, 223, 226; Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 97.34
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 Furthermore, if we accept this reading of Descartes, then the ontological monism 
that is said to dominate the history of Western thought has been at least momentarily 
interrupted.  By rejecting all things and their appearance — i.e. the ecstatic appearing of 
the world — Descartes’s radical epoche reveals that this ecstatic mode of appearing is in 
fact based upon the radically immanent and affective appearing of the subjective body,  35
in which the subject can indeed know itself in its simple self-revelation, without refer-
ring to anything other than itself.   This is why, for Henry, contra Husserl’s abstractions 36
of the act of outer (sense) perception and reflective inner (immanent) perception in his 
transcendental reduction: 
sight in its ecstatic structure (the eye and its mirror) does not constitute phenome-
nality’s first actuality and upwelling.  On the contrary, seeing can see what is seen 
only if it is first possible as seeing, that is, is apperceived in itself [i.e. in the pri-
mal self-sensing of the subjective body].  So this apperception is inherent to ek-
stasis and precedes it instead of being constituted by it.  It is appearance’s original 
self-appearing; the One of Difference; radical exteriority’s radical interiority; the 
internal knowledge that precedes acquisition; the videor of videre, what knows the 
eye, the mirror, and itself.  37
 In leading the subject back to this forgotten essence of appearing, Henry views 
Descartes as providing phenomenology with an opportunity to at last move beyond 
what he regards as its overly intellectualist tendencies, and to begin to properly explore 
the tremendous promise of affectivity, both in terms of its decisive role in the subject’s 
constitution of itself and meaningfulness of the world, and in its ability to furnish the 
subject with an insight into the way in which things are given to us in their perfect self-
givenness.  In order to begin to get a sense for this promise of affectivity, as conceived 
 Henry, ‘The Soul According to Descartes’, in Science of René Descartes, ed. by Voss, pp. 41-42.35
 Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, p. 15.36
 Ibid., p. 24.37
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by Henry, we will need to delve further into his own development of the subject’s radi-
cally immanent way of living.  
3.5 THE GENERATIVE MOVEMENT OF LIFE 
Indeed, Henry maintains that Descartes’s discovery of the cogito was of such a radical 
nature that he himself was not able to appreciate its significance or fully explicate its 
structure.   Shortly after pointing toward affectivity as the essence of thought, 38
Descartes begins to alter his position and to align the cogito with seeing and 
objectivity.   The cogito effectively becomes a cogito me cogitare, a self-representation 39
that accompanies all of my representations.   Whatever the motivations for the shift — 40
a deficient understanding of his own discovery, as Henry contends, or perhaps the pres-
sure he may have felt to couch his findings in the Scholastic terms of his time — 
Descartes effectively covers over and obfuscates his initial insights into the cogito be-
fore he is able to demonstrate exactly how it enables the subject to constitute itself and 
 As he writes, Descartes ‘gave the concept of consciousness its ontologically radical significance, in 38
which that concept designates appearance considered in itself — not just some thing but the principle of 
every thing, the original manifestation in which everything that can exist comes to be a phenomenon and 
so into being for us.  Descartes introduced the concept of consciousness at such a depth, however, that its 
primal importance could not be preserved or truly perceived, not even when taken up again by contempo-
rary phenomenology, which claimed to develop it fully — not even, I would say, by Descartes himself’. 
Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, p. 2. 
 Ibid., pp. 44-45.39
 Ibid., pp. 44, 47.40
 104
the world, in short, before he is able to develop a full-fledged material 
phenomenology.    41
 In light of this, Henry comes to see the development of the cogito, understood as 
the immanent and affective self-appearing of bodily life, as the future of phenomenolo-
gy.  The history of the subject being what it is in Western philosophy, in taking up this 
task, Henry is adamant that his work should not be regarded as a bit of nostalgia, as an 
attempt to resurrect this long-fallen spectre that we call the subject, ‘like the return of a 
past reality that, tired of being neglected, would aspire to play once again a role on the 
philosophical stage’.   Insofar as ‘the Being of the subject has never been [fully] recog42 -
nized’, it is not the subject’s ‘“return” that is announced’ in Henry’s phenomenology of 
life, ‘but its first coming’.  43
 Though this point has not been as well observed as one might expect, the crux of 
Henry’s account of the being of the subject, and his second principle argument for posit-
ing this radically immanent way of being, centres around the concept of generation.  44
The subject’s way of being consists in the productive movement of life, or what Henry 
 The ‘material’ Henry has in mind is not the physical matter or objective reality that is studied by the 41
sciences, but the phenomenological life, or transcendental affectivity, that we are.  As Ray Brassier points 
out, Henry thus spiritualises matter to such an extent that ‘there is no longer anything remotely “physical” 
left about it’.  Ray Brassier, ‘Alien Theory: The Decline of Materialism in the Name of Matter’ (unpub-
lished doctoral thesis, University of Warwick, 2001), p. 82.  Descartes’s primary epistemological motiva-
tion to refute the Pyrrhonian skepticism of Montaigne by finding one item of knowledge (and its criterion 
from within that item of knowledge) would appear to be the main factor in his overlooking of the signifi-
cance of the certainty of one’s own existence as opposed to the significance of the knowledge that I exist 
with absolute epistemic certainty at the termination of his process of methodic doubt. 
 Henry, ‘The Critique of the Subject’, in Who Comes After The Subject? ed. by Cadava et al, p. 165.42
 Ibid.43
 Though the central importance of the concept of generation in the work of Henry has in general been 44
less than well observed, Joseph Rivera deserves credit for drawing some attention to this matter in The 
Contemplative Self After Michel Henry: A Phenomenological Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2015).  See also his article ‘Generation, interiority and the phenomenology of Christianity in 
Michel Henry’, Continental Philosophy Review 44, no. 2 (2011), 205-235.
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calls subjective movement.   While there is a strong continuity to Henry’s work, his 45
account of the generative movement of life does undergo some alteration over the 
course of his writings.  His position on this matter can be seen as roughly unfolding in 
two stages: in the earlier texts, where the religious character of his work has not yet 
been explicitly rendered, and in his later, overtly Christian studies.  We will proceed 
through these stages chronologically.    
 While Henry fleshes out the role of movement in the bodily life of the living in-
dividual in increasingly greater detail as his work develops, its central role in a proper 
understanding of life is acknowledged from the very beginning.  According to Henry, 
this is something that the late French philosopher Maine de Biran understood better than 
Descartes.  In his Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, Henry credits de Biran 
with the first stirrings of an acknowledgment that movement is not first and foremost a 
transcendent phenomenon, as Descartes supposed, but is to be identified with ‘the origi-
nal sphere of existence [i.e. life]’.  ‘“Subjective movement” is an ontological determi46 -
nation of the body that “defines the real body, and not the idea of the body, as a subjec-
tive and transcendental being”’.   Therefore, subjective movement ‘is not the product 47
of constitution in the Husserlian sense of intentional acts but is directly known in “in-
 Henry maintains that Schopenhauer and Nietzsche both endeavour to speak to the movement of life, 45
though in ways that ultimately remain insufficiently developed.  See Henry, The Genealogy of Psycho-
analysis, pp. 169, 245.
 Michel Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, trans. by Girard Etzkorn (The Hague: 46
Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 57.  In his reading of de Biran, Henry outlines how de Biran takes consider-
able strides toward deepening Descartes’s account of the cogito with his insights into subjective move-
ment.  Ibid., pp. 56-57.
 Maxine-Sheets Johnstone, ‘Essential clarifications of ‘self-affection and Husserl’s “sphere of 47
ownness”: First steps toward a pure phenomenology of (human) nature’, Continental Philosophy Review 
39, no. 4 (2006), 361-391 (p. 368); Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, p. 57.
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ternal transcendental experience”’.   Movement stands ‘at the heart of subjective life: 48
“the being of movement is a subjective being”’.     49
 To try and come to grips with Henry’s account of this subjective movement of 
affectivity, we need to first understand the basic distinction that Henry draws between 
affectivity and particular affective tonalities, that is, between ‘the pathic self-relation 
which is ever the self-same life and the modalities, e.g. sensations, feelings, etc’.   The 50
life (i.e. primal self-sensing) of the subject functions as a generative movement in the 
sense that it continuously comes into and effects itself in an immanent and non-horizon-
tal manner.  Because the subject experiences its life in this way, and is irredeemably 
crushed upon against itself without distance or mediation, it experiences the movement 
of life as an original passivity and suffering.  That is to say, it experiences the movement 
of life as something it cannot will or control, but can only undergo and endure.  Suffer-
ing is thus not merely a particular affective tonality that comes and goes over the course 
of one’s life.  Instead, suffering belongs to the fundamental structure of life and accom-
panies ‘one’s life as a whole’.   Far from being ‘an unhappy accident, a natural pecu51 -
liarity, or the necessity of an incomprehensible fate’, suffering is ‘the a priori structure 
and innermost possibility of all that is, or as Nietzsche, following Schopenhauer, said, 
the Mother of Being’.   Consequently, the arch-suffering of life should not be taken in a 52
 Johnstone, ‘Essential clarifications of ‘self-affection and Husserl’s ‘sphere of ownness’’, p. 368.48
 Ibid., p. 369; Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, p. 62.49
 James Hart, ‘Michel Henry’s Phenomenological Theology of Life: A Husserlian Reading of C’est moi, 50
la vérité’, Husserl Studies 15, no. 3 (1999), 183-230 (p. 213).
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negative sense.  It merely indicates that life is characterised by a fundamental power-
lessness or impotence, in that its movement is a ‘gift which cannot be refused’, but only 
endured.  53
 By the same token, life’s continuous coming into itself means that every feeling 
is equally coloured by enjoyment.   Because life, in its immanent movement of self-54
surpassing, finds itself crushed up against itself in its very being, ‘one may equally say 
that it “arrives at itself, and becomes what it is”.  This identity of a feeling with itself is 
a source of enjoyment’.   Another way of expressing this would be to say that in the 55
movement whereby life finds itself thrust up against itself, it simultaneously finds itself 
put in possession of all of its abilities — its ability to act, feel, think and so on.  In a 
word, life’s immanent movement imbues it with a certain feeling of powerfulness; it 
imbues each feeling with ‘a certain calm and quietness (douceur) […] because every 
feeling is “always-already-given-to-itself” and because of the “tranquil force” resulting 
from this fact’.  56
 In reality, then, suffering and joy are not merely two separate affective tonalities, 
but belong together, and give life ‘a particular sense of reality’.   The movement of life 57
is lived as a feeling of powerfulness that is equally immediately a feeling of powerless-
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ness or impotence — inasmuch as the same movement that engenders life’s ability or 
potentiality is also one that it cannot refuse.  Life cannot not experience itself as this in-
cessant movement of coming into itself, as this ‘perpetual oscillation between suffering 
and joy’.  58
 Yet, this does not yet provide us with a full and complete understanding of the 
generative movement of life.  For Henry claims that life is not an abstract feeling that 
occurs apart from its particular affective tonalities.  Similar to Husserl’s characterisation 
of the primal flow (i.e. experiencing) and its acts (subjective experiences) as being dis-
tinct yet inseparable moments in one and the same flow of consciousness, Henry main-
tains that life (i.e. self-affection) is distinct and yet inseparable from the particular affec-
tive tonalities that arise within the life of one and the same living individual.  As James 
Hart puts this, ‘Life is not an unknown “I know not what” over and above the modali-
ties; rather the pathic self-relation is lived only through these modalities and none of 
these comprise essentially the original pathic self-relation of original non-reflexive self-
manifestation.’   In Henry’s case, the movement of affectivity comes into and engen59 -
ders itself only in engendering the particular affective tonalities in which it receives it-
self.  Instead of being simple, life is always composite because, as a movement that con-
tinuously comes into and produces itself, life always makes more of itself, it always 
produces and experiences itself in new waves of affects.  Put differently, as László 
Tengelyi notes, the movement of life is such that ‘every feeling has a tendency to sur-
pass itself […].  Paradoxically, feeling transcends itself precisely by arriving at itself, by 
becoming that which it is and nothing else’.    60
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 As the movement of life consists in this generation of ever-new impressions, 
Henry eventually begins to describe it as a need, more specifically, as a need that is dri-
ven for more of itself.   In its generative movement, life is not driven for something it 61
lacks, for something other than itself, but simply for ‘more’ of itself.  As this perpetual 
self-overflowing into itself, life constantly stands in need of more of itself.   Life is, 62
therefore, nothing other than a movement of self-growth.  Life needs to grow, to further 
its ability to act, sense, feel, think, and so on. 
 As such, Henry eventually comes to understand the movement of life as a primal 
temporality and historicity.   By engendering ever-new affects, the movement of life 63
effectively engenders the subject’s original, first-person sense of time and history.  As 
this movement continuously comes into itself, and is thus without limitation or end, 
Henry regards the time of life as infinite.  Therefore, life does not know of a beginning 
or end, but only the ever-developing history of its lived impressions. 
 Lest any confusion arise, Henry does not view this time of life as involving any 
kind of fracture or transcendence.  The time of life is immanent, non-ecstatic and non-
horizontal.  It, therefore, occurs as a primal and permanent Now or living present, with-
out any trace of a past, future or present.  What we are left with is effectively ‘a stable 
form for changing content’.   As Henry writes, ‘[l]ike Euripus Strait, life is changing, 64
but yet through its variations it does not cease to be life in an absolute sense.  It is the 
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same Life, the same experience of the self that does not cease to experience itself, to be 
absolutely the same, one single and same self.’  65
 An eminent example of this immanent movement that Henry frequently refers to 
is the experience of pain.  Here we come to the second argument for Henry’s insistence 
on the subject’s radically immanent way of living.  Henry provides an account of our 
experience of pain in the following passage: 
[p]ure pain is pure suffering, it is this suffering’s immanence to itself — a suffer-
ing without horizon, without hope, entirely occupied with itself because it fills the 
entire place, so that there is no other place for it but the one it occupies.  It is im-
possible for it to leave itself, or to escape itself, or to get ahead of itself — by 
throwing itself outside like one subjected to torture throws himself through the 
window to escape his persecutors — in order to escape its torture, and its suffer-
ing […].  As soon as suffering is there, it is entirely there indeed, as a sort of abso-
lute.  For the one who suffers, nothing infringes upon his suffering.  Suffering has 
neither doors nor windows, and no space outside it or within it that would allow it 
to escape […].  Between suffering and suffering, there is nothing.  For the one 
who suffers, for as long as he suffers, [ecstatic] time does not exist […].  Suffer-
ing is driven back against itself […].  Suffering is not affected by something else, 
but by itself; it is a self-affection in the radical sense that suffering is what is af-
fected, but it is by suffering that it is so.  It is at once affecting and affected, what 
makes it hurt and what hurts, without distinction.   66
As this detailed analysis reveals, it appears to be proper to our first-person experience of 
pain that the pain is not static, but occurs as a movement that has its own time and histo-
ry, and yet a movement that, according to Henry, is unable to move to an outside, but 
which can only ever come into and develop in itself.  Indeed, it is this fundamental in-
ability to escape, this inability for the pain to transcend itself, and to instead find itself 
riveted to itself in a radial immanence, that, if we follow Henry, appears to make pain 
what it is.   There is certainly something to this account.  During an especially distress67 -
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ing or painful moment in one’s life, one might try to do any number of things to relieve 
the pain, and yet, try as one might, there is at least some sense in which the pain remains 
insurmountable.  As Henry has it, this experience of pain, in which the pain seems to be 
continuously thrust back upon itself and ‘crushed under its own weight’, provides us 
with compelling evidence of the radically immanent and affective movement of life.  68
3.6 THE ARCH-PRESENCE OF LIFE 
  
Since this movement of life is radically immanent, and so, cannot ever appear according 
to the ecstatic order that structures consciousness, as something that can be presented to 
our intuition, Henry further specifies that it must ultimately be understood as uncon-
scious.  While his work in The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis is highly critical of what 
he refers to as the representational unconscious — i.e. the unconscious understood as 
‘representation’s other’, as a container for those contents that no longer appear within or 
exercise any influence on representational consciousness — he maintains that life itself 
serves as an original unconscious.  As he writes, ‘the unconscious is the name of life’.  69
The generative movement of life, as the absolute foundation of being, is, if you like, a 
productive and creative unconscious, an infinite free play of the dark forces that make 
up the secret inner life of the flesh.  
 In effect, the significance of the generative movement of life that Western 
thought has overlooked consists, at least in part, in its ability to engender things that 
happen outside the power of consciousness.  As we will recall, in his early time-lectures, 
Husserl is reluctant to explicitly acknowledge that transcendental subjectivity has its 
 Ibid.68
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basis in an unconscious life.  While Henry is not without his own criticisms of what he 
sees as the traditional account of the unconscious — i.e. the representational uncon-
scious — his study of life ultimately brings him to a more explicit acknowledgment of 
its importance for a proper understanding of the subject.  It is to Henry’s credit that he 
draws attention to this oft-neglected feature of life: its fundamental ability to cause af-
fective states and actions to happen that lie outside the purview and power of con-
sciousness.   
 In this sense, the generative movement of affectivity should be seen as a source 
of radical novelty.  Rather than having to receive its sensory content from outside itself, 
by continuously coming into itself, the life of the living individual produces its own 
content; it continuously ‘brings into being what has not yet taken place in being: hither-
to inexperienced tones, impressions, emotions, feelings and forces’ that lie outside the 
realm of what consciousness can anticipate, expect, or even control, something radically 
new that can disturb and interrupt the otherwise steady flow of our sedimented expecta-
tions and habits.  70
 This productivity of life becomes perhaps especially apparent in Henry’s study 
of the cultural life of the living individual.  In his study of the paintings and theoretical 
reflections of Wassily Kandinsky, Henry credits the Russian painter and art-theorist with 
the discovery that the generative movement of life functions as a kind of transcendental 
imagination.   Traditionally, the imagination ‘is the faculty of representing a thing in its 71
absence’.   The imagination is here thought to consist in the production of irreal images 72
and representations, such that its products are themselves imaginary — i.e. they re-
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present absent things to us as if they were really there before us.  According to Henry, 
though, what Kandinsky glimpses, and what our own account of the generative moment 
of life reveals, is that ‘the imagination belongs to life’, that the generative movement of 
life is nothing short of a transcendental imagination.   It can therefore be said that the 73
primal significance of the subject that Western thought has failed to glimpse is that the 
subjective body is a transcendental imagination, and that, as a result, the imagination 
does not merely consist in ‘the power to form images’, but in ‘the proper history of sub-
jectivity’, in ‘the expansion of its pathos, the movement by which each tone awakens 
another tone and then another within itself’.   Consequently, the products of the imagi74 -
nation are not strictly speaking imaginary; they consist in the very real affective tonali-
ties that are engendered within our flesh.  In this sense Henry notes that ‘[t]he imagina-
tion is indeed creative, even in a radical sense that gives it a positivity that was not 
glimpsed by classical thought.’  75
 As radically immanent, this generative movement of life must ultimately be un-
derstood as an arch-presence.  As the transcendental history of life expels ecstasis and 
cannot ever admit of any distance, transcendental subjectivity must in essence be under-
stood as a mode of presence that, while founding the ecstatic and visible appearing (or 
presence) of the world, always and forever stands outside of it.  Strangely enough, be-
cause the arch-presence of life, as the essence of all appearing, cannot ever appear with-
in the visible display of the world, it is itself radically invisible; it is a mode of appear-
ing that can never be seen, but which can only ever be felt and lived — hence a felt 
presence. 
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 Consequently, Henry’s conception of life leaves us with a radical bifurcation of 
the two modes of appearing.  In construing the transcendental life of the subject as a 
radically immanent mode of appearing, Henry attempts to separate the transcendental 
from the empirical, life from the world, immanence from transcendence, the non-inten-
tional from the intentional, the invisible from the visible.  On his account, then, the his-
tory of life has no relation to or dependence upon the world or intentionality.  It remains 
forever refractory to the ecstatic temporality of the world, and thus to the intuitive 
present that has traditionally been granted primacy as the source of all truth and knowl-
edge.  
 On the one hand, because of this, as commentators such as Emmanuel Falque 
have pointed out, Henry renders the transcendental life of the individual a ‘flesh without 
body’.   Henry divorces the transcendental flesh, which he regards as the reality of the 76
subject, from the empirical body as it appears within the transcendence of the world, 
which is seen as an extreme unreality or illusion, in the sense that life can never appear 
therein.   He denies that anything other than this radically immanent and non-intention77 -
al affectivity is essential to the nature of the subject, thereby reducing intentionality and 
thought to secondary and illusory by-products of life.  In short, Henry angelises life as 
something a-cosmic and indifferent to anything outside itself.  On the other hand, by 
arguing that there is a mode of presence — an arch-presence — of an altogether differ-
ent order, one that, while making the visible disclosure of the world possible, can never 
appear within the latter and thereby allow itself to be grasped by intuition or perception, 
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Henry manages to escape, in some ways, the metaphysics of presence that ensnares 
Husserl’s work.  78
3.7 PRIMAL SELFHOOD 
It is not immediately apparent, nonetheless, how this unconscious movement of life ac-
tually engenders a sense of selfhood.  On the one hand, Henry says that ‘[i]t is suffering 
that suffers.’   That is to say, suffering is not affected by anything other than itself, such 79
that it is at once affecting and affected.  On the other hand, Henry explicitly states that 
the flesh is not impersonal and anonymous, but is always the flesh of someone.  László 
Tengelyi offers the helpful suggestion that because life continuously surpasses and ar-
rives at itself and nothing else, 
feeling becomes fixed and crystallized within a milieu of a diffuse and fluent af-
fectivity; thus, it loses its agility and its multivocity.  Henry says: ‘In a feeling the 
absence of surpassing — its identity with itself — is that which surpasses it.  Such 
a surpassing, that of identity, accomplishing itself in identity, gives to a feeling its 
content.’  This is the way in which an affective attunement becomes an affect, a 
particular feeling: love or happiness, sadness or despair.  It is this process of co-
agulation of particular feelings that provides us with the missing link between af-
fectivity and selfhood.  This process conveys to feeling ‘the weight of its proper 
being’.  Feeling becomes the feeling of a self.  In The Essence of Manifestation, 
we are told: ‘That which, in this way, is charged by itself, for being itself once and 
for all, is solely what may be rightly described as a self.’  80
On this reading, it is life’s tendency to surpass itself by continuously coming into itself 
and engendering new affective tonalities that conditions and makes possible the self-
hood of the self.  As François-David Sebbah notes, the movement of life can thus be 
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seen as ‘a paradoxical blossoming’ or springing forth in that it emerges ‘only to itself, in 
itself’ — it is ‘“arrival in self”’.     81
 An important part of the significance of Henry’s account of the self-sensing of 
life as a generative movement thus consists in the fact that the essence of subjectivity ‘is 
a work and an [ever-ongoing] accomplishment’.   It is life’s tendency to surpass itself 82
and to engender ever-new affective tonalities that gives the life of each individual its 
distinct and ever-developing sense of self.    
 We are thus left with a very particular sense of self — not the immobility of a 
thing, the ‘pure and simple identity to self — “empty” and thus solidified in something 
like a death — that would give forth nothing’.   Rather, the movement of affectivity 83
engenders a self — or an ‘ipseity’ (ipséité), to use Henry’s language —  whose way of 84
being consists in nothing other than this movement of self-engendering, that is to say, a 
self that comprises the incessant generation and production of a veritable wealth of lived 
impressions, in life’s pains and pleasures, its hungers and desires, and so on.  The self, 
in other words, with which Henry is concerned, is neither the objectified self before or 
after Husserl implements the reduction of the natural attitude to the transcendental-phe-
nomenological attitude; it is rather what precedes any such reduction as an experience 
of life in concrete, individual, human existence. In this case, the self is not determined 
by its position within the ecstatic temporality of the world, but by virtue of its inherently 
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unique self-experience.  Merely by virtue of experiencing itself, each living being is in-
dividuated as a radically singular self.    85
3.8 THE QUESTION OF DIVINE GENESIS 
Henry’s work can thus be seen as clarifying what transcendental subjectivity really is. 
Transcendental subjectivity must at heart be understood, not as a disembodied pure ego 
— as in Husserl — but as the unconscious, generative movement and history of a liv-
ing, embodied subject; a transcendental ego that has its own time and history, and which 
engenders and embraces the wealth of all of our bodily impressions and powers.  An 
important issue that we have yet to touch upon, and which needs to be addressed, is 
whether the transcendental life that is outlined in Henry’s earlier work is simply that of 
the living human being, or whether it should in some way be identified with an absolute 
God.  This issue is by no means settled and obvious.  Andrew Sackin-Poll, for instance, 
believes that there is a certain ‘ambiguity with regard to the theological status of Life 
found in the early works’.   On the one hand, one does find in some of the early works 86
statements that identity life with God.  In The Essence of Manifestation, for instance, 
Henry makes the following remark: ‘Being and life […] the life of God himself, an ab-
solute life’.   That being said, exactly how the two might be connected, as well as the 87
nature or status of this God more generally, are not spelled out in these early texts.  
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 Given the indeterminate nature of this God, Poll raises the question as to 
whether Henry’s initial equation of life with God is not similar to Spinoza’s ‘equation of 
Nature with God’?  As he writes, 88
[i]f the equation of Life with God is, indeed, Spinozist, then a similar, classical 
criticism of Spinoza’s formula Deus sive Natura can also be raised against Hen-
ry’s own equivocation: could not ‘Life’ simply be a secular experience of inner 
embodied life, without God? Could not such an immanent experience be closer to 
a Nietzschean conception of life (that is, after the ‘death of God’) than a Christian 
understanding of the living God? Could not the expression of life through suffer-
ing articulate simply the profound bond riveting the self to itself in a profoundly 
passive relation to the pathos of life, like the early phenomenological works of 
Emmanuel Levinas?  89
    
As Henry’s early works do not admit of any form of transcendence in the life of the liv-
ing individual, he is barred from an explicitly theological engagement with a divine 
transcendence.  Thus Poll remarks that since there is no fracture or alterity within life, 
‘[t]he living self is seemingly incarcerated in its own self-affecting life.’   This in and 90
of itself ‘renders problematic Henry’s own nomination of Life as “God”’.  91
 If we take into consideration the fact that Henry’s early studies draw fairly heav-
ily on the work of figures such as Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, this lends only further 
credence to the suggestion that this early account of life does not necessarily need to be 
seen in a Judeo-Christian theological light.  Indeed, for all of his criticisms of Descartes, 
Henry views Nietzsche as in some ways further drawing out Descartes’s essential in-
sights into the cogito.  As Henry writes in an early essay, ‘[f]or an adequate formulation 
of the cogito it is necessary to wait a long time, to wait for Nietzsche, who will say, not 





“I am”, but in a more rigorous and fundamental way “I am who I am.”’   While Henry 92
is not without his criticisms of Nietzsche (which we examine  later) he also finds in his 
work a compelling argument for the central role that our bodily life plays in the consti-
tution of the normative and intelligible character of our lived experience, one that very 
much informs his own account of these matters.  
 On a still more basic level, the prospect of a strictly secular reading of Henry’s 
early account of life gains further traction when we acknowledge the fact that life is a 
phenomenological concept that arises in response to a set of strictly phenomenology 
problems, namely, how, if at all, can transcendental subjectivity, as the absolute founda-
tion of all appearance and knowledge, manifest itself and thus in some way be known 
by the phenomenologist? Furthermore, who or what is transcendental subjectivity, and 
how should we understand the way in which it functions in the constitution of itself and 
the world? In attempting to address these matters, Henry’s concept of life joins the long-
standing philosophical tradition that endeavours to attain a genuine insight into the first 
principles of all experience and knowledge.  Given these roots, Henry’s account of life 
can be taken in a strictly phenomenological way, as a concept that illuminates the in-
nermost recesses of the human subject’s lived experience, and all of this without requir-
ing any recourse to God. 
 The question as to who transcendental subjectivity really is thus remains a con-
tentious and unsettled matter in the early works.  It would appear, nonetheless, that Hen-
ry’s early account of life can proceed quite well without any association with a divine 
God.  If viewed in a strictly secular way — as a kind of Dionysian life, to borrow the 
language of Nietzsche — then transcendental subjectivity would simply be the actual 
living human individual, understood in terms of its immanent mode of self-appearing, 
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i.e., as the unconscious, generative movement of bodily life.  Meanwhile, the empirical 
ego would consist in the subject as it appears in the ecstatic and worldly order of ap-
pearing.  In this case, the difference between the transcendental and the empirical ego 
would not simply be a matter of philosophical method; it would not arise primarily out 
of the tension between the natural and transcendental-philosophical attitudes.  Rather, it 
would be founded in our bodily life.  This would represent a genuine step forward from 
the account of transcendental subjectivity that we find in Husserl, inasmuch as it lends 
some much needed clarity and specificity to the latter’s rather vague and indecisive ac-
count of the matter.  The same could be said of a theological account of the life of the 
living individual, but there would need to be some kind of evidence to support this view, 
and the precise nature of the connection between this living God and the living human 
being would need to be drawn out in a detailed and coherent manner.  
3.9 A TURN TO CHRISTIANITY 
If the question of who transcendental subjectivity really is — i.e. is it ultimately human 
or divine? — is one that remains undecided, or at least unclear in the early works, Hen-
ry’s own position on the matter comes forward in a strikingly decisive manner in his 
latter texts, though in a way that is not itself without some potential issues.  In the final 
stage of his career, Henry makes an explicit turn to Christianity, and to the insistence 
that the finite life of the human subject is engendered in an absolute and eternal life (i.e. 
God).  In this sense, not unlike Husserl, Henry’s transcendental project claims to reveal 
an a priori mode of knowledge that applies to ‘all possible experience in general’, 
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whether human, divine or alien.   Let us now take a moment to unpack this later ac93 -
count of life.  While in this later phase Henry continues to insist that there is one life, 
one affectivity, it now enjoys two senses, a strong (i.e. absolute, eternal life) and a weak 
sense (i.e. relative, finite life), with each one immanent to the other.  
 The self-affection of the living God is strong in that it and it alone has the power 
to engender itself and all of the living selves — hence its absoluteness.  In its eternal 
movement of coming into itself, absolute life engenders itself by engendering an arch-
ipseity or first living self.  As he explains in I Am the Truth, 
[l]ife can embrace itself, and thus reveal itself to itself in the enjoyment of itself, 
only by generating in itself this Self that embraces itself as the phenomenological 
effectuation of its own self-embrace.  This singular Self within which life em-
braces itself, this Self that is the sole possible mode in which this embrace occurs, 
is the First Living [Christ].  Thus, in its absolute self-generation, Life generates 
within itself He whose birth is the self-accomplishment of this Life — its self-ac-
complishment in the form of its self-revelation.  The Father — if by this we un-
derstand the movement, which nothing precedes and of which nobody knows the 
name, by which Life is cast into itself in order to experience itself, this Father 
eternally engenders the Son within himself, if by the latter we understand the First 
Living in whose original and essential Ipseity the Father experiences himself.    94
The strong affection of absolute life is thus that which engenders and gives all that is. 
Life is nothing other than this radical movement of giving, and what it gives is nothing 
other than itself.  Hence, life can be seen as a gratuitous self-giving, as a free and unde-
served gift, a radical novelty.  Absolute life is both giver and gift, both affecting and af-
fected, both Father and Son. 
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 To the extent that absolute life experiences itself only by engendering and expe-
riencing itself in and as an arch-ipseity (or arch-flesh), there is what Henry refers to as a 
reciprocal interiority between absolute life and the first living self.   As Henry writes,  95
the relationship between the Father and the Son […] can be defined with absolute 
rigour as a relationship of reciprocal interiority, since the Son is revealed only in 
the Father’s self-revelation, while the Father’s self-revelation takes place only in, 
and as, the revelation of the Son.  The primordial Father/Son relationship is not 
merely this relation whose essence is constituted by Life, nor is it merely this rela-
tion whose essence is constituted by Life, nor is it merely this relation whose es-
sence generates the terms.  Rather, it also generates them as internal one to the 
other, such that they belong together, one and the other, in a co-belonging that is 
more powerful than any conceivable unity, in the inconceivable unity of Life 
whose self-engendering is one with the engendering of the Engendered.  96
The reciprocal interiority between absolute life and the arch-ipseity is thus nothing other 
‘than the mode in which phenomenality originally phenomenalizes itself — as the orig-
inal phenomenality that is Life’.   97
 Understood in this way, the arch-ipseity of life serves as the condition of the ip-
seity of each finite living subject.  The arch-flesh of life is that which immanently en-
genders and sustains the flesh of each living individual, and which each individual nec-
essarily undergoes within its own flesh.  Concretely, this means that, in its flesh, each 
living individual experiences that its life is not of its own making, but is something it 
passively receives from an absolute life that infinitely exceeds it, and in which it is con-
tinuously generated, whether it likes it or not.   This gives to the life of the finite living 98
individual its weak tenor.  The life of the finite living individual is weak in that it cannot 
engender itself and all of its powers and abilities.  In this way, the life of the finite sub-
ject is relative to that of absolute life.  The transcendental birth of the finite individual, 
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and the continued generation and subsistence of all of its powers, depends on the gener-
ative movement of an absolute life over which it has no control.  
 This weak sense of life gives to the finite individual the distinct nature of its 
self-experience.  As weak, 
[t]he Self is not only passive with respect to itself and each of the modalities of its 
life, as each suffering is passive with respect to itself and is only possible as such, 
taking its affective tenor solely from this passivity whose pure phenomenological 
tenor is affectivity as such.  Above all, the Self is passive with respect to the eter-
nal process of Life’s self-affecting that engenders it and never ceases to do so. 
This passivity of the singular Self within Life is what puts it into the accusative 
case and makes of it a ‘me’ and not an ‘I’, this Self that is passive about itself only 
because it is passive to begin with about Life and its absolute self-affection.  But 
this passivity of the singular Self in Life — the passivity making of it a ‘me’ — is 
not a metaphysical attribute posited by thought.  It is phenomenologically deter-
mined such that it is constitutive of the Self’s life and is therefore continually 
lived by that Self.  This determination is so essential, the proof so constant, that 
our life becomes confused with this feeling of being lived.  99
   
As continuously engendered in the eternal self-affection of life, the finite living individ-
ual experiences its life in the accusative, as something it does not itself posit, but which 
is given to it and which it passively receives time and again.  Consequently, the life of 
the finite individual is experienced by said individual as a burden, as a weight it cannot 
lift, try as it might.  At the same time, because the living individual finds itself affected 
in this way, it not only experiences itself in an accusative sense, but also in a nominative 
sense, as an ‘I’ or ego that, as given to itself in the strong affection of life, experiences 
itself as being in possession of itself, and thus as being capable of exercising all of its 
powers to sense, act and think.   The ego, in this sense, is distinguished from the self 100
as an ‘“I can”’.   As Henry writes, ‘“I Can” deploy each of the powers that I find in 101
me, because, coinciding with that power and placed inside it in some way, I have it at 
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my disposal and can exercise it whenever I care to and for as often as I want’.   In 102
point of fact, though, since the ego’s powers are engendered and given to it by an abso-
lute and eternal life, all of its powers ultimately depend on this eternal life over which it 
has no power.  At the heart of all of its myriad powers, then, the ego experiences its ‘ab-
solute powerlessness’.     103
 For all these important differences between the strong and weak senses of life, it 
should be kept in mind that Henry always contends that we are nevertheless dealing 
with one and the same life.  Absolute life does not stand over and beyond the life of 
each finite individual; it inaugurates itself only in the very movement by which it inau-
gurates the life of each finite individual.  Therefore, absolute life is not older than the 
lives of living individuals, and it does not engender them from some kind of elsewhere 
or outside.  Absolute life engenders each living individual as purely immanent to itself. 
While there is what Henry calls a ‘pathetik difference’ in life, which consists in its 
strong and weak senses, it is pathetik in that it is a difference that does not consist in any 
fracture or ecstasis.   It is a difference of modality, wherein the two modalities — the 104
strong and weak senses of life — remain immanent to one another.   
 As much as Henry insists that these dual senses of life remain radically imma-
nent to one another, does not the introduction of this distinction necessarily break up the 
immanence of life in some significant sense? Without Henry’s perhaps even realising it, 
has not a form of transcendence secretly stolen into, or emerged from within, the heart 
of life? As engendered within the arch-ipseity of absolute life, each living self experi-
ences itself in its flesh as being lived, as being lived by a life of ‘another order’, by a 
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‘phenomenological substance absolutely other than it’.   In suffering its own life, each 105
living self does not merely suffer itself alone, but also the arch-suffering of absolute life, 
such that suffering is always experienced as involving something more within itself, as 
betraying ‘another life’.   106
 In keeping with these findings, Henry’s later work states that absolute life 
should indeed be understood as a kind of transcendence.  Paradoxically, though, this 
transcendence simply ‘means the immanence of Life within each living being’.   As 107
Henry explains in Incarnation, 
[b]ecause this immanence concerns the self-revelation of every living being, such 
as it accomplishes itself in the self-revelation of absolute life, it comes to its phe-
nomenological possibility, and thus to its actual realization in the original passibil-
ity with which absolute Life reveals itself originally to itself.  ‘Transcendence’ is 
just a word, still rather undetermined, for that essence.  108
   
Transcendence is simply a name for the sense of affection in which each living self is 
given to itself, for the generative power that is qualitatively other than, and yet imma-
nent to the flesh of the living individuals it engenders and sustains.  Another way of 
putting this would be to say that the transcendence of absolute life has to do with the 
limits of the ‘I can’ of each finite flesh and what makes them possible.   
 Transcendence is thus not a matter of the relation of the embodied ego to the 
world or to an external object.  The sense of transcendence in question here is not one 
that has to do with any kind of exteriority or ecstasis.  Instead, it refers to the powers of 
my bodily life and its limits.  Henry believes that the transcendence or excess of abso-
lute life is in fact radically immanent to each living self because these limits are not ex-
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ternal but internal to each living self.  The generative power of absolute life that goes 
beyond and delimits the powers of the living self only ever goes beyond them as their 
own internal and constitutive limit, as the limit that makes possible and continuously 
sustains the myriad powers of the living self. 
 Because of this, Henry contends that the dual sense of life does not contravene 
its immanence.  God is, in a manner of speaking, in me more than me myself.  He is the 
true reality and fount of my being and the perennial motivation for all that I do.  As 
Henry provocatively puts this, ‘[i]n the depths of its night, our flesh is God.’   In re109 -
sponse to the long-standing phenomenological problem as to who or what transcenden-
tal subjectivity is, Henry’s later work unabashedly asserts that it is none other than a di-
vine God, or, more exactly, the Christian God, the living Christ, the word become flesh. 
The primal significance of Henry’s engagement with the being of the subject would thus 
consist in the revelation of the subject’s divinity, in its participation in the absolute life 
of Christ.  If we are to truly allow the being of the subject to come forward, and if phe-
nomenology is to realise its destiny as a radical phenomenology, then the individual 
must be reborn to Christianity, she must come to realise that Christianity is radical phe-
nomenology, that Christianity is the destiny of phenomenology, which has been await-
ing it from the inception of humanity and of all human thought. 
3.10 THE WORLD OF LIFE 
Whether the generative movement of life is ultimately seen as divine or human, by 
putting each living self in touch with itself and all of its powers to sense, act and think, 
Henry finds that it constitutes and gives the subject an immediate and immanent knowl-
 Henry, I Am the Truth, p. 373.109
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edge of the whole of its experience, including its experience of the world.  According to 
Henry, the living subject enjoys an immanent knowledge of the world inasmuch as it 
experiences the latter as the correlate of its original bodily movements and actions.  As 
Henry writes,  
[b]y its essence, nature [i.e. world] is available to an original Body, that is, either 
the fluctuating correlate of a movement or its fixed limit.  This ‘fixity’ is deter-
mined only in and through this movement.  The Earth is not conceivable except as 
that on which we place or can place our feet, as the ground on which we stand. 
The ‘air’ is not conceivable except as that which we breathe or that which might 
burn us.  No surface, volume or solid is conceivable except the one that we can 
touch.  No light is conceivable except the one that shines in the subjectivity of our 
Eye.  Body and Earth are joined together by Co-belonging (Copropriation).  It is 
so original that nothing can ever occur in a pure Outside, as an object, for a theo-
ria, as something that would be there without us — except as the history of this 
original Co-belonging (Copropriation) and as its limit mode.  We will call this 
original Co-belonging (Copropriation) a Bodily-ownness (Corpspropriation).  It 
is so original that it makes us the owners of the world.    110
As can be seen here, while Henry regards the world as an illusion, he doesn’t deny that 
everything that is experienced therein is experienced as real within our flesh.  The truth 
of the external world simply doesn’t belong to it.  Rather, it consists in the way in which 
it is endured in our flesh.  As John Mullarkey writes, ‘“[i]llusions of transcendence” are 
real as immanent affect, but not as content.  Or rather, their content is their form of ap-
pearing, which is immanent.’   Because of this, Henry can state that ‘the world is filled 111
with [affective] resonances: all of the vibrations marking its repercussions in the soul 
and the spiritual action that they exert.  In this respect, all matter — while seemingly 
dead — is a tonality and a living spirit’.  112
 Henry would thus appear to uncover a more original sense in which the subject 
belongs together with the world.  On this account, as Michael Staudigl notes, the world 
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should not first be ‘understood in the traditional sense of “the totality of all things”, nor 
is it to be taken phenomenologically as the “horizon of horizons” [Husserl], nor is it 
even the “medium of care” [Heidegger]’.   Instead, before all else, the world is the 113
correlate of the appropriating event that is the generative movement of life.    114
 Because the world is primarily there as the correlate of the movement of affec-
tivity, the world can be experienced and known in terms of its resistance to our bodily 
forces or effort.  To understand how this is so, we need to say a brief word about what 
Henry refers to as the organic body.  When the force of the subjective body is exercised 
and expressed in a concrete action,  
the body runs up against a first resistance.  Its internal phenomenological systems 
give way to its effort and constitute our ‘organic body.’  These are not our group 
of ‘organs’ as they appear to an objective knowledge of some kind but precisely as 
we live them within our subjective body as the terms of our effort.  These are the 
primal ‘configurations’ whose entire being consists in their being-given-to-effort 
and exhausted in it.  Second, at very heart of this zone of relative resistance of-
fered by the organic body, the pressure that weighs on it and gradually makes it 
give way, that is, the use of the powers of the subjective body, runs up against an 
obstacle that no longer gives way.  The Earth [i.e. world or nature] is a line of ab-
solute resistance that lets itself be felt continually within the organic body and is 
the unsurpassable limit of its deployment.  Here again, the Earth is as we live it, 
that is to say as we experience it in our subjective bodily movement.  It exists in 
the effort that pushes it back, defeats it, and breaks it apart.    115
The organic body is thus our immediate, first-person experience of the relative resis-
tance (i.e. limitation) that the subjective body undergoes in the use of its force or effort, 
and of the absolute resistance it encounters in the world.  Because the organic body ex-
periences the world as this absolute resistance, though, the resistance that the subject 
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experiences in its flesh provides it with an immediate and immanent knowledge of the 
world.  
 Because the subject experiences the world in this way, Henry finds that it has a 
constant and unrelenting knowledge of the latter.  That is to say, because every one of 
the powers that join body and world together in an original co-belonging is a ‘power of 
a flesh nothing is able to divide’, these powers provide each individual with an arch-
knowledge or ‘immemorial memory’ of the world that cannot be broken.   In light of 116
this, it is important to remember that the original bond between flesh and world is not 
dependent upon the transcendent sensible body that functions within the world and 
which receives actual sensory impressions.  Instead, Henry believes that  
[b]ecause the subjective originary body is constantly present to itself in this Archi-
Presence of life to itself, the world to which it opens us through each of its pow-
ers, and notably by touch, is a world that also surpasses the actuality of the per-
ception that I have of it at any given moment of my experience.  It is a world that 
is potentially given to me because I can deploy the powers that give me access to 
it, because the paths that lead to the world are pre-delineated in me and I can fol-
low them whenever I wish.  I can touch things at any moment.  This power is one 
with me and thus all of the things that compose the world are accessible to me in 
principle, inasmuch as I carry this power within me and coincide with it.   117
The generative movement of life effectively places each subject in a constant commu-
nion with the world that is not dependent upon sensory impressions for its accomplish-
ment.   Therefore, just as Henry’s work challenges the primacy of touch in Husserl’s 118
account of how the subject comes to know its own body, so too it challenges any view 
that would uphold touch — or any of our ecstatic senses or any act of outer perception 
— as our primary access to the world.  On this view, it is only because the living subject 
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first undergoes the whole of its experience in the immanent self-affection of life that 
touch and all of our other bodily senses and acts of perception are possible; and so, it is 
only because the subject first experiences and knows itself and the world in the primal 
self-affection of life that it can know these facets of its life by way of its senses and 
higher-order acts of apperceptive objectification.     119
  
3.11 ORDERS OF CONSTITUTION 
  
If we accept this account of the process of constitution, then Henry’s work furthers our 
understanding of how the primal self functions in the constitution of itself and the 
world.  Henry’s work offers up some of those ‘wanting names’ for the hidden art of the 
soul and its essential structures.  His work suggests that the most basic level of constitu-
tion should be understood as a matter of generation.  Life is generative inasmuch as it 
produces itself in an immediate and immanent manner; it does not wait upon something 
outside itself to affect and set it into motion.  Life affects and generates itself, and it is 
because it does so that the living individual comes into itself, and by doing so, into all 
of its powers to sense, act and think.  It is because the living subject immanently comes 
into and possesses itself that the subject is put in touch with its bodily powers, with its 
ability to sense, perceive and reason about things, with all of these powers that open and 
make possible the transcendence of the world.   In this way, the radically immanent 120
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appearing of life is said to found and makes possible the ecstatic appearing of the world 
(i.e. object-manifestation). 
 This serves to fill out and clarify our understanding of the process of constitu-
tion.  Constitution can no longer merely be understood as a matter of sense-bestowal 
(Sinngebung), as was the case in Husserl.  Rather, we find ourselves left with two fun-
damental levels of constitution: (i) that of the generative movement of affectivity; and 
(ii) noetic acts of sense-bestowal.  
 In line with this, it can be said that there are two forms of sense or meaning. 
According to Henry, life engenders ‘a completely different concept of meaning’.  121
What does this wholly new concept of meaning consist in? Why nothing other than the 
generative movement of affectivity, of course.  More specifically, the primal sense of 
life consists in its unconscious drives and needs.  Here we have a form of meaning that 
is not created or otherwise posited by consciousness, but which consists in the affective 
tonalities and unconscious tendencies of life.   As life endlessly engenders new im122 -
pressions and encompasses the whole of our experience, including our experience of the 
world, Henry insists that this primal sense of life is not static, but dynamic and infinitely 
rich.   In turn, we then have the form of sense that pertains to noetic acts of conscious123 -
ness (i.e. noematic meaning), which we outlined in the previous chapter. 
 While the primal sense of life founds the noematic meaning of the world, given 
Henry’s strict separation of the two modes of appearing, he states that life cannot cross 
over into, possess, or be in any way informed by meaning in the conventional sense. 
Since it contains no ecstasis and cannot relate to or represent itself as such, life cannot 
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‘“mean” itself, or consequently have a [noematic] meaning in itself’.   Life cannot 124
emptily intend or signify this or that; it cannot pose questions that would call for re-
sponse or that would need to be fulfilled by something other than itself.  Drawing on the 
poet Angelus Silesius, Henry states that ‘Life is like a rose: “The rose does not ask why. 
It blooms because it blooms.  It cares not for itself, nor does it desire to be seen”’.  125
 Instead, Henry views the primal sense of life as double in structure.   Life, as 126
the perpetual spring of all being, and the one and only true reality, appears in a duplici-
tous or two-sided manner.   The life of the living subject is effectively revealed in its 127
reality within our flesh, and it is disseminated in an unreal manner in the transcendent 
images of the world.  As Joseph Rivera notes, the ecstatic appearing of the world ‘oper-
ates according to the logic of imaging whereby the appearance of a thing is merely an 
exterior image of the thing-itself.  Transcendence has the limited power to manifest the 
thing not as it really is but rather as images, reflections and exteriorizations’.    128
 Be that as it may, one might very well ask how all of this is possible? If the ap-
pearing of life is radically immanent and does not admit of any fracture or alterity, then 
there remains some question as to how life gives rise to the transcendence of the world. 
Henry states that this duplicity of appearing is simply an ‘Arche-fact’ of life, but this 
response leaves much to be desired.   While Henry indicates that the transcendental 129
ego should be understood as the immanent affective manner in which the real, embod-
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ied subject experiences itself, whereas the empirical ego consists in the way in which 
one and the same subject appears within the light of the world, as with Husserl before 
him, he does not spell out how these two are unified and how they relate in sufficient 
detail. 
3.12 THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY OF AFFECTIVITY 
An implication of this position is that the non-objectifying self-sensing of bodily life 
enjoys a level of autonomy and absolute priority that has been largely overlooked within 
the history of philosophy.  As this account of the constitution of the world of life has 
begun to suggest, the primacy of affectivity is such that it marks the subject’s first ac-
quaintance with itself and the world of life as a whole.  More than that, though, Henry 
contends that, in its absolute priority, life’s non-intentional and non-objectifying self-
sensing unilaterally founds and makes possible the objectifying and non-objectifying 
intentional acts through which we experience things.   
 On this point, Henry diverges from Husserl.  At least in his early work, Husserl 
insists on the absolute priority of the intentional objectifying acts of consciousness over 
its non-objectifying acts, as well as its non-intentional feeling-sensations.   Within the 130
Logical Investigations, he states that ‘[e]ach intentional experience is either an objecti-
fying act or has its basis in such an act.’   On this account, non-objectifying acts, such 131
as certain affective states (i.e. moods, emotions, feelings, etc), are founded upon objecti-
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fying acts of intentionality (i.e. perception, remembering, imagination).  Emotional ex-
periences are dependent upon an intentional presentation of the object in question — 
upon our intentional familiarity with an object that carries the value-properties which 
the emotion reveals.  In feeling admiration for a person, for example, said individual is 
an object of admiration because she is first the intended object of a thought or judgment. 
In fact, as a part of this, Husserl suggests that the intentionality of the subject’s non-ob-
jectifying emotions and feelings is founded upon its objectifying acts.  As a result, the 
intentionality of the former is seen as secondary, while the intentionally of the latter is 
primary.   
 However, the suggestion that the objectifying experience has an absolute priority 
over the subjects non-objectifying experiences is not well founded.  The subject can 
clearly enjoy the salty smell of the sea or the appearance of sunlight before she objecti-
fies and represents such things.  Similarly, a young child can enjoy moving her limbs 
without having to first objectify the experience.  The experiential facts of the matter 
suggest that the subject’s objectifying acts do not hold an absolute priority over its non-
objectifying acts. 
 Now, to be fair, as Husserl’s work progresses, his position on this matter changes 
and becomes more complex.  In his later works, Husserl begins to question whether it is 
in fact the case that the subject’s objectifying acts enjoy such an absolute priority.  As 
Nam-In Lee points out, at least in terms of their transcendental genesis, Husserl finds 
that such non-objectifying moods, emotions and feelings have ‘an absolute priority 
against representational [i.e. objectifying] intentionality’.   As we have seen, it is the 132
kinaesthetic sensations and other passive associations that serve as the building blocks 
 Nam-In Lee, ‘Phenomenology of Feeling in Husserl and Levinas’, New Yearbook for Phenomenology 132
and Phenomenological Philosophy 5 (2005), 189-209 (p. 204).
 135
out of which the subject’s objectifying acts are built.  Moreover, as Lee continues, in the 
works that follow the Logical Investigations, Husserl 
also admits the possibility that a feeling that is founded upon a representational 
intentionality can found another representational intentionality.  In order to show 
that such a possibility really exists, he takes into consideration the fact that a per-
son’s aesthetic enjoyment of an artwork changes into a theoretical observation of 
the same work when considered from the standpoint of history of art.  In this ex-
ample, the theoretical act of an art historian cannot be there if it is not founded on 
the aesthetic act of enjoying the artwork as a kind of non-representational [i.e. 
non-objectifying] act.  For this reason, one can say that the former is founded on 
the latter in the same sense in which the non-representational act of feeling the 
beauty of a flower is founded on the act of representing the same flower as a thing 
in the world, as is the case in the Logical Investigations.  This example is a threat 
to the assumption that the representational act has an absolute priority against the 
non-representational act.   133
   
There would thus appear to be at least some evidence that Husserl eventually came to 
some appreciation for the fact that non-objectifying affective states can and do found 
objectifying intentional acts. 
 Be that as it may, as Lee also acknowledges, even in these later works, Husserl 
‘still conceives of the analysis of objectifying acts as the most urgent task of his phe-
nomenology.  Thus he fails to incorporate the phenomenology of mood [and of emo-
tions, feelings, etc.] into one of the most important parts of his phenomenology’.  134
While Husserl acknowledges that non-objectifying acts can have some manner of priori-
ty over the subject’s objectifying acts, the latter are still afforded priority in terms of the 
overall importance they hold within the constitution of the subject’s experience, and so, 
not surprisingly, they often figure at the forefront of his analyses, to the point that the 
former are left undeveloped and under-appreciated.         
 Lee, ‘Phenomenology of Feeling in Husserl and Levinas’, p. 203; Husserl, Erste Philosophie 133
(1923-24), p. 101.
 Nam-In Lee, ‘Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology of Mood’, in Alterity and Facticity: New Perspec134 -
tives on Husserl, ed. by Natalie Depraz and Dan Zahavi (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 
pp. 103-120 (p. 118).
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 With Henry, the decisive importance of non-objectifying affective tonalities in 
the constitution of the subject’s experience is explored at length and is ultimately 
brought forward in a most dramatic manner.  For Henry, the importance of the non-in-
tentional and non-objectifying self-sensing of the subjective body does not merely con-
sist in the fact that, in its absolute priority, it marks our first contact with ourselves and 
the world, or that it always founds the objectifying and non-objectifying intentional acts 
of consciousness.  Though it is not always explicitly spelled out by Henry himself, his 
work harbours the suggestion that life, in its absolute priority, also drives the actions of 
the subject, and that it provides the latter with an absolute knowledge of all life and be-
ing. 
 As we will recall, Husserl maintains that it is objectifying acts of consciousness 
that largely carry out these functions.  But if the effectivity of the primal self-affection 
of life does not depend on anything other than itself, then Henry’s thought carries the 
implication that this non-objectifying self-sensing does not depend on noetic sense-giv-
ing — i.e. on the conscious positing of a goal — to drive its actions and to help it find 
its way in the world.  To the contrary, inasmuch as the intentional acts of consciousness 
are but the unreal translation of life, it must be said that the former are always depen-
dent upon and secretly guided by the latter, as though by an invisible hand.  135
 Moreover, if the life of the living individual does indeed function as a radical 
immanence, without any fracture or distance to admit of the possibility of error or 
doubt, then it must be acknowledged that the non-objectifying self-sensing of life can 
provide the subject with an absolutely certain, indubitable and infallible knowledge of 
 As Henry writes, ‘[a]s thought’s ultimate possibility, affectivity reigns over and secretly determines all 135
its modes.’  Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, p. 29.
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things in their absolute self-givenness.   Indeed, if we take Henry’s account of the du136 -
plicity of appearing seriously, then it is necessary to acknowledge that it is the non-ob-
jectifying self-sensing of life, and not any manner of reflection or objective awareness, 
that alone can provide us with the absolute givenness of things.     
 Since life can never appear within the ecstatic mode of appearing to which it 
gives rise, and the latter can only ever seek to represent life in unreal and partial abstrac-
tions, Henry’s work reveals and explicitly acknowledges that the primal event of life, as 
the absolute foundation of all appearance and knowledge, can never be absolutely given 
to our (inner or outer) sensory perception or thought.  Despite this, to the extent that the 
intentional acts (i.e. perception, judgment, etc.) of the subject take their cue from the 
affective life that determines them, Henry nevertheless maintains that they will have at 
least some understanding of life, however imperfect, obscure or otherwise confused.   137
 With this in mind, Henry concludes that ‘[t]o want “to bring to light” the foun-
dation is the ultimate ontological absurdity.’   Life can only be given absolutely in its 138
own self-revelation.  Returning to Husserl’s statement that ‘every experience whatsoev-
er […] can be made into an object of pure seeing and apprehension while it is occur-
ring’,  as Jeffrey Hanson and Michael Kelly note, Henry insists that ‘[w]hat Husserl 139
meant by “while it is occurring” was not best realised by Husserl himself’, but only by 
his own phenomenology of life.   It is only within life, and not in reflection, that 140
 Ibid., p. 61.136
 Michel Henry, ‘Material Phenomenology’, in Quiet Powers of the Possible: Interviews in Contempo137 -
rary French Phenomenology, ed. by Tarek R. Dika and W. Chris Hackett (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2016), pp. 117-144 (p. 142).
 Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, p. 42.138
 Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, p. 24.139
 Jeffrey Hanson and Michael R. Kelly, ‘Michel Henry and The Idea of Phenomenology: Immanence, 140
Givenness and Reflection’, in Michel Henry: The Affects of Thought, ed. by Jeffrey Hanson and Michael 
R. Kelly (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), pp. 62-84 (p. 79).
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everything can be revealed in its perfect givenness while it is occurring.  As Henry 
writes, ‘all possible reality, including the reality of nature, the cosmos, the other, the ab-
solute and even God, only becomes actual by being situated in Life’.   Consequently, 141
‘[t]here is no longer any need to obey the Socratic precept “Know thyself.”’   In other 142
words, true knowledge of oneself is no longer dependent upon reflective elucidation. 
Instead, ‘it is enough merely to cry’, to live life.  143
 Henry’s phenomenology of life thus attempts a remarkable reversal of tradition. 
As Hart remarks, while Husserl aligns absolute givenness with objective awareness, ‘for 
Henry, [such ecstatic] knowing is always inadequate, corrigible, and partial and can 
never serve as the way of access to philosophy as wisdom rooted in first principles.  The 
bias of the tradition is to seek to establish first principles in [ecstatic] knowledge and to 
hold that immediate non-reflexive self-presence is incapable of providing us with such 
principles’.   With the unprecedented attention he pays to the pre-reflective, non-ob144 -
jectifying self-sensing of the subjective body, though, Henry has begun to harvest the 
untapped potential of affectivity, and makes the case that the latter is not merely a po-
 Henry, Material Phenomenology, p. 94.141
 Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, pp. 177-178.142
 Ibid.  In each pain or pleasure the subject undergoes in the immanent experience of its flesh, the sub143 -
ject’s pain is always given absolutely; it is given and known absolutely in and as the pain itself, and not 
through any intention or objectifying relation.  In Henry’s words, ‘[p]ain itself teaches me about pain and 
not some kind of intentional consciousness that would aim at its presence, its being there now.’  Henry, 
Material Phenomenology, p. 25.  For further demonstration of this, we might momentarily return to 
Descartes.  On Henry’s reading, Descartes’s example of the individual who is moved by his passions 
while dreaming suggests that, although what we imagine and represent to ourselves is false, 'we cannot be 
misled in the same way regarding the passions, in that they are so close and so internal to our soul that it 
cannot possibly feel them unless they are truly as it feels them to be’.  Descartes, The Philosophical Writ-
ings of Descartes: Volume 1, p. 338.
 Hart, ‘Michel Henry’s Phenomenological Theology of Life’, p. 221.  As Zahavi notes, though Husserl 144
speaks of the ‘absolute givenness of our conscious experiences’, and denies that such acts appear ‘in spa-
tial perspectives, he does emphasize the temporality of the act, and therefore acknowledges that it appears 
in temporal perspectives.  That is, instead of conceiving of pre-reflective self-awareness as a truly imma-
nent, non-horizontal, and non-ecstatic self-manifestation, Husserl treats it — according to Henry — as a 
givenness in inner time-consciousness, that is, as a givenness which is intrinsically caught up in the ecsta-
tic-centred structure of primal impression-retention-protention’ — and in this sense, ecstatic knowing is 
always partial and corrigible.  Dan Zahavi, ‘Michel Henry and the Phenomenology of the Invisible’, Con-
tinental Philosophy Review 32, no. 3 (1999), 223-240 (p. 229).
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tential objectivity, but that which alone can provide the subject with the absolute self-
givenness of things.  While Henry thus departs from Husserl in explicitly acknowledg-
ing that the ultimate foundation of life can never be presented to our gaze, he continues 
nevertheless to insist that it is, and so, can be felt and lived.    
 To some extent, an account of this absolute knowledge may already be found in 
embryonic form in Descartes’s study of the cogito.  Yet, as we have begun to see, 
Descartes did not fully appreciate the nature of his discovery or its implications.  He did 
not grasp the generative nature of life, the duplicity of appearing that obtains between 
life and the world, or the absolute priority that the former enjoys in guiding the latter 
and providing the individual with an absolute knowledge of everything that is. 
 In drawing out these points, it is Henry who clarifies the innermost nature of the 
absolute knowledge that philosophy has always sought.  In revealing that the primal 
sense of life is not static and monotonous but dynamic and infinitely rich, Henry’s work 
bears the suggestion that the pre-reflective and non-objectifying self-sensing in which 
the living subject knows itself and the world with absolute certainty is not a final and 
complete knowledge, but one that is endlessly changing.  As Henry stresses in his later 
work, while the life of the subject is full, it is also incomplete, inasmuch as there is al-
ways more to give and learn.   Though Henry claims that his account of life uncovers 145
the indubitable self-presence, the Parousia and absolute knowledge for which philoso-
phy has always yearned, it is, in the last analysis, one that does not permit a final set-
tling of accounts, a complete reckoning with who one is and how things stand, but one 
that sends the living individual on an endless journey of self-discovery.   
 Henry, Incarnation, p. 251.  For a study of some of the implications of Henry’s account of life as full 145
and yet incomplete, see my article ‘The Failure of Life: Michel Henry and The Ethics of Incompleteness’, 
Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 21, no. 2 (2017), 208-229.
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 Nevertheless, Henry himself has yet to fully draw out the implications of this 
account of the transcendental life of the living subject.  Though Henry finds that life is 
eternally wedded to itself, he acknowledges that, as a part of this endless journey, the 
absolute life that imbues the subject with a drive for self-growth and self-enhancement, 
and which provides her with an arch-knowledge of everything that is, can in some sense 
be occluded or forgotten, and can thus stand in need of being recovered.  How all of this 
actually plays out, and whether it poses any challenges or problems for Henry’s account 
of life, is something that we will still need to explore and assess.  
 141
CHAPTER 4 
PUTTING LIFE TO THE TEST: CULTURE AND BARBARISM 
In the previous chapter, we noted that Henry regards the generative movement of life as 
an endless journey that, in its absolute priority over intentionality, is wholly responsible 
for directing the individual toward her own self-growth and self-enhancement.  This, 
Henry argues, enables the individual to somehow forget and recover her basis in abso-
lute life.  This chapter, in part, elucidates Henry’s account of these movements or trans-
formations.  To do so, we will take up Henry’s study of culture, that is, those acts or 
ways of living which enhance life, as well as its counter force, what he calls 
‘barbarism’, understood as those acts which foster a forgetting of life.   
 Far from representing a different phase in Henry’s work, the study of culture is 
the practical fleshing out and fulfilment of his theoretical reflections on the phenomeno-
logical life of the subject that guide his work from beginning to end.   As J. Aaron 1
Simmons and David Scott put it, Henry’s study of culture ‘is where the theoretical phe-
nomenological rubber meets the practical social road, as it were, or where Henry’s ma-
terial phenomenology of life’s auto-affection meets the “rough ground”, as Wittgenstein 
might say, of human existence in a cultural framework’.   By putting Henry’s theoretical 2
account of life to the test of our everyday cultural life, we will be able to critically as-
sess in this chapter whether his own practical account of the aforementioned transfor-
 As Jean-Yves Lacoste notes in his forward to Henry’s Words of Christ, ‘[f]rom Philosophie et 1
phénoménologie du corps — the first book he wrote, before L’Essence de la manifestation — to Paroles 
du Christ, the intellectual itinerary of Michel Henry followed a straight line.’  See Michel Henry, Words of 
Christ, trans. by Christina M. Gschwandtner (Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
2012), p. ix.
 J. Arron Simmons and David Scott, ‘Is there Life after Barbarism? Phenomenological Reflections on 2
Science and the Future of the University’, Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy 28 (2017), 1-31 (pp. 
2-3).
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mations, as well as the things themselves, can in fact sustain and otherwise support his 
conception of life. 
4.1 SELF-GROWTH AS THE FOUNDATION OF CULTURE  
Henry’s work on culture has received little in the way of sustained attention, at least in 
comparison to other aspects of his work, such as his philosophy of religion.  One of the 
likely reasons for this relative neglect is the fact that Henry’s study of culture calls for a 
seismic shift in the traditional understanding of how culture arises and what it is.  The 
cultural world has traditionally been understood as dependent upon the intentional re-
gard and the conceptual and ideological constructions of the ego.   As Henry writes, 3
‘[i]nasmuch as culture is traditionally comprised exclusively of the group of significa-
tions delivered by language as a discourse, it is in fact this linguistic, mythical and con-
ceptual culture based on the universe of representation and the symbolic or cognitive 
relation between the subject and the object.’    4
 In keeping with his account of the absolute primacy of life, Henry insists that 
culture arises from and essentially has to do with the affective movement of life, and not 
with intentionality and its objective works.  In this sense, culture is an a priori possibili-
ty of life.  Because the subject cannot escape life’s unrelenting need for self-growth, 
Henry says that this need endows the life of each individual with a burdensome weight 
and an ever-mounting energy that it will need to deploy, not so as to decrease it, but so 
 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, p. 74.3
 Ibid., p. 73.4
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as to it give free rein.   Life engenders culture as an attempt to do just this, to free the 5
burgeoning energy of its flesh and to thereby realise its essence as a movement of self-
growth.    6
 At its heart, then, culture is not about the intentional relation between a subject 
and its object.  Instead, it is nothing other than life’s movement of self-growth, its con-
tinuous effort to transform its self-experience, which is to say, its ability to feel, sense, 
act, think, and so on.  As Henry explains, 
[e]very culture is a culture of life, in the dual sense whereby life is both the sub-
ject and the object of this culture.  It is an action that life exerts on itself and 
through which it transforms itself insofar as life is both transforming and trans-
formed.  ‘Culture’ means nothing other than that.  ‘Culture’ refers to the self-trans-
formation of life, the movement by which it continually changes itself in order to 
arrive at higher forms of realization and completeness, in order to grow.  But if 
life is this incessant movement of self-transformation and self-fulfillment, it is 
culture itself.  Or at least it carries it as something inscribed in it and sought by it.   7
At the same time, nonetheless, it is of importance to remember that this cultural move-
ment is by no means blind or dumb; the identification of culture with life rather, 
does not just signify that culture is the self-transformation of life.  This self-trans-
formation alone could only be blind.  Inasmuch as it seeks growth, it must rely on 
a type of knowledge: culture thus relies on another type of knowledge than that of 
science and consciousness.  This is the knowledge of life, and as we have indicat-
ed, life constitutes this knowledge by its own essence.  It is the very fact of expe-
riencing oneself in each point of one’s being and thus this auto-revelation with 
which life begins and ends.    8
Culture, therefore, consists in the immediate and immanent knowledge in which the 
subjective body finds itself bound and put in possession of itself and all of its powers, 
 Henry, Barbarism, pp. 98-99.  As Henry explains, to liberate the energy of our life is not ‘to get rid of it, 5
to provide an opportunity to dispense with it, to gradually decrease it and thereby to exhaust it and make 
it disappear’.  Rather, ‘[t]o liberate energy […] means to give it a free reign, to deploy its being, and to let 
it grow, such that the act of culture has no other end than giving permission to the Energy of growth, that 
is to say, to being itself: the auto-realization of subjectivity in the actualization of its auto-affection’. 
Ibid., p. 100.
 Ibid.6
 Ibid., p. 5.7
 Ibid., p. 10.8
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and in which the living subject is given an absolute knowledge of how to live, move its 
limbs, eat, sleep, read, and so on.   While culture is a movement or praxis, this praxis 9
must always be understood as the practical know-how of life.   
 It is because of this original know-how of the flesh that, for example, the subject 
can turn the pages of her biology book and, in an act of consciousness, read and com-
prehend the meaning of the theorems contained therein.   With this, Henry can be seen 10
as providing a practical fleshing out of how the knowledge (i.e. appearing) of life neces-
sarily serves as the foundation of all other forms of knowledge, in this instance, the 
knowledge of consciousness (in this case, the act of reading) as well as scientific 
knowledge (the knowledge contained in the biology book).    11
 If culture consists in this practical know-how of life, then we are left with a 
rather broad cultural world.  On this reading, culture involves,  
the set of enterprises and practices in which the overflowing of life is expressed. 
All of them are motivated by the ‘burden’, the ‘too much’ that prepares living sub-
jectivity internally as a force ready to be dispensed and required to act under this 
burden.  This situation — that is, the ontological condition of life — does not 
merely determine the great projects of culture, for example, the creation of 
mythologies as a distantiation from original fears and terrors, poetry as a ‘deliver-
ance’, etc.  It resides within every need, even the most modest and routine ones.   12
Far from consisting merely in its high forms, among which Henry identifies art, ethics 
and religion, culture pertains to all of the subject’s acts, including — as lower forms of 
culture — its everyday production and consumption of goods, provided those acts serve 
life’s need for self-growth and thereby liberate its burdensome energy.   Thus, as Scott 13
 Ibid., 12; Henry, Incarnation, 200.9
 Henry, Barbarism, p. 11.10
 Ibid.11
 Ibid., p. 99.12
 Ibid., pp. 100, 103, 126.  As Henry writes, cultural acts are all of those actions ‘that match our pathetic 13
relation to being, are capable of expressing it, of growing with it, and thus of growing it, in turn’.  Ibid., p. 
100. 
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Davidson points out in his introduction to Henry’s Barbarism, ‘there are cultures of 
food, shelter, work, erotic relations or relations to the dead’, and so on.   14
4.2 THE ARTISTIC FORM OF CULTURE 
As for how the needs and drives of life guide the subject in her everyday cultural en-
gagements, Henry draws on the work of Kandinsky.  The reason for this has to do with 
the shared ambition that unites their respective projects: like Henry, Kandinsky’s work 
is guided by its attempt to draw out the value of the inner life of the individual.  In the 
eyes of Henry, Kandinsky’s development of abstract art is more than simply a particular 
movement in painting.  What Kandinsky reveals, Henry claims, is that all art — indeed, 
the entire world of life — is abstract, which is to say that, in essence, both art and the 
world stand wholly outside the transcendent, visible world, and are instead exclusively 
guided by the a-cosmic ‘laws of sensibility’, by the movement of life, in its need for the 
growth of its self-sensing.   According to Henry, it is these laws that drive the actions 15
of the individual, and which determine just how successful and valuable things are, 
thereby mapping out the various gradations of culture, from its higher to its lower 
forms.   
 A study of the feasibility of Henry’s contention that life unilaterally drives the 
actions of the subject thus calls for an examination of these laws and how they operate. 
According to Henry, certain cultural practices are generally more adept at adhering to 
these laws than others, most especially, those of art.  Art is said to offer the closest ap-
 Ibid., p. xv.14
 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, pp. 81, 25.  Cf. also Ruud Welten, ‘What Do We Hear When We Hear Mu15 -
sic? A Radical Phenomenology Of Music’, Studia Phaenomenologica 9 (2009), 269-286 (p. 278).  
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proximation of the laws of sensibility.   In this sense, Henry believes that the laws 16
which guide and shape all of experience are inherently aesthetic in nature.  Consequent-
ly, as Vincent Giraud suggests, Henry’s thought can be understood as ‘“aesthetics as 
first philosophy”’.   Given its privilege as an exemplar for all experience, our attempt 17
to assess Henry’s position on this matter will be best served by focusing on how art par-
ticipates in and is guided by the laws in question.       
 Henry’s contention that the subject’s engagement with an artwork — in both its 
production and reception — is guided by the laws of life issues from his observation 
that such works, as an exemplar of all things, are first and foremost experienced in 
terms of the primal self-affection of life.  To demonstrate how this occurs, we will limit 
our focus to the example to which Henry turns the most frequently and that he elabo-
rates on in the most detail, namely, that of painting in fine art.  
 Drawing on Kandinsky, Henry notes that the content of a painting does not 
merely consist in lines, forms and colours as aspects of an object, which appear to the 
subject’s regard as the ‘“noematic” or objective colour’ and form, and which, as such, 
are known in terms of what they signify or mean within the world’s context of signifi-
cance.   Such elements also appear in themselves, in the way in which they are first 18
given in an immediate and non-representational manner as an affective tonality that is 
produced within our flesh.   In line with Kandinsky, Henry thus finds that a painting 19
consists of external content — lines, forms and colours as they visibly appear to the 
 It is important to remember that, according to Henry, any laws of art, or ‘laws of beauty’, can only ever 16
be ‘an ideal approximation of [the] proportions and equilibriums at play in sensibility’.  Ibid., p. 81.
 Vincent Giraud, ‘L’esthétique comme philosophie première’, in Michel Henry et l'affect de l’art: 17
Recherches sur l’esthétique de la phénoménologie matérielle, ed. by Aden Jdey and Rolf Kühn (Leiden: 
Brill, 2012), pp. 41-64 (p. 41).
 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, p. 71.18
 Ibid., p. 28.19
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subject’s representational regard in the ecstatic world — and internal content — these 
lines, forms and colours in their immanent (invisible) pathos.  In this sense, all cultural 
works, be they paintings or pastries, are not merely experienced as objects in the ecstat-
ic world, but as forms of action — or praxis — in that they are suffered and enjoyed in 
and as the movement of life.  In fact, in keeping with his account of the duplicity of ap-
pearing, Henry claims that the real being of such lines and colours — as well as sounds, 
smells, and all sensible elements of the world — consists exclusively in the affective 
tonality that is roused in the subject’s flesh, and that noematic lines and colours are 
‘only the [intentional] projection of a sensation of colour onto the thing’.    20
 Lines and colours are therefore not determined by or restricted to the objective 
forms that appear to contain them on the canvas (just as notes and tones are not restrict-
ed in any non-representational musical composition in a musical score, in, for example, 
a work of musique concrète).  As Henry writes,  
[t]his opens the possibility for colour to break free from the limits in which form 
seeks to contain it.  Knowing no barriers, overflowing the drawing, and exploding 
outside of the predefined space it was assigned until then, colour spreads out 
wherever it wants to, submitting only to its own force and its own volition. 
Where, then, does this pictorial imperative of delineating a colour by a form, its 
inscription in a form and its subordination to a prior outline come from? It comes 
from the world and its ‘objective reality’.  It is in the world of perception with the 
really perceived object that colour ends where the surface that it colours ends. 
The contour of the object is wedded to the limit of this surface, plane, or volume. 
The liberation of colour from external reality implies its release from the form of 
objects and all graphics in general; it marks the arrival of a new life, the life of 
colour delivered to itself [my emphasis] and having become a pure pictorial form 
[i.e. an affective tonality].  21
 Ibid., p. 71.  Consequently, the essential function of art cannot be to represent this or that, or to evoke 20
certain socio-cultural significations, memories, or the like.  Instead, it is to ‘express’ the invisible, to par-
ticipate in and thereby arouse the inner movement of life.  The creativity and tasks of the painter’s com-
position with ‘colours’ compares more favourably to the non-representational expressive creativity char-
acteristic of the musical composer’s work with ‘sounds’ than to the (mechanical) production of a ‘photo-
copy’ of a ‘real’ object.  Ibid., p. 123.
 Ibid., p. 30. 21
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The liberation of line and colour from the objective forms that appear on the canvas, 
and from the worldly contexts of significance to which the latter refer, allows ‘a new 
form’ to be born, what Kandinsky refers to as ‘a “purely artistic form”, which confers 
upon the painting the strength necessary for independent life, and which is able to raise 
picture to the level of a spiritual subject’.   We find a striking example of this in the 22
following passage:   
it is possible not to take account of the letter’s purposes and to no longer perceive 
it as a letter but only as a mere form, a specific design composed of various seg-
ments organised in a variety of ways.  When the linguistic purpose of the letter 
has been set aside, it is no longer a letter.  It has become a pictorial form.  A deci-
sive event takes place then.  Presented with this letter that no longer plays the role 
of a letter and ceases to belong to the system of language, the spectator experi-
ences a new feeling, one that is different from what was felt in relation to the or-
dinary letter, a feeling so faint that it hardly seemed to be conscious.  To the con-
trary, the emergence of an unknown form — the form of a letter that has never 
before been perceived in its purity and formal autonomy — provokes a particular 
impression, ‘happy’ or ‘sad', ‘languishing’ or ‘proud’.  This holds for the form of 
the letter as well as the linear segments that compose it.  We experience this unde-
tectable change at the basis of sensibility — the change from the almost uncon-
scious tonality experienced with the linguistic sign to the much more lively, some-
times overwhelming, experience that the form of this sign as such stirs in us — 
for example, when we are looking at an alphabet that we do not know.    23
   
As this indicates, the real being of all of the sensible elements of the world — i.e. of 
every point, line, form, colour, sound, smell, etc. — consists in their artistic form, which 
is to say, in the way in which they directly participate in, rather than merely mimic or 
represent, the affective life of the individual.  Hence, as Henry writes, ‘abstraction’s re-
 Ibid., p. 24; Wassily Kandinsky, Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art, ed. by Kenneth C. Lindsay and 22
Peter Vergo (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1982), p. 353.  Suffered and enjoyed in the flesh of the subject, the 
lines and colours of a painting participate in its world of life, and in this respect they may be said to have 
their own independent life, their own flesh.  See Henry, Seeing the Invisible, p. 74.      
 Ibid., p. 34.  Henry finds another such example in the experience of a set of letters engraved on an 23
Egyptian temple: ‘The visitor of an Egyptian temple who discovers its huge sections of rock covered with 
undecipherable writing feels the type of emotion that we are talking about.  To be sure, this is altered and 
overdetermined by the fact that the visitor knows that this is a text, that the characters have a religious 
meaning, and that this mind, influenced by the sacred character of the place, is directed respectfully to-
wards them.  But the deception felt on the plane of knowledge cannot explain the gravity and plenitude of 
the experience.  This is not solely a religious experience, since the sense of the specific content of the 
theological inscriptions is not known.  It is primarily an aesthetic experience whose content […] is the 
affective tonality provoked by the perception of known forms grasped in themselves and which are re-
vealed to the visitor in and through this tonality.’  Ibid., pp. 34-35.
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duction of the elements to their pure pictoriality signifies the reduction of the cosmos 
[and the world] to its true reality’, which is to say, to its basis in life.  24
 It follows that the subject’s experience of artworks — and so of things in general 
— is not determined on a merely psychological level.  Henry writes, 
[t]his equation of the original being of colour with its tonality does not only free 
art from the domain of objectivist and symbolic culture; it also dismisses every 
attempted psychological interpretation of art […].  [Such an interpretation] claims 
that a tonality belongs to a colour on an associative level.  Although psychology 
deals with the soul, the type of association that it uses and abuses takes us back to 
the world of representation.  It provides a link that is based on spatial and tempo-
ral contiguity or objective resemblance.  In such cases, exteriority is the basis of 
the associative connection. If it is reduced to this connection, the primal unity of 
colour and [affective] tonality is broken.  It becomes an external relation depend-
ing on circumstances […]. The brilliant insight of abstract painting is to reverse 
the psychological explanation and to show that all the associations organised 
around a colour, instead of explaining its particular tonality, depend on its tonality. 
The pathos of each colour produces the variable network of images that it typical-
ly awakens; the permanence of this tonality and its link to a colour explains all of 
its associations.  25
So far as the real being of things, as well as their unreal external projection in the world, 
is engendered by the transcendental affectivity of life, to explain the tonality of things 
by psychological association is to mistake the original for the copy, the foundation for 
that which it founds.  If we accept the absolute primacy of life, then any and all such 
psychological explanation of the subject’s experience of the sensible elements of the 
world must depend upon and be explained by the tonality of the things themselves.  26
 In light of this, Henry argues that the theory of form and colour that emerges in 
Kandinsky, and that he draws on and develops, is founded philosophically, and does not 
 Ibid., p. 138. 24
 Ibid., p. 75.25
 Insofar as the being of all such lines, forms and colours is determined by nothing other than the tran26 -
scendental life of the individual, an affective tonality cannot be said to be ‘joined to colour or visible 
graphics [i.e. points, lines, forms] as the result of an association of ideas that would vary with individuals 
or depend on their individual histories, such as an infantile trauma that would give one a dislike of white 
and another a taste for black’.  Ibid., pp. 35-36.
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amount to a merely psychological explanation, or to ‘a creative yet vague poetic dis-
course’.   Instead, Henry says that ‘Kandinsky’s analysis operates in the same way as 27
does Husserl’s eidetic analysis.  It proscribes the foreign properties from the essence of 
art in order to perceive art in its purity.’   In effect, Kandinsky’s theory of form and 28
colour provides a phenomenological insight into ‘colour’s [and form’s] own interiority 
to itself as a pure impression, or, what we have called its pathos’.   To the extent his 29
descriptions accurately attest to the essence of things, they can be said to provide the 
subject with some insight into how particular lines, forms and colours are necessarily 
experienced by all human beings, regardless of the position they occupy, and the level 
of education or knowledge they have acquired, in the ecstatic world’s socio-historical 
context of significance.   30
4.3 A THEORY OF FORM AND COLOUR 
While this explains how things are experienced internally within the life of the subject, 
we have still yet to work out in detail how these artistic forms (i.e. affective tonalities) 
can possibly account for the richness and diversity of experience.  How is it, for exam-
ple, that things in the world, whether an abstract painting of Hilma af Klint or a willow 
tree, affect me in the distinct way in which they do? To better understand this, let us un-
pack Henry’s elaboration on Kandinsky’s theory of form and colour.  It is here that Hen-
 Ibid., pp. 35-3627
 Ibid., p. 40.28
 Ibid., p. 75.29
 Ibid., pp. 74-75.  In light of this, Henry claims that ‘those who build temples and sacred edifices and 30
who decorate them with splendid ornamentation feel the colours of these decorations just as we feel them 
today.  Colours exist in the sole way in which a colour can be felt: by blending with and being nothing but 
the sensation of the colour’.  Ibid., p. 74.
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ry draws out and develops his account of this matter in detail.  Upon doing so, we will 
then be in a better position to fully understand and assess Henry’s account of how life, 
as that which engenders and makes possible our experience of things, is alone able to 
constitute the laws that are responsible for guiding the subject in her engagements with 
the world. 
 Kandinsky’s theory of form and colour consists in what he refers to as two ‘great 
contrasts’: that between hot and cold, and between white and black (or light and dark).  31
These contrasts result in ‘three fundamental pairs of opposites: the straight and the 
curve with respect to lines, the triangle and the circle with respect to planes, yellow and 
blue with respect to colours’.   In brief, Henry sees Kandinsky as asserting that every 32
force and ‘drive within the framework of subjectivity has its immediate equivalent in a 
specific linear form, since the force’s intensity, its changes, the time of its action, its in-
terruptions and its returns have their exact corollary in the genus (straight, curved or 
zigzag line) and accidents (slope of the curve, length of various segments and degree of 
the angles) of the linear forms described above’.   For example, a ‘point is stationary 33
and expresses a feeling of calm’, whereas lines are mobile and more boisterous.   In the 34
case of the latter, Kandinsky distinguishes between straight, curved and zigzag lines. 
On this account, a straight line is ‘produced by one single force acting on the point in a 
constant manner’.   As a ‘straight line results form the initiative of a single, unopposed 35
force, its domain is that of the lyric’.   Kandinsky identifies three kinds of straight 36
 Ibid., p. 76.31
 Ibid., p. 138.32
 Ibid., p. 51.33
 Ibid., pp. xi, 50.34
 Ibid., p. 50.35
 Ibid., p. 52.36
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lines: horizontal, vertical and diagonal.  In his description of the inner content of these 
lines, Kandinsky identifies the aforementioned contrast between hot and cold.  As Hen-
ry notes,  
[t]he horizontal [line] corresponds to a primordial dimension of experience, the 
ground on which human beings stand, where they can either remain or move 
away.  Kandinsky defines the horizontal as ‘a cold, basic support that can be ex-
tended in various directions’ and as ‘infinite, cold possibility of movement in its 
most concise form’.  This stands in contrast to the vertical line, outwardly by its 
mark and inwardly by its affective tonality, which no longer offers the human be-
ing any touchstone or resting place, where the flat and the ‘cold’ are replaced by 
the abruptness of the ‘hot’.  Kandinsky notes: ‘Thus, the vertical is infinite, warm 
possibility of movement in its most concise form.’  The third type of straight line 
is extraordinary: the diagonal is the true mixture of the former two in its external 
as well as its internal tone.  Consequently, it is a union of ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ and of-
fers the possibility of gradually changing the respective roles of these two tonali-
ties through the infinite number of imperceptible gradations.  To achieve this ef-
fect, the slope of the diagonal varies, tending either towards the horizontal or the 
vertical.    37
On the other hand, curved and zigzag lines result ‘from the joint action of two forces. 
This situation can be distinguished depending on whether the introduction of the two 
forces is simultaneous or successive.  Simultaneous action engenders a curved line, 
while successive action engenders an angular or zigzag line’, which, in keeping with the 
force of the successive movement that engenders it, ‘conveys a feeling of 
discontinuity’.  38
 Moreover, when the forces of two or more lines ‘are present and thus enter into 
conflict, as is the case with the curve or the zigzag line’, we are said to pass from the 
realm of lyricism to that of drama.   That is to say, when lines are combined and mixed 39
together they forge a dramatic dialogue that can liberate and give free rein to life’s need 
to transform itself and to grow in the way in which it experiences itself.  As Henry 
 Ibid., pp. 57-58.37
 Ibid., p. xi.38
 Ibid., p. 52.39
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states, ‘[t]his dramatic aspect increases and becomes more “hot”, when the action of two 
antagonistic forces is simultaneous.  It is taken to its paroxysm when a large number of 
forces come from all sides and fuel the battle to the point of making it a sort of cosmic 
clash.’   Therefore, lines do not simply arouse certain affective tonalities on their own. 40
Because the being of all such sensible elements find their inner unity and sense within 
life, they can mix and thereby alter one another to arouse an endless variety of affective 
tones within the flesh of the individual.  41
 This same dramatic tension is similarly at play in the case of form and colour.  In 
the case of the former, the opposing extremes consist in the form of a triangle and that 
of a circle.  According to Kandinsky, the inner tone of a triangle is ‘“high-pitched”, 
“loud”, [and] “shrill”’, whilst the circle has a ‘concentric force [that] combines with the 
perfection of a continuous movement to give a feeling of the power and peace of eterni-
ty’.   As Henry states, the contrast between these forces ‘is what makes the impact of 42
an angle on a circle, an act of aggression and a dramatic conflict comparable to the 
greatest effects obtained by Michelangelo on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel’.  43
 Finally, in terms of colour, Henry, following Kandinsky, notes that  
[e]very colour […] potentially has four basic tones, since it can be hot — and at 
the same time light or dark — or cold — and again, light of dark […].  In the case 
 Ibid.40
 Since Henry maintains that all such sensible elements are ultimately engendered by and find their in41 -
nermost unity within the immanence of life, which admits of no real division, he contends that the affec-
tive tonality of any given form or colour cannot be separated from the tonalities of other forms and 
colours.  Therefore, when Kandinsky endeavours ‘to display the discrete, autonomous nature of the ele-
ment [i.e. ‘the genus “red” or the essence of the “circle”’] and to recognise it as the true element of an 
analysis, this possibility only holds for its external aspect (for example, what is perceived by the mind as 
pure red when I say the word ‘red’ or as an isosceles triangle when I produce this concept)’.  By necessi-
ty, then, Kandinsky’s analyses always remain an ideal approximation of the affective experience of form 
and colour.  Consequently, as we’ll soon see, when an artist composes a work in an effort to express a 
particular inner content, in order to be as successful as possible, Henry believes that she must consider 
how a particular set of forms and colours will combine to express the inner content in question.  Ibid., p. 
89.
 Ibid., p. 84.42
 Ibid., p. 49.43
 154
of heat, the movement goes toward the spectator, while in the case of cold it re-
treats.  In the case of heat, the tendency is towards the colour yellow, while the 
general tendency of cold is towards blue […].  Through experience, yellow is hot 
and has a horizontal, approaching movement, while blue is cold and has a hori-
zontal, retreating movement.     44
In addition to this description of its basic tones, Kandinsky finds that ‘[b]lue is the 
colour of depth, the “heavenly colour”.  It appeases and calms; it “calls man towards the 
infinite” and awakens “a desire for the pure and, finally, for the supernatural”.  As it 
moves towards black it becomes sad, while it becomes more remote and impersonal as 
it lightens.’   Meanwhile,  45
white is elevated far above the world and its colours […].  It is an absolute si-
lence, not a silence that is dead but one that is filled with possible things.  This 
‘nothingness’ precedes every birth and beginning.  In relation to it, the sounds of 
all other colours ‘become dulled’, while many dissolve completely […].  By con-
trast, black is a nothingness bereft of possibilities.  It is a future ‘without hope’ 
and a death ‘as if the sun had become extinct’.    46
As with all of the elements we have been discussing, when two or more colours are 
present together, when they mix or play off one another, and when they are joined with 
respective tonalities of particular lines and forms, these tonalities alter one another and 
the tonality of the work as a whole.  As Henry writes, ‘[g]iven that there is an infinite 
spectrum of colours and likewise an infinite number of forms — once they are no longer 
reduced to forms in the objective world — the possibility of joining external elements in 
order to give rise to corresponding feelings becomes inexhaustible.’  47
 Ibid., p. 76.  Describing yellow further, Kandinsky notes that it ‘is disquieting to the spectator, pricking 44
him, stimulating him […] revealing the nature of the power expressed in this colour, which has an effect 
upon our sensibilities at once impudent and importunate.  This property of yellow […] can be raised to a 
pitch of intensity unbearable to the eye and to the spirit.  Upon such intensification, it affects us like a 
shrill sound of a trumpet being played louder and louder, or the sound of a high-pitched fanfare’. 
Kandsinky, Kandinsky, ed. by Lindsay and Vergo, p. 181. 
 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, p. 78.45
 Ibid., pp. 78-79.46
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4.4 ART AS NORMATIVE CULTURE 
As the foundation and inner unity that engenders all of these sensible elements and 
makes their union and mixture possible, Henry believes that it is ultimately life itself 
that provides the criteria which determines just how successful (or unsuccessful) things 
really are — whether in the realm of art or, by extension, in our more mundane en-
gagements in the world — and which therefore guides the subject in her actions and in 
her effort to further her self-experience.   Kandinsky speaks to this matter quite well in 48
the following letter to painter and atonal music composer Arnold Schoenberg: 
[e]very formal procedure which aspires to traditional effects is not completely free 
from conscious motivation.  But art belongs to the unconscious! One must express 
oneself! Express oneself directly! Not one’s taste, or one’s upbringing, or one’s 
intelligence, knowledge or skill.  Not all these acquired characteristics, but that 
which is inborn, instinctive.  And all form-making, all conscious form-making, is 
connected with some kind of mathematics, or geometry, or with the golden section 
or suchlike.  But only unconscious form-making, which sets up the equation ‘form 
= outward shape’, really creates forms; that alone brings forth prototypes which 
are imitated by unoriginal people and become ‘formulas’.  But whoever is capable 
of listening to himself, recognising his own instincts, and also engrossing himself 
reflectively in every problem, will not need such crutches.  One does not need to 
be a pioneer to create in this way, only a man who takes himself seriously — and 
thereby takes seriously that which is the true task of humanity in every intellectual 
or artistic field: to recognise, and to express what one has recognised!!! This is my 
belief!     49
As this passage indicates, while there may be several elements that go into the construc-
tion of an artwork — the ‘artist’s personality’, the ‘style’ and ‘aesthetic postulates’ of 
the time — it is the unconscious movement of affectivity that is principally responsible 
for determining how the external contents should be arranged in order to best capture 
the inner content in question, and for thereby providing the criteria for the success or 
 Henry, Barbarism, p. 100.48
 Schoenberg to Kandinsky, January 24, 1911 (http://www.schoenberg.at/lettersneu/ search_show_let49 -
ter.php?ID_Number=180 accessed 10.03.2014.  Also cited in Welten, 'What Do We Hear When We Hear 
Music?’, p. 280.
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failure of the artwork as art.   In other words, it is life that provides the a priori laws, or 50
what Kandinsky refers to as the principles of ‘[i]nternal necessity’ of the artist’s self-ex-
pression that should guide the action of the subject in her composition of a work of art, 
and in her everyday engagements with the world.  51
 Now, it could be asked what gives life the authority to dictate the criteria by 
which actions are measured? Drawing on the work of Nietzsche, Henry claims that, in 
experiencing itself, the life of each individual knows itself to be good.   As Henry asks, 52
‘[w]hy is life good? Because in the self-suffering that constitutes it life’s coming into 
itself is its delight in itself and as such pure delight.  Happiness.  Good! Happiness is 
good.  Because life’s essence contains happiness as its necessary product, it is good.’  53
Consequently, the generative movement of affectivity ‘has value originally and uncon-
ditionally, and thus constitutes the principle of every possible evaluation and value’.  54
In this case, it is because life is this generative movement, because, in affecting itself, it 
produces the self and all of the powers and tendencies that it lives from and enjoys, that 
it has value in itself and that it knows itself as such.  And it is because life has this in-
herent value that the evaluations and values it produces necessarily have value and 
count for something.  55
  Yet it remains to be seen exactly how this process plays out.  Let us return to the 
exemplary case of fine art.  For the individual who finds herself driven to express a cer-
tain internal content (i.e. affective tonality) or theme, Henry states that the inner neces-
 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, p. 25.50
 Ibid., pp. 24-25, 27, 54, 98.51
 Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, pp. 246-248.52
 Ibid., pp. 248, 276.53
 Ibid., p. 248.54
 Ibid., p. 246. 55
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sity of life generates ‘a principle form’, which ‘communicates its own tone to the entire 
work’, that is, to the myriad points, lines, forms and colours that are at play in the work 
in question.   In this way, life dictates that ‘composition consists in the subordination of 56
all [particular] forms’ to this ‘principle form’.   That is to say, to successfully express 57
an inner content, the artist should not simply throw an array of colours at the wall; she 
should not allow herself ‘to be duped’ by a particular forms beauty and value, or to in-
troduce particular forms into the work owing to her personal psychological 
preferences.   Rather, her aim must be to adhere to the principle form and inner unity of 58
the inner theme, and to thereby include only those forms that are necessary, and to 
arrange them in such a way that they mix and play off one another so as to express the 
principle form of the work in an optimal fashion.  59
 According to Henry, the essential role of life’s internal necessity in determining 
the success or failure of an artwork explains ‘the impression of necessity given by every 
authentic [i.e. successful] work, and the contingency, even the gratuity, characteristic of 
mediocre painting.  The weakness of mediocre painting consists in its possibility of be-
ing otherwise — the result of this uncertainty is the indifference of a regard that is con-
 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, p. 98.56
 Ibid.57
 Ibid.58
 Ibid., pp. 98, 54.  Though Henry acknowledges that it is impossible for an individual to perfectly ex59 -
press an internal content in the external contents of her work, it is therefore paramount to the success of 
any given work that the artist ‘recognise’ or remain attuned to her life, and that she harness all of her 
power and skill to express what she has recognised as best she can.
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strained by nothing to reproduce a design from which it would no longer be able to turn 
away’.  60
 This provides us with a basis for understanding how life drives the actions of the 
living subject.  In short, life carries out this function by not only founding and initiating 
the subject’s actions, but, as we can now see, in making possible the norms and stan-
dards that orient her engagements with things.  That is to say, life engenders the criteria 
by which she can immediately evaluate things and assign value to them, that propel the 
subject in one direction rather than another, and that inform her as to whether her ac-
tions are going well or poorly.  In the case we have just laid out, for instance, life’s need 
for self-growth initiates action on the part of the subject by engendering in her flesh an 
unconscious goal of expressing a particular theme in a painting.  Simultaneously, life 
engenders the criteria by which she can feel and know how she needs to proceed in or-
der to best express the inner content in question.  In so doing, it drives the individual to 
create a particular assemblage of forms and colours rather than another.  Upon follow-
ing any given course of action, the subject can then review her work and, looking at it, 
undergo a certain pleasure where her actions have been somewhat successful in approx-
imating the inner necessity of the inner content in question, and displeasure where they 
have not.  As per the duplicity of appearing, the affective sense that the individual un-
dergoes can then be translated into a sensible impression, and on the basis of this im-
pression, the individual can form a judgment and come to objectively see the work she 
 Ibid., p. 25.  Henry suggests that certain styles of painting can be more successful in participating in the 60
a priori laws of life than others.  He writes: ‘[w]hereas the purely artistic construction subsists on its own 
with the invincible coherence that comes from Inner Necessity, from the necessity presides over the 
choice of form — which no longer has or needs any external support — figurative paintings rely on ex-
ternal reality.  Their pallid colours and loose forms collapse due to “formal indigence”, once this support 
is absent.  This is the case for all naturalistic paintings, including impressionism.  The breakdown of these 
paintings, for example, when one looks at them upside down or when in some way or another their refer-
ence to the objective world is broken — which in the eyes of many constitutes the sole “sense” of paint-
ing — provides the proof that form derives its rigour and force from Inner Necessity and that, in spite of 
all appearances, it has no other possible content than life.’  Ibid.
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has produced as good or bad, etc.  In this sense, as Henry notes, there are ‘two series of 
values: first, what originally has value before every act of evaluation and valorization 
[i.e. the movement of life]; second, the values that result from that act as the archetypal 
representation of that from which the act itself proceeds’.   61
 Of course, this process occurs not only in the realm of art, but across the breadth 
of our experience (i.e. in the art of logic, ethics, law, architecture, play and so forth).  As 
we have stated, Henry views the living subject’s experience of art as an exemplar for 
how the subject essentially experiences all things in general.  In his eyes, the unalterable 
laws that determine our experience of artworks (i.e. their quality or value) are also those 
that determine our experience of the world of life.   Abstract art, as Henry says, ‘is not 62
opposed to nature; it discovers nature’s true essence’.    63
 In this case, the value of the objects produced in everyday life must similarly be 
determined by the extent to which they adhere to the needs of life.  While the actions 
and objects that colour our everyday life may not rise to the level of art, they are never-
theless guided by life’s need for self-growth.   Since Henry himself does not elaborate 64
on this in much detail, let us do so briefly now.  As Henry acknowledges, life’s need for 
self-preservation and self-growth inscribes a wealth of goals in the flesh of the living 
subject — i.e. the need for food, shelter, companionship, etc.   In experiencing a chill, 65
 Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, p. 248.61
 Henry, Barbarism, p. 42; Henry, Seeing the Invisible, p. 140.62
 Ibid.63
 Ibid., pp. 20-21.64
 As Henry writes: ‘life itself knows what it should do […].  It does not know what it should do through 65
rational knowledge but in its own way — not through the discovery of an objective field of quantifiable 
and calculable phenomena but through the irrecusable experience of its desire and its passion.  Life leads 
individuals to work in order to feed themselves; it leads couples to be formed and societies to exist.  Life 
is the true Reason.  It assigns specific goals to human beings.  It has initially constructed these goals in 
them, and they reside in the irresistible movement of their drives and their love — in the movement of 
life’.  Henry, From Communism to Capitalism, p. 116.
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for example, as a ‘subjective experience of discomfort’, the subject’s drive for self-
preservation and happiness will condition and make possible a series of objectifying and 
non-objectifying acts that are bent on the achievement of this goal, and on ‘abolish[ing] 
its negative determinations, its “suffering’’ this discomfort’.   For instance, upon feel66 -
ing cold, an individual may reach for a wool blanket, or make herself a warm cup of tea, 
or crawl into bed with her partner.  Depending on the extent to which these practices, as 
well as the objective things or individuals, are successful or unsuccessful in meeting the 
given need(s), they will be experienced within the individual’s flesh in an immediate 
and immanent way as pleasurable or unpleasurable — i.e. as being useful or useless, 
good or evil.  On the basis of the positive assessment of the blanket that the subject un-
dergoes within her flesh, she will then undergo a similarly positive sensation within her 
sensible body, and ultimately come to objectively see the blanket as useful for warming 
herself, whereas other items, such as a desk lamp, will be seen as relatively useless.  67
 What distinguishes art as a high rather than low form of culture, is simply its 
ability to better adhere and give free rein to life’s need to further its self-experience.  As 
Henry writes,  
[w]hether it is a giraffe or a toad, a human being or a fish, an elephant or a mouse, 
creative forces in nature […] seem to function in terms of the ‘principle of con-
centric construction’.  Art, by contrast, opens the new possibility, unknown in na-
ture, of an uncentred construction.  As we have seen, this is how abstract painting 
conceives free straight lines; they are detached from the plane, ‘float’, and no 
longer have a relation to it or any of its points.  Every constraining objective con-
text has disappeared, and in place of the natural concentric layout, the sole re-
 Michel Henry, Marx: A Philosophy of Human Reality, trans. by Kathleen Blamey McLaughlin (Bloom66 -
ington: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 97.  As Henry further explains, ‘[e]ven when it functions with 
the apparent designs of procuring some advantage or removing some obstacle, the ultimate motivation 
behind its effort is the happiness that it experiences through the experience of its force.’  Henry, Seeing 
the Invisible, p. 43. 
 In this case, Henry’s work reveals that objects are what they because they either assist or hinder the 67
needs and practices of the sensible body, which themselves are ultimately founded upon and experienced 
within the original praxis of life.
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maining principle of construction is the subjectivity of the elements.  Only their 
tone will determine their distribution and their assemblage.    68
In the last analysis, insofar as artworks remain indifferent to all objective and practical 
meaning and adhere exclusively to the inner necessity of life, they enjoy a freedom and 
a level of rigour that is not generally known by everyday objects and things in nature. 
Where things in nature are often ‘muffled resonances that are inaudible due to the fact 
that they have already been heard’, or mired in ‘constraining objective [and practical] 
contexts’ of meaning that, in Henry’s view, distract from and thereby mitigate their af-
fective tonalities,  artworks can produce configurations that are more novel and exact69 -
ing in their adherence to the movement of life.   70
 In doing so, it should be noted that artworks do not merely transform and ex-
pand the subject’s life; they intensify her self-experience by adhering to and arousing 
her sentiments in a more rigorous and determined manner.   As becomes most apparent 71
in Henry’s study of culture, the self-growth of life is not merely the transformation of 
the subject’s inner world, but an intensification of it.  When it is done well, art intensi-
fies the life of the individual by carrying it to its ‘extreme point’, to the ‘“paroxysm of 
life”, where life experiences itself on its own basis, in which it is lost in this “impossible 
happiness” that Kandinsky calls “ecstasy”’.  72
 To the extent living individuals pursue this way of life, the result is a cultural 
world.  As Henry tells us, culture, understood as those actions that adhere to the needs 
of life,  
 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, p. 139.68
 Ibid., p. 140.69
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 Henry, Barbarism, p. 42.71
 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, p. 19.72
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arranges the world in such a way that, in all its various aspects, it reflects this 
need [to grow].  That is, in and only in relation to subjectivity — for example, the 
seen in its relation with seeing — it puts subjectivity in relation with oneself in 
growth.  Each construction refers to the fundamental need of shelter: each build-
ing, each tomb, each stele [or stela], each public building, each village, and even 
entire cities.  In a cultural world, they are necessarily organized as the elements 
that allow life, in each of the human senses and more broadly in each power of 
subjectivity, to realize its essence.  They allow one to see more, to feel more, to 
love more, to act more, even if it is only through an imaginary exercise of its 
powers of organic subjectivity — and thereby to realize the essence of subjectivity 
itself.  73
As we can see here, Henry’s study of culture reveals in a very concrete way how the 
movement of life is necessarily expressed in the world.  So far as the living subject en-
dures and abides by the needs of life, she will necessarily organise the elements of the 
world in such a way as to best meet life’s need for self-growth.  Put differently, in such a 
state, living individuals will tend to order and view things in terms of their use-value, in 
terms of their ability to meet the subject’s needs and enhance or otherwise further her 
self-experience. 
4.5 THE RAMIFICATIONS OF NORMATIVE LIFE 
Yet if this is so, then it is undeniably the case that objective cultural works, and the in-
tentional acts that are essential to their production and reception, do play a positive, 
even vital, role in the growth of life.  These findings cannot help but surprise us for a 
number of reasons.  First, given that Henry insists on the absolute priority and indepen-
dence of life, we might have expected that life would bring about its self-growth with-
out needing to engage with objective works of any kind.  We might have expected Hen-
ry to recommend that the subject instead engage in an ascetic lifestyle, that she retreat 
from all things and nourish herself in peaceful meditation.  Yet since this is not at all 
 Henry, Barbarism, pp. 102-103.73
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what we find in Henry, and the finite intentional acts of the subject and the objective 
works to which she relates do play a positive role in the development of life, there is 
then the issue as to how can this be, given that, as we know, Henry repeatedly claims, 
with a forcefulness that only grows stronger in his later years, that the intentional order 
of appearing tears everything from its immanent reality and thereby derealises it, effec-
tively rendering it an extreme unreality? The way in which these two points — the sup-
posed unreality of the intentional display of the world and its undeniably positive role in 
the growth of life — can co-exist is a genuine issue for Henry, and one to which we will 
return in due time. 
 On the other hand, this practical working out of Henry’s position further demon-
strates that he is justified in identifying the transcendental ego, as the absolute founda-
tion of the normative and meaningful character of our experience, with bodily life.  If, 
as Husserl suggests, the body were the constituted product of a more basic self-apper-
ception, there would have to be a foundation, apart from the subjective body and its 
practices, of the norms on account of which the meaning of bodily life would be consti-
tuted.  In line with this view, though Husserl did, to some extent, acknowledge that the 
process of constitution was a function of the embodied ego and its practices, he ulti-
mately maintains that such practices can be studied in terms of acts of consciousness 
(i.e. acts of perception, willing, valuing, desiring, etc.).   On Husserl’s account, it is a 74
desire for warmth and comfort that motivates an evaluating perceptual act, wherein the 
wool blanket appears to the subject as useful.  Together, these desiring and valuing acts 
motivate the subject to reach for the blanket in an act of will.  As Steven Crowell states, 
while Husserl here acknowledges that the reaching for the blanket ‘is a practical act that 
 Steven Crowell, Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge 74
University Press, 2013), p. 160.  
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depends on my embodiment’, he stresses that ‘the meaning of that act is constituted in 
[and through outer objectifying-sense perceptual] consciousness’.   In his eyes, ‘all that 75
is spiritual [i.e. the world of meaning] is enclosed in a certain way in the nexuses of 
lived experiences [i.e. consciousness] of the individual human being’.   76
 This, however, would appear to be a highly problematic position.  At heart, 
something appears ‘desirable not because I desire it but because it appears to fulfil a 
need, and need is not an act; it is a bodily (or spiritual) condition’.   The wool blanket 77
‘shows itself as useful not when I simply look at it but when I use it — that is, within a 
[bodily] practice that implicates it in a certain normatively ordered whole’.   If the liv78 -
ing subject found herself in a different affective state, and engaged in a different bodily 
practice — say, trying to keep herself cool — the wool blanket would no longer be use-
ful.  After this occurs, Husserl claims that we can simply perceive the object in question 
as useful or useless.  Yet, as Crowell observes,  
such a perception cannot then be called upon to serve as the act-basis for experi-
encing the hammer’s [or the blankets] utility in the original practice, and if that is 
so, this sort of utility — and the norms that constitute it — cannot be reduced to 
acts.  Thus [bodily] practices cannot be reduced to acts of consciousness.  The 
hammer is not useful because I desire to build a house; it is useful because it is the 
appropriate instrument for the job, and I can do the job entirely in the absence of 
the supposedly foundational act of desire.  Indeed, I could very well desire to be 
elsewhere, to be doing something else, and so on.  79
This suggests that the norms that make possible noematic meaning are indeed irrevoca-
bly tied to the skills and practices of bodily life, and that transcendental subjectivity, as 
the foundation of such norms, must be embodied through and through.  Henry’s study of 
 Ibid., p. 160.75
 Husserl, Ideas II, p. 371.76




culture draws out in considerable detail that it is because the living subject is engaged in 
particular practices that certain objects can be seen objectively as useful or useless; and, 
more basically still, that it is because the subject undergoes life’s need for self-growth 
and finds herself driven by the original praxis of life that these practices can arise in the 
first place and really be successful or unsuccessful.  
4.6 BARBARISM AND MODERNITY 
       
While this goes some way toward demonstrating life’s ability to guide the actions of the 
subject within the cultural realm, it remains for us to see whether and how it can enable 
the living subject both to forget and to subsequently recover its basis in absolute life. 
Given life’s radical immanence, which does not admit of any distance or alterity, how 
can it possibly tolerate and explain such transformations? 
 Henry’s most detailed attempt to address this matter is found in his study of bar-
barism.  Just as his study of culture serves as his attempt to flesh out his account of life 
as a movement of self-growth, barbarism is his attempt to render the forgetting of life 
incarnate.   
 In a very important sense, Henry’s account of this matter has to do with his ac-
count of the ontological structure of life.  As Steinbock notes, because life, in its radical 
immanence, does not reveal itself in the transcendence of the world, it ‘can never be-
come objective; and this [according to Henry] is what determines it as “hiddenness”’.  80
Life is an original hiddenness, understood as a ‘hiddenness to thought’.   This particu81 -
 Anthony Steinbock, ‘The problem of forgetfulness in Michel Henry’, Continental Philosophy Review 80
32, no. 3 (1999), 271-302 (p. 278); Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, p. 380.
 Steinbock, ‘The problem of forgetfulness in Michel Henry’, pp. 278-279, my emphasis.81
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lar hiddenness of life ‘is [thus] not related to a failure of thought, but to the essence it-
self, to the ontological structure of reality’.   So far as this hiddenness belongs to the 82
ontological structure of life, it can be said that life determines out of necessity an onto-
logical forgetfulness.   Because of this, when life engenders each human self and puts 83
it in possession of all of the powers that make up its ecstatic existence in the world, it 
brands the existence of each self with what Steinbock calls an existential forgetfulness. 
This forgetfulness is existential in that it 
is structured according to existence as transcendence, and existence […] can do 
nothing else but transcend in perception and in thought, which is to say, can only 
lose itself in the world and forget immanence.  Because thought is transcendence 
and aims at something outside the self, because it is in principle in the world, and 
because it cannot in principle achieve the essence which maintains itself outside 
exteriority, thought is condemned from the outset to forget immanence.    84
Because the human self is passively given to itself in this way, Henry says that it can 
therefore, through the exercise of its various intentional powers, actively overlook or 
forget life — i.e. ontological monism,  or ‘historical forgetfulness’, to use Steinbock’s 85
term  — and thereby mistake itself as the sovereign basis of its own being.  This is 86
what Henry refers to as the transcendental illusion of the ego.   It is this historical for87 -
getfulness that he largely has in mind when discussing barbarism.  In this case, as per 
the duplicity of appearing, culture and barbarism appear to stand in a binary relation, 
 Ibid., p. 278.82
 Ibid.83
 Ibid., p. 279; Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, p. 386; Henry, I Am the Truth, p. 141.84
 Ibid., p. 140; Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, p. 390.85
 Steinbock, ‘The problem of forgetfulness in Michel Henry’, pp. 280-281.86
 Henry, I Am the Truth, p. 140.  Henry goes on to note how the transcendental illusion of the ego gives 87
rise to a ‘system of egoism’, wherein everything is seen as serving the needs and interests of the finite 
ego.  In this system, the ego effectively relates to the world in the mode of care (an obvious allusion to 
Heidegger).  That is to say, the ego relates to itself by projecting itself outside itself and into the future, 
such that ‘it gives itself as a task “to realize”’, as a way of existing in the world that is always necessarily 
at issue, and about which it therefore has an inherent concern.  Ibid., pp. 143-144. 
 167
where the latter tears the reality of the former from itself and renders it an illusion or 
unreality.  88
 When barbarism is in effect, the subject forgets its ‘transcendental humanitas’,  89
its true reality and provenance as a son of God.  That is to say, the subject forgets that it 
is driven by the needs and primal sense of the one and only eternal life, and instead 
comes to regard its finite intentional acts, and the objectivity they make possible, as ul-
timate and foundational.   Henry thus regards barbarism as tantamount to a ‘revolution 90
of the human being’, in that it gives the individual to overlook the singular and non-ob-
jective arch-knowledge of life in favour of forms of knowing and theory that are tied to 
intentionality and that unduly privilege seeing, objectivity and universality.   91
 Henry claims that an exemplary instance of barbarism is found in the modern 
world.  In his eyes, the rise of barbarism in the modern world is associated with that of 
early modern thinking, specifically that of Galileo.  Galileo’s thought effectively revolu-
tionises the European way of thinking, and, Henry claims, it plays a prominent role in 
making it what it is.  Galilean science asserts that ‘the knowledge that human beings 
 Ibid., p. 23.  The strict opposition between culture and barbarism (i.e. scientism) is highlighted in Hen88 -
ry’s essay ‘Ce due la science ne sait pas’, in Phénoménologie de la vie, Tome III: De L'art et du politique, 
(Paris: Presses Univesitaires de France, 2003), pp. 41-51.  Antonio Calcagno develops this point at length 
in ‘Reclaiming the Possibility of an Interior Human Culture? Michel Henry and La Barbarie’, Journal of 
the British Society for Phenomenology 44, no. 3 (2013), 252-265 (p. 262).  
 Michael Staudigl, ‘From the “metaphysics of the individual” to the critique of society: on the practical 89
significance of Michel Henry’s phenomenology of life’, Continental Philosophy Review 45, no. 3 (2012), 
339-361 (pp. 353, 341).
 When describing the subject as having a special (i.e. immanent) relationship with God, in keeping with 90
tradition, Henry employs the male pronoun, i.e. son of God.  For the sake of continuity, we will retain his 
phrasing. 
 Henry, Barbarism, p. 2.  While culture and barbarism both belong to life as two of its a priori possibili91 -
ties, Henry states that barbarism comes after culture.  On this account, the becoming of the living sub-
ject’s inner world is at first thoroughly positive in nature, a purely unconscious movement of self-growth; 
and it is only later that barbarism sets in.  As Henry writes, barbarism ‘is always second to a state of cul-
ture that necessarily precedes it, and it is only in relation to this prior culture that it can appear as an im-
poverishment and a degeneration’.  Ibid., p. 5.  Because of this, it was necessary that we first lay out and 
familiarise ourselves with Henry’s account of culture before taking up the issue of barbarism.
 168
had always trusted was false and illusory’.   Of course, this ‘knowledge is the sensory 92
knowledge that leads us to believe that things have colours, odors, tastes, and sounds 
that are agreeable or disagreeable, in short, to believe that the world is a sensory 
world’.   Instead, Galileo maintains that  93
the real world is composed of un-sensed material bodies that are extended and 
have forms and figures.  Its way of being known is not the sensibility that varies 
from one individual to another and thus only offers appearances, but the rational 
knowledge of these figures and forms: geometry.  The geometrical knowledge of 
material nature  — a knowledge that can be formulated mathematically […] is the 
new knowledge that takes the place of all others and rejects them as 
insignificant.  94
  
As Henry sees it, the Galilean science of nature (i.e. modern science or scientism) is 
thus eliminativistic.  It represents a destruction of the basis of all reality in the original 
self-sensing and arch-knowledge of life, and a decision on the part of the living subject 
to abstract from and cover over the knowledge of life with that of geometrical-mathe-
matical knowledge — i.e. objectivism.   In doing so, modern science promotes an elim95 -
inative ideology wherein it is the sole domain of appearing and knowing.   It minimises 96
and distorts reality to nothing more than calculable physical matter, ‘to an objective set 
 Ibid., p. xiii.92
 Ibid.93
 Ibid.94
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will see, Henry, on the other hand, regards this crisis — which, for him, is not simply a crisis, but a de-
structive way of life — as having to do with the subject’s forgetting of the primal sense of life, and with 
the drive to destroy itself that comes into life as a result.  For Henry, life’s urge to no longer live cannot be 
overcome by any heroism of reason, but only by returning and adhering to the needs and drives of life 
itself, specifically its need for self-growth.  
 Henry, Barbarism, pp. 26, 52, 106.96
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of material phenomena’, such that something truly is if and only if it can be objectively 
measured and verified.  The life of the subject ‘as it is experienced in its uncontestable 
phenomenality — this life that makes us living beings — is thus stripped of its true real-
ity and reduced to a mere appearance [i.e. illusion, nonbeing].  The kiss exchanged by 
lovers is only a collision of microphysical particles’.   97
 At first blush, this cannot but strike the reader as an outright condemnation of 
science.  Indeed, Henry states that ‘[s]cience as such has no relation with culture, be-
cause it develops outside its realm.’   Commenting on the relation between science and 98
art in particular, he states that ‘[s]cience and art fall outside of one another.  The hetero-
geneity between their respective domains is so radical that the very thought of a relation 
between the two is, at least for the moment, impossible.’    99
 Be that as it may, Henry’s own analyses in fact do not support such a harsh 
treatment of science, and, indeed, he is not always as excessive in his negative assess-
ment of the latter.  Here, it will be helpful to recall our earlier remarks regarding art.  As 
we’ve seen, contrary to his insistence that the intentional order of appearing is but an 
unreality, Henry’s own analysis of objective cultural works such as paintings demon-
strates that objective things can and do have a positive role to play in the enhancement 
of life.  If this is the case, and if he is to be consistent, Henry cannot support such an 
outright condemnation of the sciences.   
 As a mode of knowing that is dependent on intentionality and its objectivity, the 
sciences may somehow harbour the potential to distract the subject from her life by giv-
ing her to mistakenly regard her actions as sovereign and by reducing being (i.e. appear-
 Ibid., p. xiv.97
 Ibid., p. 23.98
 Ibid.99
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ing) to being-seen, but it is only that — a potential.  It must be possible for the experi-
mental objectivity of the sciences to play a positive role in social existence.  Indeed, in 
at least one place, Henry does suggest that it is not so much science as such that is bar-
barous, but only scientism, that is, the reductive practices of science in rendering life 
and human life in naturalistic terms.  In his eyes, science only becomes barbarous when 
it becomes mistaken ‘as the sole existing domain of true being and subsequently leads 
to the rejection of the domain of life and culture into nonbeing or an illusory appearance 
[…].  [I]t is [thus] not scientific knowledge that is in question; it is the ideology joined 
to it today which holds that it is the sole possible knowledge and that all other ones 
must be eliminated’.  100
4.7 THE MODERN MARRIAGE OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 
When this eliminativist ideology does rise to cultural dominance, as it apparently does 
in the modern world, the effects are said to be disastrous.  Thus, for Henry, the bar-
barism of the modern world is ‘not just a question of a crisis of culture but of its de-
struction’.   If the modern world is an exemplary case of barbarism, then at heart bar101 -
barism must be defined by this destructiveness.  To better understand how this modern 
distraction and devaluation of life proves so destructive to life as a whole, and not just 
human existence, let us take a moment to focus in on its modern incarnation.  In Hen-
ry’s view, modern barbarism predominantly unfolds in the Frankensteinian assemblage 
of science, technology and economics.   
 Ibid.100
 Ibid., p. 2.101
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 As with science, technology and economics must serve as forms of culture.  102
Indeed, in analysing the basic ontological relation of technology to human involvement 
with the world, Henry finds that technology is originally linked to the know-how or 
praxis of life in its co-belonging with the earth.  Technology consists in the ways in 
which the subject acts on the earth to which it belongs in order to change it so as to best 
meet its needs — i.e. by digging into it, moving it, shaping it, etc.   As such, technolo103 -
gy is simply ‘the realization of the original embodiment of earth [i.e. of the subject’s 
original co-belonging to the earth]’.   The tools that are invented to partake in this liv104 -
ing work on the world are ‘originally nothing but an extension’ of the organic body, as 
‘something that gives way to effort and is given in and only in that way’.   105
 Similarly, the economy is originally a matter of ‘householding’.   In other 106
words, in a cultural world, the economy, as steeped in the demands of life, is arranged 
so as to keep the affairs of life in order.  It understands the goods and services of society 
in terms of their use-value, which is to say, in terms of their ability to satisfy the needs 
of life and to help preserve and enhance its self-experience. 
 However, so far as human action grows forgetful of its basis in the normative 
context of life, then science, technology and the economy follow suit.  What results is a 
convergence of these three elements of society in something of a perfect storm.  As 
James Hart notes, in modern barbarism these strata of society come together to form 
‘what Lewis Mumford (not Henry) calls the megamachine, i.e., a self-regulating objec-
 Ibid., p. 46.102
 Ibid.103
 Hart, ‘A phenomenological theory and critique of culture’, p. 266.104
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tive, worldly system with its own kind of teleology whose determination of the details 
and rhythms of our life in the world is pervasive but whose dynamisms are divorced 
from life as the first-person immediate self-experience’.  107
 We can see this today, Henry says, in the rise of ‘the immense mechanical sys-
tem of big industry, which can be reduced to electromagnetic currents of supercomput-
ers and other high-tech machines of “techno-science”’, and which can increasingly 
function on their own, or with minimal supervision.   Similarly, it can plainly be seen 108
in the shift of the economy away from use-value to exchange value and the unlimited 
production of profit (i.e. surplus value).   Where the value of work was once measured 109
by life in its co-belonging with the earth, by the extent to which it served the needs of 
life and actualised its potentiality, it is now measured by its place in the market econo-
my and by its role in the production of exchange and surplus values.   
 Of course, this decline in the basic value of life in the name of the so-called 
megamachine spills over and effects all aspects of culture.  Henry finds an especially 
compelling example in the university.  As Henry notes, the original vocation of the uni-
versity was to fulfil the highest needs of life, its need to express itself and to grow in its 
ability to feel, act and think.  In short, the university was to function as ‘a creator of cul-
ture’,  as a site whose principle and guiding task is to help enable one to enter ‘into 110
possession of oneself’, and so, to become who one is.   As such, universities were 111
‘constituted on a principle of marginality that was deliberate’.   So as to better fulfil its 112
 Ibid., p. 265.107
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aim of fostering this flourishing of the soul (i.e. life) of the individual, as well as that of 
society as a whole, the university system was purposefully constructed in such a way as 
to allow it to stand apart from many of the social norms and laws that often apply to 
other sectors of society.     
 Today, it is not hard to find innumerable examples that demonstrate how this 
privileged marginality of the university is under threat of destruction.  As Simmons and 
Scott note,  
recent case law and public controversies concerning freedoms of speech, expres-
sion, job-security, gun regulations, etc., on college campuses all speak to the uni-
versity’s continuing, but often losing, struggle to maintain this marginality.  While 
courts have recognised the need for lassitude in select academic practices, claims 
for what we might term ‘academic’ marginality have been more consistently re-
jected.  Supporting Henry’s point, the predominant trend at least with U.S. courts 
is in the direction of treating the University like just another corporation or (for 
public universities) government agency bound by the exact same constitutional, 
statutory and common law restrictions as those entities.     113
With the rise of barbarism, the university progressively moves away from its original 
role as a ‘creator of culture’ and assumes its new lot in life as ‘merely a reflector of the 
culture produced by the social forces concerned with externalities and economic 
status’.   Where the university once figured largely in the nourishment of the soul, fos114 -
tering self-growth and serving as a ‘constant check on the otherwise inevitable slide to-
ward scientific abstraction’ on both an individual and societal level, the university sys-
tem now largely falls under its thumb, aiding and abetting the wealthy leaders of society 
 Simmons and Scott, ‘Is there Life after Barbarism?’ pp. 21-23.113
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and their objectivist ideology, or else becoming ‘marginalised in the mundane sense of 
being irrelevant’.  115
4.8 THE MALAISE OF LIFE 
Because the central importance of life has been covered over and demeaned, this bar-
barous revolution of the soul, and the world that is determined by it, prove deeply unsat-
isfying.  As Henry suggests, 
[i]magine a world where the organization of work is no longer rooted in organic 
subjectivity, where work is no longer the actualization of one’s powers through 
the immanent play of their inner disposition, their coming to themselves and thus 
the ‘liberation of their energy’.  Then, instead of this feeling of liberation, a pro-
found malaise comes to affect existence and numb it.  Without being able to ex-
haust its being by reaching its basis in self-growth and in the intoxication of one-
self, each need and motion remains only half-way to them and locked into a suf-
fering that no longer goes beyond itself into enjoyment.   116
   
Because the order of the world revolves around the economic logic of scientism that 
seeks to become increasingly autonomous, with little-to-no-regard for the needs of life, 
the actions and projects that the subject typically engages in seldom, if ever, serve the 
 Ibid., p. 24.  One can find an example of this in the rising insistence that the point of university ‘is to 115
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the practical and of the undeniable need for human beings to find work and to serve a function within 
society.  Henry does state that, in the modern world, the university and society ‘face one another in a bat-
tle that can only be a struggle to the death’.  Henry, Barbarism, p. 120.  This follows from the elimina-
tivist logic that guides barbarism and that makes it what it is, as a drive toward destruction and death. 
But, in keeping with our earlier discussion of Henry’s critique of science, it is not so much economic and 
societal concerns writ large that are in a struggle to the death with the university system and culture more 
generally.  Rather, it is only insofar as these realms fall under the spell of modern science’s objectivist 
ideology that they necessarily function in a way that is deleterious to the life of living individuals.  The 
point of Henry’s critique is thus not to diminish the importance of employment and the practical more 
generally, but to merely point out that it is only when individuals ‘are engaged in questions of meaning 
(of life)’ that they can ‘then understand why jobs matter’ in the first place, and thus well and truly position 
themselves for work and for a life in society that will actually contribute to the nourishment of their soul 
and that of society as a whole.  Simmons and Scott, ‘Is there Life after Barbarism?’, p. 25.    
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needs of life or rise to the heights of its powers, and so, its energy generally remains un-
spent.   Hence barbarism ‘is an unemployed energy’.   Barbarism is thus not only an 117 118
unemployed energy because, as we’ve seen, its value, as well as its evaluative power, 
have been covered over, devalued and, as it were, laid off and replaced by another prin-
ciple of evaluation (i.e. scientism), but because, as a result, it does not find a suitable 
release or expression.  Because of this, barbarism effectively leaves the subject stalled 
in a brute suffering.   Rather than uplifting the subject, life now becomes an unbear119 -
able weight, a burden it no longer cares to endure.  Life becomes weak and sickly in the 
sense that it now turns against itself and becomes bent on negating or otherwise destroy-
ing itself.   The movement of life, then, is one that can be either enhanced or impover120 -
ished. 
 That being said, when Henry states that the energy of life becomes unemployed 
and regresses into a kind of sickliness, he does not mean that it stops accruing in the 
flesh, or that it is in any way dulled.  In his eyes, ‘a stoppage as such is never really pos-
sible’.   To be sure, one could very well raise the question as to whether there isn’t a 121
certain slowing down to life? It seems odd, and yet perhaps very telling, that Henry has 
almost nothing to say of fatigue and illness.  Instead, in a world of barbarism, Henry 
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claims that the ever-mounting energy of the flesh is simply repressed.  Nonetheless, 
Henry remarks that, 
what this repression signifies is something that must be made clear.  Energy is not 
put outside of experience, in a world behind the scenes or a night where all cows 
are black and where anything whatsoever can be said about what is repressed. 
Instead, energy remains in the repression.  It is given to itself and burdened with 
itself, with a burden that becomes heavier at each moment.  It does not change at 
any moment into the enjoyment of growth, inasmuch as no activity is aroused in 
the individual that conforms to its own activity.  Immobilized within oneself, in-
stead, it is delivered to and reduced to its pure suffering.  It is experienced as 
something unbearable that it cannot withdraw from and cannot flee.  This impos-
sibility of fleeing oneself becomes anxiety.  At the very heart of its repression, En-
ergy remains intact along with its affect.  Unable to bear oneself and changed into 
anxiety, one aspires to change into anything else.  122
Under a more traditional understanding, repression would consist in the will’s not al-
lowing the memory of the individual to present contents to the intellect that would po-
tentially threaten or disturb its integrity.   As we can see here, though, Henry has 123
something altogether different in mind.  On his account, repression consists in the quali-
tative modification or modulation of affectivity into another affect and, ultimately, into 
anxiety.  In Henry’s estimation, repression is thus ‘the declension of that affectivity ac-
cording to its own potentialities, so that they inevitably turn to anxiety as their common 
point, as their obligatory site of transition — one is tempted to say as their essence’.  124
Indeed, Henry does state that ‘[a]nxiety is the feeling of being, as life.  It is the feeling 
of Self.’   So long as the pathos of life remains stuck (i.e. repressed) in a brute suffer125 -
ing that does not find fulfilment or joy in its self-experience, the subject grows only 
 Ibid., p. 104.122
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more anxious regarding its life, regarding this life that it knows it cannot escape and that 
has fast become an unrelenting and unbearable burden and weight.   For Henry, ‘anxi126 -
ety, at the very heart of suffering and its increase, is nothing but the feeling of not being 
able to escape itself’.   127
 As the above long-form quotation suggests, though, the subject’s rising sense 
that she cannot escape her life only exacerbates her urge to escape it.  The subject’s es-
calating anxiety thereby only drives her to redouble her efforts to flee.  When this at-
tempt invariably fails, this strengthens her feeling that she is unable to escape her life 
still further, which again leads her to all the more fervently try to throw herself outside 
herself, and so on, ad infinitum.  Undoubtedly influenced by the Danish religious-
philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, Henry thus views barbarism as a form of impotent self-
consumption, one in which the subject’s inability to consume herself as she desires con-
tinuously incites her to ever-more frantic, coarse, and yet no less futile, attempts at es-
cape.      128
 Henry thus understands barbarism as a radically different way of life, one that is 
essentially hateful and resentful towards the needs of bodily life, and that is bent on its 
own destruction and death.  As this sickliness grows, for instance, the subject may lean 
into the economic outlook that already colours her everyday life in an increasingly viru-
 Ibid., pp. 311-313.126
 Ibid., p. 313.  In this sense, anxiety is anxious about the drive of life itself (i.e. it is has to do with the 127
radically immanent manner in which life affects itself, without distance or the possibility of escape.). 
Ibid., p. 311.
 For Kierkegaard’s own account of this impotent self-consumption, see The Sickness Unto Death: A 128
Christian Psychological Exposition For Upbuilding And Awakening, trans. by H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 18-19.  Barbarism is thus not only a malaise, it is an 
increasingly hostile and violent action towards life.  Drawing on the French psychologist and psychother-
apist Pierre Janet, Henry notes that each time there is a renunciation of the higher activities in life — i.e. 
those that best serve its need for self-growth — such that there is ‘a falling back of energy to a lower level 
[i.e. to malaise]’, this ‘displacement that ought to signify a diminution and a subsistence of energy instead 
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turns them into excesses’.  Henry, Barbarism, p. 105.
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lent manner, and thus settle into the habit of weighing all of her inter-actions strictly in 
terms of what they provide her in return — a crude tit-for-tat way of being.   Or else 129
she might try to diminish her subjective and aesthetic powers by losing herself in vacu-
ous television, the internet, or by gorging herself on foods or drugs that provide her with 
a quick boost, or at least a momentary release from her pain, but which are ultimately 
harmful to her and her goals in life.  130
 The account of barbarism that this leaves us with is thus not really one of gen-
uine forgetting or destruction.  As we’ve seen, the intentional acts of the subject can dis-
tract from and devalue life; they can occlude and become hostile toward its needs; but 
they cannot ever truly forget or destroy them.   For something to be successfully for131 -
gotten or destroyed, some manner of fissure or transcendence would be necessary, 
which is refractory to life.  However impoverished life may become, it is never truly 
lost; the subject has simply forgotten how to know and to cherish it.  Henry acknowl-
edges this himself in noting that  
[t]he elimination of transcendental subjectivity by the Galilean project is never 
complete.  Life continues but […] in the coarsest ways: basic instincts are fulfilled 
without reference to a [higher] cultural model or a more demanding sensibility. 
Force is fulfilled in its most brutal ways; thought is reduced to ideological 
schemas, to shocking words and the weight of photos, in short, to collective repre-
sentations that have become a faithful reflection of an existence that skims the 
surface.  132
 Henry, Words of Christ, pp. 27-28, 37.129
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Even in barbarism, the aforementioned laws of sensibility are never fully 
extinguished.   In however marginalised and diminished a manner, they continue to 133
operate and to afford the subject some manner of development,  but the opportunities 134
for them to find adequate fulfilment becomes increasingly rare, to the point of being al-
most non-existent, and life becomes adjusted to scraping by in the most crude and base 
of manners.  Rather than fully living (or dying), then, the modern subject passes through 
the world in a dogmatic slumber.   
 At the end of Barbarism, Henry debates whether living individuals can alone 
combat this regression of life.  He acknowledges that such individuals ‘would like to 
transmit this culture, to enable one to become what one is, and to escape the unbearable 
boredom of the techno-media world with its drugs, monstrous growth, and anonymous 
transcendence.  But it has reduced them to silence once and for all’.   Instead of great 135
monumental works, Henry appears to suggest that all that those of the modern-day 
world can offer is something in a more minor key, such as, for instance, ‘brief words, 
quick instructions, a few references that isolated individuals communicate to one anoth-
 Ibid.  As Henry writes, ‘[w]hen vital teleology is inverted into an economic teleology seeking the pro133 -
duction of exchange values, these values do not in truth lose their connection to life.  They remain secret-
ly subordinated to use-values, and through them, to living work.  Money is not only a representation to 
the second degree of this work (as a representation of abstract or social work, which is a representation of 
real or living work).  It is a necessary investment in an actual process of production, its exchange against 
the use-value of raw materials and machines, and even more essentially, against the living work that is 
alone able to put into play this entire process and to produce the exchange value through it.  This clearly 
shows that money never stands on its own.  Even when it defines a new economic end in capitalism, it is 
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er when, in chance meetings, they recognize themselves to be marked by the same sign 
[…]’.   For all that, he asks, ‘[c]an the world still be saved by some of them?’  136 137
4.9 SECOND BIRTH 
In his very last works, Henry provides a response to this matter.  He claims that Chris-
tianity may offer the means to overcome modern barbarism in that, as we’ll see, it situ-
ates salvation not in reason or knowledge, but in bodily feeling and in a particular kind 
of action or way of life.  In his words, ‘[i]t is not just any god today who is still able to 
save us, but — when the shadow of death is looming over the world — that One who is 
Living [i.e. Christ, the Son of God]’.   In keeping with the absolute priority of life 138
over intentionality, Henry claims that the return of the finite self to its basis in eternal 
life — i.e. second birth — can only ever be initiated by absolute life itself.  As he 
writes,  
[t]his possibility which is always open to life, to suddenly experience its self-af-
fection as absolute Life’s self-affection, is what makes it a Becoming.  But then, 
when and why is this emotional upheaval produced, which opens a person to his 
own essence? Nobody knows.  The emotional opening of the person to his own 
essence can only be born of the will of life itself, as this rebirth that lets him sud-
denly experience his eternal birth.  The Spirit blows where it wills.  139
The living subject can only be reborn to her basis in the eternal life of God by virtue of 
the latter’s grace (i.e. a free and undeserved gift).   In this case, as Rolf Kühn argues, 140
 Ibid.136
 Ibid.137
 Henry, I Am the Truth, p. 275.  Here Henry is referring to a line from Heidegger’s last interview with 138
Rudolf Augstein and Georg Wolff in Der Spiegel, in which he states that ‘only a god can save us’.
 Ibid., p. 232.139
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overcome the historical forgetfulness of life, it does not enable her to overcome the ontological and exis-
tential forgetfulness that determines her being or way of life.
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there is a kind of transcendental reduction at work in Henry.  But, unlike in Husserl, 
where this reduction is a matter of the subject’s freedom, it is here the subject’s radical 
non-freedom, her passive suffering of the affective event and will of God’s immediate 
self-revelation, that is solely responsible for drawing her back to the one and only true 
life and for thereby providing her with salvation.  141
 While the subject who has succumb to barbarism can always engage in the sorts 
of activities that are generally aligned with higher culture — whether engaging with fine 
works of art, or, presumably, reading Henry’s own phenomenology of life — and may 
even find some sustenance therein, it is only when the grace of God alights upon the 
subject and initiates her rebirth that her experience of the objective work in question can 
erupt into an unlimited joy.  In this sense, while the subject’s actions, say, her engage-
ment in a phenomenological reflection on life, can serve as a propaedeutic for an even-
tual rebirth, they cannot accomplish this rebirth itself.  Notably, this means that, in con-
trast to Husserl, phenomenological reflection, or engagement with the history of ideas 
more generally, cannot provide the impetus for the radical transformation whereby the 
subject comes to fully know and attest to the ultimate foundation of life.  As Frédéric 
Seyler remarks, the second birth of the self is ultimately ‘dependent on a favourable 
moment [the grace of God] that would be the equivalent of kairos for radical phenome-
nology’.  142
 All the same, if we look to Henry’s description of how this process actually 
plays out, it seems as though this second birth cannot be entirely random or fortuitous. 
As per his suggestion that art, religion and ethics serve as high forms of culture, Henry 
 Rolf Kühn, ‘La contre-reduction comme ‘saut’ dans la Vie absolue’, in Retrouver la vie oubliee: cri141 -
tiques et perspectives de la philosophie de Michel Henry, ed. by Jean-Michel Longneaux (Namur, Presses 
universitaires de Namur, 2000), pp. 67-80 (pp. 76-77).
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contends that the second birth of the self occurs through the living subject’s participa-
tion in these higher forms of cultural action.  The case of art we already know.  In a 
favourable moment, the sensible elements of a painting or other such work of art can 
awaken the soul to its basis in absolute life.     
 Similarly, Henry contends that this experience of life can occur in reading sacred 
texts or scriptures.  In Words of Christ,  Henry draws a distinction between the words of 
life (i.e. the affective tonalities of the flesh) and the words of the world, that is, the 
speech acts that are structured according to the transcendence of the world, and that, as 
such, function as signs that refer to things other than themselves.  Though Henry does 
not employ these terms, one can think of the word of life and the word of the world as 
performative and denotative speech acts.  Where denotative speech acts involve a gap 
between the word and the thing to which it refers, which allows the speaker to take a 
stance on matters and to thus lie or be deceitful, the immediate self-referential nature of 
the performative act does not allow for any such gap, and so it cannot lie.  Instead, it 
immediately produces itself as an undeniable (i.e. self-verifying) fact.  As Giorgio 
Agamben notes, ‘[t]he model of truth here is not that of the adequation between words 
and things but the performative one in which speech unfailingly actualizes its 
meaning.’    143
 In keeping with the duplicity of appearing, Henry states that there is ‘no relation 
whatsoever’ between words of the world and those of life.   And yet, in other places he 144
maintains that there is a connection between these two words,  and that, because the 145
subject has largely forgotten life, she needs scripture to help awaken her to the word of 
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life that resounds in her flesh.   By informing the subject that she is a son of God, the 146
words of the world that are harboured in the scriptures gesture toward a site where the 
word of life speaks.    147
 Once again, we see that, despite his insistence that the world derealises every-
thing that appears within its ecstatic order, Henry’s own analysis reveals that life in 
some way needs the objective words of the world.  At the same time, Henry remains 
consistent in asserting that while the scriptures can play a positive role in the recovery 
of life, this recovery is always initiated by absolute life.  It is always the word of life 
that somehow makes use of the words of the world in order to shake the subject from 
her dogmatic slumber and return her to her basis in life.   
 Henry also maintains that this revitalisation of life can occur by practicing the 
Christian ethos, by carrying out works of mercy or the Commandment of love, that is, 
agape, charity-love as described in the Gospel of John.  In fact, since it is perhaps here 
that the second birth of the self is most plainly revealed as a different way of life, works 
of mercy seem to hold a certain privileged position in Henry’s account of the matter.  In 
his words,  
[o]nly the work of mercy practices the forgetting of self in which, all interest for 
the Self (right down to the idea of what we call a self or a me) now removed, no 
obstacle is now posed to the furling of life in this Self extended to its original es-
sence.  Forgetful of Itself in merciful actions, in this new action there is only its 
givenness to itself in the Arch-Givenness of absolute Life and in its Arch-
Ipseity.  148
In turning the subject’s attention away from her own life, pleasure and position in the 
world, charitable acts of mercy, such as giving food, shelter, attention and companion-
 Ibid., p. 232.146
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ship to those in need, essentially serve to alleviate the subject’s egoistic concern with 
herself as an object.  Once again, we see that, on Henry’s account, the overcoming of 
historical forgetfulness (i.e. ontological monism) is not overcome by remembering, or 
by progressing in one’s study of certain types of knowledge, but by feeling and action, 
by the eruption of an immanent and affective action that, as Steinbock notes, practices a 
new kind of forgetfulness, the forgetfulness of the self’.   Strangely enough, the histori149 -
cal forgetfulness that plagues the modern subject is overcome by another kind of forget-
ting,  the forgetting of one’s worldly self and the crude tit-for-tat logic into which 150
Henry claims it tends to devolve. 
 As the above long-form quotation suggests, by removing the intentional will of 
the finite subject, works of mercy practice (and reveal) the subject’s very givenness to 
itself in the arch-givenness of absolute life.  Therefore, it must be said that in practicing 
works of mercy, the subject does not merely mimic or adhere to a doctrine or model of 
conduct.  The subject, rather, as Steinbock notes, lives  
in such a way that the [ecstatic] acts, whatever they may be, bear the essence of 
mercy.  To borrow a distinction that Scheler makes, one does not live ‘like’ Christ 
in the sense of copying the exterior operations (having long hair, being a carpen-
ter’s son, etc.), but living ‘as’ Christ such that whatever the acts may be (though 
they cannot be just anything) they bear inextricably the essence of or internal 
sense of that life, though they are irreducible to that essence.  151
  
 According to Henry, this means that in performing works of mercy, it is not me, 
this finite individual, who actually performs them.  Since works of mercy are nothing 
more than the self-accomplishment of absolute life, ‘[i]t is no longer me who acts’, but 
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‘the Arch-Son who acts in me’.   It is no longer my-self performing acts of mercy, but 152
absolute life itself.  By the same token, when absolute life performs these works, it is 
not the other finite individual for whom or with whom it is engaged.   The true origin 153
and end of life’s mercy and love is nothing other than life itself, in its radically imma-
nent self-embrace — hence, a self-love.    
 This reduction of the self to its basis in absolute life thus abstracts each individ-
ual from her worldly existence and history.  It reduces all of the living to what Henry 
refers to as the mystical body of Christ, who is neither male or female, father or mother, 
German or French, etc.  In so doing, though, Henry claims that the living subject en-
gages with others in the only way that lets them be known and valued for what they tru-
ly are — sons of God.  That is to say, the living subject engages with others in the mode 
of life’s immanent self-generation, its gratuitous self-giving, which is the mode of 
(agape) love.  For Henry, ‘Life is love’.   In acts of mercy, the subject loves others as 154
she loves herself (as sons of God), in an unlimited and unconditioned love and generosi-
ty.    155
 As this begins to suggest, the way of life that is on offer here is one that threat-
ens to overturn the exchange values and reciprocal tit-for-tat logic that is said to domi-
nate the modern world.  As Henry tells us, by no longer adhering so strictly to the norms 
of the world, to its crude calculations and exchange values — i.e. returning love only 
for love, hate for hate, retributive justice — the gratuitous or non-reciprocal self-giving 
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that is enacted in works of mercy invariably wreaks ‘division and discord where [soci-
etal normal] harmony and reciprocal love reigned’.  156
 Of course, none of this is done in a random or negative manner, by deciding to 
be hostile toward those whom one loves and loving toward those whom one hates, but, 
Henry says, by adhering to a deeper reason and by practicing ‘a new reciprocity’.  157
This new model of reciprocity is one that no longer hinges on the exchange values of 
the world, or on a shared ‘human nature’, political citizenry or psychological interest, 
but on the ‘interior relationship of each living being to the Life in which it lives’; and, in 
this manner, on the interior relationship that each subject has, ‘in this life, with each one 
of the other living beings who draw their own life from this same Life — which is his or 
hers and which is theirs, which is their life in common’.   By practicing the gratuitous 158
self-giving of life (i.e. the will of God), works of mercy enable the subject to achieve a 
deeper and fuller sense of community and solidarity with others as fellow sons of life.  159
This community of life is salvation in the flesh; it is the way of life that is always at 
work at the heart of experience, even during our most impoverished of days, and whose 
rediscovery enables the subject to fully actualise her potential and to become fully alive. 
 Because this ethical way of life has its basis in the immanent sensibility of life, 
which is aesthetic in nature, Henry also characterises it as aesthetic.   By the same to160 -
ken, artistic practices, such as dancing, painting and so on, are also seen as ethical.  161
And, insofar as all of these actions put the subject in touch with the absolute foundation 
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of her life, they are also regarded as religious.  The sensibility of life must therefore be 
understood as aesthetic, ethical and religious in nature.  While Henry does not develop 
this point, this suggests that there is a very real rapprochement between all of the high 
forms of cultural activity. 
 In this case, though, on Henry’s account, the living subject knows and attests to 
the basis of her being in the simple living of life, his work bears the suggestion that it is 
this higher form of cultural action — i.e. this aesthetic, ethical and religious form of ac-
tion — that enables her to overcome barbarism and to most fully come to know and at-
test to the ultimate foundation of her life.  It is, in other words, when action is no longer 
approached in terms of the world, and the subject rediscovers its basis in absolute life, 
that she fully embraces and lives an absolute knowledge of everything that is.  And, ac-
cording to Henry, this is something that can only be achieved within the deep well of 
life’s primal feeling, which does not require any assistance from intentionality.   
 As for the role of phenomenology in this process, Henry does not list it among 
the high forms of culture.  In fact, Henry is highly critical of the privilege that is gener-
ally afforded to theoretical engagement in general, and of any suggestion that the 
achievement of true knowledge requires endless theoretical investigation, as in Husserl. 
As he scoffs in I Am the Truth,  
if you wanted to question the Gospel about the salvation of your soul, then you 
would not merely, as in Kierkegaard’s ironic remark, have to await the publication 
of the very last book on the question, you would still have to put everything else 
aside and throw yourself into study, which death would surely interrupt before 
you could obtain from so many realms of knowledge and exegesis even the first 
word in an answer to the single question that matters.  162
In Henry’s view, there is no need for endless exegetical engagement because, as we’ve 
already seen, the primal knowledge of life is not dependent upon intentionality (i.e. 
 Henry, I Am the Truth, p. 3.162
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thought, etc.) and the subject’s worldly engagements.  It is life itself that initiates the 
subject’s rebirth, and when it does so, as Sylvain Camilleri succinctly remarks, the in-
terpretation of such texts ‘comes to an end so that one may begin to live them anew. 
Understanding comes to an end by giving way to living.  Why, exactly? Because these 
texts are objects waiting to have a genuine vocation in life and the communication of 
life rather than freezing in multiple interpretations of little use to existence’.   While 163
there is nothing in Henry’s work to preclude phenomenology from serving as a practice 
through which the individual may fully come to know and attest to the foundation of her 
life, this suggests that, in his eyes, it does not possess the same importance as the realms 
of art, ethics and religion in the fulfilment of this pursuit. 
4.10 RETHINKING THE UNITY OF AFFECTIVITY AND INTENTIONALITY 
Nonetheless, Henry’s account of this process is problematic in a number of ways.  As 
Seyler points out, while the suggestion that absolute life is alone responsible for the 
transformation of life is ‘perfectly consistent with Henry’s foundation-thesis’, it ‘is 
problematic with regard to his philosophy of religion’.   Seyler goes on, ‘if individual 164
life is necessarily embedded in and living through absolute life, then it seems that the 
latter should be held ultimately responsible for the development of “barbarism”, that is, 
for life’s attempt to negate itself.  But this is a consequence that Henry would clearly not 
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defend.  It would, for instance, amount to God being the agent of his own forgetting and 
negation’.  165
 Now, one could attempt to resolve, or at least mitigate, this issue, as Seyler does, 
by acknowledging that life is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for barbarism, 
and for all of life’s transformations.   Our analysis of Henry’s own account of these 166
cultural and barbarous transformations has revealed that the subject’s intentional acts 
and their corresponding objects do indeed play an important role in all walks of life.  In 
the case of culture, we have seen that objective cultural works, and the intentional acts 
that are involved in their production and reception, are necessary for the enhancement 
of life.  Our study of barbarism and the recovery of life has borne out similar results: the 
intentional acts of the subject, and its objective productions, clearly play an essential 
role in these transformations.  In fact, curiously enough, while Henry does generally 
overlook or at least downplay the role of intentionality and its objective works when it 
comes to the intensification of life, he is adamant in casting it as the villain when it 
comes to its impoverishment.  This means that, despite Henry’s reluctance to fully ac-
knowledge this point, the various movements of life must in some way depend on the 
world, which is to say, on the intentional acts of the subject and their corresponding ob-
jective works. 
 Yet these findings appear to raise more questions than they answer.  First, while 
the observation that life is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the transforma-
tions of life is consistent with his own analysis of culture and barbarism, it appears to 
stand in conflict with his insistence on the absolute priority of life.  Seyler states that as 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for barbarism, life ‘at least facilitates’ the histor-
 Ibid.165
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ical forgetting of life.   Yet if we are to take Henry’s insistence on the absolute priority 167
of life seriously, even if we acknowledge that the intentional act must be there for the 
effective accomplishment of the transformation in question, would it not be necessary to 
acknowledge that the originary impulse or initiative for any such transformation must 
always issue from absolute life itself, and that life therefore involves a drive for destruc-
tion? 
 Indeed, if we were to assert that intentionality is at least a factor in the accom-
plishment of barbarism, then there would arise the further issue as to how it can enjoy 
any such role, given that Henry emphasises throughout the course of his work that it is 
but a radical illusion or unreality.  As Christina Gschwandtner states, ‘[i]f the world 
were purely an illusion in the extreme sense Henry occasionally suggests, it could not 
have the power of barbarity and evil he also claims for it.  There would be no need to 
fight it as intensely as he does.’    168
 No less perplexing is the question we raised earlier in this chapter in our earlier 
study of art.  If intentionality tears everything from itself and renders it an unreality, 
how could it and its objective works play a positive role of any kind in the intensifica-
tion and second birth of the self? The problem is one of which Henry seems to have 
been at least to some extent aware: ‘[b]ut how affectivity is something that understands, 
how it is able to grasp and to live transcendent significations, this is what must precisely 
be explained, especially if, as we have claimed, nothing is so repugnant to the essence 
of feeling as transcendence, if the deployment of a horizon of understanding is that 
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which is most foreign to feeling.’   To properly account for these matters, it would be 169
necessary to detail how the immanent appearing of life gives rise to the ecstatic appear-
ing of the world.  As we observed in the previous chapter, though, Henry does not pro-
vide a sufficient explanation of this.  It ultimately remains a mystery how life, con-
ceived as a radical immanence, without any fissure or alterity, can possibly found inten-
tionality and the transcendence of the world.  The fact that, as we have now made plain, 
intentionality plays an essential a role in all of the transformations of life significantly 
reinforces the very real need to provide a more sufficient account of this matter. 
 Furthermore, though Henry is to be applauded for drawing out in considerable 
detail the prominent role that the non-objectifying self-sensing of the subjective body 
plays in the constitution of the world, a role that has not yet been fully understood and 
duly appreciated within the history of phenomenology, it should be asked whether it is 
in fact able to guide the subject in all of the complex issues that are involved in fashion-
ing a work of art, or in assisting others in a charitable or otherwise ethical manner, or in 
simply living out our daily lives? As Seyler points out, ‘it is difficult to see how the […] 
recognition of immanent life would translate itself univocally’ when certain complex 
decisions must be made on either an individual or a collective level.   Though Henry 170
successfully establishes that the non-objectifying self-sensing of the subjective body 
plays a more prominent role in guiding the subject in its constitution of the world than 
has traditionally been recognised, further consideration of the experiential facts of the 
matter indicate that there must be at least certain limits on its ability to steer the subject 
and to translate itself into intentionality.   
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 This suggests that the finite (i.e. ecstatic) intentional acts of the subject cannot 
be wholly reduced to affectivity, and that, as Seyler similarly comments, the former, 
while being founded in affectivity, must nevertheless possess a certain ‘relative autono-
my’.   Indeed, to return to the example of second birth, upon reawakening to life, can 171
the subject really just become a vehicle for the will of the latter? Henry’s response to the 
sickness of life is facile.  As important a role as the primal sense of life may play in our 
lives, it would seem to be the case that the subject must also think and reason her way 
through some of life’s more complex situations, at least to some extent.  In short, the 
experiential facts of the matter indicate that intentionality must play a larger role in the 
life of the living individual than Henry suggests.   
 However, Seyler himself merely states this point, and no explanation is given as 
to how Henry’s thought might accommodate this position.  If, as per the duplicity of 
appearing and the absolute priority of affectivity over intentionality, immanent life uni-
laterally founds and drives intentionality, such that everything that appears within the 
visible order of the latter is ultimately but an unreal reflection of the subject’s affective 
lived-through experience, then Henry’s thought cannot tolerate any autonomy on the 
part of intentionality.  For the finite intentional acts of the subject to enjoy any such au-
tonomy, it would be necessary for life to admit of some kind of fissure or transcendence.     
 So far as our first-hand experience requires us to acknowledge that the subject’s 
finite intentional acts have at least a certain relative autonomy over affectivity, and Hen-
ry’s work falls short in accommodating this reality, it must be said that his phenomenol-
ogy of life fails to give due weight to the role of finitude in the life of the living subject. 
That is to say, Henry fails to duly recognise that the finite intentional acts wherein the 
subject interprets or in some way takes a position on things themselves stand as an es-
 Ibid.171
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sential structure of life and its reality, and that they have a significant role in deciding 
the subject’s course of action.   
 This reinforces still further the need to rethink the unity or relation between af-
fectivity and intentionality.  As we have seen, Henry reduces the subject to the eternal 
self-affection of God, who is neither male or female, Greek or Jew, and so on.  As Ber-
net points out, this means that all of the finite and socio-historical features of the subject 
are effectively devalued  
in the name of the condition of man as Son of God […].  The human genealogy or 
generativity to which both Husserl and [other thinkers such as] Levinas have con-
secrated their most beautiful passages finds itself thrown back into the domain of 
the empirical and of the false evidences of the world.  It is as if one had to choose 
between divine generativity and human generativity, instead of them illuminating 
each other mutually.    172
In line with this, in his treatment of Christ, Henry is largely indifferent to the finite and 
contingent features of his existence, to the fact that he was a Jew, that he was born of his 
mother Mary, that he was, like all humans, not without negative or otherwise destructive 
impulses, and that he was ultimately crucified and died on the cross in Golgatha.  173
What largely interests Henry, rather, is the eternal nature of Christ, the angelic Christ 
who was not born of this world and who, like those who follow him, will never taste 
death.   174
 Strangely enough, while Henry criticises the history of philosophy for its onto-
logical monism, and for putting forward an overly formal and abstract account of phe-
nomenality — i.e. for understanding phenomenality as an empty form that neglects the 
affective content and reality of life — his own work proves to be guilty on both ac-
 Rudolf Bernet, ‘Christianity and philosophy’, Continental Philosophy Review 32, no. 3 (1999), 172
325-342 (p. 338).
 Ibid.173
 Henry, I Am the Truth, pp. 152, 163.174
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counts.  By construing the appearing of life as the locus of all reality, and by rendering 
the finite, intentional appearing of the world a mere illusion, Henry himself leaves us 
with only one real mode of appearing.  In so doing, he leaves us with an account of life 
that ends up proving to be unduly abstract, and which ultimately fails to fully admit its 
destructive potential. 
 In order to remedy this, and to properly account for the essential role that inten-
tionality — in all of its facets — plays in life, and that Henry’s own analyses actually 
call for, it would be necessary to dissolve the strict division and heterogeneity between 
the non-intentional affectivity of life and the intentional display of consciousness, and to 
concede that life must itself possess an ecstatic formal structure.  It would be necessary 
for material phenomenology to recognise that the radical separation that Henry imposes 
between affectivity and intentionality, life and the world, is a sign of an inadequate de-
termination of appearing. 
 Despite some of his own conclusions, then, Henry’s own analyses lead us in this 
direction.  Perhaps the strongest push in this direction that issues from within Henry’s 
own work stems from the increasing emphasis he places on the movement of life in his 
study of culture and barbarism as a matter of intensification and impoverishment.  For 
how could the self know its life is intensifying, or growing more impoverished, if the 
living present were a matter of pure immanence, without any difference or division? As 
Hart correctly notes, life simply cannot sense itself growing more intense or impover-
ished unless it involves an inner differentiation or passive synthesis, unless it retains the 
experience of its former present, in relation to which the following moment can stand 
out as either an intensification or an impoverishment.     175
 Hart, ‘A phenomenological theory and critique of culture’, p. 259.  Because of this, Hart contends that 175
‘Henry himself seems to be moving toward such a position [i.e. toward an acknowledgment of the ecstatic 
formal structure of life’.  Hart, ‘Michel Henry’s Phenomenological Theology of Life’, p. 227, note 67.
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 When this point is considered alongside our earlier findings regarding the neces-
sary role that intentionality plays in the productive and destructive movements of life, as 
well as the relative autonomy it enjoys, the result is clear and undeniable: Henry’s own 
study of culture and barbarism, as well as the things themselves, reveal that the phe-
nomenological life of the subject must admit of some manner of transcendence, and it 
must involve not only a drive for growth but a drive for destruction as well.  In this 
case, the life of the human subject cannot be enjoined to that of an eternal God in a radi-
cally immanent manner.  Even if we were to posit such an origin of all being, it would 
be necessary to acknowledge the distinct nature of human life, which would mean tak-
ing its essentially finite (intentional) and destructive character more seriously than does 
Henry himself.   
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CHAPTER 5 
RETURNING LIFE TO THE WORLD 
So far, we have argued that transcendental subjectivity cannot be properly understood 
either as absolute consciousness (Husserl) or as the eternal and radically immanent 
(generative) life of God (Henry), which does not relate to or depend upon the outside 
world.  Transcendental subjectivity must rather be understood as the ecstatic movement 
of the finite bodily life of the actual human person that is always already open to and 
inextricably engaged in a historic-cultural world, and which possesses not only produc-
tive but also destructive impulses.   
  In leading us in this direction, though, the preceding study forces us to address 
the issue as to whether we can still make transcendental claims.  Furthermore, since the 
hidden art of the soul can no longer be understood as a matter of generation, our study 
forces us to seek a name by which it might be properly called, and to determine how it 
functions in constituting the world.  In releasing the life of the subject from its angelism 
and returning it to the ecstatic (intentional) appearing of the world, do we, as Henry 
contends, necessarily lose, or at least diminish the role of non-objectifying affectivity in 
this process, and reduce it to a subordinate position with respect to objectifying acts of 
consciousness, as in Husserl? This chapter seeks to address these issues. 
5.1 RE-CONCEIVING TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY 
We recall that the transcendental realms which are accessed by Husserl and Henry are 
ones that are not restricted to the necessary and universal forms of human knowledge, 
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but extend to include those of knowledge in general.   In both cases, therefore, tran1 -
scendental claims or truths render explicit the necessary and universal structures or laws 
that hold in all possible worlds.   
 That being said, since the only life we can access or experience is that of the fi-
nite, embodied person in her contingent, factical and historical existence in the world, 
this can no longer be the case.  Cognition is invariably human cognition, and cannot 
speak to the necessary and universal forms of knowledge for all beings whatever.  In 
that case, though, should we not abandon any pretence of reflectively elucidating the 
transcendental conditions of experience? From Husserl’s perspective, this would indeed 
mean that the claim of phenomenology to explain the possibility of objective knowledge 
is relativised and leads to a dangerous skepticism and the possibility of the naturaliza-
tion of human consciousness.  For example, if, given the primacy of this worldly body, 
we suppose that the biological order and the general evolution of the human being have 
some bearing on the logical relations that set the standards and laws for knowledge, then 
it would seem as though this would undermine the necessity and universality of knowl-
edge.  If all normative ‘logical forms and laws’ are to some extent determined by the 
biological order of the subject and its evolution over time, then, as Husserl points out, it 
seems as though these laws would necessarily evolve along with her.   Furthermore, if 2
we maintain that logic, to some extent, depends upon the evolution of the human being, 
and thereby assert that the laws of logic are to some extent relative, then, as Mensch 
notes, this finding, itself a position based on logical inference, would necessarily un-
 Husserl, we will recall, asserts that eidetic-ontological claims are valid ‘not just for human beings, but 1
also for God — as the ideal representative of absolute cognition’.  Husserl, Ideas I, p. 362.  In Henry, 
meanwhile, the arch-knowledge of life is one that, similarly, is not only valid for human beings, but also 
for God and for all of the living.  
 Edmund Husserl, Die Idee der Phänomenologie: Fünf Vorlesungen, ed. by Walter Biemel (Den Haag: 2
Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 21; Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume I, p. 147.
 198
dermine itself.   The position in question thus appears to be a breeding ground for skep3 -
ticism.  
 However, while the acknowledgment of the absolutely basic character of bodily 
life in its ineluctable bond with the world modifies and weakens the conception of the 
transcendental as presented in Husserl and Henry, it is not clear that it undermines it al-
together.  For phenomenology to continue to operate within a transcendental register, it 
would be necessary to demonstrate that transcendental claims still retain their own dis-
tinct modality, and that they still in some way bear the mark of necessity and universali-
ty.  Moreover, it would be necessary to lay out a phenomenological procedure that en-
ables the subject to elucidate these truths.   
 To begin our assessment of this matter, let us first try to determine whether, in 
light of the above considerations, transcendental claims can still retain a specific modal-
ity of their own.  On the one hand, insofar as the life of the subject cannot be reduced to 
a pure consciousness or life, and always remains a human life situated within the socio-
cultural world, transcendental conditions cannot be entirely separated from the level of 
empirical facts.  On the other hand, as Samantha Matherne points out, while this means 
that there is necessarily more of a mutual enveloping between the transcendental and the 
empirical realms than has traditionally been supposed (e.g. Husserl, Henry), it does not 
mean that transcendental and factual truths are indistinguishable.   As Matherne notes, 4
transcendental conditions can be seen as fundamental or absolute facts, which are dis-
tinct from sheer accidents.   Sheer accidents, Matherne tells us, are things that simply 5
 Mensch, Decisions and Transformations, p. 8.3
 Samantha Matherne, ‘Toward a New Transcendental Aesthetic: Merleau-Ponty’s Appraisal of Kant’s 4
Philosophical Method’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27, no. 2 (2019), 378-401 (p. 393). 




happen to the subject, ‘where that subject […] is “indifferent” to that fact.  For example, 
there is a fact that pertains to how long my hair is today as compared to yesterday; how-
ever, this is something that has befallen me and that I am indifferent to’.   In contrast, 6
fundamental facts consist in those structures or rules that, while contingent to the situa-
tion into which the subject has been thrown, are nevertheless essential to this factical 
life of the subject, and to the way in which the subject relates to her situation.   In other 7
words, these absolute facts ‘shape our experience at the ground level.  And it is this ba-
sic or ‘originary’ character of these contingencies that set them apart from accidents’.  8
 These fundamental facts are undoubtedly contingent in that they are relative to 
us, to the embodied human subject that we just happen to be, and who could well be 
otherwise, and who may be so at some indeterminate point in the future.  As such, they 
cannot be necessary in the sense of being formal principles for all possible worlds, and 
yet they retain a sense of necessity all the same.  They remain necessary in that ‘they 
have become necessary as the fundamental ways in which we take up our contingent 
situation’.  9
 As for the universality of such claims, there are grounds for supposing that such 
absolute facts should be characterised in this way as well.  These fundamental facts can 
be called universal in that they form a part of the underlying nature and set of structures 
that are shared by all human subjects at this point in time, and which thereby enable 




 Ibid., p. 394.  While acknowledging that human life is based upon certain contingencies, insofar as the 9
subject has some understanding of her situation, Charles Taylor also contends that the subject can eluci-
date some of the structures and rules that are indispensable to her contingent life in the world, and to the 
way she takes it up.  See Charles Taylor, ‘The Validity of Transcendental Arguments’, Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 79 (1979), 151-165 (pp. 163-164).
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and the world more generally.  Consequently, inasmuch as transcendental claims stand 
as those which render explicit these necessary and universal structures, they would re-
tain a distinctive modality of their own. 
 Yet if this is the case, then what is the phenomenological procedure that enables 
the subject to accede to such insights? Let us momentarily return to Husserl’s transcen-
dental reduction.  By attempting to suspend the intramundane contents of the world — 
i.e. the empirical world and the psychological ego who is involved with it — and to ac-
cede to an ontologically neutral position from which it may be possible to fully grasp 
the conditions of meaning and objectivity of any concrete experience, the subject en-
counters something that resists this manoeuvre, and which ultimately proves to be an 
insurmountable limitation on any such endeavour.  In light of the centrality of bodily 
life that has come forward in our study of Henry, we can now assert that this insur-
mountable limitation is nothing other than the pre-reflective and non-objectifying bodily 
life of the subject in its co-belonging with the pre-objective world.   Consequently, the 10
subject can never entirely free herself from the natural attitude. 
 While the performance of the transcendental reduction thus fails in certain re-
spects — i.e. in unlocking a realm that is wholly independent of the intramundane con-
tents of the world — it is important to note that this does not render it altogether useless. 
The transcendental reduction remains successful in that it not only enables the subject to 
assume a philosophical attitude and to discover that her bodily life is defined by its in-
volvement in the world, but to see that the world’s existence, as inextricably intertwined 
with this pre-reflective and non-objectifying bodily movement, is always taken for 
 In other words, the performance of the transcendental reduction itself serves as further indication of the 10
absolutely basic character of bodily life in its co-belonging with the world.  As Merleau-Ponty notes, 
‘[t]he most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of the complete reduction. 
If we were absolute mind, the reduction would present no problem.’  Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception, pp. xiv, viii, xxvi.
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granted by this reflective operation, and that any such reflection therefore depends upon 
conditions that always remain in the background, and so, out of view.  The performance 
of the reduction is thus instructive in that it reveals that any reflective attempt to eluci-
date the presuppositions of experience itself has presuppositions that it cannot entirely 
seize upon or thematise and that, as a result, the proper and guiding object of phenome-
nology is to uncover — as best it can — the ways in which the objective world, and our 
higher-order objectifying acts, are founded upon the pre-reflective and non-objectifying 
sensibility of life in the world.   By bringing this to the attention of the subject, and by 11
subsequently enabling her to attempt to reflectively seize upon the necessary and uni-
versal structures of her contingent life in its directedness towards the world, these pro-
cedures allow the subject to render explicit those fundamental facts that tend to be taken 
for granted and thus remain implicit within the natural attitude.     12
 In this case, in being led back to the ecstatic movement of human bodily life as 
the absolute beginning of phenomenology, we are not led to the ruin of its transcenden-
tal status.  In acknowledging the absolutely basic character of this bodily life, we are 
still able to hold to the basic commitments of transcendental philosophy: we are still 
able to fashion transcendental claims that have their own distinctive modality, and we 
can still effectively elucidate these basic structures and rules via phenomenological de-
scription.  However, we now do so by acknowledging that this methodology, and the 
claims it renders, presuppose and receive their defining limitation in the finite and con-
tingent bodily life in which they are steeped.  In this sense, our findings do not undo or 
 Contrary to Husserl’s suggestion that it is always the objective world that is the proper object of phe11 -
nomenology, we thus find that it is this pre-objective world that should be the primal concern and object 
of phenomenological description.
 When this existential-phenomenological transcendental reduction is performed after the eidetic reduc12 -
tion, the subject would then, as a matter of course, attempt to seize upon the essential features of her acts 
in their directedness toward essences.
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overturn transcendental phenomenology so much as they open the door to its matura-
tion.   
5.2 THE HIDDEN ART OF THE SOUL 
Yet in order to walk through this door, and to begin to demonstrate how this pre-reflec-
tive subjective body functions in the constitution of the world, we must put this 
methodology into practice.  We must return to absolute subjectivity once more and en-
deavour to actually lay out some of the necessary and universal structures that comprise 
its inner nature.  Let us pick up where we left off, with the living present, as the hidden 
art of the soul. 
 The previous chapter revealed that while this hidden art of the soul finds its 
source in the productive movement of life, this movement cannot be properly under-
stood as a radically immanent self-generation.  Indeed, Henry’s growing emphasis on 
the living present as a movement of intensification and impoverishment provides at 
least some suggestion that he himself may have been moving toward a re-conception of 
the matter.  Whether he would have done so or not, however, is, in some sense, moot, 
since his analyses, in contrast to his assertions, themselves point in this direction.  
 In this case, Henry’s analyses point to a conception of the living present that 
would appear to be at least somewhat in line with that of Husserl.  But here we must 
introduce an important qualification: while Henry’s analyses draw him near to the living 
present of which Husserl tried to speak, Husserl himself never duly acknowledged the 
bodily origin of the living present.  Therefore, it can be said that Henry’s analyses point 
toward a relatively new conception of the living present, an affective living present that 
might have been, but which he himself never duly took up.  
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 Be that as it may, if this conception of the living present is to be taken on to 
some extent, then we will first need to determine whether our experience of the body 
can indeed be aligned with this level of time.  To do so, we must briefly recall Husserl’s 
account of the living present.  As we know, Husserl regards the living present as a fixed-
but flowing form, which is pre-temporal, pre-individual and anonymous (i.e. inexperi-
encable and unsayable).   As this standing now has no position on a temporal scale, and 13
cannot be characterised by the features of our individual experiences in subjective time, 
by those attributes that are in some sense common, and whose commonality on some 
level lends them to discursive presentation and discussion, it escapes conceptualisation 
and cannot be fully captured in speech.  While the subject can nevertheless experience 
this standing now in an immediate way, it can only ever experience its own in this way, 
and never that of another subject (and vice versa).  Therefore, as Mensch points out, the 
standing now is immediately experienced as my own in a ‘uniquely singular’ manner — 
as the immediate and unique first-person self-experience from which I constantly act.  14
And yet, because this is so, because the standing now is in some sense experienced, it 
follows that it can still be communicated in some way, however imperfectly.  The stand-
ing now thus involves both a communicable and an incommunicable sense.  15
 At the same time, since this living present not only stands but also functions as 
an endless (i.e. infinite) differential repetition or self-othering, the moment our reflec-
tive regard attempts to seize upon the primal now in which the subject always acts, we 
 In drawing the self back to this primal flow, we are thus left with a sense of self that stands at a certain 13
remove from our everyday understanding of ourselves.  We are left with the universal form and source of 
all intentional life, one which, as such, cannot strictly speaking be said to be exclusively mine, but which 
necessarily functions implicitly and anonymously within all human subjects.
 Mensch, Decisions and Transformations, p. 115.14
 Ibid., pp. 115-116.15
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find that it has already changed and slid into the past as a not-now.   In grasping it as an 16
object that has slid into the past, we effectively lose the actual occurrence of the primal 
now as the source of all intentional life.   
 What remains for us to determine is whether the body can be seen as operating 
on this level.  If we return to the things themselves, we find that our experience of our 
lived body is indeed consistent with these descriptions of the primal flow.   First, it can 17
be seen that the constant presence of the standing now can be traced back to that of the 
subjective body.  While the objects of the perceptual world of things emerge and disap-
pear, the lived body, as an absolutely constant standpoint or centre of orientation, is al-
ways here, an absolute here.  Though I can change my spatial position in relation to 
things, what remains constant and stable is the unity and absolute position of my lived 
body.  
 Drawing on this, we can say that the lived body is given as an absolute (pre-
temporal and pre-spatial) position before there is any personal ego that can act (i.e. be-
fore the ‘I can’).  In this case, just as consciousness would not be able to apprehend its 
succession of temporal experiences as such and thereby order things in objective time if 
it did not stand in a fixed, pre-temporal position, so too there could be no motion or rest, 
no activity or passivity, or any self (as here) or other (as there), if my lived body did not 
occupy an absolute (pre-temporal and pre-spatial) position.   
 While the living subject is finite in actuality — i.e. in that it has to carry on from the particular position 16
and perspective on the world in which it finds itself, it is infinite in principle, in the sense that, at its most 
basic level, the stream of consciousness functions as an open-ended horizon of possibilities.  As László 
Tengelyi notes, the kind of infinite at play here is not that of an ‘absolute infinity’, in the sense of an ‘“ab-
solute totality”’ or an ‘“unconditional whole”’.  It is not an infinite that is exterior to consciousness, but 
one that is found within the finite itself, as transcendental subjectivity’s open-ended horizon of possibili-
ties.  See László Tengelyi, ‘Experience and Infinity in Kant and Husserl’, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 68 
(2005), 479-500 (p. 492). 
 James Mensch also makes this point.  We are indebted to his account of this matter in Husserl’s Ac17 -
count of our Consciousness of Time, pp. 242-243.  More recently, Mensch touches upon this issue in his 
Decisions and Transformations, pp. 115-116.
 205
 This absolute position thus exceeds any distinction between subjectivity or ob-
jectivity, inner or outer.   It is, instead, the primal transcendence that always already 18
opens the lived body to the world in the immediacy of its here-ness.  As such, the abso-
lute position of the lived body can be seen as the horizon of all horizons — i.e. as the 
shared, objective world.  It is, as Alweiss notes, ‘the absolute stability of the world’, an 
absolute stability that precedes and makes possible time and space, and which makes 
possible all experience and intelligibility within the world.  19
 In keeping with this, it must be said that the knowledge of the subjective body 
— i.e. its pre-reflective and non-objectifying self-sensing — surpasses knowledge of 
my individual experiences in time and space, as well as knowledge of objects in the 
world.  This bodily self-consciousness — this primal sense of life — also unfolds on a 
pre-temporal and pre-individual level, and is thus undergone as something that cannot 
be fully captured in speech.  As with the standing now, this pre-individual bodily life is 
nonetheless experienced in a direct and immediate way, though, once again, it is only 
my own life that can be experienced in this way.  Given the unique egocentric (i.e. first-
personal) givenness of all human experience, I can only experience my own subjective 
body in a direct and immediate manner, and never that of the other (and vice versa), and 
so, in some sense it always remains unique to me.   The presence of my lived body can 20
thus never be confused with that of another; it is always experienced and known by me 
in a uniquely singular way.   And yet, because this remains a kind of experience, as 21
 Alweiss, The World Unclaimed, p. 160.18
 Ibid., p. 164.19
 For more on this, see Decisions and Transformations, pp. 115-116.20
 Ibid.21
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Mensch points out, the lived body also lends itself to discursive presentation to some 
degree, and so it too has a communicable and an incommunicable sense.    22
 Finally, the self-alteration of the primal flow can similarly be traced back to the 
lived body.  We know that the lived body is able to sense itself as an object.  In the case 
of touch, for instance, the sensing body can touch itself as a physical object that exists 
in the world.  In so doing, however, as Mensch similarly notes, ‘we lose it [the lived 
body] as a sentient subject — and vice versa.  There is, in other words, never a merging 
of the two.  We can never directly apprehend both together so that the one could be 
identified with the other’.   This is because in attempting to do so, the self-othering, 23
which structures the now in which the subject always acts, drives an interval between 
them.  24
 In this case, it is the differential repetition of the transcendental affectivity of 
bodily life that constantly renews the primal flow and which makes it the pre-temporal 
event that it is.  It is the transcendental self-affection of bodily life that makes possible 
the passage or transitivity of the living present, on which all intelligibility (i.e. all asso-
ciations) and phenomenality depend.  This life-drive, which is a drive for self-growth, 
thus remains an original and indefatigable spontaneity or movement.   Though a mo25 -
ment ago we indicated that this transcendental affectivity precedes all motion and rest, it 
is important to remember that we were here referring to movement within three-dimen-
sional space-time.  The movement of life remains irreducible to extension, or any divi-
 Ibid.22
 Ibid., p. 116.23
 Ibid.24
 As I have suggested elsewhere, the living present can thus be understood as similar in spirit to Niet25 -
zsche’s account of the eternal return of the same.  See Schaefer, ‘The Issue of Novelty in Husserl’s Analy-
sis of Absolute Time-Constituting Consciousness’, p. 983.
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sion between inner and outer.  Henry’s insistence on the irreducibility of movement to 
the objective displacement of a thing in space can thus be maintained within the ecstatic 
order of appearing.  This originally ecstatic and infinite movement is the immediacy of 
life in its exposure to a world before the subject knows itself as a moving body in the 
world.  It is the appropriating event of this standing-streaming life in its co-belonging 
with the world; this event that constitutes the world, as well as all time and space. 
 Because the movement of affectivity functions as this differential repetition, 
though, we diverge from Husserl in acknowledging that the pre-temporal event of life 
stands as an unconscious domain, which, as such, is irreducible to intuition or presence. 
In this case, though, the primal event of life is not irreducible to sight because it func-
tions outside the transcendence of the world, as in Henry, but because it is a past that 
has never been given as present, one that opens, makes possible and thereby belongs to 
the appearing of the world, as the otherness of our own being.  Before I act — i.e. be-
fore the lived body is subject to my will — I have always already been as this uncon-
scious movement of life.  The living present functions as a pre-memorial, moving, af-
fective bond with the world, which occurs before the sensing (i.e. presence) of any thing 
that might be sensed (i.e. present).  The movement of life thus stands as a primordial 
transcendence that precedes and makes possible the immanence of conscious life, with-
out ever being wholly contained or grasped within it. 
 In contrast to Husserl and Henry, then, it is necessary to acknowledge that tran-
scendental subjectivity has a ground that can never be given absolutely.  The pre-tempo-
ral event of life can neither be presented to our reflective regard (Husserl), nor can it 
wholly coincide with itself in a radically immanent and affective self-presence (Henry). 
Instead, life can only ever be felt in a vague or indeterminate manner.  Nevertheless, the 
fact that the ultimate ground of transcendental subjectivity cannot be absolutely given is 
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itself an absolute phenomenological insight, in the sense that it can be absolutely given 
to our reflective regard. 
 So construed, though, the name for the transcendental life of the subject that was 
left wanting in Husserl cannot be that of generation (Henry).  Insofar as the movement 
by which life comes into and affects itself is ecstatic in its formal structure, we propose 
that it be referred to as a matter of creation.  Life is creation in the sense that, contra 
Henry’s account of generation, the movement by which it produces itself — i.e. the 
primal sense of life — simultaneously opens, rather than closes the subject off from, the 
phenomenological distance of the world.  At its most basic level, then, the process of 
constitution should be seen as a matter of creation.  Consequently, the two basic levels 
along which this process unfolds are those of (i) creation (i.e. passive syntheses of af-
fectivity), and (ii) apperceptive objectification (i.e. noetic sense-bestowal).   
  
5.3 BACKGROUND FEELINGS 
We have stated that life, as a pre-temporal event, has an affective bond with the world 
before the sensing of any thing.  Exactly how this unfolds, however, and how it enables 
the subject to make contact with particular things, is something that still needs to be un-
packed and explained.  The flesh is bound to the world in the immediacy of its absolute 
here-ness.  The primal event of life thus consists in the affective manner in which the 
living subject finds herself situated in her factual surroundings.  Since life, in its original 
and all-founding drive for self-growth — i.e. a drive that make possible all others, such 
as the drive for food, sex, self-defence, curiosity, etc. — functions as an impulsive striv-
ing toward something, as a pattern of action that is intensely directed toward a pole at 
which it aims, and which is bent on its satisfaction, the living subject finds herself at-
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tuned or affectively disposed to the world in particular ways.  Here, these attunements 
(i.e. affective dispositions), or what we will also refer to as implicit background feel-
ings, should be understood as the affective relation in which the subject currently stands 
with respect to the world.  In other words, such background feelings consist in the fun-
damental felt relation of self and world, in the feeling of oneself in relation to the world. 
As such, background feelings serve as the foil against whose continuum particular af-
fects stand out as ‘eruptive peaks’.  26
 Matthew Ratcliffe has developed a theoretical account of affectivity that is in 
some respects similar to the sense of self-affection we have in mind here.  Ratcliffe, 
whose work on this matter is a development of insights found in Antonio Damasio and 
Heidegger,  characterises these background feelings — or ‘existential feelings’, as he 27
calls them — as follows: 
 Jan Slaby and Achim Stephan, ‘Affective intentionality and self-consciousness’, Consciousness and 26
Cognition 17, no. 2 (2008), 506-513 (p. 512).
 While the accounts of attunements or background feelings found in the work of contemporary figures 27
such as Ratcliffe and Slaby have in some respects been influenced by the work of Heidegger, it should be 
noted that Heidegger’s own account of this matter is not without its shortcomings.  Famously, in Being 
and Time, Heidegger does not address the role of the body in Dasein’s way of existing, despite the fact 
that he places considerable emphasis on practical activity, which suggests that the body should hold at 
least a certain place in his analyses.  There have been various accounts as to why Heidegger may have 
opted to forgo any substantial discussion of the body in this work.  We cannot — and need not — weigh 
in on this matter here.  That being said, let us note that some commentators, such as Robert Stolorow, 
argue that Heidegger did not actually overlook the ontological significance of the lived body in this early 
work, but that he actually situated it at the centre of Dasein’s disclosdness in his discussion of mood. 
Robert D. Stolorow, ‘Heidegger, Mood and the Lived Body: The Ontical and the Ontological’, Janus 
Head: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature, Continental Philosophy, Phenomenological Psy-
chology, and the Arts 13, no. 12 (2014), 5-11.  On this point, let us make two brief comments: (i) even if 
we were to accept Stolorow’s suggestion, though Heidegger insists on the central importance of affectivi-
ty in Dasein’s disclosedness, he appears to in fact privilege understanding over affectivity or mood in his 
existential analytic of Dasein.  As Daniel Dahlstrom puts this, Heidegger ‘talks the talk’, but ‘does he 
walk the walk? […] Does he incorporate affectivity effectively and sufficiently into his existential analy-
sis?’ Dahlstrom suggests — and we would tend to agree — that he does not, and ‘that affectivity is miss-
ing in action, in some cases conspicuously, perhaps even egregiously, from Heidegger’s existential analy-
sis in Being and Time.  I say “egregiously” because the absence of an account of the relevant affectivity 
imperils, by his own account, the integrity of the analysis’.  Daniel O. Dahlstrom, ‘Missing in Action: 
Affectivity in Being and Time’, in Heidegger on Affect, ed. by Christof Hadjioannou (Switzerland: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 105-125 (p. 111).  (ii) In Heidegger’s late work in the Zollikon Seminars, 
which marks his only attempt to provide at least a somewhat more substantial treatment of this issue, and 
where, if Stolorow is correct, one would expect to find a more extensive treatment of the relation between 
affectivity and the lived body, to some surprise, one finds nothing of the kind.  While in this work Hei-
degger discusses the lived body’s relation to spatiality, there is not a single mention of its relation to affec-
tivity, which seems very odd indeed.  
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[t]he world can sometimes appear unfamiliar, unreal, distant or close.  It can be 
something that one feels apart from or at one with.  One can feel in control of 
one’s situation as a whole or overwhelmed by it.  One can feel like a participant in 
the world or like a detached, estranged observer, staring at object that do not feel 
quite ‘there’.  Such relationships structure all experiences.  Whenever one has a 
specific experience of oneself, another person or an inanimate object being a cer-
tain way, the experience has, as a background, a more general sense of one’s rela-
tionship with the world.  This relationship does not simply consist in an experi-
ence of being an entity that occupies a spatial and temporal location, alongside a 
host of other entities.  Ways of finding oneself in the world are presupposed spa-
ces of experiential possibility, which shape the various ways in which things can 
be experienced.  28
     
As this helps spell out, such attunements, which make up the basic bond between self 
and world, do not primarily consist in the experience of an entity who stands at a partic-
ular spatial-temporal location within the world.  In keeping with the foregoing analysis, 
these background feelings occur before any effective separation between self and world. 
At heart, then, such feelings reveal a more general relation between self and world, 
where the living agent and the factical situation in which she finds herself are distinct 
yet unified aspects of one and the same experiential process.  An important consequence 
of this is that these affective dispositions cannot therefore be limited to what is currently 
felt by the subject at any given moment in time.  There is always something more in the 
subject’s basic bond with the world than what the lived body is currently in touch with. 
Rather than being reducible to particular concretions within time, these background 
feelings — as necessary and universal structures of the living subject — determine the 
field of experiential possibility that is presupposed by all of the subject’s particular af-
fective states, values, beliefs and actions in the world.  As Jan Slaby and Achim Stephan 
put this, attunements reveal ‘a sense of concrete possibility’.   They reveal what a situ29 -
 Matthew Ratcliffe, ‘The feeling of being’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 12, no. 8 (2005), 43-60 28
(pp. 8–10).
 Jan Slaby, ‘Affective Self-Construal and the Sense of Ability’, Emotion Review 4, no. 2 (2012), 29
151-156 (p. 152).
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ation offers ‘in terms of potential doings and potential happenings affecting me that I 
have to put up with or adequately respond to’.    30
 As this suggests, attunements do not only reveal the world, but a veritable sense 
of self or agency as well.  Such attunements provide the individual with a pre-reflective 
and non-objectifying awareness of what she can and cannot do, and of the fact that it is 
this embodied, dynamic (i.e. temporal-historical) sense of ‘I can’ and ‘I cannot’ that 
(pre)structures the way in which she relates to and otherwise apprehends and evaluates 
herself, others and the world as a whole.  It is important to bear in mind, though, that the 
sense of agency and ability that these attunements bring about cannot be understood 
apart from the subject’s dialogue or engagement with the world.  To the contrary, back-
ground feelings must necessarily be understood as a matter of action, as the feel of life’s 
movement in the world.  The living individual’s ever-changing sense of herself and 
what she can or cannot do is therefore necessarily caught up in and co-determined by 
her standing in the world, and by certain features of the concrete situation in which she 
is engaged. 
 In fact, if we look closer, as Slaby and Stephan have pointed out, we find that 
this account of implicit background feelings can be further filled out and rendered more 
concrete by noting that these feelings appear to unfold on various interconnected levels. 
As Slaby and Stephan note, with each new level, the background feelings take on a 
‘growing situational specificity and increasing conceptual impregnation’.   The first 31
level would consist in the pure background feelings that we have just described.  There 
are then ‘feelings of basic familiarity and security on a second level [one might say, a 
 Ibid.30
 Slaby and Stephan, ‘Affective intentionality and self-consciousness’, p. 510.31
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feeling of trust], thirdly more specific existential background feelings, and finally on the 
fourth level emotional feelings in mood-like variations’.  32
 More specifically, at the most basic level, attunements reveal ‘one’s basic bodily 
functioning’.   On this level, then, attunements provide the individual with a funda33 -
mental feeling (or self-consciousness) of life, with the feeling that one is and has a body, 
that one is healthy and fresh or tired and weak, and that there is a world to which one 
belongs.   As this suggests, while such attunements are intentional in that they remain 34
moments directed across the stream of life to other moments thereof, or else they form a 
more general relation to the world as a whole, they do not relate to anything specific.  In 
that sense, they are ‘quasi objectless’.   This is not to say that attunements do not have 35
phenomenological content.   Their content is nothing other than the living individual’s 36
general standing in the world, her factual situatedness, the fact that she is here as this 
specific being, as this temporal-historical position, this original past from which she will 
have to carry on, whether she wants to or not, and which paves the way for present and 
future events. 
 As this indicates, the attunement of life is not monolithic.  In its creative and dy-
namic temporal movement, which consists in various interconnected aspects, the basic 
feeling of life is always necessarily mutable — with some background feelings lasting 




 Ibid., p. 511.35
 Ibid.36
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 Describing the remaining levels, Slaby and Stephan begin by noting that the 
second level  
subsumes more specific relations to the social and physical environment, e.g., the 
feeling of familiarity or unfamiliarity with a certain setting or social group, and 
relatedly the feeling of a basic existential ‘security’ or ‘insecurity’ (e.g., feeling 
safe and in control vs. feeling unspecifically threatened or vulnerable in a given 
environment).  Feelings of general relations toward objects and persons also be-
long to this second level, i.e., the more specific feeling of familiarity one has to-
wards one’s loved ones […].  Third level existential feelings are more specific 
still: Here, we have more conceptually sophisticated feelings like the feeling of 
‘belonging to the elite’ and the feeling of being in control or not in control in a 
specific setting (in one’s job, in a relationship, etc.), the feeling of being part of a 
larger machine or system or the feeling of being excluded from a certain group or 
social practice.  On the fourth level we find the most inter-individual variation and 
the closest connections to the more specifically directed emotions.  Examples for 
fourth-level existential feelings are the situational feelings of being flawed and 
diminished, the situational feelings of being a moral failure, being unloved, hated, 
or torn (between two or more options).     37
This clearly indicates the way in which background feelings unfold across various inter-
connected levels of specificity and conceptual sophistication.  As it proceeds through 
these layers, the drives and feelings of the living individual become increasingly tied to 
the specific dynamics of her relations and projects, and to the social contexts and capa-
bilities that pertain to her factual situations and engagements in the world.   
 Given the interconnected nature of these levels, it follows that there would nec-
essarily be a certain interaction between levels.   Let us consider the case of a woman 38
who is currently feeling fresh and sprightly while walking along a beach on a warm, 
sunny day.  At the most basic level, what we find here are fundamental bodily feelings, 
a sense of vitality, energy and perhaps even relaxation.  These feelings can translate into 
a feeling of being capable and comfortable within her current situation.  This would 
amount to a shift from level one to two.  This feeling of being capable and comfortable 
 Ibid., p. 510.37
 Ibid.38
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might then shift into more specific feelings of being enthused, confident and at home in 
her surroundings, such that the specifics of her current position in this situation — i.e. 
her sense of herself as a woman in this town, her sense of the beach, and of the other 
people tanning in the sun and swimming in the water, etc. — would be lived and experi-
enced in various positive ways and thus represent a shift from level two to three.  39
 By the same token, as Slaby and Stephan point out, transformations on higher 
levels can similarly bring about changes in lower levels.  As they note, for example, ‘a 
concrete feeling of alienation in a specific social situation (level 4) can downgrade one’s 
feeling of control and strength (level 3), and furthermore lead to more general existen-
tial feelings of unfamiliarity and lack of security (level 2)’.  40
 All in all, then, what this reveals is that the gamut of background feelings, from 
the elemental to the more specific and conceptually complex, are all necessarily inter-
twined and thus modify and motivate one another.  Contrary, therefore, to the dominant 
view in the history of Western thought, the feelings and conceptual and evaluative ca-
pacities of the living subject are not separate or opposed processes.  They belong, rather, 
together in the unitary movement of life.  This means that reason and higher-order acts 
of judgment and belief have their basis in, and are necessarily influenced by, the depths 
of affectivity. 
5.4 AFFECTIVELY DRIVEN CONSCIOUSNESS 
On the basis of this non-objectifying affective bond between self and world, the subject 
is able relate to particular things within the world.  In fact, if, as we have seen, these 
 For a further example, see Ibid., pp. 510-511.39
 Ibid., p. 511.40
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background feelings themselves are already intelligent and involve a certain evaluative 
capacity, then, contrary to Henry’s insistence that the ecstatic (intentional) appearing of 
the world reduces all appearing to object-manifestation, this suggests that not only can 
the ecstatic appearing of the world accommodate a non-objectifying mode of appearing, 
but that, within this order of appearing, the non-objectifying drives of life can still guide 
the low-level perceptual acts of the subject, without the aid of noematic sense.  If this is 
the case, then there can still be two modes of appearing, that of the non-objectifying and 
objectifying drives of life, but they would no longer unfold in two radically separate 
domains as in Henry, but as two interrelated modalities within the unified, ecstatic 
movement of life.   
 Indeed, in some of his late manuscripts, Husserl himself considers the possibility 
that there may be non-objectifying drives that unfold before the formation of promi-
nences.   Initially, he writes, ‘the ego at the primal level is the ego of instinct with 41
undisclosed instinctive goals’.   Husserl states that ‘original affection is an instinct, 42
thus a sort of empty striving still lacking the “presentation of a goal [i.e. noematic 
sense]”’.   This indicates that while the subject has an original urge or desire toward 43
something, it is not yet conscious of, or does not yet posit, a particular satisfaction for 
that urge.  In everyday life, then, as Bower notes, it would appear that ‘experiences and 
behaviours “unconsciously” appear desirable or undesirable, tending to solicit or inhibit 
 Edmund Husserl, Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie: Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instink41 -
te. Metaphysik. Späte Ethik (Texte aus dem Nachlass 1908-1937), ed. by Rochus Sowa and Thomas 
Vongehr (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014).
 Husserl, Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934): Die C-Manuskripte, p. 252.42
 Ibid., p. 326.43
 216
responses on our part […] without our having to take special notice’.   For all that, 44
Husserl insists that the the non-objectifying instincts that drive conscious life without 
positing any noematic sense do not extend very far into the life of the individual.  45
 These late considerations must come as something of a shock, given that, 
throughout much of his life, Husserl is adamant that noematic sense is essential to per-
ception, and that all concepts must be traced back to such perceptually-founded acts. 
Indeed, despite these later considerations, Husserl’s account of the ability of the non-
objectifying drives to guide low-level perceptual activity remains tentative and frag-
mentary at best, and his official position ultimately appears to remain that noematic 
sense is indeed essential to perception, and that it is generally responsible for driving 
our perceptual activity.   
 However, it is anything but clear that this is the case, or that the ability of these 
non-objectifying drives to orient the subject’s low-level perceptual activity is as short-
lived as Husserl suggests.  On the basis of the way in which they find themselves at-
tuned to the world, the particular non-objectifying instincts, in their aesthetic-ethical 
nature, are predisposed to respond to the field of sensory data in particular ways, and 
thereby aid in determining whether the subject attentively turns toward this or that con-
tent, or takes up this or that course of action.  Though the aesthetical-ethical laws of 
sensibility may not be as hard and fast as Henry supposes, it stands to reason that cer-
tain innate biases would be to some extent ingrained into the subject for evolutionary 
 Bower, ‘Husserl’s Theory of Instincts as a Theory of Affection’, p. 138.  Such instinctive intentional 44
states remain unconscious in the sense that they have not yet risen to the level of act-intentionality and 
object-manifestation.  They function as a pre-reflective and non-objectifying directedness that does not 
yet involve the ego’s taking an active stance on things, and which, accordingly, are not yet directed to-
wards objects as such, but towards what Husserl refers to as pre-constituted object-like formations.  As 
Husserl himself writes, ‘I do not need to say that the entirety of these observations that we are undertak-
ing can also be given the famed title of the “unconscious”.  Thus our considerations concern a phenome-
nology of the so-called unconscious’.  Husserl, Analysis of Passive and Active Synthesis, p. 201.
 Edmund Husserl, Die Lebenswelt: Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution, ed. by 45
Rochus Sowa (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), pp. 317-318.
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purposes.  For example, the subject is predisposed to find shapes that evoke safety, such 
as circles and curved lines, as appealing, while those that suggest threat or injury, such 
as triangles and sharp angles, are seen as unappealing.  As the experience of the subject 
develops, her pre-reflective and non-objectifying awareness of the affective movements 
of her life, and the passive associations that are formed therein, will aid in the formation 
of passive preferences for certain contents and actions that enable the subject to find 
pleasure and avoid displeasure, in light of which the subject’s perceptual landscape be-
gins to take on a more determinate form.   
 In this case, when certain elements in the flow of sensory data sufficiently ap-
peal to the subject and arouse her to action, the non-objectifying drives will continue to 
monitor how her actions are faring by providing her with positive or negative rein-
forcement in the form of varying degrees of pleasure or displeasure.  In light of this 
feedback, the subject will alter her bodily movements accordingly, say, when her actions 
are going well, by continuing to explore this sensory data and those things which bear 
some resemblance or contiguity with it, and all of this without the subject’s being objec-
tively aware of the conditions for the fulfilment of her desire (i.e. without noematic 
sense).  Instead, in such low-level perceptual acts, the subject is simply guided by what 
we have called the primal sense of life, by a set of desires and goals still lacking in 
noematic sense.  In these perceptual acts, the subject is, in a manner of speaking, led 
blindly through the world by the irresistible vivacity of life, by its need for self-growth 
and for those actions and contents that may satisfy its needs.    
 As these non-objectifying drives find fulfilment, they can then develop into and 
provide the materials for higher-level drives, for objectifying drives that seeks to syn-
thesise and make objective sense of the given data and to present the object as such.  In 
this way, rather than being separate, the non-objectifying drives found and make possi-
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ble the objectifying drives and the higher-order synthetic activities that constitute the 
objective world. 
 Even as the non-objectifying drives find fulfilment and increasingly give onto 
higher-order objectifying acts of consciousness, however, this does not mean that the 
former cease to drive the subject’s more low-level perceptual acts, without the aid of 
noematic sense.  To the contrary, our everyday experience indicates that, throughout its 
lifetime, the living subject is still routinely pulled toward certain sensory contents, and 
displays a preference for certain actions, without her necessarily taking any notice, or 
being able to fully explain or account for these preferences.    
5.5 THE DRIVE FOR DESTRUCTION 
That being said, as we began to see in the previous chapter, the subject is not only dri-
ven by her drive for self-growth.  Though this point has not been well documented with-
in the history of phenomenology,  insofar as life’s need for self-growth functions as its 46
original and all-founding drive, when this need remains largely unsatisfied, it follows 
that it invariably turns against itself and gives rise to a drive to destroy itself and life in 
general. 
 In this case, contrary to Freud’s insistence that patterns of destruction issue from 
a retreat from sexuality, our view suggests that the destructive impulse (or death drive) 
 Husserl himself does not treat the issue of a drive for destruction at all.  Additionally, Merleau-Ponty, 46
who otherwise provides a detailed analysis of the lived body, does not seem to have much of an ear for 
this aspect of life.  As Leonard Lawlor writes, ‘it seems we have to confirm what many commentators 
have said over the last couple of decades: Merleau-Ponty’s thought is based on a kind of tranquility. 
What has become of the barbaric principle, the wildness or savageness, the evil of nature? It has become 
tranquil, “the true tranquility”, as Merleau-Ponty says in the first nature course’.  Leonard Lawlor, The 
Implications of Immanence: Towards a New Concept of Life (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2006), p. 120.
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must arise from a retreat from the creativity of life.   When the living subject, in its 47
drive for self-growth, fails to engage in actions that rise to the height of its energy, as 
invariably occurs from very early on in life, a certain malaise and unhappiness arises 
within the flesh, ushering in an impulsion toward aggressive or otherwise destructive 
forms of behaviour.   The death drive is present at every moment life is not lived fully; 48
and since the subject cannot always engage in actions that rise to the heights of her en-
ergy, the death drive is always present in life in varying degrees and manners. 
 As this suggests, the life and death drives cannot be conceived as separate.  As 
Freud himself recognised, they ‘are always alloyed with each other in varying and very 
different proportions and so become unrecognisable to our judgment’.   In our own 49
case, it is necessarily life’s drive for self-growth that founds and sustains the drive for 
self-destruction.  Consequently, as we indicated in the previous chapter, the death-drive 
can never wholly overtake or nullify the life-drive.  The death drive remains a form of 
curiosity and self-growth.  It can thus itself serve as a form of pleasure, but as a pleasure 
in unpleasure, as occurs in masochism, for example.  Therefore, the death drive does not 
overturn the pleasure principle, that is, life in its need for self-growth.  Strictly speaking, 
as Nicolas Smith notes, there is no beyond the pleasure principle.  50
 Given that the drive for self-growth is all-founding, and thus spawns a basic in-
terconnection amongst all the drives, it follows that there can be a certain exchange 
 The Austrian psychoanalyst Otto Rank similarly contends that self-destructive forms of behaviour are a 47
result of a failure in creativity.  Our view of this matter — and, indeed, that of Henry — while distinct 
from that of Rank, undoubtedly bears some similarities to it.  Henry himself does not appear to have been 
familiar with Rank.  At the very least, Rank receives no mention in his Genealogy of Psycholanalysis, or 
in any of his other works.  For more on Rank’s position, see Art and Artist: Creative Urge and Personali-
ty Development, trans. by Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Agathon Press, 1975). 
 Henry, Barbarism, p. 103.48
 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans. by David McLintock (London: Penguin Books, 49
2004), p. 97.
 Nicolas Smith, Towards a Phenomenology of Repression — A Husserlian Reply to the Freudian Chal50 -
lenge (Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Stockhomiensis, 2010), p. 293.
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amongst the drives.  As a result, when, in one way or another, the creative impulse of 
life feels frustrated, the numbness or hostility that comes into it can be transferred onto 
or otherwise find expression within any of the other drives, such as the drive for sex, 
self-defence, etc.   On account of a mounting malaise with life in general, for instance, 51
an individual may yell or act aggressively toward her spouse, or she may try to further 
numb the creative tendency of her life by sitting in front of the television, or by clinging 
to her sadness and refusing to deal with her depression.   
 By the same token, certain drives can compensate for others.  As Smith notes, it 
may prove to be the case that ‘drinking [can] compensate for […] an obstructed sexual 
desire’.  Of course, ‘such an exchange of hostages will never be completely successful, 
for ultimately all transferences of drive fulfilment will leave intact a core of desire that 
knows no articulation and which therefore will always elude mediate or immediate sat-
isfaction: “It is no accident that human beings never obtain peace of mind”’.  52
 As Freud well knew, owing to the painful or distressing nature of these frustrat-
ed experiences, certain contents, and indeed, even certain drive-complexes and back-
ground feelings, can be repressed, which means, contrary to Henry’s understanding of 
the matter, they can be thrust away from consciousness.   Indeed, the account of the 53
living present we have laid out, in which the primal flow functions as an endless process 
 In fact, it must be said that this works both ways: just as a basic, underlying dissatisfaction with life 51
can transfer onto and effect other drives, so too any frustration undergone with these other drives can feed 
back onto and take a toll on life’s instinctive curiosity and drive for self-growth.  What we have here is 
thus an intricate web of drives that mutually motivate and modify one another.
 Smith, Towards a Phenomenology of Repression, p. 170.52
 As Freud writes, ‘[w]e have learnt from psycho-analysis that the essence of the process of repression 53
lies, not in putting an end to, in annihilating, the idea which represents an instinct, but in preventing it 
from becoming conscious’.  Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV (1914-1916): On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers 
on Metapsychology and Other Works, ed. by James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957), p. 166.
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of self-othering, can be seen as the necessary condition that makes repression possible.  54
As we have seen, in its constant self-differentiation, the primal flow functions as an 
endless gliding away, where each present moment is equally immediately retained and 
continuously slides ever-deeper into the past.  As this process unfolds, certain drives, 
and the contents toward which they are directed (i.e. drive-complexes), can form certain 
passive associations with still other drive-complexes, and thereby continue to hold vary-
ing degrees of influence over the subject’s conduct in the world.  At the same time, 
though, because life functions in this way, the drives necessarily compete, inhibit and 
otherwise cover over one another, as occurs, for instance, when a desire for sleep is 
subdued and overcome by a desire to persevere and push through the work one needs to 
finish, or else they can be altogether repressed in order to prevent their distressing 
pathos from threatening the integrity of conscious life.   Indeed, insofar as these pro55 -
cesses appear to be built into the essential structure of life, and seem to be necessary for 
things to be constituted as they are, we can join Nicolas Smith in asserting that these 
processes of inhibition and repression are ‘necessary [and universal] structural 
aspect[s]’ of life.       56
 Of course, the concepts of repression and the unconscious do not have their origin in any one individ54 -
ual.  As Rosemarie Sponner Sand notes, they appear, if only in embryonic form, throughout the history of 
Western thought, and appear to stretch back to its very beginnings.  See The Unconscious without Freud 
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), p. 18.  Lancelot Law Whyte also develops this point in The 
Unconscious before Freud (London: Tavistock Publications, 1962).  To give but one example, Blaise Pas-
cal touches upon the concept of repression in his famous assertion that ‘the heart has its reasons which 
reason does not know’.  Blaise Pascal Pensées, trans. by A. J. Krailsheimer (Penguin Books, 1966), p. 
277.
 Analysing the process of repression at work within perception, Husserl notes that even though the pre55 -
vious intentional structure is voided, it is not erased from consciousness, but remains there as crossed out. 
In his words: ‘we are still conscious of the previous sense, but as “painted over”, and where the corre-
sponding moments are concerned, crossed out.  Accordingly, here we are studying what the phenomenon 
of “otherwise”, of “annulment”, of nullity, or of negation looks like.  We recognise as basic and essential 
that the superimposition of a new sense over a sense that is already constituted takes place through re-
pression, just like correlatively in the noetic direction, there is a formation of a second apprehension, a 
second apperception that is not juxtaposed to a first one, but lies over it and contends with it’.  Husserl, 
Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Syntheses, pp. 69-70. 
 Smith, Towards a Phenomenology of Repression, p. 280.56
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 As Smith points out, ‘Husserl suggests that when something is repressed due to 
a conflict (as between two intuitions that do not cohere), it becomes suppressed beyond 
intuition but does not thereby loose its vivacity, for the conflict itself increases 
vivacity’.   Husserl himself appears to acknowledge that while this repressed level of 57
retention is withdrawn from consciousness, and thus tends to go ‘unnoticed’, it does 
lose its force entirely, but continues to actively engage with passive associations.   In58 -
deed, one can find evidence for this in some of Freud’s case studies.  As he notes in Be-
yond the Pleasure Principle: 
[e]veryone knows people whose human relationships all end up the same way. 
This includes benefactors who are eventually deserted in resentment by every one 
of their protégés […] and who thus seem fated to taste to the dregs all the bitter-
ness of ingratitude.  This includes men whose friendships all end in the same way: 
betrayal.  This includes others who during their life, time and time again, repeat-
edly raise another person into a position of great authority in the private or public 
sphere, only to overthrow this authority figure after a certain time and replace him 
with someone else.  This includes lovers whose love affairs with women all go 
through the same phases and come to the same end.    59
Everyday life is full of such cases in which human beings find themselves acting in 
ways that are destructive to them or to the species at large, without their taking any real 
notice of it.  Indeed, even in cases when an individual does know that her conduct is de-
structive and expresses a desire to change it, it is often the case that, nevertheless, for 
reasons that remain mysterious even, or perhaps especially, to her, she cannot help but 
continue in such courses of action.  This serves as evidence that life possesses the abili-
ty to bring into being affective states and actions that lie beyond the purview and power 
 Ibid.  In Husserl’s words, ‘[i]n this case, a special repression takes place, a repression of elements, 57
which were previously in conflict, into the “unconscious”, but not into the integrally cohesive sphere of 
the distant past; by contrast, in the living conflict, repression takes place as a suppression, as a suppres-
sion into non-intuitiveness, but not into non-vivacity — on the contrary, the vivacity gets augmented in 
the conflict, as analogous to other contrasts’.  Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthe-
ses, pp. 514-515.
 Ibid.58
 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, ed. by Todd Dufresne (Toronto: Broadview Editions, 59
2011), pp. 63-64.
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of consciousness.  As such, the affective force of the non-objectifying drives for de-
struction appear to continue to play an integral role in orienting and otherwise steering 
the subject in her everyday involvements with the world throughout her lifetime.   60
5.6 TOWARDS THE FULL PRESENCE OF THINGS 
Nonetheless, it could be asked whether the sensibility of life should really be seen as 
powerful enough to make contact with the world and the full presence of things.  Is it 
not the case, as Husserl’s work suggests, that it is apperceptive acts of objectification 
that are solely responsible for enabling the subject to see a table in its entirety as a chair 
(as a three-dimensional object), and not just the partial profiles (the chair as a two-di-
mensional object-like formation) that are given to her at the moment?  As Husserl 61
might remind us, while affectivity can put the subject in touch with the so-called pre-
world, with its pre-constituted, two-dimensional object-like formations, it is simply too 
indeterminate to provide the subject with access to the full presence of things in the 
three-dimensional world.  For this to be achieved, the two-dimensional sensory flux 
must be apprehended or ‘interpreted in light of perceptual expectations involving possi-
 Freud deals with this in his account of the return of the repressed.  In his view, when the repressed no 60
longer succeeds in keeping the distressing away from consciousness, it irrupts and comes back as a symp-
tom (or else as a fantasy, slip of the tongue, etc.), but what comes back — in this case, the symptom — 
tends not to be the same as that which was originally repressed.  More often than not, since having been 
repressed, the repressed feeling or idea has undergone significant distortion, to the extent that the subject 
in question finds it difficult to see any link between her suffering and the symptom, and thus tends to see 
the symptom as the invasion of an alien intruder in her life.  See his Moses and Monotheism: Three Es-
says, trans. by James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1974).
 In other words, this noematic sense forms a schematic that contextualises sensory information and en61 -
ables the subject to apperceive the object as such through this noematic sense.  
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ble series of visual sensations that work together to present things’ three-dimensional 
spatial structure’.  62
 It is highly questionable, nonetheless, whether Husserl is justified in supposing 
that (visual) sensation is two-dimensional.  As Bower rightly notes, while it may be the 
case that a momentary instance of sensory data is spatially vague or indeterminate, this 
does not necessarily mean it forfeits a spatial dimension.   If this is the case, then the 63
non-objectifying sensibility of life can put the subject in touch with the world, even 
though it does not represent it as such.  Yet if, for the sake of argument, we accept 
Husserl’s framing, the non-objectifying affects would still appear equipped to make the 
three-dimensional structure of things detectable by the perceiver.  While it is true that 
the sensory information with which the subject is presented at any given moment in 
time may not present the subject with the three-dimensional object, by virtue of its non-
objectifying drives, the subject can over time explore the thing in question and form 
what Bower refers to as affect schemas that  
enable a snapshot-like snippet of sensation to link up in certain ways with an-
tecedent and successive sensation to bring forth the structure of the momentary 
sensation.  In other words, synchronically, visual sensation does not reveal (e.g.) 
three-dimensional structure, but it may do so diachronically.  The apparent pover-
ty of sensation (i.e. without apprehension) is due only to the artificial focus on it 
as an ever-vanishing instantaneous snippet of experience.   64
As the non-objectifying drives motivate the subject to continue to explore the sensory 
data, and to alter her bodily movements according to how well or poorly they are faring, 
the initially indeterminate sensory data will be clarified and contextualised to provide 
 Bower, ‘Husserl on Perception’, p. 19.  As this indicates, what is at stake in providing the subject with 62
the full presence of ‘the perceived world is its specifically spatial phenomenal character’.  Bower, ‘Affec-
tively Driven Perception’, p. 238.
 Bower, ‘Husserl on Perception’, p. 21, note 12.63
 Ibid., p. 20.  Nico Frijda and Gerrod Parrott also make this point.  See Nico H. Frijda and Gerrod W. 64
Parrott, ‘Basic emotions or Ur-emotions?’ Emotion Review 3, no. 4 (2011), 406–415. 
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the subject with a pre-objective and non-objectifying awareness of the full presence of 
things.   Therefore, even though the non-objectifying feelings do not represent the 65
world as such, there remains a very real sense in which they do enable the subject to 
make contact with a full-fledged world, with the pre-objective world. 
 Indeed, as the subject is led along by these non-objectifying drives, she will only 
further develop a primal sense of how to conduct herself in exploring the world, of how 
to best move her limbs, crane her neck, or tense or relax her eyes in order to better ac-
cess and explore her surroundings.  So far as this is the case, it stands to reason that the 
subject’s ability to clarify the initially indeterminate sensory data will similarly im-
prove.  Thus, we are able to overcome, or at least diminish, the strict contrast that 
Husserl posits between the lucidity of the mind and the opaqueness of the body. 
 This is not to deny that apperceptive acts of objectification play an important 
role in the life of the subject.  While affect is able to steer low-level perceptual acts and 
to, in some sense, provide the subject with the full presence of things, it is not all-pow-
erful, as Henry is wont to suppose.  It does not exclusively guide higher-order acts and 
it is unable to represent determinate properties in things.  For this, perceptual sense (i.e. 
horizon-laden experience) is required.  To be sure, as we have now seen, in making pos-
sible the normativity of experience and enabling the subject to access the full presence 
of things, non-objectifying feelings found and sustain the objectifying acts and the ob-
jective world to which they relate.  But this does not take anything away from the fact 
that apperceptive acts of objectification provide the subject with a schematic orientation 
or set of expectations that help guide higher-order perceptual acts through the world, 
 As Bower notes, ‘[t]hese affective and motor accompaniments of sensation can be thought of as doing 65
the disambiguating work on sensation that relieves it of the indeterminacy Husserl felt held it back from 
counting itself as inherently intentional and object-directed’.  Bower, ‘Husserl on Perception’, p. 20.
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and which enable the subject to represent and see things as they are in themselves (i.e. 
in their objectivity).   
 Indeed, it appears to be the case that objectifying acts of apprehension can them-
selves give rise to certain non-objectifying affective tonalities.  Based on the foregoing 
study, when the subject observes a painting, her theoretical observations regarding the 
artwork must ultimately be founded upon certain non-objectifying affects and back-
ground feelings.  In terms of the transcendental genesis of such objectifying acts, non-
objectifying feelings must enjoy an absolute priority; they must serve as the building 
blocks upon which the former are necessarily based.  Yet this does not mean that the 
latter unidirectionally found the former, as Henry contends.  As the individual observes 
the painting in front of her, her theoretical reflections can themselves enter into and in-
spire certain non-objectifying feelings within the subject.  This means that objectifying 
acts and complex conceptual and linguistic contents are in fact required in order for the 
subject to be able to experience some of the feelings that it undoubtedly does.  For ex-
ample, when the subject gazes upon the painting of a setting sun, apart from the affec-
tive tonalities elicited by the arrangement of its sensible elements — its curves, colours 
and so forth — the concept of a setting sun will itself be undergone as a non-objectify-
ing feeling.   The experience of a setting sun involves a non-objectifying feeling that 66
requires a certain level of conceptual and linguistic sophistication in order to be ex-
plained.   To give a further example, as Slaby and Stephan point out, a subject can sim67 -
ilarly experience ‘the feeling of being a true American, which might include a compli-
cated conception of what being a true American amounts to.  The feeling of being a 
 In a manner of speaking, the living subject bathes in a world of sensible elements and higher-order 66
conceptual contents.
 For more on this see Slaby and Stephan, ‘Affective intentionality and self-consciousness’, p. 513.67
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“moral failure” might require an understanding of what being a moral agent in a given 
community amounts to’.   In all of these cases, we find affective states that require 68
‘very complicated, high-level contents — contents that only beings with sophisticated 
conceptual [and linguistic] capacities are capable of instantiating’.   Objectifying acts 69
are therefore necessary and universal conditions for certain non-objectifying feelings. 
Contrary to Henry’s assertions on the matter, therefore, it must be acknowledged that 
the relation between non-objectifying and objectifying acts is not unidirectional, where 
the former always gives rise to the latter, but bidirectional, where the two mutually mo-
tivate and modify one another.  Because of this, it can be said that both the objectifying 
and non-objectifying drives are essential in putting the subject in contact with the world 
in the fullness of its presence. 
  
5.7 TRUST, WORLD AND OTHERS 
While this sharpens our understanding of some of the necessary and universal structures 
that enable the subject to experience material things as existing in themselves, there is 
another, narrower sense of objectivity that we have yet to address, and which our study 
of the transcendental life of the subject as the ultimate foundation of the world needs to 
account for.  This sense of objectivity, as we indicated in our earlier study of Husserl, is 
the more commonplace understanding of the term, where objectivity signifies valid for 
everyone.  In this case, something is objective when everyone comes to the same con-
clusion regarding it.  But how is it that things can appear to different people in the same 




be a world that is there for everyone?  Put differently, how is it that each living subject 70
not only has an experiential world that is its own, but that together they also have one 
that is experienced as common to all of them?  
 Obviously, the constitution of this other type of objectivity depends upon inter-
subjectivity, which is to say, upon a certain interrelation amongst human subjects.  In 
this sense, intersubjectivity must be a constitutive (i.e. transcendental) structure of sub-
jectivity.  An account of this common, shared world hinges upon an account of the way 
in which the subject’s experience of a foreign subjectivity enables it to experience (i.e. 
constitute) a common world.  
 We know that it is the ecstatic self-alteration of the primal flow, as the most ba-
sic level of subjectivity, which serves as the necessary and universal form of all human 
subjects.  While this primal flow does not itself appear to depend upon others, as it ap-
pears to enjoy at least a certain ontological autonomy, it is that which makes it possible 
for the living subject to relate to the world and others.   As we have observed, contrary 71
to Husserl’s early assertions on the matter, this primal flow cannot be contained within 
the immanence of consciousness.  There is, rather, always a stream of life as a primor-
dial transcendence that exceeds this enclosure, and which is always already open to the 
world and the absolute otherness of others.   
 The foregoing analysis has gone some way towards illustrating how this process 
unfolds.  It is the continuum of dynamic background feelings and non-objectifying dri-
ves that stand as the living subject’s first contact with the world.  Affectivity simply is 
 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 91.70
 Indeed, if the primal flow did not enjoy at least a certain ontological autonomy, it would not be possi71 -
ble for there to be a genuine intersubjectivity; there would be no real difference between subjects, and so 
there could be no real interrelation between them.
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the subject’s general standing in the world (i.e. her factual situatedness); it is the weight 
of her ever-developing history, as well as her first communication with others.   
 In this case, affectivity would be the very heart of our experience of a foreign 
subjectivity.  Henry himself suggests that the mother-child bond is an exemplary case of 
our essentially affective, a priori interrelation with others.   The mother-child relation is 72
exemplary for Henry inasmuch as it appears to function as an interrelation that is not 
founded upon ‘a noematic or noetic mode of presentation’; it is an access to the other 
that does not require conscious reflection, language, or any other cognitive act of objec-
tification.  Instead, the mother and her infant communicate on a wholly affective, non-
objectifying level.    73
 According to Henry, it is, among other things, precisely this affective basis of 
the subject’s relation with the other that Husserl fails to fully capture or appreciate.  In 
his eyes, even though Husserl affords an important role to empathy in the fifth Carte-
sian Meditation, he still regards it as a gear in the more complex mental machinery of 
objectifying cognition.   In line with his approach to appearing in general, Husserl 74
favours apperceptive acts of objectification over affectivity in the constitution of inter-
subjectivity, and so he reduces the appearing of others to object-manifestation.  In light 
of this, whether rightly or wrongly, Henry argues that Husserl does not sufficiently dis-
tinguish between how the subject experiences an object and how she experiences anoth-
er human individual.   
 Henry, Material Phenomenology, p. 115.  Other exemplary cases of intersubjectivity that he mentions 72
include ‘the hypnotist with the hypnotized, the lover with the beloved, [and] the analyst with the patient’. 
Ibid.
 Ibid.  Of course, in Henry’s case, this occurs outside the ecstatic world and its referential relations of 73
meaning.
 Ibid., p. 114.74
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 While the life of the subject cannot function in the radically immanent manner 
Henry suggests, he is not wrong that the mother-child relation serves as an exemplary 
case of the affective basis of this bond.  On our view, given that the transcendental life 
of each living subject enjoys a certain ontological autonomy, and functions as a primor-
dial transcendence, it follows that the fetus is in the mother as a one in the other, as a 
transcendence in immanence.  While the mother and her fetus cannot therefore be im-
manently fused with one another as Henry suggests, the fact that they share a common 
temporal and bodily basis in the anonymous and pre-individual self-alteration of the liv-
ing present means that, as Husserl knew, they enjoy ‘mutually corresponding and har-
monious constitutive systems’.   This makes possible ‘a harmony in the genesis [of 75
sense] that is occurring in the individuals’.   At heart, this unfolds on an affective level. 76
Because mother and fetus possess these harmonious constitutive systems — i.e. because 
they are, in a manner of speaking, moments of the same syntax — they are both capable 
of affecting one another in their bodily actions in ways that are thoroughly intelligible to 
one another, that is, as either complementing or frustrating one another’s needs and dri-
ves in various degrees and manners.   
 Sticking with the exemplary case of mother and fetus, it must be said that, in 
particular, the fetus is wholly vulnerable to and dependent upon the mother for its nour-
ishment and subsistence.  As the felt bodily actions (or body schema) of the mother re-
spond to and anticipate those of the fetus (and vice versa), a passive and associative 
bonding occurs that provides each with an affective, non-objectifying awareness of it-
self in relation to the other  — i.e. as distinct yet coordinated, living, experiencing be-
ings who feel and behave in similar ways — which does not depend upon any media-
 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 108.75
 Ibid.76
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tion of the understanding.   More specifically, the fetus develops a sense that its ‘neuro-77
muscular activity comes already blended with the co-affective feeling of the presence of 
the other […] and the [affectively] anticipated arc of the other’s intentional action’.  78
Susan Stuart describes this as ‘enkinaesthetic dialogue [i.e. interactivity]’, as a ‘com-
munity’ and ‘reciprocity of affective co-engagement’, as ‘the experiential entanglement 
of our sensory-kinaesthetic action-enquiry, that is, the reciprocally affective neuro-mus-
cular dynamical flows and muscle tensions that are felt and enfolded between co-partic-
ipating agents and objects’.    79
 In the case of the fetus, for example, as the bodily movements of the mother 
sympathetically respond to its rhythmic movements and needs, and thereby achieves a 
certain affective harmonisation with the latter, it can be said that the fetus develops a 
primal, non-objectifying awareness of itself as being in some sense intertwined with and 
known by the mother, by the mother who is, at this point, its world.   To the extent this 80
affective interaction is successful, it endows the fetus with a primal sense of trust in the 
mother (i.e. world).  81
 This can be evidenced in the affective, bodily synchronisation that is achieved between the two.  See 77
Janet A. Dipietro, Rafael A. Irizarry, Kathleen A. Costigan and Edith D. Gurewitsch, ‘The psychophysiol-
ogy of the maternal-fetal relationship’, Psychophysiology 41, no. 4 (2004), 510-520 (p. 519).
 Susan A. J. Stuart, ‘Enkinaesthesia: Proto-moral value in action-enquiry and interaction’, Phenomenol78 -
ogy and the Cognitive Sciences 17, no. 2 (2018), 411-431 (p. 422).  In other words, as this affective inter-
activity unfolds, the fetus gradually develops a primal sense of itself as implicated in a common texture or 
world of life.  Ibid., p. 420.
 Ibid., pp. 413, 419.  As Stuart goes on, ‘[w]e might describe this by saying that our lived experience is 79
always tempered by the direct spontaneous reception, or passive synthesis, of the experientially entangled 
living being of the other as they transgress our own experience and we theirs, but the point to note is this: 
this intentional transgression is immediate, non-inferential co-being, characterised by a pre-noetic imma-
nent [i.e. direct] enkinesthetic intercorporeality’.  Susan A. J. Stuart, ‘Feeling Our Way: Enkinesthetic 
Enquiry and Immanent Intercorporeality’, in Intercorporeality: Emerging Socialities in Interaction, ed. by 
Christian Meyer, Jürgen Streeck and J. Scott Jordan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 51-72 
(pp. 63-64).
 Alejandra Martinez Quintero and Hanne de Jaegher have similarly found that there is a certain minimal 80
intersubjectivity already at play between mother and fetus.  See ‘Pregnant Agencies: Movement and Par-
ticipation in Maternal-Fetal Interactions’, Frontiers in Psychology 11 (2020), 1-16 (p. 14).
 I develop the issue of trust in Henry’s thought in my article ‘Bonds of Trust: Thinking the Limits of 81
Reciprocity with Heidegger and Michel Henry’, Studia Phaenomenologica 19 (2019), 289-309.
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 Here we have the so-called fate of the subject: the primal knowledge of the other 
that helps create the individual’s affective disposition (i.e. background feelings, such as 
trust, understood as the feeling of safety and confidence in one’s openness and vulnera-
bility to another), and which will serve as the basis for all of its future relations, and 
which will thereby echo through its remaining days.  As Henry writes, ‘I hear forever 
the sound of my birth’.  82
 As a matter of course, this enkinaesthesic consonance with and primal feeling of 
trust in others and the world continues to develop and attain new layers as the life of the 
individual progresses.  As the practical bodily enkinaesthesic actions of the infant’s par-
ents and caregivers continue to intertwine with her own and meet her needs, this rein-
forces the infant’s feeling of familiarity with and trust in foreign world-directed sub-
jects, as well as the world in which she finds herself, and it deepens her expectation that 
both will continue to satisfy her needs in the future.    83
 Altogether, this strengthens the infant’s feeling that other sensing and experienc-
ing subjects, as unique centres of reference for the world, genuinely recognise rather 
than merely imitate her, and that the things she experiences according to her needs and 
aesthetic-ethical sensibility — her tendency to find this agreeable, that disagreeable — 
are also experienced in much the same way by others.   Because of this, the subject ex84 -
periences the world on an affective level as mediated by its experience of its givenness 
for others.  This further solidifies the individual’s primal sense that its own experiential 
world is intertwined with that of others, where each one manifests the other, thereby 
 Henry, I Am the Truth, p. 262.82
 Stuart, ‘Enkinaesthesia: Proto-moral value in action-enquiry and interaction’, pp. 415-416.83
 Ibid.84
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forming a non-objective world that transcends one’s own finite existence and that is 
there for everyone. 
 In keeping with the nature of background feelings, this feeling of trust pre-struc-
tures the ways in which the subject can relate to, evaluate and, ultimately, apprehend 
herself, others and the world as a whole.  Owing to this attunement, for example, the 
subject is able to feel secure and at ease in her being in the world, in certain situations, 
and in her relations with certain individuals.  As a result, she is able and willing to as-
sent to, emulate and internalise the enkinaesthetic melodies (i.e. sensori-kinaesthetic 
actions), affective values and instructions of others, and to thereby let herself become 
gradually exposed to the full presence of things and the world as a whole, to the non-
objective, common world that can never be entirely thematised in reflection.  In this 
way, affectivity serves as a necessary and universal structure in the subject’s interrela-
tion with others and in their constitution of a shared, intersubjective world. 
 Yet if this is the case, then there needs to be an alteration of the natural attitude 
as understood by Husserl.  The belief around which Husserl’s account of the matter is 
centred has now come forward as being premised upon this pre-reflective and non-ob-
jectifying feeling and praxis of trust.  The belief in the world that characterises the nat-
ural attitude has its basis in this deep and fundamental sense of trust.  Where the sub-
ject’s belief in the world is an epistemological relation and a matter of cognition, trust is 
an aesthetic-ethical relation and is at heart a matter of affectivity.  There is here an inter-
twining of epistemology, aesthetics and ethics, such that the former can never entirely 
break free of the latter.   
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5.8 LAYERS OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
While the enkinaesthesic intertwining and non-objectifying feeling of trust serves as the 
foundation of the subject’s relations with others, and continues to help shape the ways 
in which she can relate to others, needless to say, this does not stand as the only level 
along which the subject’s sense of interconnection with others unfolds.  In keeping with 
the foregoing analysis, there are various layers to human intersubjectivity.  Our interre-
lation with others as co-constitutors of the world (i.e. as foreign world-directed agents) 
is not only experienced, in however primitive a manner, on the level of affection, but on 
the level of apperceptive acts of apprehension as well.   
 To see how this is so, let us return to Husserl’s theory of perception.  As we have 
seen, Husserl finds that the perceptual experience of objects to some extent hinges upon 
the appresentation of absent yet co-given properties or adumbrations of the object.  The 
object possesses an array of simultaneous adumbrations.  In the analysis of this horizon 
of co-existing adumbrations, Husserl comes to realise that these adumbrations ‘cannot 
be actualized by a single subject, since it at any given time is restricted to a single per-
spective’.   However, since, as Zahavi notes, 85
the ontological structure of the object implies a simultaneous plurality of adum-
brations, Husserl is forced to refer to a plurality of possible subjects, who are to be 
understood as the noetic correlate of the object’s noematic plurality of co-existing 
aspects.  Provided that the subject as subject is directed towards objects, provided 
that every experience of objects is characterised by the horizontal appearance of 
the object, where a certain aspect is present and the others are absent, and provid-
ed that this horizontal intentionality, this interplay between presence and absence 
can only be accounted for phenomenologically through a reference to a plurality 
of possible subjects, the consequence is, that I in my being as subject is referred to 
Others.  86
 Dan Zahavi, ‘Husserl’s Intersubjective Transformation of Transcendental Philosophy’, Journal of the 85
British Society for Phenomenology 27, no 3 (1996), 228-245 (p. 231).
 Ibid.86
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In this way, the horizonal character of perception contributes to the subject’s a priori 
reference to others.  Indeed, according to Husserl, this sense of interrelation with others 
as co-subjects is present for the subject irrespective of whether others are concretely 
present for her or not.   Because perceptual consciousness involves this a priori refer87 -
ence to others, everything that is presented to the subject is given with ‘an apperceptive 
horizon of possible experience, own and foreign’.   This means that the subject’s expe88 -
rience of things is mediated by her experience of their givenness to others, and this en-
ables her to experience her world as being intertwined with a common objective world. 
 This sense of intersubjectivity as co-subjectivity can then be executed and fur-
ther developed through empathic understanding.   First, though, it bears noting that, as 89
Stuart rightly points out, enkinaesthesia (and, in our case, trust), while the foundation of 
empathy, should not be confused with the latter.   On Husserl’s account, the subject’s 90
empathic experience of the other is seemingly perceptual in nature, in that it grasps the 
other herself.   That is to say, when I perceive an individual articulate one of her inner 91
experiences, I also perceive these experiences themselves — I see her joy, pain, etc. — 
though, Husserl adds, I can only have an outer and not an inner perception of them. 
 That being said, Husserl’s position on this matter is not without a certain tension 
or indecision.  For he also states that while the body of the other is intuitively given, the 
 Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Zweiter Teil: 1921-1928, ed. by Iso Kern 87
(Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 289.
 Ibid.  See also Zahavi, ‘Husserl’s Intersubjective Transformation of Transcendental Philosophy’, p. 88
231.
 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 92.  As Zahavi notes, in the late C-manuscripts (C 17) Husserl 89
writes ‘“[w]hen empathy occurs, is the community, the intersubjectivity there already in advance, and is 
empathy merely a disclosing performance?” This is a question which he answers positively shortly after’. 
Zahavi, ‘Husserl’s Intersubjective Transformation of Transcendental Philosophy’, p. 231.
 Stuart, ‘Enkinaesthesia: Proto-moral value in action-enquiry and interaction’, pp. 413, 424.90
 Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Erster Teil: 1905-1920, ed. by Iso Kern 91
(Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 24.
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same cannot be said of the other’s inner experiences.  My own inner experiences are 
given to me originally (i.e. directly), but those of the other cannot be given in the same 
way.  Instead, Husserl finds that the other’s inner experiences are appresented to me 
through a unique form of apperception, which enables those experiences to appear to 
me as co-present.   In this case, when I see and hear the other speaking, what I directly 92
see is her body and its expressions, and, on the basis of this perception, I empathically 
co-perceive her joy, sadness, etc.  Therefore, while it can be said that we see the human 
person taken as a whole, the same cannot be said of her inner psychical experiences 
considered in themselves, which can only be empathically represented.  
 Be that as it may, Husserl will at times continue to speak of empathy as provid-
ing the subject with an original experience of the consciousness of the other.  Indeed, he 
stresses that the other that is given to me in empathy is not a mere analogue of the other, 
but the other herself.   How, if at all, do we square these accounts? Zahavi offers a 93
helpful suggestion in this regard, one that is supported by some of Husserl’s own texts. 
While Husserl ultimately finds that empathy does not provide me with first-person ac-
cess to the inner experiences of the other, Zahavi notes that he does correctly observe  
that empathy [nevertheless] involves a perception of the other, i.e., that it amounts 
to a form of person perception, and that it furthermore would be a mistake to mea-
sure empathy against the standards of either self-perception or external object per-
ception.  Empathy has its own kind of originality, its own kind of fulfilment and 
corroboration and its own criteria of success and failure.  94
Husserl’s reluctance in places to affirm that the subject enjoys a direct empathic under-
standing of the other clearly issues from a concern that this would be tantamount to 
 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 123-124, 149.92
 Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Zweiter Teil: 1921-1928, p. 385.93
 Dan Zahavi, ‘Empathy and mirroring: Husserl and Gallese’, in Life, Subjectivity & Art: Essays in Hon94 -
or of Rudolf Bernet, ed. by Roland Breeur and Ullrich Melle (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), pp. 217-254 (p. 
230).  Though the two positions remain distinct in important ways, as Zahavi discusses in this essay, 
Husserl’s account of empathy and pairing finds support in the neurological discovery of mirror neurons 
and the mirror neuron hypothesis as propounded in the wok of Vittorio Gallese.
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claiming that the subject enjoys the same kind of first-person access to the conscious-
ness of the other as it does its own.  Yet this concern appears to be less than necessary. 
As Zahavi duly points out, such a concern  
assumes that there is a single golden standard of what directness amounts to, and 
that a direct access to one’s own mental life constitutes the standard against which 
everything else has to be measured.  In other contexts, however, Husserl has been 
careful to point out that it is unacceptable to transfer the demands we put on evi-
dence in one domain to other domains where these demands are in principle inca-
pable of being realised.  Employing that insight, one could respect the difference 
between first-person and third-person access to psychological states without mak-
ing the mistake of restricting and equating experiential access with first-person 
access.  To put it differently, why not argue that it is possible to experience minds 
in more than one way?  95
If we acknowledge that the demands placed on evidence in one domain do not necessar-
ily apply to all others, then it must be said that the fact that the subject does not enjoy 
the same first-person access to the other’s inner experiences as it does its own does not 
constitute a failure or shortcoming, nor does it necessarily mean that the subject does 
not enjoy a direct experiential understanding of the other.  96
 In fact, if the inner experiences of the other were accessible to us in the same 
way as our own, then the other would no longer be truly other to us and we could not 
speak of intersubjectivity in a meaningful way at all.  This difference is a necessary 
condition for the possibility of an interrelation with others.    97
 Additionally, though we cannot access the other’s experience as if they are our 
own, this evasive excess of the other is itself accessible to us.  While living individuals 
enjoy an enkinaesthesic consonance and direct experiential understanding of one anoth-
 Ibid., p. 232.95
 Ibid.96
 As we stated earlier, the egocentric (first-personal) givenness of human experience is a necessary con97 -
dition for intersubjectivity.  Thus, as Zahavi correctly notes, ‘far from being competing alternatives, sub-
jectivity and intersubjectivity are in fact complementing and mutually interdependent notions’.  Dan Za-
havi, ‘Beyond Empathy: Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity’, Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 8, no. 5-7 (2001), 151–167 (p. 166).
 238
er, there always remains an elusive singularity or excess to the other, but one which can, 
at least to some extent, be felt and empathically understood as such (i.e. as elusive), 
even if it can never be adequately captured in speech or reflection.  Commenting on this 
very matter, Hanne De Jaegher points out that this would explain ‘why inter-affection 
does not always happen instantly, but can sometimes take time, and also why we always 
remain “other” and different to each other to an extent as well’.  98
 Again, though, none of this means that the subject does not enjoy some manner 
of direct experiential access to the other.  We have already explored in detail how this 
unfolds in the enkinaesthesic intertwining between self and other.  In empathy, as we 
have stated, when the subject sees the other, when she perceives his body and its ex-
pressions, on the grounds of that perception, the subject is able to empathically co-per-
ceive her inner experience.  If we follow this line of thought in acknowledging that em-
pathy has its own kind of originality (i.e. directness) and optimality which should not be 
measured against those proper to the givenness of one’s own self, we can assert that 
when I see my friend excitedly chatting from across the table, or when I see her grimace 
in pain, I do in fact have a direct experiential understanding of her inner experiences, 
and this without in any way compromising her alterity.    99
 This formulation represents a slight deviation from Husserl’s occasional way of 
describing the matter, when he states that empathy provides us with access to the expe-
rience of others, but not originally.  Yet it is one that stands in line with his recognition 
that the demands placed on evidence in one domain do not necessarily transfer to those 
of others, and it ultimately better enables us to reconcile his occasional and seemingly 
 Hanne De Jaegher, ‘How We Affect Each Other: Michel Henry’s “Pathos-With” and the Enactive Ap98 -
proach to Intersubjectivity’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 22, no. 1-2 (2015), 112-132 (p. 126).
 Zahavi, ‘Empathy and mirroring’, in Life, Subjectivity & Art, ed. by Breeur and Melle, p. 232.99
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conflicting claims that empathy can provide us with an original experience of the con-
sciousness of the other, and that the latter always in some sense remains an absolute al-
terity for us.    100
 In fact, if we focus closer in on the special form of apperception that is at work 
in empathy, then it becomes all the more apparent how this is achieved.  As Husserl of-
ten states, this form of apperception is not an act of thinking or inference, but involves 
what he refers to as an analogical transference of sense, which is achieved via a passive 
pairing of certain aspects of the self and the other.   As we have seen, it is one’s own 101
body, as an interplay of ipseity and alterity, that serves as the basis for this transfer of 
sense.  On our account, it is because the subject experiences its own body in a pre-re-
flective and non-objectifying self-sensing, and also sees and feels itself as an external 
physical object, that this sense of subjectivity can be apperceptively carried over and 
seen in the other.  It bears noting, however, that we are not here describing a temporal 
genesis.  This self-experience does not have to be temporally prior to that of the other. 
Rather, there simply needs to be a kind of self-givenness in order for the transfer of 
sense to be carried out.  102
 The groundwork for Husserl’s account of pairing has already been laid.  As we 
know, in his account of intentionality, Husserl finds that experiences are gradually sed-
imented and passively synthesised into patterns of understanding that continue to influ-
ence and shape the subject’s subsequent interpretation or understanding of things.  For 
instance, after having experienced a red apple, the subject’s subsequent apprehension of 
a red apple, or other things that in some way resemble it, will contain certain passive 
 Ibid., pp. 233-234.  Husserl emphasises the absolute otherness of the other in Zur Phänomenologie 100
der Intersubjektivität: Erster Teil: 1905-1920, p. 6.
 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 108-109, 111-113101
 Zahavi, ‘Empathy and mirroring’, in Life, Subjectivity & Art, ed. by Breeur and Melle, p. 238.102
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associations — i.e. an analogical link — with its prior experience of red apples, as well 
other similar things, and will thereby influence the new experience — just as, converse-
ly, the new experience can influence prior experiences.   
 Similarly, when I apperceive another human subject, my self-experience will 
serve as a 'primal norm’ and fund of meaning, which can be passively transferred to the 
other.   Indeed, as our earlier analysis helps suggest, it is not only, or even primarily, 103
the similar visual appearance of the other that inspires this analogical transference of 
sense.  The fact that the other feels and behaves in ways similar to myself plays an im-
portant part in this as well.    
 However, it is something of an open question as to how this primal norm of the 
living subject should be understood.  On the one hand, Husserl does emphasise the role 
of analogy in the apperception of others.  On this reading, when the subject apperceives 
the other as a lived body, the analogical apperception of the other involves a representa-
tion of the subject’s own self-experience, a representation that, as a matter of necessity, 
ultimately points back to the subject’s original presentation to herself.   On the other 104
hand, though, Husserl no less stresses the fact that empathy is not a mere reproduction 
of oneself; that when I apperceive the other, I do not merely apperceive me myself at a 
distance.    105
 Our earlier analysis of background feelings can help us better resolve these 
seemingly conflicting claims.  While the analogy is not a perfect one, where attune-
ments serve as a foil against which particular feelings and emotions stand out, so too the 
primal norm of the subject’s self-experience, rather than functioning as a model, can be 
 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p., 126.103
 Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Erster Teil: 1905-1920, pp. 251-252.104
 Ibid., p. 188.105
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understood as a foil against which the difference of the other can reveal itself.   In this 106
case, while the subject’s self-experience remains a necessary condition for the experi-
ence of the other, it is simply the foil against which the other can be immediately apper-
ceived as she really is in herself, rather than the model in relation to which she would be 
but an altered projection.    107
 As Husserl recognises, this transfer of sense is not unidirectional but bidirec-
tional or reciprocal.   Through its encounter with the other, the subject does not only 108
experience the difference of the other in an immediate and genuine manner, but she can 
also experience herself as encountered as a living and breathing agent by a fellow 
world-directed subject, and thereby come to understand that she herself belongs to an 
objective common world.  For one, the fact that the transfer of sense occurs as this ‘mu-
tual awakening’ highlights the fact that the other who is encountered therein is not 
merely my own projection, but a genuinely sensing and experiencing subject in her own 
right.   While Henry was not wrong that Husserl did not fully recognise or appreciate 109
the role of affectivity in our experience of other, this indicates that he was mistaken in 
suggesting that he did not sufficiently distinguish between how we experience objects 
and other living subjects.  Moreover, this further indicates that, despite Henry’s insis-
tence to the contrary, as important as affectivity is in our experience of the world, it is 
not in and of itself able to provide us with all of the richness and diversity of experi-
ence.  While the non-objectifying self-sensing of life provides the individual with a 
 The difference between the two cases in question is that whereas particular feelings stand out against 106
the subject’s attunements as peaks in the continuum of the subject’s self-experience, the other stands out 
in its genuine otherness from the subject.  For more on this matter, see Zahavi, ‘Empathy and mirroring’, 
in Life, Subjectivity & Art, ed. by Breeur and Melle, pp. 240-241. 
 Ibid.107
 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 113.108
 Ibid.109
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primal sense of self, empathic understanding provides the subject with a fuller and more 
complex self-experience.  
 It is worth noting, nonetheless, that in his later years, Husserl attempts to draw 
attention to the fact that our interrelation with others also unfolds on the level of nor-
mality and historicity.   On this account, the subject’s experiences are in part steered 110
by anticipations of normality.   When the subject constitutes and apprehends others 111
and the world as a whole, she does so through certain normal structures and patterns of 
understanding that have been sedimented over time.  Importantly, these typical struc-
tures and patterns include those of convention, which transcends any particular individ-
ual.   Therefore, as Zahavi notes, the individual’s apprehension of things necessarily 112
involves  
indeterminate general demands made by custom and tradition: ‘One’ judges thus, 
‘one’ holds the fork in such and such a way, etc.  What is normal I learn from 
Others (and firs and foremost from my closest relatives, that is by the people by 
whom I am brought up, and who educate me), and I am thereby involved in a 
common tradition, which through a chain of generations stretches back into a dim 
past.   113
As a matter of course, then, when the aforementioned mutual awakening occurs in an 
empathetic transfer of sense, and the individual apprehends the other and herself as be-
longing to an objective, shared world, she necessarily does so in terms of these typical 
structures and conventional, handed-down (i.e. historical) norms and patterns of under-
standing.     
 As the preceding analysis demonstrates, Husserl himself clearly views intersubjectivity as consisting 110
in various layers — something that has often gone overlooked by commentators.
 Ibid., pp. 125-126.  Zahavi develops this point in ‘Husserl’s Intersubjective Transformation of Tran111 -
scendental Philosophy’, p. 234.
 Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Dritter Teil: 1929-1935, ed. by Iso Kern 112
(Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 611; Zahavi, ‘Husserl’s Intersubjective Transformation of Tran-
scendental Philosophy’, p. 234.
 Ibid.113
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 Ultimately, Husserl appears to identify at least two basic kinds of normality.  For 
one, there is the normality of those who have reached a certain level of linguistic and 
cognitive development; the normality of rational and healthy individuals of a certain 
maturity.  In this case, the abnormal would include infants and those who deviate from 
physical and psychological norms (i.e. those who are deaf or psychotic).   At the same 114
time, there would also be the normality proper to those individuals who belong to a par-
ticular home-world, and who thereby apprehend themselves and others through the lan-
guage and handed-down norms that comprise the life-world in which they have been 
reared.   In this case, those who belong to foreign life-worlds would be regarded as the 115
abnormal.   That is, at least until the foreign life-world in question is in some way ex116 -
perienced and apprehended as such, in which case its members can come to be seen as 
belonging to a ‘foreign normality’.  117
 This means that when any given subject apprehends things as valid and there for 
everyone, everyone here means those who satisfy the criteria for normality.  However, 
as disagreements invariably arise between members of any given life-world, these dif-
fering positions, if or when they are synthesised into a richer view of the world, can 
help motivate a shift from the ‘“normal” objectivity’ that belongs to a particular histori-
 Ibid.114
 In brief, Husserl understands the life-world as the typical structures and linguistic and socio-cultural 115
norms that underlie and make possible the universe in which the subject finds itself immersed.  As such, it 
consists in the pre-theoretical and unthematic way of life that belongs to the individuals of a particular 
historical community.  Given our present aims, we cannot delve into this matter at any further length. 
Husserl provides an extensive treatment of the life-world in the Crisis.  It also figures in the Cartesian 
Meditations, and in Experience and Judgment.  For an accessible and more extended study of Husserl’s 
treatment of this matter, see Kevin Hermberg’s Husserl’s Phenomenology: Knowledge, Objectivity and 
Others (New York: Continuum, 2006).
 Zahavi, ’Husserl’s Intersubjective Transformation of Transcendental Philosophy’, p. 234.116
 Ibid.117
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cal community, to a more ‘“rigorous” objectivity’ that belongs to any and all living and 
breathing subjects.    118
 As this indicates, the constitution of an objective common world is an ongoing 
historical process.  It is not a one-way street but consists in various layers that mutually 
motivate and modify one another.  In sum, given the all-founding nature of affectivity, 
even the insights that are gleaned on these higher levels of objectivity would necessarily 
feed back into and be undergone on a non-objectifying affective level, leaving us with a 
rich interweaving of the objective and pre-objective life-worlds. 
 Ibid; Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Zweiter Teil: 1921-1928, p. 111.118
 245
CHAPTER 6 
BECOMING FULLY ALIVE 
The previous chapter allowed us to reach some determinations regarding the nature and 
essential structures of transcendental subjectivity, and to draw attention to the way in 
which phenomenology can still strive to attest to these structures.  It remains for us to 
determine, in this final chapter of our study, how this shift to the philosophical attitude 
comes about.  What, in other words, is the unity of motivation that enables the subject to 
take up this shift in attitude?  
 Moreover, if transcendental subjectivity no longer stands outside the actual his-
torical world, but always already belongs together with it, then what ramifications does 
this have on the way in which the living subject can assume some distance towards the 
familiarity and obviousness (and absolutization) of the world that characterises the (the-
sis of the) natural attitude and come to a higher awareness of it as such? While the pre-
ceding analysis has allowed us to better understand that phenomenology is indeed one 
way in which the individual can pursue this goal, in light of these considerations, can it 
really be said that it is the only, or even the highest, one? To put it differently, is the 
problematisation of the subject’s absorption in the world the privilege of the philoso-
pher, or is it a broader movement or phenomenon that characterises other facets of life 
as well? And if so, how do these forms of life relate? Is there a highest form of life, an 
ideal way of knowing and attesting to who or what we are?  
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6.1 LIFE’S UNITY OF MOTIVATION AND THE NATURAL ATTITUDE 
To begin to address these questions, let us turn to the work of Husserl.  For Husserl, 
consciousness is ultimately understood as ‘an absolute domain of being’, and as a ratio-
nal infinite process of self-constitution, which is determined in advance by God, under-
stood as the ultimate logos or rational principle.   This leads him to view philosophy as 1
the infinite task of coming to know this absolute foundation and of thereby achieving 
perfect self-justification (i.e. truth, total self-disclosure) for all of one’s positions (i.e. by 
grasping the essence of things in evidence).  In his eyes, it is this idea of philosophy, 
this idea of philosophy as rigorous science and first philosophy, that serves as the unity 
of motivation which enables the shift from the natural to the philosophical attitude.  
 Yet our studies require us to take another route.  Insofar as all experience and 
knowledge is structured by the transcendental life of the subject in its original and in-
eluctable bond with the world, it follows that it is this worldly life of the subject that 
determines the course of consciousness as an infinite movement, and which thereby en-
ables the individual to problematise her natural attitude and assume a philosophical atti-
tude.   It is, in other words, the needs and drives of life, as entwined with and co-deter2 -
mined by the world, that serve as the unity of motivation which makes such changes 
possible.  
 It now remains for us to determine exactly how this process unfolds.  The previ-
ous chapter revealed that, by virtue of its essential structures, the living subject first ex-
periences and comes to be oriented towards the world and others through enkinaesthesia 
 Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 133-134.1
 Given that, on our account, the subject can never wholly overcome the natural attitude, we will refer to 2
any movement in which the subject assumes some distance toward her natural attitude as the problemati-
sation of the latter.
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and, in particular, through the feeling of trust, understood as the feeling of safety and 
confidence in one’s openness and vulnerability to the world.  By virtue of this affective 
orientation toward the world, we witnessed how the subject comes to accept, mimic and 
internalise the norms, language, and patterns of understanding of her lifeworld.   
 In our view, then, the living subject’s cognitive belief in the independent exis-
tence of the world is founded upon this feeling of trust.  On the basis of this feeling, the 
living subject uncritically accepts the absolute existence of the world and thereby takes 
its existence for granted; she comes to regard the objects, events and norms of the life-
world as obvious and familiar.   In her infatuation with this lifeworld, the subject in the 3
natural attitude sees no need to question its origin or constitution.  In turn, this assured 
belief only further reinforces the subject’s non-objectifying feeling of familiarity with 
the lifeworld, where familiarity is understood as a feeling of comfort and closeness. 
 On account of this trust and unreflecting acceptance of the norms, values and 
beliefs of her lifeworld, the subject in the natural attitude tends not to fully live up to the 
heights of her energy and her drive for self-growth, but to opt instead for familiar and 
safe patterns of action.  The natural attitude is thus characterised by a certain stagnancy. 
The individual who relates to the world in this way invariably becomes lodged in a de-
limited set of feelings, habits, norms and beliefs, and, as such, even when boredom and 
dissatisfaction with her lifeworld begin to mount, she tends to feel unwilling to do any-
thing to work her way out of it in any significant way.  With the subject’s discontent 
 In his later work, Husserl similarly comes to regard the natural attitude and the lifeworld as correlates. 3
Indeed, as Luft writes, ‘[t]his correlation becomes so close in Husserl’s latest years that the lifeworld and 
the NA [natural attitude] become almost indistinguishable from each other.  This becomes evident when 
he speaks of a “natural world life” which has to be understood as an abbreviation of “living in the life-
world in the NA”.  Every type of phenomenology of the lifeworld therefore includes the NA as its essen-
tial correlate and cannot disregard it without losing a necessary element within its account’.  Sebastien 
Luft, ‘Husserl’s Notion of the Natural Attitude and the Shift to Transcendental Phenomenology’, in Phe-
nomenology World-Wide Foundations - Expanding Dynamics - Life-Engagements: A Guide for Research 
and Study, ed. by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: Springer, 2002), pp. 114-118 (p. 118).  Overcom-
ing this natural attitude of the ‘life world’ is, however, necessary for Husserl, as another way to transcen-
dental phenomenology that he had already established in Ideas I.
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with the lifeworld and her not living fully, a drive for destruction and death, therefore, 
seeps into her flesh and begins to influence her feelings, actions, judgments, and so on. 
Here stands the natural attitude that the living subject, in her basic bond with the world, 
can never entirely suspend.  To be sure, certain experiences within the flow of life can 
alter (positively or negatively) or even annul the sense of trust the individual feels to-
ward certain situations, individuals and ideas.  Yet, given the strength of the subject’s 
early fetal experiences, and the enduring passive associations and expectations they cre-
ate, as well as the regularity with which the world continues to meet her needs in vary-
ing degrees throughout her life, at the most general level, her background feeling of 
trust in relation to the world remains over the course of her lifetime.   
6.2 WONDER AND THE PROBLEMATISATION OF THE WORLD’S OBVIOUSNESS 
If this is so, then it follows that the shift in question must be brought about by some 
type of shock or problematisation.  In this case, our present aim would be well served 
by our taking up a study of the feeling of wonder or awe .  As we will show, the experi4 -
ence of wonder, as a particular affect, bears a close tie to the living subject’s vital, in-
stinctive curiosity, and it serves as one of the prominent ways in which the subject as-
sumes some distance toward her unquestioning acceptance of her lifeworld.  By investi-
gating this matter, our study will have the secondary benefit of filling a significant hole 
in Henry’s own analysis of affectivity.  As much as Henry offers one of the most exten-
sive and detailed accounts of the fundamental role of affectivity in the life of the indi-
vidual, and in his conception of first philosophy as a philosophy of affectivity in partic-
 We use the concepts of wonder and awe interchangeably.4
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ular, one does not find an especially robust analysis of the concrete forms taken by af-
fectivity.  5
 However, as Jean-Sébastien Hardy points out, as soon as we take into considera-
tion Henry’s unrelenting focus on drawing out and establishing the seminal importance 
of affectivity, this glaring deficiency becomes at least somewhat more understandable.  6
On Henry’s account, particular affects are ‘a secondary or derivative mode of affectivi-
ty’, such that ‘its interest is only accessory, if not accidental’.  7
 Whatever the reason for this relative neglect in Henry’s work, this calls for a 
more precise analysis of the intelligence of particular affective sonorities.   For our 8
present purposes, wonder is a most apt starting point.   The Latin equivalents of wonder 9
are admiratio (i.e. admiration) and mirabilia (i.e. marvels or miracles).  These Latin 
cognates suggest that wonder has to do with an attunement to the excellent (i.e. virtu-
ous) and the rare.  Along these lines, in the dictionary, wonder, taken as a noun, refers to 
a feeling of surprise mixed with admiration (or reverence), as caused by something 
beautiful, unfamiliar, unexpected or inexplicable.   As a verb, to wonder means to feel 
curious, to feel astonishment, admiration and doubt. 
 Jean-Sébastien Hardy, for one, makes this point in ‘Life Turned Against Itself: Is There a Theory of the 5
Passions in Michel Henry?’, Analecta-Hermeneutica 8 (2016), 149-165.
 Ibid., p. 152.6
 Ibid.7
 As Jean-François Lavigne puts this: ‘Henry’s phenomenology of feeling (sentiment) has paved the way 8
for a transcendental and phenomenological inquiry into affectivity and its multiple modes, understood as 
the primary source of all intelligibility.  It calls for a precise and diverse analysis of the universe of the 
affects, which would be able to show the intelligence within affectivity, in a burgeoning state, in its origi-
nal form’.  Jean-François Lavigne, ‘Conclusions…en forme d’ouverture’ in Michel Henry: Pensée de la 
vie et culture contemporaine, ed. by Jean-François Lavigne (Paris: Beauchesne, 2006), pp. 315-318 (pp. 
315-317).
 Though wonder plays a prominent role in problematising the subject’s natural attitude, this is not to say 9
that it is alone in this respect.  Other feelings can do so as well, and, indeed, we will touch on some of 
them at a later point.  Needless to say, though, we cannot provide an exhaustive account of these senti-
ments here.  Our aim is to merely lay the groundwork for understanding some of the more prominent af-
fective sonorities that carry out this function.
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 Apart from the above-mentioned characteristics, the feeling of wonder also tends 
to involve a feeling of humility, ‘a significantly smaller sense of self’, as well as a ‘need 
for accommodation’, which is to say, a feeling ‘that the stimulus cannot be assimilated 
into current mental structures, thus necessitating changes to basic beliefs, categories, 
and schemas’.   As Amie Gordon and others have further noted, there is evidence to 10
suggest that the feeling of wonder can have positive social effects as well.  Wonder, as a 
feeling of astonishment before a particular object or event, and thus as a self-transcen-
dent experience, can intensify an individual’s feeling that she is a part of an intersubjec-
tive world that is greater than herself.   Altogether, then, the feeling of wonder has the 11
ability to shake the living subject from the familiarity and obviousness of her natural 
attitude, and to compel her to rethink its significance.   
 We find further confirmation of this definition in the history of philosophy.  In 
The Passions of the Soul, for instance, Descartes describes wonder as follows:  
[w]hen our first encounter with some object surprises us and we find it novel, or 
very different from what we formerly knew or from what we supposed it ought to 
be, this causes us to wonder and to be astonished at it.  Since all this may happen 
before we know whether or not the object is beneficial to us, I regard wonder as 
the first of all passions.  It has no opposite, for, if the object before us has no char-
acteristics that surprise us, we are not moved by it at all and we consider it with-
out passion.    12
As Spinoza notes, such wonderment is not only experienced in one’s relation to external 
objects, but also in the experience of oneself.  In his words, ‘[w]hen the mind regards its 
own self and its power of activity, it feels pleasure, and the more so, the more distinctly 
it imagines itself and its power of affectivity’.  13
 Amie M. Gordon et al., ‘The Dark Side of the Sublime: Distinguishing a Threat-Based Variant of Awe’, 10
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 113, no. 2 (2017), 310-328 (p. 311).
 Ibid., pp. 310-311.11
 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1, p. 350.12
 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, trans. by Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1992), p. 135.13
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 Of course, we needn’t necessarily agree with all aspects of these accounts.  For 
example, Descartes tends to depict wonder as something of which the subject is always 
objectively aware.  Yet it should be evident from our foregoing studies that this needn’t 
be so.  The subject can experience a primal sense of wonderment as a non-objectifying 
feeling of this or that.  Her perceptual consciousness can be led blindly — in the sense 
of lacking noematic sense — through the world in a feeling of wonder.   
 Regardless, what these descriptions help draw out is the deep tie between the 
intentional structure of wonder, since wonder is always a feeling directed toward some-
thing, even if only in a non-objectifying manner, to the subject’s instinctive curiosity 
and drive for self-enhancement, as well as its seemingly prominent role in problematis-
ing the obviousness of the lifeworld.  When some aspect of ourselves or the world con-
travenes our primal sense of familiarity and confidence in it, the living subject under-
goes a feeling of wonder or awe, understood as a blended feeling of astonishment, ad-
miration, doubt, and heightened humility and curiosity.  In turn, this feeling can arouse 
the subject to question and think about the norms of the lifeworld and how it has come 
to be as such, and these higher-order changes can themselves then feed back and be un-
dergone as non-objectifying affective tonalities.   
 This is not to say that all experiences of wonder have this effect.  Wonder can 
issue from a wide variety of stimuli: certain ideas, religious rituals or experiences, the 
sight of powerful cultural figures, nature, natural events, and so forth.   Yet not all of 14
them will invariably exert enough allure on the living subject to elicit such a response. 
In what follows, we will limit ourselves to an analysis of those modes of experience that 
tend to elicit intense feelings of wonder, and which thereby figure as some of the more 
prominent ways in which the problematisation of the natural attitude is brought about. 
 Gordon et al., ‘The Dark Side of the Sublime: Distinguishing a Threat-Based Variant of Awe’, p. 311.14
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6.3 ART 
As suggested earlier, the feeling of wonder or awe often appears to be brought on by the 
experience of something that strikes us as beautiful, although, to be sure, it does not 
only arise in the experience of beauty.  Therefore, it stands to reason that art, as a high 
form of culture that concerns itself with creating and appreciating beauty, will figure 
prominently in the subject’s experience of wonder.  As we explored earlier, where things 
in daily life tend to abide by the principles of concentric construction and lead to ‘muf-
fled resonances that are [largely] inaudible due to the fact that they have already been 
heard’, art, as a more rigorous and precise attempt to express the affective movements 
of life, generally proves more capable of producing ‘unforeseen configurations’ that ap-
peal to our senses, that strike us with surprise and astonishment, and which lead us to 
wonder and contemplate the world.   Abstract art, for instance, with its ‘overturned edi15 -
fices, arborescent entities viewed from unrepresentable perspectives, metallic cones in a 
state of suspense, rays exploding like firework rockets, joined angles, enigmatic grids 
and diagonals launching an attack’, can shake the individual from the familiarity and 
obviousness of the world by challenging her expectations, rousing her feelings in new, 
unexpected and even inexplicable ways, and by thereby bringing her to wonder and to 
delight in this intensification of her sense of agency and power.  16
 Of course, since the aesthetic principles that guide art are also those of the 
world, certain rare experiences in the latter can produce similar effects.  Kandinsky pro-
vides us with a fine example of this.  Famously, Kandinsky writes: ‘“I regard the entire 
 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, p. 140.15
 Ibid.16
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city of Moscow […] as the origin of my ambitions”’.   His experience of the city leaves 17
such a lingering impression on him that he strives to capture it time and again.  Re-
counting a trip to the modest Medieval German town Rothenburg-ob-der-Tauber, after 
which he painting a work that would later be entitled ‘The Old Town’, Kandinsky 
writes:  
[e]ven in this picture, I was actually hunting for a particular hour, which always 
was and remains the most beautiful hour of the Moscow day.  The sun is already 
getting low and has attained its full intensity which it has been seeking all day, for 
which it has striven all day.  This image does not last long: a few minutes, and the 
sunlight grows red with effort, redder and redder, cold at first, and then increasing 
in warmth.  The sun dissolves the whole of Moscow into a single spot, which, like 
a wild tuba, sets all one’s soul vibrating.  No, this red fusion is not the most beau-
tiful hour! It is only the final chord of the symphony, which brings every colour 
vividly to life, which allows and forces the whole of Moscow to resound like the 
instruments of a giant orchestra.  Pink, lilac, yellow, white, blue, pistachio green, 
flame red houses, churches, each an independent song — the garish green of the 
grass, the deeper tremolo of the trees, the singing snow with its thousand voices, 
or the allegretto of the bare branches, the red, stiff, silent ring of the Kremlin 
walls, and above, towering over everything, like a shout of triumph, like a self-
oblivious hallelujah, the long, white, graceful, serious line of the Bell Tower of 
Ivan the Great.  And upon its tall, tense neck, stretched up towards heaven in eter-
nal yearning, the golden head of the cupola, which among the golden and 
coloured stars of the other cupolas, is Moscow’s sun.  To paint this hour, I 
thought, must be for an artist the most impossible, the greatest joy.  These impres-
sions were repeated on each sunny day.  They were a delight that shook me to the 
depths of my soul, that raised me to ecstasy.  18
These pointed reflections bear out the intense feeling of wonder (i.e. astonishment, ad-
miration, curiosity, etc.) that the world can arouse, and which can to some extent wrestle 
an individual from the familiarity and obviousness of the lifeworld.  Prior to all judg-
 Ibid., p. 17.17
 Ibid., pp. 17-18.  We find another compelling example of this wonderment in Kandinsky’s account of 18
his experience of his first paintbox: ‘“I can still feel today the sensation I experienced then — or, to put it 
better, the experience I underwent then — of the paints emerging from the tube.  One squeeze of the fin-
gers, and out came these strange beings, one after the other, which one calls colours — exultant, solemn, 
brooding, dreamy, self-absorbed, deeply serious, with roguish exuberance, with a sigh of release, with a 
deep sound of mourning, with defiant power and resistance, with submissive suppleness and devotion, 
with obstinate self-control, with sensitive, precarious balance.  Living an independent life of their own, 
with all the necessary qualities for further, autonomous existence, prepared to make way readily, in an 
instant, for new combinations, to mingle with one another and create an infinite succession of new 
worlds”’.  Ibid., p. 29. 
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ment, this feeling of wonder can better attune the subject to the beauty of the necessity 
of things, which is to say, to their excellence (i.e. virtuousness), to their inner nature and 
astonishing uncanniness, which is rarely ever glimpsed.  When this lightning strikes, 
however, as it did for Kandinsky, it can spur one on to an infinite creative activity.  As 
Kandinsky writes, ‘“I have only painted Moscow my entire life.”’  19
 If we acknowledge that the so-called laws of art, the laws which provide the cri-
teria for the success and failure of its works, are also those that orient the subject’s 
everyday existence within the lifeworld,  then introspective reflection on one’s experi20 -
ence of such artworks can indeed help enable the subject to problematise the obvious-
ness of the lifeworld and to achieve some insight into how the sense of the latter is con-
stituted by the hidden art of her soul and its essential structures.   For example, on the 21
basis of the wonder an individual feels before a great artwork, she can reflect on her ex-
perience, whether on her own or with the assistance of art theorists, and eventually 
come to sense and know that her bodily needs, drives and desires are transcendental 
conditions of the lifeworld; that, accordingly, she is a meaningful (aesthetic) order of 
life who is responsible for the sense of the lifeworld; that the lifeworld is not something 
that exists on its own, independent of human beings, as something that does not neces-
sarily say anything fundamental about who we are — as if the configuration of the 
 Ibid., p. 19.19
 As Henry writes, ‘[t]he greatest painters […] have lived and presented their art as a mode of metaphys20 -
ical knowledge’.  Ibid., p. 18.
 This would be introspection and reflection on an everyday level — mundane reflection, if you like — 21
and not the more sophisticated phenomenological variety.  Introspection is here understood as a reflective 
looking into one’s experience and the way of experiencing it.  As Christopher Gutland argues, phenome-
nology, as a transcendental method, can be regarded as a more refined (i.e. systematic and scientific) form 
of introspection.  As Gutland notes, while Husserl distinguishes his method from psychology’s inner ob-
servation, ‘he occasionally characterised it as introspection’.  Christopher Gutland, ‘Husserlian Phenome-
nology as a Kind of Introspection’, Frontiers in Psychology 9 (2018), 1-14 (p. 1); Husserl, Zur Phänome-
nologie der Intersubjektivität: Dritter Teil: 1929-1935, p. 23.
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world is ‘just the way things are’ — but that the two are inextricably interwoven, such 
that the sense of the latter always speaks to the depths of our nature. 
 Indeed, there is nothing that prevents at least certain artists from attaining some 
measure of insight into their work and, by extension, the lifeworld.  Needless to say, not 
all artists are privy to such insight.  As is well known, Plato exiles the poets from the 
Republic,  in part, because their works appear to be divinely inspired; they appear to 22
issue from some mysterious, non-rational impulse outside their own self.  Hence the 
reason why artists often cannot themselves explain what they create.   That being said, 23
while artistic works can indeed issue from the non-objectifying impulses of the individ-
uals own life, given that such drives involve an objectifying moment, they are necessari-
ly linked to reason, such that the latter are but a higher-level realisation of the former. 
Because of this, the impulsions that inspire works of art can be brought to the level of 
objectifying thought to some extent, even if not entirely, which enables the artist to re-
flect on her productive activity and what it reveals about her lifeworld.  To the extent 
this is the case, these newly won insights can in turn influence, and even enhance, the 
way the artist goes about her creative endeavours. 
 Kandinsky is an exemplary case of an artist who achieved this theoretical in-
sight.  Owing to the wonder he underwent in his experience of the city of Moscow, as 
we observed in our third chapter, Kandinsky lays out a detailed and extensive treatment 
not only of the so-called laws of art and beauty, but also of the essential and universal 
 Yet brilliantly uses ‘myth' and ‘myths’ to develop and articulate his philosophy, i.e. mythos and logos 22
are indistinguishable in Plato in some contexts.  Of course, we cannot expound upon this further here.
 Plato, The Republic, trans. by Tom Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 23
313-346.
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role of sensibility in structuring the lifeworld, and in rendering it a fundamentally aes-
thetic one.   24
 While one needn’t agree with all aspects of Kandinsky’s insights, or Henry’s in-
terpretation of them, such reflective engagements, although not necessarily obtained 
through the same methods as phenomenology, can indeed shake the individual out of 
her dogmatic slumber and problematise the familiarity and obviousness of the world.  In 
fact, it can hardly be denied that the novel or unfamiliar ideas found in such reflections, 
or in the history of Western thought more generally, can themselves serve as a source of 
wonder and thereby dislodge the subject from her natural attitude in a similar manner.  25
 It would therefore seem that the living subject can problematise her natural atti-
tude and strive to know and attest to the hidden art of life and its essential structures in 
ways that stand outside of phenomenological philosophy.  We know where Husserl 
stands on this matter.  Husserl believes it to be the privilege of phenomenological phi-
losophy to attest to the inner nature of the ultimate foundation of the world.  As we’ve 
seen, and as other commentators have noted, Husserl believes it is the position of a tran-
scendental spectator that ‘enables us to best understand ourselves and our relation to 
what is’.   Because of this, as Bernet rightly notes, Husserl thought the performance of 26
his transcendental reduction and its ‘(endless) theoretical investigation […] to be the 
 Michel Henry, ‘Kandinsky and the Meaning of the Work of Art’, in The Michel Henry Reader, ed. by 24
Scott Davidson and Frédéric Seyler (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2019), pp. 181-192 (p. 
183); Kandinsky, Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art, ed. by Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo, p. 
176.
 Amie Gordon identifies the ability of novel ideas to elicit a feeling of wonder or awe in ‘The Dark Side 25
of the Sublime: Distinguishing a Threat-Based Variant of Awe’, p. 311.
 Dodd, ‘Attitude-Facticity-Philosophy’, in Alterity and Facticity, ed. by Natalie Depraz and Dan Za26 -
havi, p. 74.  As Dodd asks, ‘[i]s it really the case that the relation between the world and the life that lives 
in and in terms of the truth of this world can best be understood vis-à-vis this model of an intellectual 
grasp of an object, a theoria[?] Is the “understanding” of the world basic to life — life as it is lived, not 
life as a theoretical construct — an understanding for which the world is a spectacle? Is the knowledge 
that we are seeking when we turn to philosophy, the understanding which reveals the origin of the sense 
of the world in general, predicated on the realization of a transcendental spectator (Zuschauer)? When we 
speak of “understanding”, even “conceiving” the world, does such theatrics exhaust the meaning of such 
conception?’ Ibid.
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best and worthiest form of human life’.   However, with the acknowledgement of the 27
absolutely basic character of bodily life, and its immersion and involvement in an inter-
subjective and historical world, this can no longer be the case.  In undergoing an intense 
feeling of wonder or awe before the beauty of an artwork or that of the lifeworld, the 
subject who is sufficiently moved can find herself compelled to problematise and clarify 
the natural attitude by producing and/or studying works of art. 
 In fact, insofar as the hidden art of life consists in the pre-individual, pre-reflec-
tive and non-objectifying self-sensing of the living present, in that mysterious and sub-
lime moment of life that can be indeterminately felt but never seen, it may be said that, 
historically speaking, the arts have generally displayed a greater attentiveness to the in-
ner nature of life than has philosophy, with the latter’s dominant focus on the objectivity 
of things. 
 While Henry thus remains correct in the limited sense that an engagement with 
the arts, as a form of high culture, does indeed serve as a prominent way in which the 
subject can come to know and attest to the oft-overlooked inner nature of things and 
their fundamental structures, he is mistaken in contending that thought and other objec-
tifying acts of consciousness do not play an essential role in this process.  As a result, 
thinking and living — i.e. the theoretical and the practical — should not be separated as 
they are in Henry, with the former being secondary and subordinate to the latter, and 
eventually giving way to it, as we witnessed in the previous chapter.  While it is true 
that an excessively analytical approach to the world can potentially sully one’s experi-
 Rudolf Bernet, ‘Perception as a Teleological Process of Cognition’, in The Teleologies in Husserlian 27
Phenomenology, ed. by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing), pp. 
119-132 (p. 131).
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ence of the very object one wishes to illuminate,  thinking is itself a practical activity, 28
and can just as well play a positive role in enabling the individual to further draw out 
the living heart of things throughout the course of her lifetime.  
6.4 LOVE 
In any event, when the living subject is appropriately moved to problematise the natural 
attitude, this movement involves a sense of self-giving love.  Wonder bears a close fam-
ily tie to love in that it often arouses the latter, understood as a feeling of deep affection 
and admiration for something, as an intense feeling of joy, power and calm.  As this de-
scription of agape love suggests, we find that agape love always involves an element of 
eros (i.e. a passion or desire motivated by an object).  Such love always involves our 
being directed toward something that strikes us as alluring.  In this respect, we would 
agree with Felix Ó Murchadha when he states that ‘to think agape without eros, or eros 
without agape, misses an essential messiness in love, a lack of purity, a contamination 
in love’.    29
 We recall that Henry himself regards life as a movement of self-giving (agape) 
love.  While we obviously cannot agree with all aspects of his account — for example, 
that agape love is the self-love of a radically immanent and non-intentional life; that it is 
 In his discussion of the neurotic personality, Otto Rank similarly identifies overthinking as something 28
that can be deleterious to the life of the individual.  See Otto Rank, Beyond Psychology (New York: 
Dover Publications, 1958), pp. 48-50.
 Felix Ó Murchadha, ‘Love’s Conditions: Passion and the Practice of Philosophy’, in Thinking About 29
Love: Essays in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, ed. by Diane Enns and Antonio Calcagno (Penn-
sylvania, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2015), 81-97 (p. 87).  For a critical reading of Henry’s 
treatment of love, and of some of the assumptions and prejudices that predominate in conceptions of love 
within contemporary French phenomenology, see Christina M. Gschwandtner, ‘The Phenomenon of 
Kenotic Love in Continental Philosophy of Religion’, in Thinking About Love: Essays in Contemporary 
Continental Philosophy, ed. by Diane Enns and Antonio Calcagno (Pennsylvania, The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2015), 63-80.
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indifferent to anything outside itself and without any trace of eros  — what remains 30
pertinent in this account is his acknowledgment of the central role love plays in the life 
of the subject, as well as his understanding that this love is not merely a feeling but an 
infinite praxis or action.   
 Indeed, it bears noting that Husserl was not without an appreciation for the im-
portance of love either.  In some of his late manuscripts, Husserl describes a personal 
and pure love for an absolute ought or value that is more basic than the subject’s percep-
tion of a particular good as that which is objectively best.  As Ullrich Melle remarks, 
what Husserl stresses here is that ‘[o]ne has to distinguish between the objective value 
and the same value as an individual, subjective value of love.  A pure and true love is 
not only a value-perception, but a loving embrace and choice of the value out of the 
most inward centre of the subject’.   For Husserl, this absolute value, vocation or call31 -
ing of the living subject consists in an affection that precedes rational explanation, but 
which also necessarily involves an element of choice and decision.  As a calling that 
issues from the heart of the individual, as Melle indicates, Husserl finds that ‘“to go 
 As Jean-Sébastien Hardy points out, in his late, unpublished manuscripts, ‘Henry’s philosophy of love 30
culminates in some daring consequences: “Dialecticians say: to love is to treat [the Other] as an absolute 
value; but that is false.  Jesus saw John and loved him; that definitely does not mean that Jesus treats John 
as an absolute value; to love someone is to be totally free from him […]; I would not mind if you were not 
there anymore.”  In this sense, what distinguishes pure love and mundane love (lived through the impas-
sionate lenses of jealousy, envy, competition, mimesis, etc.) is not the direction of the feeling (love for the 
other vs. egoistic love), but more profoundly the fact that true love has no direction and is indifferent to 
anything outside the gratuity of its affective revelation.  In other words, the joy of the living comes from a 
“love without alterity”, a love for life itself.  This astonishing thesis was programmed to be at the center 
of Henry’s last project that he never had the chance to finish, Le livre des morts, and gives us an idea of 
the notion of “clandestinity” that he wished to develop in this writing’.  Hardy, ‘Life Turned Against It-
self: Is There a Theory of the Passions in Michel Henry?’, p. 160.  While we might agree with Henry that 
the living subject can and does undergo a love for life as a whole, this love cannot take place outside the 
lifeworld.  Moreover, though such love is not dominated by competitiveness, jealousy or the desire to 
possess and control, that it is completely indifferent to the other — i.e. to her various worldly attributes 
and existence — to the point that one would not mind if she were not there anymore, seems to us to be 
quite wrong.  We can agree that love involves a kind of releasement (gelassenheit) or letting-be, in the 
sense of desiring that the other be free, that she realise her full potential and become who she is, whether 
that means her remaining here with me or not, but none of this requires the bizarre and, ultimately, inhu-
man sense of detachment for which Henry advocates.
 Ullrich Melle, ‘Edmund Husserl: From Reason to Love’, in Phenomenological Approaches to Moral 31
Philosophy: A Handbook, ed. by John J. Drummond and Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Springer, 2002), pp. 
229-248 (p. 238).
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against this value is to be untrue, to lose oneself, to betray one’s true “I”, which amounts 
to an “absolute practical contradiction”.  We have to follow the call of our individual 
conscience; we have to realize and preserve our true genuine self, be true to our deepest 
self, to the absolute ought of our pure love’.   However, as commentators have noted, 32
Husserl’s account of this love remains sketchy, and he ultimately does not provide a sys-
tematic account of its relation with reason.    33
 Be that as it may, what remains pertinent in Husserl’s account is that love issues 
from a deep affection that precedes rational explanation and which takes the form of a 
personal calling.  In keeping with the foregoing analysis, we would slightly diverge 
from Husserl in pointing out that this calling does not only strike but is to some extent 
carried out by the individual on an instinctual level.  Inasmuch as the non-objectifying 
drives of the subject serve as the basis of the normativity of experience, the feeling of 
love can itself not only create and embrace this absolute value, but it can even guide 
some of the individuals low-level perceptual activities.  As such, this non-objectifying 
feeling of love structures the way in which the subject can objectively evaluate and ap-
prehend herself, others and the world as a whole.   
 In this way, through the experience of wonder and love, the subject can become 
dedicated to a vocation that problematises the natural attitude and which involves her in 
an infinite creative activity.  We say infinite because the living subject’s primal feeling 
of the thing which arouses wonder and love in her flesh is one that, while inciting the 
subject to try and reflectively elucidate it, can never be wholly captured by any such 
attempt.  In a poem entitled ‘Les Pivoines’, Philippe Jaccottet speaks to this quite well 
 Ibid., p. 244.  Husserl goes on to discuss a community of love in Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjek32 -
tivität: Zweiter Teil: 1921-1928, pp. 165-184, 192-204.
 Melle, ‘Edmund Husserl: From Reason to Love’, in Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philoso33 -
phy: A Handbook, ed. by John J. Drummond and Lester Embree, p. 247.
 261
when he observes how the flowers he sees ‘abide in another world at the same time as in 
this one; that’s exactly why they slip away from you, obsess you’.   The flowers abide 34
in an affective non-objectifying lifeworld that, owing to the individual’s finite, perspec-
tival nature, can never be entirely thematised in the objective world of reflection.  Con-
sequently, this sets off an energy in the subject that can endlessly feed on itself.  The 
more the subject feels compelled to pursue this calling and to further her experience of 
it by actively taking it up on the level of a theoretical investigation, the more she dis-
covers that remains to be explored, and the more she discovers, the more she tends to 
feel compelled to further pursue and clarify this experience, which involves an endless 
problematisation and clarification of the natural attitude.  Because of this, the metaphys-
ical desire to achieve perfect self-presence can never be entirely overcome.  Love there-
by remains an infinite self-giving movement in that, for the subject who finds herself 
properly motivated, it drives her beyond merely engaging in disparate, arbitrary and fi-
nite relations that come and go, and compels her to give her life to an endless creative 
renewal of her given project(s) — as in the case of Kandinsky, who only painted Mos-
cow his entire life.  In so doing, love better enables the individual to fulfil her ongoing 
need for self-growth. 
6.5 ETHICS 
Yet this is not to say that the experience of wonder which fosters a problematisation of 
the natural attitude can only, or even primarily, be brought about through such aesthetic 
experiences and pursuits.  As we noted earlier, a sense of wonder can arise not only in 
 Philippe Jaccottet, ‘Apres beaucoup d’annees’, in Oeuvres, ed. by Jose-Flore Tappy, Herve Ferrage, 34
Doris Jakubec and Jean-Marc Soudillon (Paris: Gallimard, 2014), p. 821.
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the experience of beauty, but in the experience of something unfamiliar, unexpected or 
inexplicable.  And since, as we’ve seen, human sensibility is aesthetic and ethical in na-
ture, such that the two enjoy an internal link, it follows that the ethical domain, itself a 
form of high culture, would similarly serve as a prominent site from which such experi-
ences can take root.   35
 We believe we find a most striking example of how this may unfold within 
James Mensch’s Ethics and Selfhood.  In this work, Mensch describes an encounter be-
tween an individual and a Jewish woman who all of a sudden and quite unexpectedly 
shows up at one’s door in Eastern Europe during the time of the Holocaust.  Why is it, 
Mensch asks, that some people in this situation decided to help the stranger at their 
doorstep and others did not?   As I have stated elsewhere,  36
[i]n a unique and extreme case such as this, as Mensch points out, reductive psy-
chological explanations as to why certain individuals opted to provide this 
stranger with assistance and others did not seem inappropriate.  Apart from the 
fact that such extreme circumstances, characterised by ‘risk and secrecy’, do not 
lend themselves to being replicated in an experiment and thereby made available 
in an objective and public knowledge, Mensch notes that there is reason to doubt 
that the decision to help can be adequately accounted for by maintaining that such 
individuals were of an altruistic personality.  37
Mensch goes on to correctly note that  
[t]he altruist has a history, a personality that develops over time, one that comes 
finally to expression in a more or less fixed pattern of behaviour.  This is the be-
haviour of a person who seeks others out, searching for ways to help them.  By 
contrast, the rescuer, particularly in the East, does not seek to rescue, but rather is 
 Henry himself suggests something along these lines when he writes that ‘[e]thics develops in the foot35 -
steps of life and follows its progress step by step.  This happens through dramatic experiences that are 
nothing other than the various ways in which life comes into contact with its own Basis.  Each time one 
of these experiences occurs — for instance, when a man allows his brother or enemy to go ahead of him 
or when he recognizes Life in the face of the Other — a law of ethics is affirmed […] with an irresistible 
force […].  [T]he greatest force arises within such experiences and allows one to experience that one is 
alive.  This experience resides even in the smallest of our gestures, the most routine acts, inasmuch as the 
greatest force resides in them too and makes them possible’.  Henry, From Communism to Capitalism, p. 
112.
 James Mensch, Ethics and Selfhood (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), p. 112.36
 Schaefer, ‘Bonds of Trust: Thinking the Limits of Reciprocity in Heidegger and Michel Henry’, pp. 37
305-306; Mensch, Ethics and Selfhood, p. 112.
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sought out.  The Jew appears — perhaps standing at the door.  Confronting him, 
the rescuer faces an immediate decision, one that he has probably not thought 
through before.  Since the circumstances surrounding rescue are not those of nor-
mal life, the idea of his having developed a pattern of response for this ex-
traordinary situation is highly problematic.  Given that the circumstances sur-
rounding rescue in the East were unprecedented, they could play no part in the 
psychological history of those suddenly facing them.  38
The uniqueness of this situation appears to preclude our explaining this charitable mo-
ment by referring to an altruistic personality that the individual in question may have 
cultivated over the years.   
 Under these circumstances, the sudden appearance of the other is truly miracu-
lous.  We submit that, in a flash, the unexpected and inexplicable appearance of the 
stranger strikes certain individuals whose nature and experience has not closed them off 
from such experiences with an intense feeling of wonder or awe that rouses them out of 
the familiarity and obviousness of their lifeworld.   Though the decision of the individ39 -
ual in this position to assist the other cannot issue from past patterns of understanding 
and action, the sudden compulsion to charitably assist the other can spring from forces 
deep within the instinctual life of the rescuer, of which the rescuer herself may not even 
be aware.  In this moment of wonder, the individual whose enkinaesthetic consonance 
with and trust in others has disposed her to accept the norms and habits of her lifeworld, 
now sufficiently astonished, humbled and attuned to her underlying interconnection 
with others, may all of a sudden undergo a heightened sympathy for or empathy with 
the stranger and offer her assistance, perhaps even before she is objectively aware of 
what she is doing.   Like the stranger herself, the individual’s primal evaluation of this 40
 Ibid.38
 It would appear that, whether through nature, nurture, or some combination of the two, some individu39 -
als are simply more open to experiences of wonder than others.  
 This appears to reveal a tragic character to life: the very enkinaesthesia and feeling of trust that gives 40
the subject to unquestioningly accept the lifeworld and take it for granted is the same one that, when 
paired with the wonder it helps make possible, enables the subject to assume some distance towards this 
natural attitude and begin to inquire about its significance. 
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situation and the offer of assistance comes like a flash, as a non-objectifying compul-
sion or feeling, before the subject herself has time to objectively assess and cognise 
what she is doing.    
 As we witnessed earlier, however, this feeling of wonder can prompt the subject 
to reconsider the nature of her experience in the lifeworld.  Extraordinary experiences 
such as this challenge the subject’s assumptions about the lifeworld and, whether at 
once or over a period of time and in conjunction with other similar experiences, can im-
bue the subject with a need to engage in introspective reflection on the nature of the 
lifeworld.       
 As studies confirm, such ethical experiences can have much the same effect on 
those who observe them from the outside.  As Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt’s 
seminal study indicates, when a subject observes another person engage in an ex-
traordinary moral act, or, say, when they read about such acts, this can give rise not only 
to a feeling of wonder or awe but to a feeling of elevation as well, where elevation is 
understood as a ‘warm’ and uplifting feeling, which can foster ‘a desire to become a 
better person, or to lead a better life’.   For the individual who bears witness to such 41
ethical experiences in some way or other, by reading about them for example, the ensu-
ing wonder and elevation can foster in said individual a love that embraces this charity 
or generosity of spirit as an absolute value, and which compels her to want to be more 
generous and to lead a better (i.e. good) life.  
 As a part of this, this primal sense of wonder, elevation and love can, at its 
height, urge the individual to problematise her natural attitude by introspectively re-
 Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt, ‘Approaching awe, a moral, spiritual, and aesthetic emotion’, 41
Cognition and Emotion, 17, no. 2 (2003), 297–314 (p. 305).  For more on elevation as an important ethi-
cal feeling, see Jonathan Haidt, ‘Elevation and the positive psychology of morality’, in Flourishing Posi-
tive Psychology and the Life Well-Lived, ed. by Corey L.M. Keyes and Jonathan Haidt (Washington: 
American Psychological Association, 2003), 275-289.  Of course, this is not to say that elevation — or 
other such feelings — always fosters a desire to lead a better life.
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assessing her understanding of the lifeworld and the way in which it is given.  That is to 
say, it can prompt the individual to reflect, either on her own or by engaging with the 
history of ideas (i.e. meta-ethics, psychology, etc.), on the intersubjective nature of the 
lifeworld, on how it is that other human beings appear to exert this pull on her, and on 
what moral beauty or goodness are and how they come to be constituted and understood 
as such.  For example, the aforementioned feelings may eventually lead the subject to 
inquire as to whether generosity is, as Descartes suggests, a wonder tinged with love, 
which consists in the rightful esteem the subject has for her own worth, for her ability to 
master her passions and control her willing in a positive or negative way, on account of 
which she can have the proper esteem for others as agents who have the same ability?  42
In other words, such experiences can lead the subject to consider whether generosity is a 
virtuous will, understood as a form of self-control,  or whether it issues from non-ob43 -
jectifying drives that we can never entirely control, as our example concerning the indi-
vidual who all of sudden offers assistance to the stranger who inexplicably darkens her 
doorstep appears to suggest. 
 However, insofar as the living subject’s ethical experience of others, and of the 
sense of wonder, love and generosity that can be aroused in such experiences, can never 
be entirely thematised and known with absolute certainty, and, what is more, inasmuch 
as there is always more that can be given in such experiences, it follows that this prob-
lematisation of the natural attitude via ethical experience and reflection is an endless 
creative activity (i.e. an ethical creativity).  For the subject who finds herself duly 
touched and motivated by wonder, and who, in a pre-reflective manner, lovingly em-
 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume I, pp. 384-388.  As this suggests, there is a 42
strong family bond between trust, wonder, love and generosity.
 Ibid., p. 385.43
 266
braces such an ethical way of life as an absolute value, such combinations of wonder 
and love have the ability to urge her towards an infinite creative activity, which consists 
in the subject’s continually striving to problematise and clarify the ways in which such 
experiences, and the concepts and norms that emerge from them, are given.   
6.6 THE DARK SIDE OF FEELING 
These reflections provide us with some indication of how the problematisation of the 
natural attitude can be undertaken outside of phenomenology.  In experiencing wonder 
before a beautiful artwork or event, by encountering a novel or startling idea, or by un-
dergoing a dramatic or unexpected experience of another human being, the individual 
can find herself motivated to problematise her natural attitude by engaging in the arts, 
that is, by producing and reflecting upon works of art, or in ethics, by striving to be 
more generous, to lead a good life, and to reflect on what this entails and how such con-
cepts arise and are constituted in the first place. 
 In both of these cases, it is a positive feeling of wonder that prompts the prob-
lematisation of the natural attitude.  Though, historically, this positive feeling of wonder 
has received comparatively more attention, there is also a negative valence of wonder or 
awe, which itself plays an important role in shaking the subject from the natural atti-
tude.  This would be a threat or fear-based variant of wonder.  Indeed, despite the com-
parative neglect of this flavour of wonder, as Keltner and Haidt have found, this threat-
based sense of wonder appears to be at least as primordial as the more positive variety.  44
 Keltner and Haidt, ‘Approaching awe, a moral, spiritual, and aesthetic emotion’, Cognition and Emo44 -
tion, p. 306. 
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The forces of the world that astonish us are often no less frightening.  As Rainer Maria 
Rilke declares in the first of his Duino Elegies, ‘[e]very angel’s terrifying’.  45
 Things can elicit a positive or negative valence of wonder depending on the con-
text and the way in which the experience is evaluated or appraised.  As in all cases of 
wonder, as Gordon reports, this threatening valence can spring from a variety of stimuli, 
such as upsetting works of art (say, a painting with violent, jagged lines, or a piece of 
ominous music, etc.) certain ideas (‘learning “about the horrors of the Vietnam war”’ ), 46
or other ‘social (e.g., a dominant, powerful individual), natural (e.g., lightning), or even 
more metaphysical (e.g., contemplating one’s place in a vast universe) experiences’.  47
Historically, one such prominent source of this threat-based wonder is religion, where 
God is often described as both wondrous and petrifying, and as an all-knowing and, at 
times, vindictive entity.    48
 Yet a more quotidian source of this threat-based wonder, which is common to all 
people, regardless of race or creed, and which plays a prominent role in all of our lives, 
is that of the death of another human being, and the awareness of death — as our 
awareness of the punctuated or finite character of human life — that this fosters.  In an 
 Rainer Maria Rilke, Duino Elegies and The Sonnets To Orpheus, trans. by A. Poulin Jr. (Boston: 45
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1975), p. 5.  As Rilke writes, ‘[a]nd if I cried, who’d listen to me in those 
angelic orders?/Even if one of them suddenly held me/to his heart, I’d vanish in his overwhelming pres-
ence./Because beauty’s nothing/but the start of terror we can hardly bear,/and we adore it because of the 
serene scorn/it could kill us with.  Every angel’s terrifying./So I control myself and choke back the lure/ 
of my dark cry.  Ah, who can we turn to,/then? Neither angels nor men, and the animals already know by 
instinct/we’re not comfortably at home/in our translated world.  Maybe what’s left/for us is some tree on a 
hillside we can look at/day after day, one of yesterday’s streets,/and the perverse affection of habit/that 
liked us so much it never let go./And the night, oh the night when the wind/full of outer space gnaws at 
our faces; that wished for,/gentle, deceptive one waiting painfully for the lonely/heart — she’d stay on for 
anyone.  Is she easier on lovers?/But they use each other to hide their fate./You still don’t understand? 
Throw the emptiness in/your arms out into that space we breathe; maybe birds/will feel the air thinning as 
they fly deeper in themselves.’  Ibid., pp. 5-7.
 Gordon et al., ‘The Dark Side of the Sublime: Distinguishing a Threat-Based Variant of Awe’, p. 321.46
 Ibid., p. 311.47
 Ibid.48
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unpublished manuscript (A6-12-4415), Henry in fact draws close to describing this neg-
ative valence of wonder that the death of the other can arouse in us: 
[o]nly one thing is absurd: the disappearance of a subjectivity, the death of some-
one.  This is what leaves us absolutely uncertain and which causes anguish and 
makes us doubt our very being, makes us doubt that which is indubitable […]. 
This is what makes the world collapse, puts it in question and surprises it, what 
surprises us — the death of the beloved does this, but it does this in an accidental 
way in that it is the beloved [and] we live as if we are justified by the beloved — 
the death of the beloved does all of this, because it is the death of someone.    49
We find in this account of the death of the other a number of the central characteristics 
of threat or fear-based wonder that are identified in Keltner and Haidt’s seminal study of 
the matter.  Apart from the primal sense of astonishment, surprise and doubt which 
colour all forms of wonder, this negative valence, as experienced here in the presence of 
the dead other, diminishes the individual’s sense of control, and it fills her with a sense 
of dread, anguish and despair.    50
 On this account, what elicits this fear-based wonder before the dead other is the 
lifeless visual form of her bodily life.  In this case, it is the living subject’s awareness of 
the bodily life of the other, and not, as Heidegger suggests, language which determines 
the subject’s conceptual understanding of death.   As Henry observes, it is when we 51
witness the cessation of the other’s bodily life, and we see ourselves in the place of the 
 Michel Henry, ‘Notes préparatoires à L’Essence de la manifestation: la subjectivité’ in Revue  49
Internationale Michel Henry 3 (2012), 93-215 (p. 195).  St. Augustine reaches a similar conclusion in his 
Confessions, trans. by Garry Wills (New York: Penguin Books, 2008), pp. 131-135, 139.  Kirk J. Schnei-
der addresses how the death of another human being can elicit a negative form of wonder or awe in Re-
discovery of awe: Splendor, mystery and the fluid center of life (Minnesota, Paragon House, 2004). 
Melanie Rudd, Kathleen Vohs and Jennifer Aaker also speak to this matter in ‘Awe expands people's per-
ception of time, alters decision making, and enhances well-being’, Psychological Science 23, no. 10 
(2012), 1-7.
 Keltner and Haidt, ‘Approaching awe, a moral, spiritual, and aesthetic emotion’, Cognition and Emo50 -
tion, p. 308.
 For a fine critique of Heidegger’s account of our being-towards-death, see Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, 51
‘The Enigma of Being-Toward-Death’, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 29, no. 4 (2015), 547-576.
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other, as one who will invariably meet with the same fate, that we become conceptually 
aware of death, of the punctuated or finite nature of human life.  52
 To be more exact, as Maxine Sheets-Johnstone points out, in perceiving the dead 
other, the subject sees a being who still has the same familiar form as when she was 
alive, yet all movement on her part has ceased now and forevermore.   The corpse of 53
the other is thus a ‘unitary phenomenon, but it is also dual insofar as it is adjoined at the 
same time and without felt contradiction whatsoever to its ghost’.   In death, the other 54
who once sensed and moved like me is not merely perceived as behaving in an unusual 
way, but as having undergone ‘an utter change of being’ — she has become ‘another 
other', a ‘muted and distant Thereness’.   In her stillness, the other no longer entreats 55
me nor I her; the two no longer participate as agents in a community of shared projects 
in the world — and this not only for the time being, here and now, but for always.  56
 At the same time, the death of the other does not spell the loss of all intersubjec-
tive significance.  There remains a residual sameness in the appearance of the dead oth-
er.  As Johnstone writes,  
there is a sense of former encounters with this now still and solitary Other; there 
are images of commonly lived moments.  No matter the radical transfiguration, 
the Other remains Other.  A particular past creeps in and with it a sense of ongoing 
consistency enduring through change.  Throughout the variety of recollections and 
images, a persistent sameness anchors a once-communal life.  An aura of continu-
 Henry, ‘Notes préparatoires à L’Essence de la manifestation: la subjectivité’, p. 195.  That being said, 52
Henry himself does not explain how the subject can see herself in the place of the dead other.  Antonio 
Calcagno engages in a reading of Henry’s account of death in ‘Reclaiming the Possibility of an Interior 
Human Culture?’.
 Maxine Sheets-Johntone, ‘On the Conceptual Origin of Death’, Philosophy and Phenomenological 53
Research 47, no. 1 (1986), 31-58 (p. 48).
 Ibid.54
 Ibid., pp. 47-48, 50.55
 Ibid., p. 51.56
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ity impresses itself upon the kaleidoscope of remembrances and images, however 
fleeting or vague.  57
In this way, the lifeless visual form of the deceased other is effectively apperceived as 
belonging to the density or texture of a shared past, so that the subject apperceives a 
temporal continuity between the living past of the other and the strange stillness of her 
present.    58
 Because of this, what the living subject perceives in her encounter with the dead 
other is not only her newfound separation and strangeness from her, but an individual 
temporality or stream of life that has now ended once and for all.   On the basis of this 59
experience, though, in a ‘reverse analogical apperception’, the living subject can realise 
that, though she is different from the dead other in that she is still alive and moving, it is 
also the case that she too is a continuity, a stream of experience that is separable from, 
but which also enjoins her to, a communal past with others; that she too is ‘a persistent 
sameness across a manifold of change’; that she too is ‘a present in continuity with a 
past’.   And it is in the apperception of this combination of similarities and differences 60
between herself and the dead other that the living subject becomes aware in an intense 
moment of fear-based wonder or awe that she will one day find herself there where the 
deceased other is now; that her life, like that of the other, as a ‘temporal open-ended-
ness’ of feeling and movement, is one that does not stretch on forever, but which is fi-
nite and which will inevitably be destroyed.  61
 Ibid., p. 5257
 Ibid., pp. 52-53.58
 Ibid., p. 53.59
 Ibid., pp. 53, 56.60
 Ibid., p. 56.61
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   Though he does not explain how it happens, when this awakening occurs, Hen-
ry acknowledges that we do indeed return to ourselves ‘destroyed’, that is, we return to 
ourselves in a state of deep sadness and dejection over the fact that the life we love will 
eventually end.   Such negative sentiments, undoubtedly, can be deleterious to the life 62
of the individual inasmuch as they can diminish her curiosity, make her more liable to 
conform to societal norms, cause her to act in an aggressive or destructive manner to-
ward herself (say, by refusing to work her way out of her melancholy) or towards oth-
ers, and lead her to further entrench herself in ways of thinking that deny or neglect the 
subjective sources of the sense of the world.  Yet, despite this, studies indicate that neg-
ative sentiments can also bring about positive developments in the life of the 
individual.   As in the other cases we have explored, intense moments of fear-based 63
wonder or awe can intensify the curiosity of the subject; they can, as Viktor Frankl re-
ports, urge an individual to reconsider her understanding of what life is, and what can 
and cannot be taken away from it.   In so doing, fear-based wonder makes it possible 64
for the subject to question the lifeworld and the way in which it is constituted, and it can 
motivate her to embrace this pursuit, in whatever form it should take (i.e. art, ethics, 
science), as an absolute value that she continuously takes up over the course of her life.       
 This is true not only for fear-based wonder, but for other negative feelings as 
well.  While perhaps not as powerful or as transformative as the wonder undergone in 
the experience of the deceased other, other objects and events, and the sense of depres-
sion or boredom they inspire, can bring about similar results.  Take the experience of 
 Henry, ‘Notes préparatoires à L’Essence de la manifestation: la subjectivité’, p. 195.62
 Naturally, this can occur with a single experience or as the cumulative result of a series of them. 63
 Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotheraphy (Boston: Beacon Press, 64
1959), pp. 116-119.  See also his Recollections: An autobiography of Viktor E. Frankl (New York: 
Perseus Publishing, 2000).
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boredom.  The issue of boredom arose briefly in our earlier discussion of the malaise 
that Henry sees as dominating life in the modern world.  Though he does not address the 
matter at length, Henry makes it clear that, in his eyes, boredom arises when the living 
subject does not participate in actions that rise to the height of her needs and thereby 
release her energy.  When this occurs, boredom is experienced as ‘an affective disposi-
tion in which unemployed energy is revealed to oneself.  At each moment in boredom, a 
force emerges; it inflates by itself, and stands ready.  It is ready for whatever use one 
would like to make of it’.   For Henry, then, boredom is a positive energy that issues 65
from the subject’s failure to deploy her creative force.  It is, as Antonio Calcagno notes, 
‘the pure feeling of the force to potentially create’, but one that is never properly ful-
filled.   Boredom is, in other words, an ‘arousal with no release, a priapism of affect’, 66
which, as a result, often occurs together with feelings of malaise, melancholy and 
lethargy.   Hence the typical image of boredom as a kind of ‘living death’, as some67 -
thing that largely removes the individual from the productive, social flow of life.  68
 In fact, as this suggests, though Henry appears to be correct in stipulating that 
boredom always involves a certain energy, it must also be acknowledged that boredom 
can be something of a drain on one’s life-force.  Boredom can sap one’s strength, per-
haps even to the point of death. 
 Henry, Barbarism, p. 109.65
 Antonio Calcagno, ‘The life that is not purely one’s own: Michel Henry and boredom as an affect’, in 66
Boredom Studies Reader: Frameworks and Perspectives, ed. by Michael E. Gardiner and Julian Jason 
Haladyn (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 53-63 (p. 54).
 Ibid.67
 Barry Sandywell, ‘The dialectic of lassitude: A reflexive investigation’, in Boredom Studies Reader: 68
Frameworks and Perspectives, ed. by Michael E. Gardiner and Julian Jason Haladyn (London: Rout-
ledge, 2017), pp. 38-52 (p. 43).  Indeed, Henry’s account of barbarism can very much be seen as a kind of 
living death.
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 As our earlier analysis of the malaise of life bore out, Henry regards such nega-
tive affective sonorities as merely blocking and stagnating the growth of life.   Bore69 -
dom blocks the subject from engaging in actions that rise to the height of her needs, and 
instead directs her to forms of engagement that are antithetical to the growth of her aes-
thetic-ethical sensibility, such as listlessly sitting in front of the vapid expressions of 
television (aesthetics), or participating in nihilistic forms of action (ethics).  In so doing, 
though, boredom only intensifies its own sense of inertia and dullness, and it fosters in 
the subject a growing hostility towards life, and a desire to destroy herself and life in 
general.  This appears to be confirmed by other accounts of boredom.  As Barry Sandy-
well writes, we often forget ‘how much boredom is a hidden motive of aggression and 
the destructive impulse (including, of course, the self-destructive impulse).  Boredom 
— the lassitude of the soul — is the other side of inarticulate aggression and violence 
(consider the problems of disaffected youth as generated through chronic boredom)’.  70
 For all that, we should not overlook the fact that negative affective states such as 
boredom can also urge us on to productive and creative forms of action.  As Calcagno 
notes, the psychoanalyst Adam Phillips, in a development of the work of Donald Winni-
cott, argues that ‘boredom is an important experience for children to undergo’, though 
one whose value is often overlooked in the world of adults.   In Phillips’s words,     71
[i]s it not, indeed revealing, what the child’s boredom evokes in adults? Heard as 
a demand, sometimes as an accusation of failure or disappointment, it is rarely 
agreed to, simply acknowledged.  How often, in fact, the child’s boredom is met 
by that most perplexing form of disapproval, the adults wish to distract him – as 
though the adults have decided that the child’s life must be, or be seen to be, end-
lessly interesting.  It is one of the most oppressive demands of adults that the child 
 Henry, Barbarism. p. 110.69
 Barry Sandywell, Dictionary of Visual Discourse: A Dialectical Lexicon of Terms (London: Routledge, 70
2011), p. 177.
 Calcagno, ‘The life that is not purely one’s own’, in Boredom Studies Reader, ed. by Gardiner and Hal71 -
adyn, p. 159.
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should be interested, rather than take time to find what interests him.  Boredom is 
integral to the person’s taking one’s time.  While the child’s boredom is often rec-
ognized as an incapacity, it is usually denied as an opportunity […].  Boredom, I 
think, protects the individual, makes tolerable for him the impossible experience 
of waiting for something without knowing what it could be.  So the paradox of the 
waiting that goes on in boredom is that the individual does not know what he was 
waiting for until he finds it, and that often he does not know that he is waiting.   72
Phillips here provides a compelling insight into the positive role that a negative affect 
such as boredom can play in enhancing the life of the individual.  In holding the indi-
vidual at a certain remove from the productive, social flow of life, boredom, while un-
doubtedly a painful, lethargic and, in its more extreme moments, even depressing state 
of affairs, simultaneously provides the living individual with the opportunity to take her 
time and to let the world fly up in front of her, to let it present itself to her in a new 
light, such that the subject can actually find and pursue something that genuinely inter-
ests her and that is worthy of her interest.    
 We needn’t look any further than the history of Western thought for examples of 
how this can occur.  Precisely because of the boredom they endured, philosophers and 
countless other writers and artists — from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, to Gustave 
Flaubert, Henrik Ibsen and Arthur Schopenhauer — found the motivation to withdraw 
from the familiar and the everyday and to seek out the uncanny, essential nature of 
things.  In so doing, such individuals, through their reflections and the works they creat-
ed, were able to problematise the natural attitude and to illuminate the way in which the 
lifeworld is constituted, thereby opening life to new vistas of growth and joy.  
 This suggests a more nuanced understanding of the growth of life than we found 
in Henry.  Where Henry views the positive and negative affects as standing in some-
 Adam Phillips, On Kissing, Tickling and Being Bored: Psychoanalytic Essays on the Unexamined Life 72
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 69-70, 77-78.  Calcagno comments on this in ‘The life 
that is not purely one’s own’, in Boredom Studies Reader, ed. by Gardiner and Haladyn, p. 160.  As 
Gilbert remarks in an essay by Oscar Wilde, ‘to do nothing at all is the most difficult thing in the world, 
the most difficult and the most intellectual’.  See Oscar Wilde, The Collected Works of Oscar Wilde: The 
Plays, the Poems, and the Essays including De Profundis (Hertfordshire: Woodsworth Library Collection, 
2007), p. 996.  Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot is a famous example of this.
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thing of a binary relation, where the former fulfils life’s need for self-growth and the 
latter only ever blocks it, we find that this is clearly not the case.  While negative senti-
ments such as fear-based wonder and boredom, and its attendant malaise, can certainly 
prove so debilitating that they more or less swamp and cripple the individual, pushing 
her down an all but irrecoverable path of self-destruction, as we have demonstrated, 
they can also enable life to grow and to attain to new heights, as in the problematisation 
of the natural attitude.  Accordingly, this means that the negative or destructive forces in 
the world — i.e. sense-denying works of art, nihilistic or viciously relativistic ethical 
world-views and forms of action, as well as destructive religious beliefs and practices  73
— would hold a similar potential. 
6.7 A CHORUS OF VOICES 
These findings indicate that the living subject can problematise the natural attitude in a 
variety of ways.  In the grip of a prominent affective state such as wonder (in its posi-
tive or negative valence) or boredom, the living subject can question and strive to shed a 
newfound light on the way in which the lifeworld is experienced by way of the produc-
tion and study of works of art, ethics, science, philosophy and phenomenology.  Though 
these disciplines may employ different methods, as they all seek to elucidate the essen-
tial structures of the world in its actuality, there is no ‘modal gap’ between them, and 
they can each help make explicit how the world is constituted.  
 Importantly, an experience that prompts such an affective state from any one of 
these domains does not necessarily urge the subject to respond to said experience, and 
 For more on the need for Henry’s thought to admit the destructive potential of life and its cultural prac73 -
tices, see Calcagno, ‘Reclaiming the Possibility of an Interior Human Culture?’, p. 262.
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to potentially problematise her natural attitude, from within the domain in which this 
experience arose.  The individual who undergoes a positive experience of wonder be-
fore a beautiful work of art, for example, can, depending on the historical situation in 
which she finds herself, very well feel compelled to problematise her natural attitude, 
not by engaging in the arts — or not only by engaging in them — but by turning to ethi-
cal, scientific, philosophical and phenomenological pursuits, as themselves forms of 
high culture.   
 What is more, even when the subject undergoes a sense of wonder or boredom 
within a domain that does not in itself serve as a fitting ground for the problematisation 
of the natural attitude, such as within the religious sphere, the wonder or boredom that 
arouses her within that dimension of her life can nevertheless motivate her to take up 
other pursuits that do (i.e. philosophy).  
 In the case of religion, for example, Emmanuel Falque points to the promising 
dialogue that religion can undertake with philosophy when, commenting on the work of 
Maurice Blondel, he suggestively urges believers to acknowledge that  
we can no longer be satisfied to ‘live as Christians and think as philosophers’ and, 
thus, to limit ourselves to a theology which is never, or almost never, fully re-
alised (hence the nearly explicit refusal of Blondel to address properly theological 
notions like trinity, incarnation, resurrection, etc., always pretending instead that 
he should leave them for theologians).  Instead, and inversely, we must ‘think as 
Christians and live as philosophers’, which means daring to address properly the-
ological concepts — to think as Christians — by translating them philosophically 
in order to speak precisely of and to basic [finite] human experience, the mode of 
our humanity tout court — to live as a philosopher.  74
Though we cannot explore this point at length here, as this suggests, the living subject 
can think as a Christian and live as a philosopher, and so, can undertake a religious phi-
losophy by engaging in a study of theological concepts, such as that of the Incarnation, 
 Emmanuel Falque, The Loving Struggle: Phenomenological And Theological Debates, trans. by 74
Bradley B. Onishi and Lucas McCracken (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), p. 251.
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in an effort to draw out what they help illuminate about the nature of our finite human 
experience. 
 The unity that makes all of this possible is nothing other than the bodily life of 
the living individual, and its unrelenting need to grow its self-experience by questioning 
and clarifying its experience in ever-new ways and degrees.  It is the bodily life of the 
subject which serves as the mutual point of intersection between all of these distinct 
disciplines (religion, philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, etc.).   There is therefore no uni75 -
form way in which the problematisation of the natural attitude must come about.  The 
process is always specific to the contextual situation of each living individual. 
 None of this takes away the distinct role that phenomenology can play in this 
process.  In keeping with the foregoing analysis, the impetus to take up phenomenology 
can arise from a variety of stimuli: from a sense of wonder or boredom that is under-
gone in the realm(s) of art, ethics, science, religion, or philosophy.  In particular, the 
birth of philosophy from an experience of wonder has been well documented.  In book 
one of his Metaphysics, Aristotle states that ‘it is owing to their wonder that men both 
now begin and at first began to philosophize’.   However this unfolds, phenomenology, 76
as conceived here, retains its traditional function of providing a basic check on the sci-
entific and philosophical conceptions of those aspects of the lifeworld that involve an 
experiential dimension.   
 Indeed, though the subject is more than capable of introspectively reflecting on 
the inner nature of the lifeworld and its essential structures, the phenomenological 
method provides her with a more stringent and refined way of practicing this reflective 
 As Falque correctly points out, ‘[e]ven given the necessary and legitimate distinction of philosophical 75
and theological disciplines according to their points of departure (human life and the revelation of God, 
respectively), a new unity is nevertheless possible in their mutual point of arrival or crossover — at least 
in Christianity, this point in the figure of the God-man (theologian-philosopher).’  Ibid.
 Aristotle, Metaphysics, p. 692, 1.2.982b10.76
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endeavour.  The epoche enables the living subject to obtain a certain distance from her 
everyday absorption in the natural attitude and its unquestioned prejudices.  Because of 
this, the living subject can, in the reduction proper, describe and thereby render explicit 
the essential structures of her contingent life, with as little intrusion from false assump-
tions as possible.  Through eidetic variation, meanwhile, the subject is able to further 
test her claims about the essential structures of the lifeworld without relying on actual 
perception.  This variation allows the subject to bypass the constraints of empirical in-
duction and to obtain generalisable results.  Finally, by sharing and discussing her re-
sults with others, the living subject can further test the validity of her findings.    
 However, this does not mean that phenomenology serves as an overseer of all 
disciplines.  In fact, since not all disciplines — e.g. theoretical physics — are required 
to be wholly consistent with our lived experience of things, this cannot be the case.  As 
a result, it is not clear that there is a highest form of life, an ideal way of attesting to 
who or what we are.  
 What our findings do, in part, suggest, though, is that nothing bars the phenom-
enologist — like the artist, scientist, etc. — from drawing on and engaging with other 
disciplines, as we ourselves have done here.  In contrast to the phenomenological 
projects of Husserl and Henry,  then, we find that phenomenology and natural science, 77
while distinct disciplines, are not necessarily incompatible, but can actually maintain a 
productive exchange.  In fact, this includes not only the arts, ethics and science, but re-
ligion as well.  Just as the religious person can strive to translate her theological con-
cepts philosophically in an effort to further illuminate the nature of our finite human 
experience, so too the non-believing phenomenologist can draw on theological concepts 
in an effort to advance her study of life. 
 One could also mention Heidegger here.77
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 Indeed, the living subject’s study of this transcendental life may serve as motiva-
tion for the positing of such a belief.  The Bible emphasises that God, as the sole, 
unique, self-sufficient creator of the world, is transcendent to human beings and exceeds 
conceptual human understanding.  Yet it also states that he is related to human beings by 
way of their shared bodily nature.  The Apostle Paul, for instance, speaks of Judeo-
Christians as forming the body of Christ.  In his words, ‘[j]ust as a body, though one, 
has many parts, but all its many parts form one body, so it is with Christ.  For we were 
all baptised by one Spirit so as to form one body’.   It is owing to this perceived bodily 78
intimacy that God is not an impenetrable abstraction, but something that the living sub-
ject can come to experience and in some sense know.   79
 As Mensch notes, the reason for emphasising this bodily intimacy between God 
and human beings has to do with the striking similarity between the living body and the 
transcendent God.   The aforementioned uniqueness and transcendence of the flesh can 80
be seen as being, at least in part, a reflection of that of God.  As with the flesh, the 
Judeo-Christian God of Israel is a unique singularity; he is known in only one instance, 
his own.   Because God is not one amongst many, but is unique, like our flesh, he nec81 -
essarily transcends the common meanings of our language.   Our experience of God, 82
like that of our flesh, involves this experience of an excess that cannot be fully concep-
tualised.   
 1 Corinthians 12:12-13.78
 Mensch, Decisions and Transformations, p. 189.79
 Ibid.80
 Ibid., p. 190.81
 Ibid., pp. 190-191.82
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 That being said, what Mensch does not point out, and what must also be ac-
knowledged, is that where some may see a divine presence in this living flesh, others 
will simply see the mystery of life, a life that is, at the end of the day, to borrow the lan-
guage of Nietzsche, ‘human, all too human’.  While life can serve as the motivation for 
a belief in God, contrary to what Henry suggests, it does not offer an irrefutable revela-
tion of this divine presence.  Life lends itself to secular and religious interpretation. 
While this point cannot be pursued any further here, this indicates that life provides a 
basis for ‘a common “grammar” with those who see things differently [i.e., atheists] and 
do not share our assumptions’, one that might help us to avoid ‘speaking different lan-
guages even though we may be using the same tongue’.    83
 Whether the phenomenologist is a believer or not, for the individual who is in-
spired to undertake this theoretical investigation of the hidden art of the soul, the em-
brace of this way of life involves the individual in an endless creative activity.  As 
Kierkegaard knew, thought ultimately wants ‘to discover something that thought cannot 
think’.   In our case, it is the singularity of life in the world that the phenomenologist 84
ultimately wants to reflectively elucidate.  And, like the flowers that Jaccottet wrote 
about, it is because this life can only be felt in a vague or indeterminate manner but 
never fully thematised, and because there is always more in this life to be experienced, 
that the phenomenologist finds herself obsessed by this life, and, in an act of love and 
generosity, bent on endlessly seeking to further elucidate this life in ever-increasing lev-
els of detail.  
 John Paul II, ‘Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the Bishops of Western Canada on their “Ad 83
Limina” Visit”, Sunday October 30th, 1999, cited in Emmanuel Falque, Crossing the Rubicon: The Bor-
derlands of Philosophy and Theology, trans. by Reuben Shank (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2016), p. 133.
 Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. by Howard V. Hong (Princeton: Princeton Univer84 -
sity Press, 1962), p. 46.
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 In this way, the phenomenological attitude should not be understood as merely a 
way of looking at things in an academic manner, but must be seen as a way of life, as a 
style of presence that seeks to fully live up to and fulfil life’s need for growth by contin-
uously striving to reflectively elucidate life in as precise a manner as possible.  Phe-
nomenology joins the other forms of high culture (art, ethics, science, etc.) as a way of 
life wherein the living individual problematises the natural attitude and strives to be-
come fully alive by living up to the heights of her energy and furthering the growth of 
life. 
 We are thus left with a chorus of voices that are brought together and sustained 
by an underlying love and generosity.  This would be a community of love and generos-
ity wherein each living individual pursues the same goal in his or her own way — i.e. 
the intensification of life by continuously striving to better come to know and attest to it 
via art, ethics, science, philosophy, etc. — and where all are duly motivated to support 
one another in their respective projects. 
 In so doing, though, the individual does not engage in an endless march of 
progress.  By virtue of her finitude, the living subject’s way of taking up these forms of 
high culture always involves an element of danger: in striving to better know and attest 
to the hidden art of her soul, the subject always remains at risk of making mistakes, of 
taking wrong turns, or coming to grief upon the limits of her abilities.  An essential fea-
ture of such a way of life, therefore, is that they do not only allow us to further our 
awareness of the endless transformability of life, but they enable us to become explicitly 
aware of our imperfections and failures, and, in so doing, they endow in us the requisite 
motivation to continuously try and overcome these imperfections as much as we can, 
while simultaneously recognising that we can no more leap over them than we can leap 
over our own shadow.   
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 More than that, though these ways of life enable the subject to problematise her 
natural attitude and become more explicitly aware of the nature of life and its essential 
structures, it never enables the subject to fully master her life and death drives.  Try as 
one might, the subject will always, and for reasons that will forever remain mysterious 
to her, find herself engaging in aggressive or otherwise destructive forms of action that 
are deleterious to her own projects and well-being.  There is no enlightenment that is 
capable of saving the individual from this possibility, as it is one that is essential to the 
nature of human life.  One must welcome the irrational in life.  Indeed, as we have seen, 
such destructive drives, and the negative sentiments they arouse in the flesh, are not 
only essential in shaping the course of our experience, but can themselves even play a 
positive role in furthering our growth.  The living subject’s attempt to better know and 
attest to the hidden art of her soul always remains a genuine struggle of competing in-
terests and traditions. 
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CONCLUSION 
This work has sought to clarify the nature of transcendental subjectivity, and to deter-
mine whether and how the subject can endeavour to know and attest to its absolute 
foundation with its essential structures.  Toward this end, we have investigated the work 
of Husserl and Henry, both of whom maintain that transcendental subjectivity functions 
as a pure field of experience that is not a part of the world, but which makes possible the 
meaningful appearance of that world, and whose ultimate foundation can, in some way, 
be given absolutely.   
 In addressing the work of Husserl, our first chapter began as an attempt to shed 
light on Husserl’s search for a proper methodology for conducting phenomenology, as 
he defines it, which, in his estimation, will unlock the hidden power of this transcenden-
tal field of experience, and therein enable one to reflectively elucidate the inner nature 
of the transcendental ego and its essential structures.  In doing so, however, we ob-
served that, while Husserl makes it clear that it is an act of phenomenological reflection 
that brings about the split between the empirical and the transcendental ego, and that the 
two must be connected in some way, he does not adequately address the nature of this 
union at length.  Ultimately, Husserl does not provide a sufficiently clear or detailed ac-
count of the identity of the transcendental ego.   
 Following this, in chapter two, we applied Husserl’s methodology in an effort to 
determine the inner nature and essential structures of transcendental subjectivity, and to 
see whether Husserl’s analyses support his assertion that the absolute ground of this 
primal self can in fact be given absolutely.  We found that Husserl’s own study of the 
living present, as the ultimate level of absolute time-constituting consciousness, places 
him in a precarious position.  Though Husserl’s phenomenology, as a rigorous science 
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that idealises presence, wants to suppose that it is possible for us to see the primordial 
ego in its actual occurrence as the source of conscious life, even if only as an ideal that 
lies in infinity, his analyses in fact point us in another direction.  We have argued that 
Husserl’s findings regarding the way in which the primal flow appears to itself as post-
factual and differentially repetitive suggests that this event should be understood as an 
unconscious life that precedes and makes possible the immanence of consciousness. 
Insofar as this is the case, Husserl inadvertently reveals a primordial transcendence that 
exceeds intuition and presence, and which thereby functions as an anonymous level of 
sense that can never be presented to our gaze.  Husserl’s conception of phenomenology 
as a rigorous science that grants primacy to intuition and presence thus succumbs to a 
life that lies forever beyond the illuminating rays of our reflective regard. 
 In this case, though, it is not only the identity of transcendental subjectivity that 
remains less than clear.  If the pre-temporal event of life stands as an anonymous level 
of sense that can never be captured or understood in terms of apperceptive objectifica-
tion, then it remains to be seen just how it should be understood.    
 In a critical response to Husserl’s intentional phenomenology, Henry advances a 
material phenomenology that endeavours to provide a more adequate account of the ap-
pearing of transcendental subjectivity.  In so doing, we argued in chapter three that Hen-
ry advances our understanding of who or what transcendental subjectivity is and how it 
functions.  He does this, in part, by drawing greater attention to the fact that the living 
subject’s experience of its own body cannot be sufficiently understood by way of outer 
thing-perception, or from the analogy of thing-perception.  Henry highlights the fact 
that the living subject does not first have a pure mental awareness of itself, which logi-
cally precedes and is independent of anything outside of consciousness, including its 
body, to the effect that it would only apprehend its body as its own from the outside 
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through the objectifying experience of touch.  Rather, the living individual is its body, 
and it first comes to know itself in the radically immanent, non-intentional and non-ob-
jectifying self-affection of its bodily life.  As such, the transparency thesis of lucid mind 
and opaque body that underpins post-Cartesian modern philosophies of human subjec-
tivity in Locke, Hume, Kant and Husserl, is not phenomenologically defensible for Hen-
ry.  Indeed, if the transcendental ego, as the ultimate foundation of the normative and 
meaningful character of experience, were reducible to a pure mental-conscious aware-
ness, then it would need to be possible to identify a foundation, apart from bodily life 
and its practices, of the norms on account of which the meaning of life is constituted. 
Yet, as we have shown, this cannot be done, as the norms that make possible noematic 
meaning are irrevocably tied to the needs and practices of bodily life.   
 In drawing attention to this point, Henry draws attention to the fact that tran-
scendental subjectivity is not a pure, absolute consciousness, but the actual, living and 
embodied individual.  For Henry, though, this means that the reality of transcendental 
subjectivity is exhausted by the immanent and affective appearing of life, understood as 
an unconscious, generative movement.  In his eyes, all reality and truth are reducible to 
the immanent and non-intentional self-affection of our flesh, such that the empirical 
ego, understood as the subject as she appears in the ecstatic order of appearing, in her 
finite, intentional acts, is mere illusion and unreality.   
 In this case, the most basic functioning of transcendental subjectivity must be 
understood as a matter of generation, as the immanent self-affection of a life that pro-
duces itself and all of its needs and drives.  On Henry’s account, it is this non-intention-
al and non-objectifying affectivity, in its absolute priority over intentionality, that uni-
laterally founds and drives all of our acts, and which is ultimately responsible for pro-
viding the subject with an absolute knowledge of all life and being.  In a striking rever-
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sal of tradition, Henry claims that it is the non-objectifying sensibility of life, and not 
any reflection or objective awareness, that enables the subject to come to know and at-
test to the absolute foundation and perfect self-presence (the Parousia) for which phi-
losophy has always yearned.  For Henry, the ultimate foundation of transcendental sub-
jectivity can never be absolutely given to thought, but only ever in this non-intentional 
self-affection of life. 
 While this explanation and elaboration of phenomenology furthers our under-
standing of the inner nature of absolute subjectivity and its essential structures, it leaves 
us, nonetheless, with certain questions regarding the identity of transcendental subjec-
tivity and how it is connected with the empirical ego.  It remains a contentious point as 
to whether transcendental subjectivity should, at heart, be understood as human or di-
vine.  Furthermore, though Henry’s work suggests that the unity between the transcen-
dental and empirical ego must rest in our bodily life, he fails to account for how the two 
are united.  Thus Henry cannot explain how a radically immanent and non-intentional 
life could possibly give rise to the ecstatic and intentional order of appearing.  Instead, 
we are left with two bifurcated modes of appearing, with the result being that the imma-
nent appearing of life, as the locus of all reality, finds itself radically separated from the 
ecstatic and unreal appearing of the world.   
 Although Henry, therefore, seemingly provides us with a more robust, concrete 
account of transcendental subjectivity, in that he emphasises its essentially affective, 
bodily nature, his account encloses the subject in a realm of immanence that is even fur-
ther removed from the world than in Husserl.  Indeed, in a strange twist of fate, while 
Henry harshly rebukes the history of Western thought for its ontological monism and its 
tendency to assume that there is only one mode of appearing — that of the world — 
Henry himself is guilty of an ontological monism, inasmuch he disqualifies the ecstatic, 
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intentional appearing of the world as an extreme unreality, and contends that all reality 
unfolds in the immanent and non-intentional appearing of life. 
 However, in putting the radical and divine immanence of life to the test of our 
everyday existence in the cultural world in chapter four, we found that this position is 
problematic.  For one, if we admit, as Henry does, that in our everyday cultural lives, 
the life of the human individual can forget its basis in absolute life, and can consequent-
ly become weary and bent on the destruction of itself and life as a whole, then this poses 
problems for Henry’s account of the divine nature of life.  If life does unilaterally found 
and drive all of our conscious acts, then, as we argued, in opposition to the philosophy 
of religion that especially dominates Henry’s later work, life itself would appear to be 
responsible for the genesis of this destructive impulse, and cannot therefore be divine or 
indestructible (i.e. eternal) in nature.   
 What is more, in his attempt to demonstrate how life’s non-objectifying drive for 
self-growth initiates and steers the subject in her various cultural engagements, Henry’s 
own analyses, for example, his study of how the subject recovers its basis in absolute 
life through an aesthetic, ethical and religious way of life, indicate that life does in some 
ways depend upon our finite intentional acts, as well as their corresponding objects, and 
that the latter play a crucial, and, in some cases, even positive, role in the various trans-
formations of life.  Further along these lines, it seems hard to deny that, as important as 
affectivity may be in driving the subject in her various acts, there are certain complex 
situations where it cannot steer the subject, and where it must rely on objectifying, in-
tentional acts to take the lead and inform the subject as to what she needs to do.   
 Yet, if all of this is the case, then this places an even greater onus on Henry to 
account for the unity of life, that is, to account for how this radically immanent and non-
intentional life gives rise to the ecstatic order of intentionality, such that the latter is able 
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to play this positive, edifying role in the development of the former.  This, nonetheless, 
cannot be done, we argued, unless we admit that life possesses an ecstatic formal struc-
ture.  Indeed, though Henry remained reluctant to admit that life contained any such 
fracture, we observed that the growing emphasis he places on life as a drive for self-
growth itself suggests that life must involve an element of transcendence.  The subject, 
after all, could not have a sense of its life, as either growing or diminishing, unless she 
retained her prior states through passive syntheses and thereby admitted a certain dis-
tance between temporal phases.    
 In this case, though, it fell to us to determine what these findings meant for our 
understanding of transcendental subjectivity and how the subject can strive to know and 
attest to its inner nature and essential structures.  If we acknowledge the absolutely basic 
character of our finite bodily life, and admit that it possesses an ecstatic (intentional) 
formal structure and is ineluctably exposed to the lifeworld, are we still able to speak of 
transcendental subjectivity in a meaningful way? Can transcendental claims still retain 
their own distinct modality? In light of the above findings, in our fifth chapter, we ulti-
mately pointed out that, in contrast to Husserl and Henry, transcendental subjectivity 
must be understood as the finite bodily life of the subject in its ineluctable bond with the 
world.  Moreover, we argued that while our findings require us to modify or weaken our 
understanding of the sense of the transcendental as found in Husserl and Henry, they 
still enable such claims to retain their own distinct modality.  The subject is still able to 
render transcendental claims by making explicit the necessary and universal structures 
of her contingent life in the world. 
 By putting a revised version of the phenomenological method into practice, we 
proceeded to try and shed further light on the hidden art of the soul and its essential 
structures.  In doing so, we uncovered a new account of the living present, one that ac-
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knowledges its ecstatic (intentional) formal structure, and which details how this primal 
flow is founded upon our bodies life-drive.  In light of these findings, we argued that the 
living present, as the hidden art of the soul, must be understood neither as a pure and 
radical immanence (Henry), nor as a transcendence-in-immanence (Husserl), but as a 
primordial transcendence that exceeds and makes possible the immanence of con-
sciousness, without ever being wholly contained therein.  As such, we found that the 
innermost nature of transcendental subjectivity must be understood as an unconscious 
movement of creation, as a past that has never been present.  The most basic functioning 
of the living present must be understood as a matter of creation, as the creation of an 
endless stream of affective tonalities.  In this case, we suggested that there are two fun-
damental levels of constitution: that of creation, and that of noetic sense-bestowal, 
where the former can never be given absolutely.  Contrary to the assertions of Husserl 
and Henry, our study forced us to admit that the ultimate foundation of transcendental 
subjectivity, as an anonymous level of sense, can never be given absolutely.  It can nei-
ther be presented to our reflective regard (Husserl), nor can it wholly coincide with it-
self in the perfect self-evidence of a radically immanent self-presence (Henry).  Instead, 
it can only ever be experienced in a vague or indeterminate feeling. 
 In providing this revised understanding of the innermost heart of the subject, we 
effectively set the phenomenology of life on a different path.  On our account, transcen-
dental subjectivity cannot be understood as an absolute consciousness (Husserl), nor as 
a divine, a-cosmic flesh (Henry), but must be acknowledged as nothing other than the 
finite, embodied person in her primordial bond with the lifeworld, which includes both 
life and death drives.  In proceeding to elucidate some of the essential structures of this 
newfound transcendental subjectivity, we demonstrated that its ecstatic and intentional 
order of appearing can better account for the essential role of both the objectifying and 
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non-objectifying drives in the constitution of the world.  We showed that every non-ob-
jectifying drive gives onto, and is thereby united with, an objectifying drive as a higher-
order realisation of the former.  In so doing, we were able to avoid Henry’s problematic 
bifurcation of the two modes of appearing.  Furthermore, by not only drawing on, but 
also critically modifying and extending, the later work of Husserl, Henry and other con-
temporary thinkers, we were able to show that the non-objectifying drives are still able 
to guide the subject’s low-level perceptual acts, and to provide her with the full presence 
of things, while acknowledging that these non-objectifying drives do not unilaterally 
found the objectifying acts of consciousness.  Our study revealed that while the non-ob-
jectifying drives enjoy an absolute priority over objectifying acts in terms of their tran-
scendental genesis, nevertheless, the latter can give rise to the former.  All in all, this 
provides us with a more robust, nuanced understanding of the finite nature of transcen-
dental subjectivity, as well as its essential structures, including the life and death drives, 
and how they function in the constitution of the world.  It enables us to overcome 
Husserl’s relative neglect or downplaying of the role of the non-objectifying drives in 
the constitution of the world, as well as Henry’s utter neglect and dismissal of that of 
intentionality and the objectifying acts of consciousness.     
 In light of these findings, in the sixth and final chapter, we argued that this 
emergent understanding of transcendental subjectivity forces us to conclude that, apart 
from phenomenology, the living subject can also problematise her natural attitude and 
come to know and attest to the hidden art of her soul through other high forms of cul-
ture, such as art, ethics, science and religious philosophy.  Given the essential role of the 
needs and drives of life in determining the course of consciousness, we detailed how the 
natural attitude is founded upon the subject’s felt sense of trust in the world.  In our 
view, the subject problematises and assumes some distance from this attitude by virtue 
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of a type of shock, which is primarily undergone in a positive or negative valence of 
wonder, and in other negative feelings such as boredom.  Therefore, Henry was not 
wrong to suggest that, in contrast to Husserl, the subject can attest to the heart of her 
being in ways of life apart from that of phenomenology.  Yet the foregoing study forces 
us to acknowledge that, in contrast to Henry, these ways of life are intentional in nature; 
that this form of appearing is able to sustain both non-objectifying and objectifying dri-
ves; and that objectifying acts of consciousness play a positive, crucial role in prob-
lematising the natural attitude and in thus enhancing the life of the individual. 
 In drawing out the multiple ways in which the subject can attest to the funda-
ments of her being, this study suggests that, in contrast to Husserl and Henry, phenome-
nology and natural science, though distinct disciplines, are not necessarily incompatible. 
Instead, our work helps reveal that there can be a fruitful dialogue between phenome-
nology, science and other high forms of culture.  At the end of the day, it is not only 
phenomenology that properly understands life.  Other disciplines and methods can also 
be appealed to as ways of coming to understand and further our knowledge of the hid-
den art of the soul.   
 At the beginning of this work, we quoted a statement from Jean-Luc Marion, 
which asserts that Henry’s thought contains within itself ‘a possibility still scarcely 
glimpsed’.   At the time, we wondered whether this might be taken to suggest that Hen1 -
ry’s thought may demonstrate how the absolute foundation of transcendental subjectivi-
ty is given to us absolutely.  We have since seen that both Henry and Husserl are unsuc-
cessful in this regard.  For all that, our study of both has furthered our understanding of 
the nature of transcendental subjectivity as the finite bodily life of the living person in 
 Henry, Phénoménologie de la vie, Tome I, p. 8.1
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her inescapable bond with the lifeworld, and it has enabled us to better understand that 
this life is creative and destructive in nature.   
 Finally, by drawing attention to the multiple ways in which the subject can come 
to know and attest to her essential nature, this work indicates that such ways of life have 
the potential to open the subject onto a community of love and generosity, to a commu-
nal way of life in which each individual is bent on furthering the growth of life in her-
self and others.  Indeed, while our study has drawn attention to certain affective states 
that tend to shake the individual from her dogmatic slumber and rouse her to new 
heights of growth, there may yet be other such states, not to mention other forms of high 
culture — politics, for example  — which we have not been able to dwell upon, but 2
which may serve as fruitful ground for further study, and for further development of this 
community of life. 
 Henry, for one, pursues this matter in his study of Marx.2
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